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This dissertation locates and treats the Early German Romantic project of finding or creating an "organ"
for metaphysics. The Romantics derived their sense of Organ from a spectrum of meanings and
etymological developments of the Greek organon, "instrument." Simultaneously physiological and
metaphysical, what I call Romantic organology was meant to bridge the critical gap between thought and
being, and to provide a transition from the speculative to the political. What resulted was a kind of
technological imagination forming a major moment in modern metaphysics.
The term Organ had conceptual and metaphorical origins in German in the late 18th century--in biology,
but also in the works of Leibniz, Kant, and Herder, it was always present but never semantically fixed.
Indeed, its modern meaning ("functional part of a living being") was established in the German public
sphere only in the 1790s. Aristotelian scholasticism had long described logic a set of tools for philosophy,
an organon. The organon's etymological sibling, the organ, had a primarily physiological heritage ("senseorgan," "internal organ"). Intentionally conflating the medical and logical notions, the Romantics imagined
their literary-philosophical efforts as the construction of an ideal yet concrete tool. This project has until
now been missing from the intellectual historiography of the period (and especially from the important
works of Hans Blumenberg and Michel Foucault).
HÃ¶lderlin, Schelling, and Novalis shared the project of determining what sort of knowledge can count as
metaphysical in a world filled with antinomies created by the political and technological upheavals of the
18th century. A new metaphysics, they reasoned, would need a determinate means, and they exploited the
term Organ's newness and attendant ambiguity to underpin their aesthetic and philosophical pretensions.
HÃ¶lderlin used it to found a metaphysics of tragedy; Schelling to bridge gaps between epistemology,
natural science, and theology; and Novalis to lend weight to his universal encyclopedia. Goethe and Marx,
I argue, both inherited this project indirectly, revising the Romantic project for their own metaphysical and
political programs. Organology is at the basis of a surprising metaphysical legacy of Romanticism, which
the dissertation reconstructs both systematically and contextually.
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ABSTRACT
Metaphysical Organs from Leibniz to Marx
Leif Weatherby
Catriona MacLeod

This dissertation locates and treats the Early German Romantic project of finding
or creating an “organ” for metaphysics. The Romantics derived their sense of Organ from
a spectrum of meanings and etymological developments of the Greek organon,
“instrument.” Simultaneously physiological and metaphysical, what I call Romantic
organology was meant to bridge the critical gap between thought and being, and to
provide a transition from the speculative to the political. What resulted was a kind of
technological imagination forming a major moment in modern metaphysics.
The term Organ had conceptual and metaphorical origins in German in the late
18th century—in biology, but also in the works of Leibniz, Kant, and Herder, it was
always present but never semantically fixed. Indeed, its modern meaning (“functional
part of a living being”) was established in the German public sphere only in the 1790s.
Aristotelian scholasticism had long described logic a set of tools for philosophy, an
organon. The organon’s etymological sibling, the organ, had a primarily physiological
heritage (“sense-organ,” “internal organ”). Intentionally conflating the medical and
logical notions, the Romantics imagined their literary-philosophical efforts as the
construction of an ideal yet concrete tool. This project has until now been missing from
the intellectual historiography of the period (and especially from the important works of
Hans Blumenberg and Michel Foucault).
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Hölderlin, Schelling, and Novalis shared the project of determining what sort of
knowledge can count as metaphysical in a world filled with antinomies created by the
political and technological upheavals of the 18th century. A new metaphysics, they
reasoned, would need a determinate means, and they exploited the term Organ’s newness
and attendant ambiguity to underpin their aesthetic and philosophical pretensions.
Hölderlin used it to found a metaphysics of tragedy; Schelling to bridge gaps between
epistemology, natural science, and theology; and Novalis to lend weight to his universal
encyclopedia. Goethe and Marx, I argue, both inherited this project indirectly, revising
the Romantic project for their own metaphysical and political programs. Organology is at
the basis of a surprising metaphysical legacy of Romanticism, which the dissertation
reconstructs both systematically and contextually.
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Introduction. Romantic Organology and Metaphysical Technology:
Aristotle, Blumenberg, Foucault
Prelude in (and out) of the University

In 1917, Max Weber delivered his address, “Die Wissenschaft als Beruf.”
Speaking to and about die Jugend (in a Munich bookstore in front of the
Freistudentischer Bund), Weber defended a narrow definition of academic discipline that
confined the professor to a carefully circumscribed pedagogical role. While she should
not “teach” life as such, the professor could offer consistency to students’ contemplation
of life-decisions—in short, the professor could require the student to have rationality in
his tool-belt, even if he could not force him to be rational.1 The felt discrepancy between
life and discipline could be not redressed but addressed.
This conclusion came at the end of Weber’s sweeping account of the history of
knowledge in European civilization. The first scientific means of grasping the world was
the concept—Weber’s example is Plato’s cave-allegory. The second world-historical
instrument of that science is the “rational experiment,” which Weber places in the
Renaissance, with particular reference to Bacon’s interventions against the idola of the
concept. The experiment provides the rationalizing force that separates the conceptual
holism of life and science into the “controlled experience” which makes knowledge a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

“Wir können so, wenn wir unsere Sache verstehen (was hier einmal vorausgesetzt werden muß) den
Einzelnen nötigen, oder wenigstens ihm dabei helfen, sich selbst Rechenschaft zu geben über den letzten
Sinns eines eigenen Tuns. Es scheint mir das nicht so sehr wenig zu sein, auch für das rein persönliche
Leben.” (Max Weber, Schriften: 1894-1922, ed. Dirk Kaesler (Stuttgart: Kröner, 2002), p. 505.)
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matter of discipline and the knower a practitioner of a specific field’s experimental logic
(and, in the best case, a consistent pedagogue).
The experiment was “das zweite große Werkzeug wissenschaftlicher Arbeit”2—
and with this metaphor, Weber entered the terminological history that is the object of this
study. Weber’s address defended disciplinarity in the face of attempts by youth
movements such as Expressionism and Dada to present a unified sense of life and
knowledge in both their artistic and social productions. The debate between Heidegger
and Cassirer in Davos in 1929 will have the same contours: “deep life” (which resonated
with the emergent National Socialist movement) versus “symbolic” Wissenschaft.3 And
Husserl would step in, somewhere between Heidegger and Weber, defending Geist while
calling for a careful approach to its re-orientation to the scientific endeavor.4 Weber’s
metaphor—the “tool” of rational science—can help to orient us among these expressions
of anxious modernity. This is because the use of “tool” points to a longer terminological
history intimately tied to the problem of the specific logic of science and the general logic
of life or the spirit. Indeed, to speak, as the tradition continuously did, of an instrument of
Reason, is to invoke, however unintentionally, a quasi-conceptual layer of terminological
history that runs from Aristotle to the present. This study, far from attempting to exhaust
this field, concentrates on a shift in that history in the texts of German Romanticism. This
shift was metaphysical and metaphorical all at once, and presents us with a figure that has
too often gone missing in intellectual histories of modernity: a modern metaphysics
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

Weber, Schriften, p. 491.
See Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Peru, IL: Open Court,
2000), and Peter Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2010).
4
See Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, ed. Elisabeth Ströker (Hamburg:
Meiner, 1996).
3

!

!! 3!
!
rooted in a discourse of Reason’s instruments. That metaphysics was intended to give
speculation and life a central role without stealing the specificity of the (emergent)
disciplinary order’s individual fields of knowledge. And this metaphysics, as we shall
see, also aimed at providing a dynamic transition to a politics of a sort, an attempt to
produce dispositions in complex relation to that metaphysics. Uniting “instruments” and
“Reason,” “metaphysics” and “politics” terminologically meant producing a body of
thought that I shall call technologia transcendentalis or Romantic organology. The story I
will tell is that of the invention (in the rhetorical sense) of new tools of rational
orientation in a world fragmented by disciplinarity and political upheaval. The pressures
of those upheavals, as well as the increasing dependence of the natural sciences on literal
instruments, led to a contemplative engagement with the problem of instrumentality
itself, and this engagement resulted in a body of thought in productive and intentional
tension with the increasing specificity and instrumentality of Wissenschaft. Between
Romantic organology and the present stand many confrontations between these opposing
forces of modernity (not least Weber’s moment itself), and yet I think this study will be
of more than genealogical interest. David Wellbery has written (in another context) that
“[t]o evaluate Enlightenment aesthetics from a contemporary standpoint is not to look for
those still valid truths the aestheticians discovered, but rather to determine those areas of
contemporary thought that continue to operate with eighteenth-century instruments.”5 I
will suggest that providing a terminological history of the term “organ” as tool and sense
in German Romanticism can help us—as it did the Romantics themselves—not only to
understand a part of the history of our conceptual apparatus, but to build upon that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

David Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 239.
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apparatus intentionally, to provide our thinking with an instrument—an organon—of
concrete engagement with historical life. To be sure, the terminological history of the
organ continues in the present, and this study will therefore also serve the genealogical
purpose. But if we are confronted by contemporary political and technological antinomies
in development, then technological thought could contribute a systematic outlook of
enduring relevance.

Romantic Organology: Aristotelian Terminological Problems

Friedrich Schlegel’s version of the Romantic demand for a “new mythology,”
presented as a task for the Jena circle in his Gespräch über die Poesie, calls for poetry to
function as the instrument of an “ideal realism”:!
Auch ich trage schon lange das Ideal eines solchen Realismus in mir, und wenn es bisher
nicht zur Mittheilung gekommen ist, so war es nur, weil ich das Organ noch dazu suche.
Doch weiß ich, daß ichs nur in der Poesie finden kann, denn in Gestalt der Philosophie
oder gar eines Systems wird der Realismus nie wieder auftreten können.6

This philosophy remains, in this text, largely a task, but one with specifications.
Both “ideal” and “real,” the philosophical or rational mythology must present a cohering
organism of sentences and verses, yet not appear in the form of a “system.”7 Thus
Spinoza, whose philosophical style is perhaps as far away from Schlegel’s notion of
Poesie as any, and indeed was understood by contemporaries as purely systematic—of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

Friedrich Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie in: Walter Jaeschke (ed.), Früher Idealismus und
Frühromantik: Der Streit um die Grundlagen der Ästhetik (1795-1805). Quellenband (Hamburg: Meiner,
1995), p 117.
7
The term “system,” as we shall see, is at least as complicated as that other celebrated Romantic term,
“fragment.” Schlegel’s enthusiasm for Spinoza here already points us to that complication. On different
types of “system”-notions, see Paul Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments and
German Idealism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), especially pp. 84 ff., where “holistic
monism” is differentiated from the “derivation monism” of Karl Leonard Reinhold—Kant’s first
popularizer—and those in dialogue with him.
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course, the subtitle of the Ethics does read: more geometrica demonstrata—is
nevertheless the heart of the canon for any would-be poetic genius. Schlegel’s proposal
is, indeed, an impossible task, self-consciously contradictory in historical appeal and
philosophical determination. Worse, its impossibility is meant nevertheless to become
reality by means of a metaphor: an organ.
If we look to Schlegel’s use of the word “organ,” we can see that these
impossibilities and their figurative solution nevertheless house a philosophical conception
I will be calling Romantic organology. The term “organ” is first etymological: the Greek
organon means “instrument” or “tool,” and developed in German (as in English) to mean
“bodily” or “sense” organ.8 The Jena Romantics used the concreteness and functionality
of the medical concept to make an analogy to the normativity and desired concreteness of
a set of ideal or social circumstances.
This terminological conflation produced an impossible term, a logico-aesthetic,
passive yet formal concept: the Romantic organ. “Organ” was meant to unite form with
content, the general with the particular. As such, it was the central term of a new
metaphysics, one open to real development and responsive to the historical conditions of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8

The Greek is in turn derived from an Indo-European root (“uerg”) for work, cause, effect (German
wirken). See Jörg Henning Wolf, Der Begriff “Organ” in der Medizin (Munich: Werner Fritsch, 1971), p.
9. Wolf carefully shows that its modern sense did not emerge until the 18th century—we can already see
that its etymology continued to confuse and fascinate in two editions of Johann Heinrich Campe’s
Wörterbuch zur Erklärung und Verdeutschung der unserer Sprache aufgedrungenen fremden Ausdrücke:
Ein Ergänzungsband zu Adelung’s und Campe’s Wörterbüchern (Braunschweig: Schulbuchhandlung,
1813), pp. 449-50 (cited in Wolf, Der Begriff, p. 14). The entry covers the sense-organ meaning of the
term, going on to its etymological use specifically in language-functions in the body (the “liebliches
Organ” as the voice of the actor or singer), and then uses the term to separate the organic from the
inorganic (the latter definitionally does not have organs). Campe goes on: “In folgender Stelle eines unserer
Schriftsteller: “Dieser Äther ist das Mittel=organ,” könnte Zwischenmittel gesagt werden: Dieser Äther ist
das Zwischenmittel…” In the earlier edition (Braunschweig: Schulbuchhandlung, 1801), p. 498, Campe
had written: “‘Dieser Äther ist das Mittel=organ,’ könnte Wirkmittel dafür gesagt werden: Dieser Äther ist
das Wirkmittel u.s.w.” As we shall see, this terminological/etymological richness is essential to the term’s
creative use. Both the separation of organic from inorganic and the wavering sense of the organ’s
“effectiveness” (wirk-) contribute to the semantic field of Organ around 1800.
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knowledge and political life. The organ thus made ontological innovation in the historical
world a possibility, bringing system and anti-system (Cassirer’s two tendencies of the
Enlightenment9) into an intentionally impossible identity.
The literal organ is both a physical location and a manner of operating, a set of
rules: the location or part of the body performs a function with respect to the whole. By
analogy, the “organ” is a set of rules for thinking and the concrete application of those
ideal rules—the ideal “organ” thus makes thought real and makes thinking efficacious.
The medical concept was intentionally conflated with the philosophical concept of an
organon, the tools for philosophy itself. Organon was the name given in the tradition to
Aristotle’s logical corpus, and important echoes in the Early Modern period were to be
found in Francis Bacon and Johann Lambert—as we shall see.
Since real and ideal, for Schlegel and his compatriots, are meant to be
complements in an admixture of organic, developing reason, the concept “organ”
operates on a continuum of materiality and ideality, and its metaphoric force attains its
value along this continuum. Its distance from the one or the other pole makes it relatively
figurative or literal, but its figurating activity is not primarily or finally at a
(representative) “distance” from those poles. Rather, it is itself an agent of metaphysical
change. The sense in which we mean “organ” as an operator with a determinate range of
effects in a given system both comes from and is here applied to the traditional problems
of metaphysics. As the active principle in a developmental monistic metaphysics, “organ”
is both absolutely general and entirely particular. All possible rules must be real within an
organ of their application, yet the real must be organological as much as the ideal. When
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9

See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, transl. Peter Gay (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979), pp. 3-37.
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we say that a publication is the “organ” of an ideology within party politics, we are only
shifting this specific usage from metaphysics to sociology. But in doing so, we also
deprive it of its organological pretension, the ability of the term (for and in Early German
Romanticism) to undercut dualisms like “metaphoric/literal” and “real/ideal” by
operating as the generator of such necessary antinomies. When we demote organs from
their metaphysical status after organology, we re-metaphorize a term that once served to
open out onto and bind speculation and pragmatics.
That binding served the purpose of achieving metaphysical cognition: the
metaphorical but “real” ability to range over the sliding scale between real and ideal also
is meant to afford us insight into and power over the reasons for our cognition of being
and beings, being in beings.10 Yet the link to the specificity of disciplinary knowledge,
and even to the possibility of ethical action, is also retained. Organology develops an
instrument for the mixing of speculation and observation even as it also crosses the divide
into action, allowing for a systemic (but not deductive) relationship between metaphysics
and politics.
I will be arguing here that this metaphysics, standing in the tradition of those
systems, from Leibniz forward, that think of the scientific and democratic revolutions as
the occasion for a new determination of the “queen of the disciplines” (rather than signs
of its irrelevance), neither necessarily produces regressive social viewpoints nor
determines in advance what sort of an empirical world we live in. My investigation treats
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

Because this insight is into the ground of our knowledge of being, it recognizes what Jacobi calls “das
Sein in allem Dasein,” (F.H. Jacobi, Werke, eds. Klaus Hammacher und Wolfgang Jaeschke (Stuttgart:
Frommann-Holzboog, 1998 ff.) 4/1, p. 87), while maintaining the critical focus on the manner of knowing
that being. It also responds to the imperative that metaphysics should be directly related to problems of
“orientation,” that is, that our knowledge of how things are should be informative of what we do. This
link—preserved from Plato’s Cave to Marx’s Capital—is meant here to become plastic in the name of a
developmental metaphysics.
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the concept of the organ for metaphysical cognition and action as the foundation of an
open system.11
Romantic organology is the figurating center of Romantic metaphysics.12 In
demanding an ideal yet concrete organ, Schlegel was drawing on and innovating in a
terminological history that goes back, as I have briefly indicated above, to Aristotle.
Indeed, both organon (the term used to classify the logical works in the Aristotelian
corpus) and organ are ultimately of Aristotelian descent. The German das Organ (unlike
its English and French—organe—counterparts), did not come to have its present
meaning—“functional part” of a living being: internal or sense organ—until the late 18th
century.13 We can mark out three distinct but interlocking semantic fields of the Greek
organon’s heritage in Aristotle himself, in order then to see what the Romantics were
doing by conflating the modern meanings of organ and organon.
The most general definition14 given to the term reveals the organon as that which
is potential with respect to a field of actuality on which it is concentrated. This technical
definition fits well with the sense of a “tool”: the flint houses a possibility, the reality of
which we call fire. We can note that this example wavers: flint is only an organon when
it is used to make fire. And this is precisely the framework in which Aristotle develops
his term organon. The comparison of nature (physis) to artifice (techne)—artifice is, in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

I thus intentionally exclude some uses of the term that deserve their own studies—for example, the use of
the term to discuss the voice in theatric and especially operatic settings (see note 8 above). I also generally
leave out the sense given to periodicals and newspapers as the “organs” of certain governing bodies, etc.
12
I engage in more detailed arguments below about whether the Romantics had a metaphysics below. For
the moment, I refer the reader to Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism,
1781-1801 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), esp. pp. 349-465. This depiction of “romantic” or
“absolute” idealism has received a more compact treatment from him in his The Romantic Imperative: The
Concept of Early German Romanticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 131-53.
13
Jörg Henning Wolf, Der Begriff "Organ" in der Medizin (Munich: Werner Fritsch, 1971), esp. pp. 38-44.
14
Wolf maintains, Der Begriff, pp. 17-18, that Aristotle never gives a definition of organon, although he
often defines meros/morion, “part” (without the functional sense of the former term). But Aristotle uses the
same conception of the term across a number of metaphorical applications, and thus provides us with
something like a working or base definition. The De partibus animalium is, of course, peri zoion morion.
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his terms, an “imitation of nature” or mimesis—provides the conceptual background on
which to develop the notion of function, both for nature’s teloi and for human uses:
Pos de pote hekaston gignetai, enteuthen dei labeiv, archen poiesamenous protow men
hoti hosa phusei gignetai e technei, hup’ energeia ontos ginetai ek tou dunamei toioutou.
Whatever is formed either by Nature or my human Art, say X, is formed by something
which is X in actuality out of something which is X potentially.15

This analogy—which is sometimes called “technomorphism” or the “techne-physis
analogy”16—allows for the passage, whether natural or technological, from potential to
actual. And it does this by means of the organon—indeed, this is the latter’s most
fundamental meaning. The “organ,” we can say, is that functional part—in any order,
natural or human—which is so organized as to bring about a specific effect within a field
of possibility its own specificity circumscribes. Human purposes mimic—indeed, are a
mimesis of—cosmological teloi, and the concrete actualization-apparatus is called, in
both cases, organon.
The concreteness of this functional part does not pre-determine it to physical
existence (except in the sense of physis which corresponds to “nature”). So, in a first—
and determinative—metaphorical application of the term, Aristotle defines the senses as
the “instruments of perception.”17 The “sensor” (aistheterion) is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15

Aristotle, Generation of Animals, trans. A.L. Peck, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942/2000).
Cited as: GA (734b22–23).
16
Wolf collects Aristotle’s uses of this analogy, Der Begriff, pp. 16 ff. Because Aristotle develops the
concept in parallel to a notion of common structures (like cells) and “differing” structures (anhomoiomere)
in animals, Wolf, Der Begriff, p. 16, is able to show both his use of the concept of the organ and his nonapplication of the term to the concept. Nevertheless, organon is used precisely where the anhomoiomere
take on functional or “practical” characteristics: “Wie sich vermuten läßt, ist dies die Einbruchstelle für den
Gedanken einer Analogie zwischen dem zweckgerichteten Naturvorgang einerseits und dem immanent und
einheitlich zielgerichteten Naturvorgang anderseits [sic]. Mit anderen Worten: Das Feld dieser Analogie ist
der geistige Ort, wo sich der neue Sinn von organon entfaltet und der Begriff eines organon der Natur
herauskristallisiert. Die Teleologie als vorherrschende Anschauungsform für die Naturvorgänge schlechthin
ist es, von der die Analyse des bei Aristoteles geprägten organon-Begriffs auszugehen hat.”

!!

17

The phrase is not used, but the definition is. The metaphorical use obviously gave way to a literal one in
the modern sense, but we can still observe the metaphor’s predominance in the 18th century, from
physiological to aesthetic treatises. Albrecht von Haller, in the author-overseen 1770 translation of his
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Hoste to poiouv hoion auto energiai, toioutovn ekeino poiei dunamei on.
That part which is potentially such as its object is actually.18

The concrete sense-“organ” (we can say, with terminological anachronism) is an
organon, a functional part covering a field of potentiality—in this example, the tactile—
and making perception possible through the characteristic transfer from possible to
actual. Epistemologically, the point is that the senses cannot transfer the material they
interact with to the mind, but instead only the formal elements of that field. We do not get
an eyeful of wood when we look at a tree, but a representation of that tree. Aristotle
continues:
Katholou de peri pases aistheseos die labein hoti he men aisthesis esti to dektikon ton
aisthetow eidown aneu tes hules, hoion ho keros tou daktuliou aneu tou siderou kai tou
chrusou dechetai to semeion, lambanei de to chrusouv e to chalkouv semeion, all’ ouch
hei chrusos e chalkos... aistheterion de proton en joi he toiaute dunamis.
By a “sense” is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of
things without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which
a piece of wax takes on the impress of signet-rign without the iron or gold... but it is
indifferent what in each case the substance is; what alone matters is what quality it has,
i.e. in what ratio its constituents are combined... By an aestherion is meant that in which
ultimately such a power is seated.19
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physiology textbook, Umriss der Geschäfte des körperlichen Lebens (Berlin: Haude und Spener, 1770), p.
224: “Wir wollen also die Sinnen zuerst stückweis durchgehen, hernach dasjenige betrachten, was ihnen
allen gemein ist, und was in der Seele auf die Veränderungen der Werkzeuge der Empfindungen folget.”
The orginal, however, reads mutationes sensorium (translating aistheterion). (Primae Lineae Physiologiae
(Göttingen: van Rossum 1758), p. 158; my emphases.) Johann Jakob Breitinger writes that “Die Natur hat
dem Menschen ein allgemeineres und vor seine Natur bequemeres Ergetzen zugedacht, dessen Genuß ihm
nicht so schwer ankommen sollte, aus dieser Ursache hat sie ihn mit den Sinnen, als mit Werckzeugen
begabet, mittelst deren die Schönheiten der Natur sich ihm durch einen blossen Eindruck ohne seine Mühe
offenbareten…” Johann Jakob Bodmer, Johann Jakob Breitinger, Schriften zur Literatur, Volker Meid, ed.
(Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam 1980), p. 102. And again: “Wie enge würde demnach unsere Erkäntniß
eingeschrancket seyn, wenn wir keine andere haben könten; als durch die Instrumente der Sinnen, welche
uns allein Begriffe von solchen Dingen geben, die wircklich vor uns zugegen sind?” “Von dem Einfluß und
Gebrauche der Einbildungs-Kraft” (1727), Bodmer/Breitinger, p. 31. And again, in Winckelmann:
(Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band (Berlin/Weimar: Aufbau, 1969), p. 144, after Robert Jütte,
Geschichte der Sinne, p. 164: “Das Werkzeug dieser Empfindung ist der üaßere Sinn und der Sitz derselben
der innere; jener muß richtig und dieser empfindlich und fein sein...” A wealth of other references can be
found in Ludger Schwarte, “The Birth of Aesthetics form the Spirit of Experimentalism,”
http://proceedings.eurosa.org/1/schwarte.pdf.
18
Aristotle, On the Soul/Parva Naturalia/On Breath, transl. W. S. Hett (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1935). Present translation from J.A. Smith, in ed. McKeon, Basic Works. Cited as: De anima 424a.
19
De anima 424a-b; translation modified: aestheterion, which is translated as “organ of sense,” which is
correct according to contemporary usage, but insufficient for terminological-historical purposes.
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The aestheterion is thus a dynamic formation in the natural world, and its position in the
passage from potential to actual in representation singles it out—once it gains its
metaphorical usage as “sense-organ”—as a concrete version of the definitional problem
presented by the term organon itself. To speak of the “instruments of perception,” as
authors of the 18th century so often did, was to invoke the very problem of the connection
of mind and body, and in turn, the ontological problem of the structure of the universe.
As the techne-physis analogy came into doubt with the crisis in metaphysics (and the end
of the Aristotelian “schools”) at the end of the 17th century, the term “organ” was released
into a metaphorical field where it eventually found its literal home in medicine. But there
were some detours along the way.
Although it was not Aristotle himself who gave the name organon to the logical
part of his works,20 it is possible to see, in a third semantic field opened up for the term by
the Philosopher, an overlap between the logical organon and the cosmological organon.
As we shall see below (Chapter I), the problem of an organon for metaphysics in
particular would exercise the young Kant. He rejected what he saw as the rationalists’
continued adherence to a key Aristotelian dogma—that judgments could be
unproblematically formal and material at the same time, that they could refer without
further consideration to the world. He connected the problem of the instruments of
perception to the grander problem of logic itself. Aristotle’s own repetition of the
categories in the organon’s treatise of that name—The Categories—and in the
Metaphysics (albeit in different form) was the paradigmatic error of this kind. And yet, it
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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A thorough compendium of works that use some version of this terminology to describe various parts of
the arts curriculum in the early modern period can be found in Gorgio Tonelli, Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic: A Commentary on its History, ed. David H. Chandler (New
York: Olms 1994), pp. 133-58.
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was an error that Aristotle had commented on even while committing it. The generality of
knowing and the specificity of the known—and the means of knowing—had been treated
in the De anima.
Amongst the views of his predecessors which come up for consideration and
rejection in the De Anima, Aristotle singles out Anaxagoras’s assertion that mind (nous)
must be completely distinct from that which it cognizes, its material. The Philosopher
affirms this point alone among the earlier views: the mind must be pure “in order, as
Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know.”21 For Aristotle, the mind is in fact not
real until it knows: cognition is the actualization (passage from potential) of nous itself.
He concludes:
ananke ara, epei panta noei, amige einai, hosper phesin Anaxagoras, hina krate, touto d’
estin hina gnorizei: paremphainomenon gar koluei to allotrion kai antiphrattei, hoste
med’ autou einai phusin medemian all’ e tauten, hoti dunatov. Ho ara kaloumenos tes
psyches mous (lego de noun hoi danoeitai kai hupolambanei he psyche) ouden estin
energeiai town onton prin noein. Dio oude memichthai eulogon auton toi somati: poios
tis gar an vivnoito, psuchros e thermos, e kan organon ti eie, hosper toi aesthetikoi; nun
d’ outhen estin.
Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras
says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence
of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the
sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity.
Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks
and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot
reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality,
e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an tool like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none.22

Nous must be general, or its goal of general and certain knowledge cannot be secured.
Any “admixture” of specificity cannot be nous but that on which nous works. And so
there can be no organ of reason, no circumscribed field of application of the mind. It must
operate definitionally the way that the organon does—passing from potential to actual,
and causing this passage—but it cannot be merely a tool. The paradox is given most
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De Anima 429a/19.
De anima 429a; translation modified from “organ” to “tool.”!

!!13!
!
succinctly at De anima 431b: “In every case the mind which is actively thinking is the
objects which it thinks.” [holos de ho nous estin ho kat’ energeian ta pragmata noon.]
The mind must have the organological function—it must perform the teleological
“fitting” of things to representations. And yet it cannot be specific, since its field of
function is purely general. This anticipates the problem of an organon for metaphysics in
the 18th century, a problem that could only arise when this epistemological passage from
potential to actual was no longer hidden within the technomorphic image of the cosmos.
As long as the mind was that analogy to nature’s purposes, its security rested in its
imitation of nature. It could not have23 or be an instrument, but its analogical resonance,
even for these impossible areas, was clear. Thus Aristotle sums up his use of organon
across all three problems with:
hoste he psyche hosper he cheir estiv: kai gar he cheir organon estiv organon, kai ho
nous eidos eidon kai he aisthesis eidos aestheton.
It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the
mind is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.24

The hand—as we shall see later in the present study (Chapter 5), a key figure in
organology—characterizes the human as producer. His means are organa, and his hand is
the condition of their use. This gesture towards a transcendental technology is then made
analogous not only to the instruments of perception and their formal uptake of sensible
things, but also to the mind: nous is almost an organ in the Romantic sense, a truly
transcendental tool for the grasping of all things.25 From animal-generation to
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Analogically—and determinatively for the tradition—the body was the soul’s organon. So De anima
415b/18: “All natural bodies are organs of the soul.” [panta gar ta phusika somata tes psuches organa.]
Wolf mentions this topos at Der Begriff, p. 20. Again, the analogy is allowed because it rests on the
conceptual background of the techne-physis comparison. And the definition is retained: the form (morphe)
must be actualized in matter (hule) by some means.
24
De anima 432a.!
25
This reading differs somewhat from that presented by Reinhard Löw, Philosophie des Lebendigen: Der
Begriff des Organischen bei Kant, sein Grund und seine Aktualität (Frankfurt/Main.: Suhrkamp, 1980).
Löw suggests that Aristotle’s method is based in the organ as the unit of bodily-intellectual experience, and
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metaphysical methodology, Aristotle laid the groundwork for the palette of problems the
Romantics inherited. And yet, in order for them to do so, Aristotelianism would first have
to perish on the emergent world-picture of the experimental natural sciences.
Organology sought precisely the means of actualization of cognition that Aristotle
rejected. Following the late-17th century crisis in Aristotelianism, the dominance of
Leibnizian metaphysics in Germany from the 1720s to at least the 1760s, and Kant’s
critique of all previous metaphysics, the Romantics sought to re-found the discipline,
using the concept “organ” to move from rationalist metaphysics to organicist rationalist
metaphysics. As we shall see, this move entailed rejecting a narrowly defined
representationalism about thought. Aristotle’s problem is binding so long as we remain in
that model: cognition itself must be constituted as too general to have any particularizing
means determining its object, as each sense does. Without relinquishing the notion of
representation (Vorstellung) at large, the Romantics looked to the activity of cognition in
general, and the result of this search was a model that included efficacy and development
as features of thought. Organology was a “realism” in Schlegel’s sense: a metaphorically
grounded metaphysics bordering directly on both politics and history, derived from old
problems and confronting a new world.
Hölderlin wrote the Romantic organ into the literary-historical record, borrowing
the term from the physiologist Samuel Thomas Soemmerring and applying it across his
readings of Kant and Fichte to genre-theory. The tragedy became an organ of cognition in
his work, the organ’s concreteness used to denote both non-absolute knowledge and its
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that therefore the identity of the known and knowledge is organ-based. The suggestion of an instrument of
knowledge in this sense is tied to the possession of organs (see pp. 50-52). Even if this were true for
Aristotle, he would still be confronted with the problem I am pointing to through his terminology here. His
use of this terminology in these differing contexts seems to point to a grasp of the problem, if not a
solution. !
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relation to a putative absolute knowledge presented in the tragic form itself. Empedocles,
whose self-proclaimed apotheosis as nature’s god led to his political ostracism and
eventual suicide by volcano, was the figure of that cognitive tension. The narrative of his
death presents us with a devolution into the aorgic—Hölderin’s term for the unorganized, which corresponds to “intellectual intuition” or cognition of the absolute. Yet
when read against the genre-theoretical writings, the tragedy itself becomes the figure of
non-absolute knowledge: the organ. The contradictory notion of an organ of intellectual
intuition—a concrete cognition of the absolute—thus comes to light between philosophy
and literature, in genre-theory. The organ perches lightly between its general,
philosophical sense and its actuality as tragic writing.
The ubiquitous claim that aestheticization was Hölderlin’s primary move—and
that of the Romantic movement at large, especially in Jena—can here be refined.
Literature was instrumentalized, but not in the senses given to us by the Enlightenment or
its photo-negative in Critical Theory. Instead, the reality of literature was claimed—as
Novalis put it, die Poesie ist das ächt absolute Reelle—with a subtle etymology of the
“instrument” itself. This did not only aestheticize reality—it also made the literary real,
ontologically relevant, concrete. Take the famous statement by Schelling of the primacy
of the aesthetic:
Wenn die ästhetische Anschauung nur die objektiv gewordene transzendentale ist, so
versteht sich von selbst, daß die Kunst das einzige wahre und ewige Organon zugleich
und Dokument der Philosophie sei, welches immer und fortwährend aufs neue
beurkundet, was die Philosophie äußerlich nicht darstellen kann, nämlich das Bewußtlose
im Handeln und Produzieren und seine ursprüngliche Identität mit dem Bewußten.26

There is no doubt that this statement runs counter to the Kantian division of
judgmental cognition into intuition and concept, and thus no doubt that epistemology
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F.J.W. Schelling, Werke. Band 2 (System des transzendentalen Idealismus), ed. Otto Weiß (Leipzig:
Eckhardt 1907), pp. 301-2.
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finds a significant aid in the aesthetic. But Schelling’s statement—which perhaps most
clearly represents his break with Fichte, who thought that intellectual intuition must
remain entirely unconscious—also suggests that there is a source for truly metaphysical
cognition which we already possess. Because that possession is both cognitive and
“unconscious” (which is identified with the “object” by Schelling), its source—its
organon—suggests the possibility of an intervention in the “deed” or production of
cognition. This possibility was adumbrated in the methodologically uncertain drafts of
the Naturphilosophie in the 1790s, and then first suggested in System des
transcendentalen Idealismus in 1800. There, the “organ” of philosophy was a selfintuiting I, and the organon of that philosophy was the experience of art in “aesthetic
intuition.” The productive capacity of the latter was the “poetry of the world,” a world
which fit imperfectly with the greater world it might mimetically reproduce. The organ
became the point where metaphysics not only exists but gives way to a politics, or to a
metapolitics where the absolute and the historical meet in the social, in what I term a
“Romantic metaphysics of morals.” The revision of the role of aesthetics had the
consequence of in turn revising metaphysical and political theory, not merely
“aestheticizing” them.
Take, for example, the following passage from Novalis’s Notes Towards a
Romantic Encyclopedia (das allgemeine Brouillon):
Höhere Physik, oder höhere Mathematik oder ein Gemisch von beyden wurde immer
unter Phil[osophie] bisher verstanden. Man suchte durch Phil[osophie] immer etwas
werckstellig zu machen – man suchte ein allvermögendes Organ in der Phil[osophie].27

The task assigned to the organ makes clear that both the Aristotelian sense of a
logical instrument and the medical sense of a concrete function are in play. Novalis
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comments on the history of philosophy’s search for general knowledge (metaphysics)
even as he insists in his own construction on the practical focus of philosophy itself.
Indeed, we can see his text replacing the notion of an intellectual faculty—Kant’s
Vermögen (but see Chapter I of my study for Kant’s rejection of precisely an
“allvermögendes Organ”)—with that of an organ.
Novalis describes his unfortunately-named doctrine of “magical idealism” in
nearly identical terms:
Der thätige Gebrauch der Organe ist nichts, als magisches, wunderthätiges Denken, oder
willkührlicher Gebrauch der Körperwelt—denn Willen ist nichts, als magisches, kräftiges
Denkvermög[en].28

Joining the chorus of critical continuation of the Kantian and Fichtean projects, Novalis
wrote the most robust version of organology. By including a real contradiction in the
literalized neologism “organ,” he universalized the possibility of principled but effective
intervention into both nature and history. His Notes Towards a Romantic Encyclopedia
sketch the enormity of organology’s task. So far from the irrational optimism sometimes
caricaturized as Romantic attempts to idealize the natural and historical objects around
them, the task Novalis sets himself is the unification of the speculative and the literally
disciplinary. Fachwissen is put into dialogue with the consideration of being itself, and of
cognition’s relation to will. It is precisely this relation that Kant had attacked in 1798 in
Der Streit der Facultäten—a writing that attempted to bridge this gap was, for Kant, an
organon where a canon was needed (more on this shortly). Novalis agreed, but saw every
reason to create that tool. His eventual doctrine was based in a cosmology that constituted
the universe as lacking or possessing a necessary hole. That doctrine was filled in by a
revision of Kantian Criticism that made faculties into historical organs, and sought the
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active transformation of everything into organs and organs in turn into the vehicles of a
better world. The transition to moral and political organs is clearest in Novalis, and
makes his version of the doctrine the most complete.
Thus “organ” was made literary—or more strictly, genre-theoretical—in
Hölderlin; metaphysical and moral in Schelling; and universal but also concrete in
Novalis. Organology introduced the encounter of the absolute and the historical, and it
held on that basis the possibility of systemic intervention in history in reserve. Reason’s
transition to the absolute—and back—was meant to have a means. The philosophical
discourse of metaphysical means around 1800 was rooted in the etymological field of the
organ(on).
I locate the aftermath of organology in an oblique dialogue between Goethe and
Hegel in the 1820s. Goethe had witnessed the rise of the term organ—and indeed had
contributed to it—but only came to test its etymological capacities after Hegel had
accused him of operating without means in science. Goethe combined the classificatory
drive of his classicism with the idealism he had gathered over decades in Weimar and
Jena to produce a late response to the Romantics, a revised organology. He thought, on
my reconstruction, that science itself should cut a middle path between the emergent
positivism of Paris and the waning Naturphilosophie of Schellingian and Hegelian
stripes. The social task of science would be to impress norms upon the world, to alter its
constitution categorically but tenderly. This program reflects Goethe’s long struggle to
come to terms with the political upheavals of his time.
The other reception of organology was among the Young Hegelians, whose
characteristic attempts to join system and history were anticipated in Romantic

!

!!19!
!
organology. This study concludes with a consideration of Marx’s use of the term organ,
especially in the 1844 Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte and in chapter 13 of Das
Kapital, as reflecting the other half of the dialectic: the principled attempt to intervene in
history on the basis of a construal of its laws. The Romantics were by and large already
political radicals, but that radicality was ambivalent—it could pass just as easily into the
reactionary as into the utopian. The Young Hegelians tied radicality to social
progressivism—to socialism—but still needed theoretical means for their interventions.
Marx’ thought about means, then, became a determinative moment—the founding of a
discourse—for the passage of the problems of Romantic organology into the next
centuries. It is my conviction that Romantic organology opens up a way of reading Marx’
texts both rhetorically and politically. This is because the organ among the Romantics
was supposed to bridge the gap between Critical knowledge—the means of knowing—
and action. Marx’ reception of the term was a locus of that consideration in his own
writing—the moment where materialism confronts and includes its other in abstraction,
and where analysis is called upon to submerge itself in the real.

Metaphor and Metaphysics: Blumenberg’s Metaphorical Organ

This study operates in the straits between philology and conceptuality, looking to
relate moments of textual connection to systematic problems in philosophy, aesthetics,
and the natural sciences. This method is demanded by the material: the term organ—as I
have already shown—gathers these systems into a dynamic meaning, and, among the
Romantics, is then put to use to create what I shall term a technologia transcendentalis or
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organology, a sort of ideal or metaphysical technology. Rather than making the argument
of the study here, however, I want to point to the intertwining of methodology and
polemics in the historiography of um 1800 to make clear the stakes of my intervention.
The period around 1800 is a sort of historiographical watershed. Cultural and
intellectual histories from this period suffer from a justified tendency to claim that we
still live in the paradigms founded around the turn of the 19th century.29 Some version of
this claim, the literature insists, must be true. I have already pointed to ways in which this
study will be more—or less—than antiquarian, but I do not think that any version of this
claim needs to be defended for work in the period to be relevant. And yet it is not
incidental that the literature treating um 1800 thus mixes polemics and science,30 for the
simple reason the struggle to come to terms with the legacy of um 1800 was already
present in the culture of the period. The metaphysical and political crises of the 18th
century gave rise to a second-generational difficulty, that of the “completion of” or
“rebellion against” what had come before. In this sense, these studies merely recognize
that we, too, stand in the wake of something vague called “modernity” or
“Enlightenment.” Empathy for the Romantics aside, we need more than a Nachahmung
der Romantik, and by situating their metaphysics between word-usage and conceptual
and disciplinary systems, I hope to provide a sympathetic but future-oriented reading of
Romantic organology. The project is therefore restitutive: I want to recuperate this
Romantic project neither because we still live with it nor because it can redeem the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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So—in vastly different veins, each with its own brand of compelling sophistication—Reinhardt
Koselleck, Kritik und Krise: eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt (Frankfurt/Main:
Suhrkamp, 1973); Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of
Literature in German Romanticism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); Alan Liu, Local Transcendence: Essays
on Postmodern Historicism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), to give only a sampling.
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Pace Panajotis Kondylis, Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus (Hamburg:
Meiner, 2002).!!
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present, but because it makes an important dialogue-partner for presentist metaphysical
and political concerns.
Hans Blumenberg’s notion that we might approach intellectual and textual history
metaphorologically both demonstrates the intertwining of method and polemic and comes
closest to my approach here. And yet, I will offer an alternative to his account—and to
Michel Foucault’s—because the historical picture seems to me in both cases incomplete.
The emergence of modern antinomies—as real, discursively but also pragmatically
contradictory powers—like those between the “visible” and the “invisible” or the
“metaphorical” and the “metaphysical,” was already a part of the reflexive legacy of
Romanticism as it emerged. Its answer to some of these antinomies was contained in its
organology, as we shall see.
Blumenberg’s “metaphorology” amounts to the tracking of subterranean shifts in
conceptuality, the functionalization of conceptual unities for differing human purposes
over time.31 It is based on Blumenberg’s overall sense of European intellectual history,
which centers on a putative major turn with the destruction of Aristotelian ontology. The
broadly-painted Aristotelian world-view holds that Being is complete, and that, therefore,
all human making is of the order of imitation.32 Not restricted to aesthetics, this
distinction is meant to apply all the way down—indeed, the first innovations with respect
to it are noted by Blumenberg in the works of Nicholas of Cusa, and are references to
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The treatment of “absolute” metaphors—metaphors resistant to dissolution into their conceptual
counterparts is found in Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie (Frankfurt/Main:
Suhrkamp, 1998). Here we read that “der historische Wandel einer Metapher bringt die Metakinetik
geschichtlicher Sinnhorizonte und Sichtweisen selbst zum Vorschein, innerhalb deren Begriffe ihre
Modifikationen erfahren… die Metaphorologie such an die Substruktur des Denkens heranzukommen, an
den Untergrund, die Nährlösung der systematischen Kristallisationen…” (p. 13).
32
See especially “Nachahmung der Natur: Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des “schöpferischen Menschen” in:
Hans Blumenberg, Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben. Aufsätze und eine Rede (Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam,
1981), pp. 55-103. The thesis is to be found in many of Blumenberg’s works, including his magnum opus,
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999/1983).
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craftsmen, not to “artists.” As this ordering system came to an end, according to
Blumenberg, the emergence of the theoretically creative human became possible: the
possibility of the radically new came into view.33 The end of the techne-physis analogy
meant the possibility of ontological innovation, but this innovation was unmoored from
the dock of Being, and nested ultimately in antinomical orientation. With the end of
Aristotle’s order of being, the metaphor itself could emerge.
Blumenberg himself is a practitioner of this metaphorization. In Shipwreck with
Spectator, Blumenberg returned to Husserl, expanding the metaphor’s range to include
and interaction with the Lebenswelt, understood as das Universum der
Selbstverständlichkeit.34 He writes:
To adopt Husserl’s terminology, metaphor is, first of all, “resistance to harmony.” This
would be fatal for the consciousness whose existence depends on its concern for identity;
it must be the constantly successful organ of self-restitution.35

This line of thinking was developed in notes posthumously published as Zu den Sachen
und zurück.36 Blumenberg is concerned to identify the “analyst” in both phenomenology
and psychoanalysis, and to develop some point of resistance that these schools find in
their attempts—practical and theoretical—to determine the nature of consciousness.
Collecting his luminaries—Kant, Cassirer, and Husserl—Blumenberg starts from the
notion that consciousness is both “selbstkonstitutiv und selbstrestitutiv.”37 In its selfconstitution, consciousness opens its own contents to itself. Blumenberg notes that Kant
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Blumenberg locates this emergence in the Literaturstreit with Breitinger and Bodmer. Bodmer saw
Milton as producing a “world” through a “metaphysische Handlung.” See Blumenberg, “Nachahmung der
Natur,” p. 91.
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Blumenberg’s major treatment of this topic is: Lebenszeit und Weltzeit (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
1986).
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Hans Blumenberg, Shipwreck with Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence, trans. Stephen
Rendall (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 83.
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Hans Blumenberg, Zu den Sachen und zurück, ed. Manfred Sommer (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2002).
The essay cited is called “Der Phänomenologe kann sich nur selbst berichtigen,” pp. 19-43.
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Blumenberg, Zu den Sachen, p. 19.
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had already established this when he tied the table of categories (synthetic unityproducing forms of judgment) to the table of judgments (logical—mind-given—
possibilities of that judgment). This makes—for all involved—consciousness genetically
available to itself. Blumenberg strenuously objects to a possible charge of “idealism”
here, since consciousness is taken by none of these figures to be an ontological
parthenogenesis. It merely gives itself form. Phenomenology makes experience the
source of this form instead of its product, and thus establishes a “world” in which selfcorrection, -repair, or –restitution is possible. This world is characterized by the
dynamics of remembrance, formation, and reference to other humans and other things—
all in the tension between Anschauung and judgment. What, then, is consciousness?
Das Bewußtsein ist ein zweckmäßiges “Organ” im Hinblick auf die wesentliche Typik
seiner Inhalte, die—wenn sie es nicht schon sind—als “Gegenstände” das volle Maß ihrer
Selbstdarbietung ausschöpfen.38

Resistance to the “impurities” of the empirical ego (Kant) or the psychological approach
to philosophy (Husserl) or transference (Freud) is necessarily performed by
consciousness. Consciousness is an instrument of that resistance, and it forms and repairs
itself with that goal. Its objects appear in organological form—this is transcendental “I,”
intentionality, and Freudian ego in one. Without hypostasizing itself, it serves the
function of preservation—constitution and restitution—as bulwark against the
interruptions proper to its dynamic openness. It is the “organ” of that very preservation.39
The approach taken by Blumenberg’s treated authors—and by Blumenberg—is not
“idealistic,” but rather insists that consciousness itself idealizes life:
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Als sein letztes Produkt und “Organ” treibt es elementare Lebensleistungen auf die
Spitze, zur Reindarstellung, “übertreibt” sie im auszuhaltenden Doppelsinn dieses
Wortes. Insofern ist das Urteil… reine “Übertreibung…”40

Blumenberg here integrates transcendental philosophy—of Kantian and Husserlian
stripes—with Freud’s metapsychological dynamism. The permanent frustration of the
transcendental philosopher, his openness to the empiria without an explanation for that
openness, is made the content of transcendental consciousness itself. Construed as a
legitimate problem, this duality only resolves, and then tentatively, for Blumenberg with
the notion of intermittence.41 Blumenberg contributes to our terminological history even
as he provides some orientation in the stakes of doing terminological history.
Blumenberg’s overall history is not only methodological, but narrates an
emergent domain of the metaphor, placing the end of metaphysics and the critical
emergence of the autonomous metaphor in the 18th century: “Metaphysik erwies sich uns
oft al beim Wort genommene Metaphorik; der Schwund der Metaphysik ruft die
Metaphorik wieder an ihren Platz.”42 This is to say (correctly) that conceptual
determinations (indeed, conceptual determinations of being itself) lie at the basis of
metaphysics, and that doubt about that determination dominated 18th-century philosophy,
culminating in Kant’s critical position.
His own use of “organ,” however, rejects the critical legacy of metaphysics in
dialogue with metaphorology, a key trait of Romantic organology. Where his organ
reifies the Aristotelian problems noted above, the Romantic counterpart was supposed to
engage those problems directly. Indeed, while Blumenberg’s opening of phenomenology
to psychology—without being psychologistic—shares the practical and concrete
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orientation of Romantic organology, the absence of this chapter in his historical itinerary
allows his methodological contribution to maintain the antinomy metaphor/metaphysics
uncritically.
I maintain that the loosening of the completeness of Being and the end of the
techne-physis analogy also gave way to a new metaphysics—that of the organ, a
“technological” metaphysics paradigmatic of modern concerns with the point at which
speculation and politics, theory and praxis, can communicate. Romantic organology, as I
will show, reveals an alternative to Blumenberg’s narrative: the relation between
metaphor and concept was indeed re-evaluated after Kant, but not to the final detriment
of the concept—rather to its instrumentalization, quite literally. The orientation provided
by metaphorology is indispensible, but Romantic metaphysics already includes a kind of
metaphorological awareness. Blumenberg’s “organ of consciousness” is a metaphor for
an all-too-real metaphysics. His concept is suspended between methodology and
historiography, and we need a fuller sense of that history.
A last note on Blumenberg: his notion of a Geistesgeschichte der Technik43
provides a key intervention in the debate about technological thinking at the end of
technomorphism. This late suggestion returns to earlier engagements with the late
Husserl,44 whose attempt to “re-start” within Reason a line of metaphysical thinking free
of the conflation of method and being45 proves essential for this new history. Blumenberg
writes of twin dead-ends for the intellectual history of technology, one “chronicling”
events (but ignoring the circumstances which gave rise to them), and another (Marxian)
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explaining those circumstances, but powerless to connect them to the dispositions to
which they putatively gave rise. The alternative, which draws on both Husserl and
Heidegger46 but seeks to re-fashion their “new starts” into responsible historiography,
requires that
Geschichte der Technik wird auch und vor allem die Geschichte des Heraustretens der
Technik aus der Geschichte sein müssen. Ob und wie aus einem bestimmten neuen
Verständnis der Wirklichkeit und der Stellung des Menschen innerhalb dieser
Wirklichkeit technischer Wille entsteht, wird Thema einer Geistesgeschichte der Technik
sein müssen, die nicht nur Selbstdeutungen der technischen Tätigkeit und Urheberschaft
sammelt und registriert, sondern die Motivationen eines auf Technik zielenden und von
Technik getragenen Lebensstils faßbar werden läßt.47

This study will similarly ask how a technological imagination48 stepped out of history,
and how it asked concretely what technology in the broadest sense had to offer
speculation. If metaphysical and metaphorical thought combined could respond
concretely to the “technical will” of European modernity, it will have been in Romantic
organology.

Who’s Afraid of Representation? Foucault’s Transcendental-Empirical Organs

If metaphor and metaphysics share a home in Romantic organology, and if this
home is in critical dialogue with especially the cultural effects of technologization, then
the story about Romanticism’s relationship to representation will have to be revised.
Michel’s Foucault’s engagement with both of these themes has proven determinative for
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47
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the field. Indeed, he characterizes his investigation of the “microphysics of power” in just
these terms:
Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it
as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body… The soul is
the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.49

In searching for the roots of “technologies” of power, Foucault introduced the
technological problematic into historiography. Discursive and—as he came to call
them—disciplinary means were investigated in their very genesis. And yet, this project
had arisen from an earlier one, that of an intellectual history of the disciplines themselves.
The Order of Things studies this problematic precisely in terms of representation. The
breakdown of the mode of knowledge-production (episteme) called “classical”—the early
Enlightenment, characterized by mathesis universalis, or the spatialization of beings in a
transparently classifying order—entailed a crisis of representation. Representation, a
sufficient instrument for analysis in the Classical episteme, was de-stabilized around
1800. This took place in three parallel forms, each providing a principle for an emergent
science. The principle was withdrawn into the order of the invisible, but organized the
visible itself. Thus: “labor” in economics; “organic structure” in the life sciences; and
“inflection” in linguistics. These principles were “alien” to the parts of the domains
(representations) which they organized.50 The emergence of intellectual disciplines was
based on the withdrawal of their object of investigation from the representative order—
organic structure can be investigated, but life is no longer a subset of being, but instead
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an isolated ontological area, forming the unrepresented basis of a new discipline:
biology.51
Foucault interprets Kantian criticism as paradigmatic for this move. Kant invented
the “transcendental field,” dividing it from the “empirical”—Foucault refers to this as the
transcendental-empirical couplet.52 Although he recognizes that Kant intended the two to
be united in consciousness, Foucault maintains that the division of the disciplines is
underpinned by this philosophical intervention, because it allows for empirical fields to
be divided from each other by local transcendental elements, like “life.” These
“transcendentals” function beyond the realm of representation but are the object of
representational investigation. Kant’s questioning of the legitimacy of representation
forces the “the withdrawal of knowledge and thought outside the space of
representation.”53 The new metaphysics will be not about representation, but about the
“source and origin of representation.”54 Thus two types of conditions of possibility are
identified: first, the conditions of experience itself, and second, the conditions of objects.
While Foucault sees that the second governs the first for Kant,55 he proposes that the
emergence of disciplinary transcendentals was made possible by the misrecognition of or
disagreement about that identity after Kant. Foucault concludes that “the criticismpositivism-metaphysics triangle of the object was constitutive of European thought from
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the beginning of the nineteenth century to Bergson.”56 Synthesis is split off from the field
of representations, and transcendental subjectivity is divided from the mode of being of
objects.57
This thesis has received some support from Azade Seyhan, whose Representation
and Its Discontents58 examines the critical attitude of Jena Romanticism with respect to
problems of representation. She writes that:
The journal [Athenaeum] envisioned its intellectual task to be re-presenting
representation, in other words, recasting narrative accounts of philosophy, history,
literature, and art in terms of their present or modern configuration.59

This focus on something more than representation, and indeed the notion that the representing of respresentation gives way to “critical praxis,” is salutary.60 As we shall see,
not only textually but also theoretically, the Jena Romantics sought literally to
instrumentalize representation, to employ it for the speculative purposes of organology.
And their re-casting of earlier metaphysics in this mold indeed engaged Kant’s critical
legacy directly.
And yet, in Foucault’s description of the development of biology, which focuses
on Cuvier’s functional anatomy, the Romantic legacy is missing. The “discontinuity” of
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the representational and ontological “spaces” which Foucault sketches with Cuvier is one
in which organs disappear into functionality. They form series, which are hierarchized
according to an unavailable (withdrawn) notion of life. A local metaphysics—that of the
life sciences—opens up as a disciplinary space.61 And indeed, Cuvier did break with an
analogical tradition (still defended, in the famous Akademistreit, by Geoffroy de St.Hilaire—more on this in Chapter 5, below) in favor of comparison by function. The
organization of beings was no longer the methodological point: their comparative
functions dictated classification.
What if, however, there had been a discourse about organs that saw them neither
in terms of pure functionality nor in terms of analogy? And indeed, what if this discourse
had been engaged—precisely through the lens of Kantian criticism—with the splitting of
the disciplines and the philosophical stakes of that division of knowledge? What if that
discourse had, in fact, been interested in the emergence of technicity and the disciplines
at just that moment when the classical episteme fell? I will defend in this study the notion
that just that discourse is at the heart of Early German Romantic metaphysics, and that
this metaphysics, for that reason, meant to provide something like a technology of
orientation, a technological metaphysics, concretely engaged with institutional and
technological developments as they emerged, and attempting, using the organ of reason,
to idealize them and with them life (cultural and biological). That legacy, which has gone
untreated in the literature until now, is the object of the following study.
I mean to introduce this problematic with a sketch of a metaphorology of the term
organ in the 18th century. I limit this investigation, for purposes of exposition, to three
authors, describing the arc from Rationalist metaphysics (in Leibniz) to the anticipations
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of Romantic ontology (in Kant and Herder). Each of these authors makes (increasingly)
metaphorical use of the discourse of the life sciences—specifically, the debate about the
generation of animals—to characterize his view of Reason. This borrowing of terms or
conceptual migration—this metaphorology—positions us to understand the heritage of
the term organ in a specifically philosophical but also metaphorical register, a register the
Romantics will make central and methodologically primary. Indeed, this sketch will
allow us to see, through the lens of the metaphorization of the organ, the preparation of
that methodology in Kant’s and Herder’s work. It was by uniting metaphor with
methodology that the Romantics generated their organicist, rationalist metaphysics, based
in the technological concreteness of the organon. The description of the latter set of
doctrines—organology—will show that so far from a replacement of being with
metaphor, the emergence of a relevant and critical metaphysics is the mark of that (for
Blumenberg) second post-Aristotelian generation.
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Chapter I. Towards a Metaphorology of the Organ in 18th-Century
German: Leibniz, Kant, Herder

Introduction

At the beginning of the 18th century, the world disappeared. It would be another
century before Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi would coin the term nihilism, heightening a
charge—originally made against Spinoza—and a philosophical worry about acosmism or
lack of world. By that time, however, as Kant had put it in 1781, metaphysics had lost its
status as “queen of the disciplines” and had become a mere “arena” (Kampfplatz) for
speculative polemics.62 The early-18th-century disappearance was of another sort: it was
not the cosmos itself that was gone, but its contents. The richness of that world—its
interlinking, lived reality, its creation, the knowledge of it—was reduced in the European
theater to something else: regularities, laws. Isaac Newton’s claim to non-knowledge
about the true nature of forces, complemented on the continent by Christian Wolff’s
claim to generate the world’s content from the principle of non-contradiction, are only the
antagonistic symptoms of the same felt disease, a simultaneously liberating and crippling
doubt about the nature and the knowability of the world. Metaphysics had been legislated
against in favor of lawfulness pure and simple: the world had disappeared into its own
order.63 The crisis of metaphysics—or the sense that the long 18th century was a series of
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unfolding metaphysical crises—was complemented by the political crises that erupted in
1776 and 1789.
The Romantics inherited these problems together, and their attempt to suture them
by combining and redressing them with a metaphysical sense of the term organ is the
object of this study. First, however, we need a sense of where the term came from—in
other words, we need a discursive story about what made Romantic organology possible.
That story goes by way of the disciplinary boundary between philosophy and the
life sciences. The literal sense of the term organ—functional part, whether internal or
sensory—emerged only slowly in Germany. The conceptual locus of its emergence was
the debate about the development of life, the question of “preformation” (development
from a tiny, pre-organized model) or “epigenesis” (gradual formation of the organism
from unorganized matter). This debate was marked, however, by an absence of the term
(at least in German). It was Immanuel Kant (in the Kritik der Urteilskraft—hereinafter
KU) who gave epigenesis the term organ, naming the proper object of a very old research
agenda.
That debate, however, was also metaphorized by philosophers throughout the 18th
century. Leibniz—who subscribed to preformationism—articulated a metaphysics of the
organ, a world which was organic all the way down. Writing in French, he defended this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Christian Wolff, Erste Philosophie oder Ontologie, ed. Dirk Effertz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2005), § 1, 18.
Here I agree with Max Wundt: “...[D]as neue Denken richtet sich, wenigstens wo es sich zur vollen
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abgelöst.” Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), p.
14. See for elaboration my “Das Innere der Natur und das Organ: von Albrecht von Haller zu Goethe”
(unpublished).
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vision not only metaphysically but also for the human intellect. With that shift to
epistemology, the first glimmer of a metaphorology of the organ came into existence.
Immanuel Kant’s work is filled with the dual problematics of the organon (the
tools for practicing a discipline) and the organ. From his earliest works, in which an
organon for metaphysics is sought, to his critical system, in which that organon is
replaced by a canon (a positive body of law) of the understanding, he brings the term
organ to bear on similar problematics. By also characterizing the critical system as an
“epigenesis of pure reason,” Kant furthered the metaphorology in question, tying a
critique of Leibniz to a shared—and borrowed—natural-scientific terminological
apparatus. He thus came close to anticipating the Romantics’ intentional conflation of the
two terms. Ultimately, however, his contribution to the metaphorology of the organ is
methodological. By thematizing the necessity of radical methodology in metaphysics as a
response to its century-long crisis—and by placing the terms organon and organ front
and center in that revisionary effort—he supplied a benchmark and a warning for any
innovative use of the term. That warning, of course, extended to (any possible future)
metaphysics itself.
Johann Gottfried Herder, who had studied with Kant in Königsberg in the 1760s,
supplied the cosmology—the Weltbild—of organology. Herder came to reject the term
epigenesis (generation “on top of”), favoring the notion of genesis pure and simple.
Arguing for a cosmic plurality of fundamental, pullulating dynamic forces, Herder set the
agenda in terms of content for the emergence of Romantic organology. His system, like
Leibniz’s, was entirely composed of corruptible organs expressing dynamic forces, but he
added the possibility of the new, the emergence of genuinely new being in the order of
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things. He extended the metaphorology of the organ to the mind, as Leibniz and Kant had
done before him, but he did so using analogy as his tool. For him, the “grand analogy of
nature” gave way to the encompassing perception (and ultimately love) of God in a
sensorium commune of language, time and space. Reflecting this knowledge through the
mid-point of nature as analogy were the human organs, on a scale from material to
spiritual, and rooted finally in an “organ of language,” an autonomous ability—the ability
to identify one’s proper species—reflecting the godly analogy but also affording freedom.
These four sources dovetailed to make the Romantic use of the term organ
possible. Their investigation stands between conceptual history and metaphorology, and
led ultimately—with Early German Romanticism—to a new conception of conceptuality
itself.

I. Life’s Origin: Preformation, Epigenesis and the Question of Force

Aristotle writes, in De generatione animalium,
… he phusis en toi arreni ton sperma proiemenon chretai toi spermati hos organoi kai
echonti kinesin energeiai, hosper en tois kata technen ginomenois ta organa kineitai: en
ekeinois gar pos he kinesis tes technes.
… Nature acting in the male of semen-emitting animals uses the semen as a tool, as
something that has movement in actuality; just as when objects are being produced by
any art the tools are in movement, because the movement which belongs to the art is, in a
way, situated in them.64

The physis-techne analogy is here applied to the moment of animal generation it, and
Aristotle thereby left a terminological legacy within this problematic that was taken up
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again in the 18th century.65 Aristotle’s own application of hylopmorphism to the problem
of generation (sperm is active form, ovary passive matter) formed the basis for a fierce
ideological debate—again, precisely as scholastic Aristotelianism came to an end—about
the origins of life. And in fact, the debate about life’s origins—precipitating into
preformationist and an epigenesist positions—was marked by the singular absence of the
term organ, even as it prepared the systematic background for the metaphorical
emergence of the term with which this chapter deals.
The debate about generation was, far from academic, a deep-structure
confrontation between physics in its post-Newtonian ascendance and the emergent lifesciences.66 The formation of organic beings from seemingly inorganic matter took on
urgency with the rise of the microscope67 and the rise of Newton’s mechanical model.
The microscope allowed more precise observation of the fluids which went into
reproduction—yet the debate transcended observable formations.68 Newton’s system had
two relevant sides: on the one hand, it allowed no incalculable forces to be postulated,
and this, on the other, resulted in a catholic mechanicism about nature. For Newtonians,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65

See Wolf, Der Begriff, pp. 19 ff., for an analysis of the role of movement in this complex. See also Justin
E. Smith, ed., The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), pp. 1-21, for the framing of the philosophical problem of generation in terms of the
dichotomy between being and becoming.!!
66
Which would not receive the name “biology” until 1800.
67
Which buttressed the fall of scholastic metaphysics, and simultaneously established a world “within” the
phenomena as a new area of study. For a general history, see Catherine Wilson, The Invisible World: Early
Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press, 1995). For
an examination of the implicit metaphysics which emerged with the advent of this instrument see Hartmut
Boehme, “The Metaphysics of Phenomena: Telescope and Microsope in the Works of Goethe,
Leeuwenhoek and Hooke,” in Collection, Laboratory, Theater: Scenes of Knowledge in the 17th Century
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), pp. 355-394.
68
See Blumenbach, Bildungstrieb, pp. 17-20, for a short history of Samenthierchen-theory. Indeed, the
imperfection of the instrument allowed preformation a longer lifespan than it might otherwise have had.
von Haller’s arguments against Wolff’s version of epigenesis came increasingly to rely on the
“transparency” or invisibility of pre-formed organs, an argument that failed as the instrument gained in
precision. See Shirley Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation: Eighteenth-Century Embryology and the HallerWolff Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 83-4.

!

!!37!
!
there was simply no way to explain the development of organic bodies—no force or
principle could be feigned, since it could not be formalized mathematically. This led to
the position called “preformationism,” essentially the doctrine that a small version of the
body pre-existed either in the sperm (animalculism) or in the egg (ovism). (The most
celebrated authors holding this view were Charles Bonnet and Albrecht von Haller,
whose wavering on the issue led him into direct confrontation with Wolff.) As Peter Reill
has pointed out, this position dovetailed nicely with theological presumptions (God
created all organic bodies in a fixed number at the Creation), and supported absolutistic
politics.69 Attempts to find these pre-existing Keime (seeds) failed, but the microscope’s
limited capacity left their possibility open.
The limitation of hypotheses brought the question of the nature of force into
focus. Without turning their back on Newton’s methodological modesty, it was possible
to maintain that force was not merely quantitative, but instead also qualitative.
Blumenbach understood himself explicitly in precisely this way:
Hoffentlich ist für die mehresten Leser die Erinnerung sehr überflüssig, dass das Wort
Bildungstrieb, so gut, wie die Worte Attraction, Schwere etc. zu nichts mehr und nichts
weniger dienen soll, al seine Kraft zu bezeichnen, deren constante Wirkung aus der
erfarhung anerkannt worden, deren Ursache aber so gut wie die Ursache der genannten,
noch so allgemein anerkannten Naturkräfte, für uns qualitas occulta ist. Es gilt von allen
diesen Kräften was Ovid sagt: —caussa latet, vis est notissima. Das Verdienst beym
Studium dieser Kräfte ist nur das, ihre Wirkungen näher zu bestimmen und auf
allgemeinere Gesetze zurück zu bringen.70

Appended to the obvious reference to Newton is a footnoted quote from the
Opticks, including “I use that word [attraction] here to signify only in general any force
by which bodies tend towards each other, whatsoever be the cause.”71 Blumenbach’s
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points of comparison are contractibility, irritability, and “sensility.”72 These forces were
not physical, formalizable in the manner of dynamics. Yet their postulation was a matter
of method, indeed, the modest method of Newton. The cause was not speculated upon,
while the expression of the force became the object of investigation.73
This view thus developed into the competing notion, epi-genesis (generation “on”
or “above”) to articulate a non-miraculous, qualitative, force-based generation. Various
versions of the force molding the produced being were articulated and defended in the
18th century, from the Comte de Buffon’s moule intérieure to Wolff’s vis essentialis to
Blumenbach’s nisus formativus or Bildungstrieb itself. Each of these attempted to infer
from the forms of organic beings form-producing dispositions or habitus. Yet the
discourse is marked by the absence of a significant use of the term organ.74
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Blumenbach, Bildungstrieb, p. 32.!!
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James Larson puts the point particularly clearly: “Blumenbach intended the term force to introduce the
idea of a causality acting with design in certain vital processes. The term was not explanatory but a
designation for an observed effect, a projected unity. The additional connection of phenomena according to
purpose related them and made them intelligible to the observer in a way that mechanical causality did not.
Adoption of such a principle was, according to Blumenbach, justified by its simplicity and its consonance
with observed vital processes.” (“Vital Forces: Regulative Principles or Constitutive Agents? A Strategy in
German Physiology, 1786-1802,” Isis 70 (2), 1979, pp. 235-249, here p. 241.
74
As Löw has pointed out, Philosophie, p. 95, Haller himself could use the word without coming down on
the mechanism/organicism debate. And yet, even his use is quite rare, as I have pointed out above. I find
only 7 uses in the Primea Lineae (pp. 78, 108, 145, 169, 166, 177, and 187), none of which requires
construal as organ (“instrument” tends to suffice). Informatively, Haller does use the term (for the heart)
when writing in French (which is true of Leibniz, too): “que les changements de ce principale organe ne
sont que superficiels…” Sur la formation du Coeur dan le Poulet (Lausanne: Bousquet, 1758), p. 173, cited
by Roe, Matter, p. 68. This trend seems to hold: France had the word in its modern sense (l’organe) by the
middle of the 18th century post quem, while Germany developed its modern sense (das Organ) beginning
primarily in the 1780s. See section IV below. This conclusion runs directly counter to that made by Andrew
Cunningham for the British world, The Anatomist Anatomis’d: An Experimental Discipline in Enlightened
Europe (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010). Cunningham is surely correct that the notion of the soul conditioned
early uses of the term to indicate the instrumentality of the body and its functions: “… it was the existence
of the soul that created the role of organ for the various working parts of the body. The relation of the soul
to its organs was a bit like that of master to servant: each is defined in relation to the other. This sense of
organ and of its associated terms such as “organic” and “organized,” continued to be the primary ones right
through to almost the end of the eighteenth century, but then they were discarded, and the terms were all
given new meanings…” (p. 383) This line of thinking seems to conflate two different discourses, the
organic notion of organs (French, and then German) and the instrumental (Latin) conception of the body.
In any case, the term was in varying states of conflation throughout the eighteenth century, and it is
certainly possible that instances of precisely this conflation exist (although Cunningham does not point to
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The debate was largely settled by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach in 1781, with his
Über den Bildungstrieb. His description of the positions runs as follows:
Entweder nemlich man nimm an, dass der reife, übrigens aber rohe ungeformte
Zeugungsstoff der Erltern, wenn er zu seiner Zeit und unter den erforderlichen
Umständen an den Ort seiner Bestimmung gelangt, dann zum neuen Geschöpfe allmälig
ausgebildet werde. Diess lehrt die Epigenese.
Oder aber man verwirft alle Zeugung in der Welt, und glaubt dagegen, dass zu
allen Menschen und Thieren und Pflanzen, die je gelebt ahben und noch leben werden,
die Keime gleich bey der ersten Schöpfung erschaffen worden, so dass sich nun eine
Generation nach der andern blos zu entwickeln brauch Deshalb heist diess die Lehre der
Evolution.75

The debate thus centered on the problem of the nature of matter, or rather matters.
Indeed, the 18th century saw a fierce debate in the British, French, and German worlds
(and between them) on the nature of force, a concept Newton had made urgent with his
investigations into gravity. The question of how force could be properly treated in science
and in philosophy caused a debate about the nature of matter which dovetailed with the
more intimate knowledge of that matter afforded by the microscope.
If the epigenesists adopted Newton’s conception of force, however, they did not
adopt his suggestive use of the term organ. In Query 31 of the Opticks, Newton had
written (in keeping with British physiological usage) of the “organs of sense and motion”
(eyes, ears, but also arms, bladders, etc.) in humans. The passage is famous both for its
defense of the metaphysics of force and for its presentation of the “method of analysis.”
God formed the organs of animals, but had none. The origins of our mediators was to be

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
them). Christopher Young and Thomas Gloning, A History of the German Language Through Texts
(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 248-9, suggest that organ would still have appeared as a Lehnwort in 1790
in Goethe’s Versuch, die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären. See chapter V of the current study.
75
Blumenbach, Bildungstrieb, pp. 13-14. Blumenbach’s predecessor in defending epigenesis, Caspar
Friedrich Wolff, describes the division in this way: “Whether organic bodies of nature are evolved from an
invisible state to a visible one, or are truly produced…” (Wolff to Haller, 6 October 1766, in Roe, Matter,
p. 166)
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found, the passage suggests, in the unmediated but universal mediator (more on Newton’s
conception of God’s sensorium in the section on Herder in the current chapter below).76
The problem of the emergence of organic beings from seemingly “dead” matter
thus drove scientific debate squarely into a philosophical register, one in which Leibniz
participated from the 1690s onwards, arguing that vital force was a metaphysical
principle that had to be included, although only partially, in physics for its results to sync
up with that of philosophical investigation. Kant’s first publication was a consideration of
this question too. And when Herder entered the public sphere in the 1770s, the word
Kraft was never lacking—nor was Organ. Thus, the confrontation of the life sciences and
physics—and the emergence of biology as a discipline around 1800—involved both
substantive and methodological debate offering central material for argumentation in an
uncertain period for first philosophy. The borrowings of the terms preformation,
epigenesis and organ in Leibniz, Kant and Herder all center around questions of force
and our knowledge of it. Indeed, in each case, what is at stake is the mirror-question to
that posed by the biological debate: not “what is the nature of matter?” but “what is the
nature of reason?” Or, in other words, with uncertainty reigning about the nature of the
known, the nature of knowing became a methodological problem, indeed, a metaphysical
problem.
It is not, however, a merely analogical process by which the metaphorization of
the epigenesis-debate played out. That debate was always a question, at heart, of
organicity.
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Isaac Newton, Opticks, or, a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections and Colours of Light
(London: Innys, 1730), pp. 376 ff.
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In §64 and §65 of the KU, Kant separates between mechanical and organic
causalities. The first is a necessary link between two phenomena which is unidirectional:
cause results necessarily in effect. This had been a generative explicandum of the KdrV:
when the concept “cause” is judgmentally linked to a concrete set of phenomena, its
necessity cannot be derived from that phenomena, pace Hume. This problematic led Kant
to the invention of the “understanding” (Verstand) as that faculty which establishes and
bears the weight of “objective validity”, or “legislates nature”—a faculty supplying the
necessity lacking in raw sensation, constituting nature by contributing elements like
necessity to our phenomenal experience of it. For various reasons (to which we will
return), Kant’s “understanding” only functions according to this unidirectional necessity
in the establishment of causes. In the KU (§65), he calls the causal link nexus effectivus—
the effective link, with obvious reference to the Aristotelian concept of the “efficient
cause,” in Early Modern terms: billiard-ball upon billiard-ball. Here, however, Kant
allows for another type of causality thinkable by reason: mutual causality, where effect is
cause and vice versa. This type of causality can be thought77 but makes no contribution to
the understanding’s legislation of nature. It is a candidate (a good one, it turns out) for
regulative judgments, the types of judgments we must make to function practically (and,
in this case, scientifically). The causal link here is called nexus finalis—Aristotle’s “final
cause” or telos. Indeed, Kant thinks we must use the concept of an “end” to interpret
organic beings. And we encounter the type of judgment described here daily, for
example, whenever we make judgments about human artefacts. Kant’s example is that of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The capacity for “mere thought” is essential to Kant’s notion of Reason. Because the understanding
synthetically integrates intuitions with concepts—thereby guaranteeing our constitutive knowledge of
nature—but does not generate the one from the other (which is dogmatism), Reason is free to think things
which are not thereby constituted as phenomena. This essential characteristic is described at the beginning
of the “Transcendental Dialectic” in the KdrV, starting at A293/B249.
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a house which is both cause of the income that comes to its renter, while possibility of
that income was also the cause of the construction of the house. Here the “end” is easily
placed in the reason of the maker. The concept (house or income) has to determine the
mutually causal relations a priori: the one is for the other in the reasoned representation
(Vorstellung) of the renter/builder.
This example applies safely to all artificial objects (indeed, this is why the KU
juxtaposes aesthetic and organic objects): the final cause is in the mind of the maker. In
the case of the organic object, however, the appearance of organization cannot be
explained by immediate reference to a concept determining the object (that is, without
introducing a Deus ex machina). Ultimately, Kant argues for a regulative conclusion to
God’s moral universe on the basis of our encounters with organic beings. Here, however,
we only need see that his model of the organic itself picks out the problem at the heart of
18th-century debate about life.
Kant defines the organic object as follows:
In einem solchen Producte der Natur wird ein jeder Theil so, wie er nur durch alle übrige
da ist, auch als um der andern und des ganzen Willen existirend, d.i. als Werkzeug
(Organ) gedacht: welches aber nicht genug ist (denn er könnte auch Werkzeug der Kunst
sein und so nur als Zweck überhaupt möglich vorgestellt werden); sondern als ein die
anderen Theile (folglich jeder den anderen wechselseitig) hervorbringendes Organ,
dergleichen kein Werkzeug der Kunst, sondern nur der allen Stoff zu Werkzeugen (selbst
denen der Kunst) liefernden Natur sein kann: und nur dann und darum wird ein solches
Product, als organisirtes und sich selbst organisirendes Wesen, ein Naturzweck genannt
werden können.78

Even as Kant reaches for the Greek origin to determine the concept of the “part” in a nonmechanical sense (he goes on to point out that a watch can have no true organs), he
makes a structural analogy (and this is all we are, in fact, supposed to be able to make, in
the life sciences) from the judgmental nexus (that which relates part to whole and vice
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versa in the reasoned judgment) to organic “part”: that which establishes the mutual
mereological relation is, at its root, simply a tool. But this tool cannot be one of mere
“art”; instead, it must belong to that nature which “delivers all material up to tools.”
Organization occurs by making organs which contain the traces of the force that builds
them: nature itself.
The question of which force is using the tool was always at the heart of the whole
debate. Indeed, the organ’s correlative force is what Blumenbach sought in explicitly
Newtonian (albeit qualitative) terms. The literal use of the term in biological debate, Kant
shows us here, is already a matter of how we judge, and the central ontological
problematic is analogically mirrored by differing faculties (Verstand/Vernunft). This is a
central problematic for the next generation.
Here, however, we need merely see that the debate was always about this
problem: the functionality of the literal organ (say, the heart) is exactly what Newtonians
lacked an explanation for, what had to be pushed back into the mystery of God’s creation.
Microscopic explorations of the part-whole relation, as they increasingly tended to be the
investigations of unobservable but organic forces (eventually called Bildungstrieb by
Blumenbach), became investigations of the formations of organs as the immediate
bearers of those forces. Looking to the Haller-Wolff debate, for example, we find that the
bulk of their correspondence is taken up with questions of the formation of organs from
blood-flow. As Wolff struggles to make his epigenetic point to the physiological master,
he focuses his microscope on pulsations in the first hours of gestation, hoping that the
formation of the functional animal will become not only visible, but also
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communicable.79 His hesitating tone does not prevent him from insinuating that a guiding
force is forming the organs in the earliest stages of life—his vis essentialis accruing
matter to the form of the animal.80
As Müller-Sievers has argued, Blumenbach’s intervention did not come as the
“hard” result of an experiment (he calls it a “purely textual event”81). Rather than seeing
this development as merely “ideological” (as subject to a possible revisionist “critique”),
I think this ideational shift should also be seen as productive,82 specifically of a
terminological field in which the borrowing of the term organ became increasingly likely.
And indeed, in this sense, we can see Kant less as a philosophical commentator on
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See Roe, Matter, pp. 158-173.
See ibid., 167-8 for Wolff’s response to Haller’s theological arguments. That God should have set the
program for development on organic lines that appear as emergent in the natural order seems relatively
harmless to Wolff, yet the argument cuts two ways: on the one hand, epigenesis was taken as a threat to the
role of theological argument in natural philosophy (and it was), while on the other hand, Wolff’s argument
correctly points out that God’s role is untouched by biological investigation—after all, if God set the
mechanical rules of the universe, what prevents him from having set the organic ones?
81
Helmut Müller-Sievers, Self-Generation: Philosophy, Biology and Literature around 1800 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 26-48, here p. 5. John Zammito objects to this view, calling it
“methodologically perverse,” (John Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 472.) But it is surely true (if not unique) that, rather than an
“experiment,” Blumenbach’s considerations of polyps are primarily the result of ratiocination, as we shall
see. Note also that Haller, in the middle of the most experimentally-based part of the controversy, wrote to
Bonnet that “I see all of this [in a manner] similar to what the illustrious Wolff has seen; we differ in our
conclusions.” And again Wolff: “But it is clear that he, not I, has concluded correctly from the appearances
that are the same overall for him and for me.” (Quoted in Roe, Matter, pp. 63 and 64.) Roe herself
comments: “Thus, even thought the observational dual [sic] between Haller and Wolff [on the formation of
the heart] was something of a draw, Wolff’s logical arguments would seem to have tipped the balance in
his favor.” (Roe, Matter, p. 79) Roe’s conclusion is still valuable: “It is on the level of explanation that one
must seek the roots of the inconclusive nature of the debate, and even the source of the controversy itself…
it was not the observations that were truly under contention, but rather their ties to this nonobservational
plane of controversy.” (Roe, Matter, p. 87)
82
Müller-Sievers’s account of the ties between epigenesis and gender-ideology are convincing, but I think
he fits into the Foucauldian concensus I identified as insufficient in my Introduction above. Roe writes that
“Epigenesis was as compatible with the new progressivist view of human history and natural phenomena as
preformation had been with the religious and mechanistic beliefs of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.” (Roe, Matter, p. 156) My approach is neither ideology-critique nor correlation—instead, it is
cross-disciplinary construction.
80
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natural science and more as a producer of importance discourse about the organic. He set
the terms of the debate going forward, if not the experimental program.83
But while the term came late, the philosophy did not. The major fault line
between Wolff and Blumenbach is in the nature of the force inferred from the observation
of formation: as Blumenbach points out, the vis essentialis is an almost mechanical force,
merely “gathering” the necessary material for formation. The Bildungstrieb, on the other
hand, actually does the organizing itself—it is the form of that organization.
Blumenbach’s aperçu came from the regeneration of parts in polyps. As he noted, that
regeneration occurred in a miniaturized form: the new limb was formally similar but
smaller than the original. Rather than merely collecting matter for an already (but
inexplicably) organic being, the Bildungstrieb actively formed whatever matter was
available to it, and this matter, while not itself organic, had “traces” of that forming
activity in it:
Man kann nicht inniger von etwas überzeugt sein, als ich es von der mächtigen Kluft bin,
die die Natur zwischen der belebten und unbelebten Schöpfung, zwischen den
organisirten und unorganischen Geschöpfen befestigt hat; und ich sehe bey aller meiner
Hochachtung für den Scharfsinn, womit die Verfechter der Stufenfolge oder Continuität
der Natur ihre Leitern angelegt haben, nicht ab, wie sie beym Uebergange von den
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This setting of a discursive program which goes beyond experimentation but is in dialogue with it is also
the position of Herder in this debate (although not Leibniz, who was professionally engaged in
experimentation). Wolf’s (Der Begriff) conclusion that Kant set this organicist program suffers from a lack
of Herder, who—see section IV—seems to have been instrumental in importing the term from French
Histoires naturelles. But the open texture of the debate also explains why Kant’s intervention could be read
in different ways—and still is. Timothy Lenoir (The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in
Nineteenth-Century German Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago 1989)) sees Kant at the beginning of
a functionalist biology that seeks as much as possible to approach life by way of its mechanical function.
Robert Richards (The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosopohy in the Age of Goethe
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002)) takes direct issue with Lenoir, and pleads against Kant’s
case as contributing to biology whatsoever, since he makes it a “non-constitutive” science. In a sense, both
things are true: Kant contributes significantly to the debate about function and teleology—and to the
growing use of the term organ in Germany—while subordinating biology to mechanics for scientific
investigations. And yet, the regulative picture established in the passages adduced here is nonetheless an
inspiration for Romantic biology. Richards’s account thus leaves out any possible oblique Kantian
influence, even on disciplinary scientists—and generally insists on such a strong definition of life as
essential to biology that it is hard to see why anyone—except the Romantics—would support him in his
polemic against Kant. !

!

!!46!
!
organisirten Reichen zum unorganischen ohne einen wirklich etwas gewagten Sprung
durchkommen wollen. Allein diess hindert nicht, dass man darum nicht Erscheinungen
im einen dieser beiden Haupttheile der Schöpfung zur Erläuterung von Erscheinungen im
anderen benutzen dürfte: und so sehe ich es für keins der geringsten Argumente zum
Erweis des Bildungstriebes in den organisirten Reichen an, dass auch im unorganischen
die Spuren von bildenden Kräften so unverkennbar und so allgemein sind.84

The question of organicity is here brought to its literal apex: although different types of
matter—with differently investigateable forces—exist, they interact, and the traces of that
interaction are the very moments of unification establishing the organic order.
Blumenbach makes no special use of the term: Kant combined its literal meaning with its
etymology to give conceptual articulation to the problem.85 The question is, in fact,
rooted in the organ, as the immediate expression of the interaction of forces. The mutual
causality of “part” and whole—that is, the unified phenomenon—is rooted in the
conceptual problematic of that union itself. Kant brought his perennial concerns with
synthesis to bear on a problem with deep theological and scientific charge, opening up
the term organ to philosophical and metaphorical use. The analogy between the
predicative nexus in judgment and the causal nexus in scientific reasoning opened the
field of natural philosophy to critical or transcendental investigation—this investigation
would come to be called organology. Before that naming, however, came a
metaphorization of the terms of the debate about life for the debate about cognition.
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Blumenbach, Bildungstrieb, pp. 79-80.
Reinhard Löw, Philosophie, pp. 175-80. Löw shows that Kant may indeed have read Wolff, so that his
notion of epigenesis was at least current before Blumenbach’s publications. Kant seems to have thought
that Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb was a good name but not an explanation for the phenomenon of the
organic. Indeed, Löw confirms that Kant is right to think that the vis essentialis is only a mechanical
explanation: its organization of materials leaves the question of a telic being completely unanswered (this is
Blumenbach’s own point, too). AA XIII, p. 400 asks if the Bildungstrieb is not “die Erklärung eines
obscurum per aeque obscurum” (here p. 178). This is similar to the terminology of the Herder-Rezension
(see infra). Kant calls the theory “generische Präformation… Der Bildungstrieb ist unter diesem Aspekt nur
ein Name für einen unerklärlichen Grund, den wir voraussetzen müssen, wenn wir überhaupt über die
Individualentwicklung organischer Wesen sprechen wollen.” (p. 179) On the one hand, Kant still rejects the
“formation” of the soul—this “pre-exists” (not really) and can certainly still take up no physical space. On
the other hand, this solution for Kant allows him to get rid of “hyperphysics” by assigning this phenomenon
to the faculty of judgment.
85
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II. The Divine Preformation of the Mind: Leibniz’s Metaphysical Organ

The beginnings of this metaphorization are with Leibniz. Indeed, he runs the
categories of force and organ—in the larger debate about generation—through each other
in a manner not meant to be metaphorical, but instead metaphysical. Adopting the
discourse of preformation, he contains it in a larger static order, a world in which simple
substances are in a harmony pre-established by God. Nevertheless, he uses the term in a
quasi-metaphorical way to describe the mind, and it is this use we can track forward to
Kant, and to Herder.
The New System of the Communication of Substances, and of the Union of Body
and Soul of 1695 was the first public statement of a new emphasis in Leibniz’s thought.86
This was the doctrine of “pre-established harmony,” meant to respond to a
simultaneously scholastic and Cartesian problem about the interaction of substances.87
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There is some debate about Leibniz’s early and late metaphysics. The early work is marked by
commitment to the so-called “complete concept” doctrine, which emphasizes that substances and accidents
are like subjects and predicates, and holds that each individual being has a “complete concept” (including
its past and future) which could be known—and is known by God. The later metaphysics shifts focus to the
force-dynamics within substances, and ends with the articulation of the monadology. The elements of
Leibniz I am discussing here do not change sufficiently, I think, to need such an analysis. Donald
Rutherford sums up the change as follows: “What we can surmise is that as the focus of Leibniz's interests
began to shift away from the more traditional logical and metaphysical concerns of the 1680s to the project
of dynamics, an opportunity arose for him to rethink his treatment of substance. All of the essential features
of substance remained in place. What emerged, however, was his explicit recognition that if the nature of
substance in general is to be an entelechy or principle of action, then the most appropriate device for
representing the individual nature of a substance is not a complete concept, but rather the law of the series
of its operations.” (Donald Rutherford, "Metaphysics: The late period" in: Nicholas Jolley (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.124-175, here p.
128.)
87
The best overview of topics in this field is: Steven Nadler (ed.), Causation in Early Modern Philosophy:
Cartesianism, Occasionalism and Pre-established Harmony (University Park: Penn State Press, 1993).
Eileen O’Neill’s historical overview “Influxus physicus” (pp. 27-57) especially helpful with respect to the
scholastic problem of the interaction of substances. Rainer Specht’s Commercium mentis et corporis. Über
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The larger problem was that of the interaction of substances in general: given that
substances are simple and have accidents, how are they to interact? Descartes tied this
question to the sciences, defending a strict mechanicism that allowed for efficient
causality (billiard ball on billiard ball) to be the exclusive model of physical interactions.
This generated, however, another problem, that of commercium mentis et corporis: how
could the two heterogeneous substances, mind and matter, interact? The answer
developed in its classical form by Malebranche was that of “occasionalism”: God’s touch
intervenes at each moment of such interaction, ensuring that representations are correct
and that physical actions correspond to them.
Leibniz agreed that substances do not interact. In fact, the final statement of his
metaphysics, the monadology, is absolutely isolationist in this respect: even physical
substances do not actually interact. What establishes the appearance of interaction—and
the correctness of common language about it—is a harmony pre-established by God.88
There is no need, as he would emphasize against the Newtonian Clarke, for God to
intervene again and again: God has not made the motion which decays over time
(empirical interactions) but the force which is conserved. 89 The laws of the universe are
overseen by this harmony between substances, including the body and the soul, mind and
matter. Substances reflect each other harmonically, pre-ordained by God—no interaction
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Kausalvorstellungen im Cartesianismus (Stuttgart-Bad: Cannstatt Frommann-Holzboog, 1966) is the locus
classicus for the Cartesian discourse on this problem in the 17th century.
88
This doctrine was primarily influential in the Germanies. An overview of the national politics of the
mind-body problem (commercium mentis et corporis) is given in John W. Yolton, “The Three
Hypotheses,” Locke and French Materialism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), pp. 10-38.
89
The “vis viva” debate surrounded the Cartesian principle of the conservation of motion. Leibniz was able
to show that this was false and held that “force” was conserved. The thought-experiment in §17 of the
Discourse is meant ultimately to show that motion, conserved, would simply peter out. See Roberto
Torretti, The Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 33-6.
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is necessary. At one important place, Leibniz describes this doctrine as “an agreement
produced by divine pre-formation,”90 putting a point on the analogy.
In an important passage in the Theodicy, Leibniz echoes Aristotle’s rejection of
organs for the mind, taking issue with Cartesian attempts to show that the mind can
“guide” the body,
à peu près comme un cavalier, quoiqu'il ne donne point de force au cheval qu'il monte, ne
laisse pas de le gouverner en dirigeant cette force du côté que bon lui semble. Mais
comme cela se fait par le moyen du frein, du mors, des éperons, et d'autres aides
matérielles, on conçoit comment cela se peut ; mais il n'y a point d'instruments dont l'âme
se puisse servir pour cet effet, rien enfin ni dans l'âme, ni dans le corps, c'est- à-dire ni
dans la pensée, ni dans la masse, qui puisse servir à expliquer ce changement de l'un par
l'autre. En un mot, que l'âme change la quantité de la force, et qu'elle change la ligne de la
direction, ce sont deux choses également inexplicables.91

The conservation of force leads, in this case, to the pre-established harmony: no
change in the quantity of force is possible, and so humans are restricted to the rearrangement of forces already present in the natural order. Further, the interaction of
mind and body cannot be clarified by removing this element of putative spontaneous
generation of force: any possible instrument for such an interaction would have to be
either material or ideal, precluding the very possibility of interaction. And no
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Leibniz, Philosophical Texts, transl. R.S. Woolhouse and Richard Franks (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), p. 216.
91
Gottsched’s translation of 1763 reads: “… wie etwan ein Reiter, ob er wohl dem Pferde, darauf er reitet,
keine Kräfte giebt, dennoch dasselbe regieret, indem er die Kräfte des Pferdes dahin richtet, wohin es ihm
gefällt. Allein gleich wie dieses vermittelst [sic] des Zaumes und Gebisses, der Spornen, und andrer
materialischen Hülfsmittel geschieht: so begreift man, wie es zugeht, Die Seele aber kann sich hiezu keines
Werkzeuges bedienen; ja es ist gar nichts, weder in der Seele, noch in dem Leibe, das ist, weder in den
Gedanken, noch in der Materie, wodurch man diese Veränderung des einen durch das andere erkläre
könnte. Mit einem Worte, daß die Seele die Größe der Kraft verändern könne, und daß sie die
Richtungslinie zu ändern vermögend sey, das sind zwey Dinge, davon sich eines so wenig als das andere
erklären läßt.” (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicee, das ist, Versuch von der Güte Gottes, Freyheit des
Menschen, und vom Ursprung des Bösen, Johann Christoph Gottsched (ed.), (Hannover/Leipzig: Verlag
der försterischen Erben, 1763), pp. 192-3.) As Eric Watkins has pointed out, Gottsched proposed a similar
force-guidance model: in his dissertation, Vindiciarum systematis influxus physici (1727-29), Gottsched
defends physical influx for two reasons. On the one hand, clear and distinct ideas of body and soul are
needed before we can judge, and we lack these. On the other, it is possible that the soul is like an archer:
the taught string of the bow does not possess the motion but only the force and/or the direction of the
arrow. Leibniz disallows even this possibility in the passage above (although he was dead long before it
was written).
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minimalization of that interaction makes it more probable: “guiding” the force would
require some means of guidance, some point of interactive possibility, some instrument.
The metaphorical use of “instrument” is here precisely used as a rejection of an “organ”
of material knowledge or action. It is God’s world we know, by God’s harmony of bodies
and souls. The metaphor of the instrument is put under erasure: no philosophy of
technology in the reflective, organic order of forces.92
Leibniz’s increasing emphasis on the metaphysical nature of force can help us to
see the connection of his system to the metaphorology he instigated. The category
“substance” is both that which corresponds to the subject of a judgment93 and that which
is held together by a force. He writes in the New System that, considering the nature of a
“true unity,” he was led back to the substantial forms94 of the scholastics: “I found then
that their nature consists in force…”95 Indeed, an “original activity”96 must be postulated
to explain real unity at large. Force, it seems, is that which binds actively into a unity (we
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Frederick Beiser has showed that one possible philosophy of the techne was developed by Christian
Wolff in Leibniz’s footsteps. Beiser write that “Wolff conceives of the arts as means not only of producing
things but of knowing them.” Frederick Beiser, Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from
Leibniz to Lessing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 53-4. This Baconian impulse is meant to
show that in our making objects of knowledge are also produced (which overcomes the antinomy)—yet it
is clear that nothing new is produced or known here. Wolff is merely exploiting the analogical indifference
to body and soul in substance-metaphysics, without, as far as I can see, opening the door to innovative
possibility on the order of being or the knowledge of it, i.e. in metaphysics.
93
This is included in the “complete concept” doctrine, and we will investigate it below together with Kant’s
objections to it. It is classically stated in §8 ff. of the Discourse on Metaphysics, in Leibniz, Philosophical
Essays, transls. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), pp. 35-69.
94
Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge: Bellknap, 1969),
p. 213: “By “substantial form,” the scholastics originally meant the essence of an individual thing; it was
one of the terms also used among the natural philosophers as a specification of what they meant by
“nature.” It was not the universal Platonic idea which defined the genus of a thing, but the Aristotelian form
embodied in matter and thus individuated by its matter (Thomas Aquinas), or individuated by its own
nature whether embodied in matter or not (Duns Scotus).”
Occamists denied any such thing, but German Scholasticism stood under the influence of Suarez. the term
was equivalent to ‘occult quality’ after Descartes’s rejection and the Port Royal’s rejection. “Descartes and
the moderns opposed substantial forms as principles of explanation, declaring that all natural phenomena
are explicable by the magnitude, figure, and motion of matter, whose essence, which can be clearly and
distinctly perceived, is extension.”
95
Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, p. 139.
96
Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, p. 139.!!
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shall see Kant exploiting this notion in the next section). While the instruments of force
can arise and decay, however, original activity cannot begin or end (as Herder would also
maintain). The substances bound by force cannot, therefore, originate or be annihilated.
Leibniz reaches to the model of preformation, expanding its sense from a narrow,
biological principle to a metaphysical doctrine, indifferently referring to bodies and souls.
The New System holds that true substances have always existed, a doctrine that
forced Leibniz to confront the problem of the transmigration of souls. If the soul always
exists, could it be that it is attached to different bodies at different times? Rejecting this
possibility, Leibniz develops the notion of a substantial unity he calls an “organic
machine”: the pre-formed and always-existing animal. This machine is testament to
God’s infinite power, compared to human techne, which operates or seems to operate in
an entropic world.97
Rather than transmigration, so Leibniz, “transformation” is the appropriate term.98
Referencing the experiments of Swammerdam and Malpighi (17th-century
preformationists), Leibniz offers a reason for the doctrine of preformation: since simple
substances cannot be generated—since their force is original—they must instead be
preformed. Rejecting “atoms of matter,” he suggests that there are “atoms of substance”
or metaphysical “points,” held together by this original activity. This force-bound
unification extends—but only by God’s power—to the attachment of one soul to one
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There is some question about whether Leibniz is a dualist in the 1690s (matter is excluded from
substantial unity, and exists as aggregate apart from it) or a phenomenalist (matter is a simply a confused
perception, and substantial unities are all that really exists). The latter is certainly his mature position—see
the Monadology or the Principles of Nature and Grace. I am not committed to either interpretation here.
The conditional consideration of the entropic world of motion is enough for a metaphorology.
98
One of the great ironies of the larger biological debate is that the pre-formationists used the term
“evolution” to describe their non-generative viewpoint, halting its use for the epigenetic line that lead to
Darwin. See Richards, Romantic Conception, pp. 211-12. Richards points out that Schelling may have been
the first to apply the term evolution to species alteration (p. 145).
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body. Indeed, the body and the soul are always attached—as the New Essays read: “…
death can only be a sleep, and not a lasting one at that…”99 In the New System, Leibniz
expands: “Consequently, instead of the transmigration of souls, there is only a
transformation of the same animal, according to whether its organs are differently
enfolded and more or less developed.”100
The organs in this passage are simply the organic parts, their distribution
changing in transformation, their existence contemporaneous with the whole. Organ is,
then, a medical concept. The metaphorical sheen of the passage is merely an empirical
prejudice we (or perhaps Hume) might hold: organ seems like a metaphor because the
metaphysics in which it occurs is deeply unfamiliar—for Leibniz, literal organs occur in
all substance, corporeal or rational.
Indeed, the nature generated by God is full of organs, is an infinite intension of
organs.101 Leibniz here anticipates the arguments he would make against the Newtonians
in his famous correspondence with Clarke: arguing against occasionalism broadly and
mere mechanism locally, he there would state that God’s creation is not a “watch” which
loses time—if God is a craftsman, his machines have perpetuum mobile. In the New
System the “moderns” come up for criticism on precisely this point: they lack a
distinction between natural and artificial things, a difference “not simply… of degree, but
a difference of kind.”102 The natural machines “have a truly infinite number of organs…
[and] remains a machine in its least parts… being merely transformed through the
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Leibniz, New Essays, p. 55.!
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Leibniz, New Essays, p. 141.
In 1698, in De natura ipse, the point is repeated: “… every natural machine (and this is a true but rarely
recognized distinction between nature and art) is made up of an infinite number of other organs…”
(Leibniz, Philosophical Texts, transl. R.S. Woolhouse and Richard Franks (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), p. 210, translation modified).
102
Leibniz, New Essays, p. 142.
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different enfolding it undergoes…”103 The functionality of the organic is machinic all the
way down: each part down to infinity is a pre-formed recapitulation of the whole, bound
by an original activity supplied ultimately by God.104 What in the late work would be
called “monads” are here imagined—at least for nature’s beings—in infinite unities with
each other, not substantially interacting but reflecting each other.
Human making, on the other hand, merely unites aggregates that can decay. Its
organs are merely instruments, expressive of perfections of the whole when enough
artistry is involved, but nevertheless parts capable of disintegrating from the unity
established.105 Leibniz’s assumptions here are nevertheless not purely Aristotelian, and
he has indeed established a more general positive sense of the term organ by using it
indifferently for bodies and for souls (for substances in general, that is). Yet the
technologies of God and of humans differ essentially—any possible philosophy of techne
is suppressed in the fullness of being pre-established and pre-formed. The quasimetaphorical organ is the sign of perfection, the expression of force’s regular unity, but in
the hands of the human, a mere point of possible decay. The “fullness of nature” denies
the possibility of innovation. In Blumenberg’s terms, metaphorics has not yet escaped
metaphysics. As we shall see, the problem is that an organological metaphysics has not
yet appropriated the efficacy of metaphorics for itself.
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Leibniz, New Essays, p. 142.!!
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Discours de métaphysique 2, on modern, “mechanical” authors and their explanations of the world:
“Leurs belles manières d’expliquer la nature mécaniquement me charmèrent, et je méprisais avec raison la
methode de ceux qui n’emploient que des formes ou des facultés dont on n’apprend rien.”
105
“But when corporeal substances are contracted, all their organs together constitute only a physical point
relative to us.” (Leibniz, New Essays, p. 142)
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This indifference with respect to bodies and souls (in favor of a substantial
metaphysics), combined with the static system in which force is active, is reflected in
Leibniz’s epistemology—and this model survived into rationalism at large.
Where nothing radically new could be created by humans, Leibniz’s epistemology
and its formalization in the various Logics in the rationalist school look very much like a
toolbox, a set of instruments for knowing that larger Being in all its forced-based
dynamics—and this despite the refrain that the soul can have no instruments.
Leibniz’s epistemology is a matter of how clearly and distinctly we represent:
revising the criteria for Descartes’ “clear and distinct ideas,”106 he established a
framework for making distinct that which is already clear. The Leibnizian cognition-tree
runs as follows: what is confused is representation without objects. The ability to identify
an object makes knowledge clear. Clear knowledge can become distinct when we can
identify the properties that allow for recognition of the object over multiple instances.
(Leibniz’s favored example here is that of an assayer recognizing gold by its yellowness
combined with a certain density, etc.) Distinct knowledge can become adequate when the
primitive qualities of the object are included in the representation (so, for example, the
atomic makeup of gold). Even adequate knowledge, however, can be bettered, if the
elements of that primitive makeup can be included in a single representation of the
object: Leibniz calls this type of presentational knowledge intuitive as opposed to
symbolic. The latters uses signs as markers or reminders of elements not presented; the
combination of synthesis (into a single representation) and analysis (from constituted
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Where Descartes had held that what we conceive clearly and distinctly is true, Leibniz holds that by an
increasing process of distinctivization we arrive at the truth. See Robert Mcrae "The theory of knowledge"
in: Nicholas Jolley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), pp. 176-98, here pp. 177-8.!
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object all the way to primitive property) is called “intuitive adequate knowledge.”107 The
logical treatises of Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier all take up this model, offering
refinements and explanations of these means of arriving at true knowledge. Kant was
weaned on them, and taught them to Herder. This search for a means of betterment of
knowledge is where the creative historical energy of the rationalist movement is to be
found—and it is the field that Kant intentionally entered with his early methodological
considerations, as we shall see.
What is established by this system is both the notion of epistemological means
(not yet metaphorically “organs”) and a static order known by them. David Wellbery has
labeled this model “progressive semiosis”:
Sign-use is situated, then, between two types of intuition, the sensate intuition [the basis
of confused “knowledge] of our perceptual experience and the intellectual intuition of
divine knowledge. The Enlightenment myth of the sign localizes sign use between two
experiences of plenitude and presence—an original perceptual experience in which the
world reveals itself directly, the arché which grounds man’s subsequent symbolic
representations, and the telos of divine cognition in which the world is again experienced
intuitively, but with total distinctness. The movement from one pole to the other, the
advancement of culture itself, is a process of progressive semiosis.108

Wellbery focuses on the representationalism of this system, but points to its cultural
ramifications: critical development of that system meant “advancement” in the direction
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It seems clear that Leibniz is invoking Spinoza’s Ethics Book II, proposition 42, scholium here: the
discursive knowledge of a system of relations (within an object for Leibniz, in the law of proportions for
Spinoza) is bettered by seeing the elements as instances of the relations which make up the whole. I will
come back to this type of knowledge when passing from Kant and Herder to the Romantics. Ultimately,
only God’s knowledge is both adequate (including the primitives of its object) and intuitive (grasped all at
once, as in a picture), but the rationalist schema always divides between those objects of cognition which
are immediately based on the principles of contradiction and identity (logical truths), and those mediately
based on these, falling under the provenance of the principle of sufficient reason (see Leibniz, “Meditations
on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas,” in Philosophical Essays, pp. 23-28).
107
Wellberry, Lessing’s Laocoon, p. 232.
108
Wellberry, Lessing’s Laocoon, p. 232.
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of critical reflection, although the represented system remained the unalterable
substratum.109
There is a deep structural analogy between the force-model of substances in their
pre-established harmony and our cognition of beings or progressive semiosis: each of
these models posits a fundamental dynamism contained in a static order. And indeed,
they touch at the point of God’s knowledge. This analogical presentation makes the
organ—whether of an organic machine or the ladder of knowledge—a candidate for
reflection. Methodology—how we know—comes into view, albeit encapsulated, preformed, in the order of things. As the Discourse on Metaphysics assures us: “… it is
evident that all true predication has some basis in the nature of things…”110 The
exploration of means has not yet undermined faith in the representational principle—by a
literal analogical structure, we can know the enfolded and unfolding, pre-established
world. 111
It is this substance-based structural analogy—the world of Leibnizian
metaphysics—that provided the basis for Leibniz’s initiation of the metaphorology of the
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“A tendency to idealize aesthetic representations and signs emerges into view: the Enlightenment
attributes to art the capacity to renew the life of the culture by reactivating its most archaic mechanism as
well as to anticipate the goal of cultural progress by virtue of its transparent form of signification. If, as the
first chapter argues, the telos of Enlightenment culture is a system of natural signs, then art becomes the
locus where this telos is proleptically achieved.” (Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon, pp. 6-7)
110
Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, p. 41.
111
Beck’s description of Leibniz’s program in this regard as like a “fugue” is certainly appropriate, and the
following statement may serve to clarify the elusive relation between logical inherence and metaphysical
encapsulation in Leibniz: “This is the metaphysical correlate of the logical doctrine that every predicate is
analytically contained in the concept of the subject: every state and action is a state and action of a
substance which produces them according to the law of sufficient reason, sufficient and adequate to the
complete determination of this individual substance. Even states or modifications that seem to be passions,
or passive effects of modifications in other substances, are included among the actions of the substance in
question... Hence monads are internally determined even in that which Leibniz calls their matter, or
primitive passive power [Loemker p. 607, no date]... They also are consequences of its nature, though they
seem to be caused by the actions of other substances. Just as logical accidents are really properties whose
sufficient reason we do not find because we cannot completely analyze the concept of the subject, what
seems to befall the substance is really an action in it which reflects the state of some other substance.”
(Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 222)
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organ. In that metaphysical world, with those methodological means, the question of
mind had to be treated too.
Leibniz’s doctrine of the intellect was articulated in nuce in a single comment.
Responding to the Aristotelian claim that “nothing is in the intellect which was not first
in the senses” (nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sense fuerit), Leibniz appended:
nisi ipse intellectus (“except the intellect itself”).112 With this statement, Leibniz entered a
controversy about whether there were “innate” ideas. Locke, in particular, defended an
empiricist sensationalism in which the mind was tabula rasa, and all representation arose
from physiological interaction. Leibniz thus took direct issue with Locke in order to
elaborate his statement into a doctrine of the mind.
The New Essays on Human Understanding113 take the form of a dialogue between
a defender of Locke and a mouthpiece for Leibniz. The dialogue is a running
commentary on the chapter of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690).
The preface immediately invokes the central difference: the constitution of the human
intellect. Reviewing several doctrines of “innate” ideas (the prolepses of the Stoics, for
example, and the zopyra or “little sparks” of Julius Scaliger), Leibniz announces that he
will oppose Locke’s view that the mind is tabula rasa. The establishment of the reasons
for things, and the universal necessities observed in mathematics, metaphysics, and
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For the textually complicated history of this claim see Giorgio Tonelli, “Leibniz on Innate Ideas and the
Early Reactions to the Publication of the Nouveaux Essais (1765),” Journal of the History of Philosophy
(12: 4, October), 1974, pp. 437-454. “In the excerpts and notes (probably of I669) by Leibniz to the
Appendix Practica (1669) of the pansophic philosopher J. J. Becher we find the first documentation of
Leibniz' innatism. Leibniz transcribes from Becher: “In anima connatae paucae notitiae et fundamenta, hae
velut literae. Ex his hypotheses sive axiomata scientiarum velut syllabae . . . . --Axioma insertum est: nihil
est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu.” To this Leibniz remarks: “limitandum hoc modo: nihil est
in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu. Nisi ipse intellectus.” It is improbable that this was an original
Leibnizian formula: Leibniz probably reproduced a current scholastic dictum.” (p. 441)
113
Written in 1704, withheld because of Locke’s death, then only published in 1765, and then quickly
translated into German.
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ethics, Leibniz tells us, may well only occur to us when the senses awaken our
attention—but they cannot come from the senses.114 Instead, Leibniz asks, “why could
we not provide ourselves with objects of thought from our own depths, if we take the
trouble to dig there?”115 Ultimately, the entire universe is reflected in each monad, and
Leibniz here expresses this in terms of the doctrine of unconscious perceptions, petites
perceptions, which go unnoticed as individual waves are not heard in the roar of the
ocean, though we know that they constitute the latter. This indifferent ocean, perceptive
and perceived, organic to infinite smallness, establishes the appearance of equilibrium
but is in constant activity, productive of our knowledge and even our actions by pushing
us in certain, pre-formed directions, by producing tendencies.116
Book I then begins with an account of the “new system,”117 repeating the
arguments about preformation and metempsychosis we saw in the New System.
Responding to Philalethes’ (Locke’s) assertion that there are “no innate ideas,”
Theophilus (Leibniz) states that “the new system takes me even further and… I believe
indeed that all the thoughts and actions of our soul come from its own depths and could
not be given to it by the senses.”118 For Locke has failed to distinguish “the origin of
necessary truths, whose source is in the understanding, from truths of fact, which are
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As he also notes, however, it is not entirely clear whether Locke thinks there are any ideas not
originating in sense, since he “admits… that ideas which do not originate in sensation come from
reflection.” (Leibniz, New Essays, p. 51) At any rate, that Leibniz wants to steer a middle-path here
between tabula rasa and some preformed set of concepts is clear.
115
Leibniz, New Essays, p. 53.
116
Leibniz, New Essays, pp. 54-7. Even the pre-established harmony is meant to be clarified at the level of
exposition by these perceptions (p. 56). Because they make for the “confused” matter of perception, their
clarification or distinctivization puts us on the road to intuitive adequate knowledge—properly God’s, for
us an ideal.
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Leibniz, New Essays, p. 72.
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Leibniz, New Essays, p. 74.
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drawn from sense-experience and even from confused perceptions within us.”119
Philalethes objects that for there to be innate thoughts, there must be a (necessarily
obscure) faculty for such thoughts. Theophilus rejects two premises in this argument: on
the one hand, no such faculty is needed, only rather a potential; on the other, there are no
innate thoughts, rather only innate general principles, rules which we do not always
consider but function like muscles or tendons for walking.120 Certain truths—those of
necessity—form an affinity with the human mind:
… that is what makes us call them innate. So it is not a bare faculty, consisting in a mere
possibility of understanding those truths: it is rather a disposition, an aptitude, a
preformation, which determines our soul and brings it about that they are derivable from
it.121

The disposition of the mind, from which it internally draws necessary truths—those of
metaphysics, arithmetic, geometry, and ethics—is thus cast metaphorically in the
terminology of the biological debate. The mind is imagined as a slab of marble, which,
far from being indifferent to the sculptor, is instead veined. The sculptor has sought this
piece of marble—as God has preformed this type of mind—because he sees that its form
is amenable to its intended function: to represent Hercules, or to represent and act upon
the enfolded but unfolding truth. Unlike “vulgar” forms of innatism, Leibniz’s doctrine is
founded in a sort of preformation of the mind,122 which has metaphorical veins as
principles of application, an established field for the investigation of truth. The mind is
not generated but created, given in shape but appearing only slowly, as our attention to its
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Leibniz, New Essays, p. 84.
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To point out how precisely analogous the preformationism in metaphysics is, we can call to mind the
statement, from De natura ipse, that “things have been given a certain ability, a form or force (such as we
usually call a ‘nature’), from which the series of phenomena follows in accordance with the dictates of the
original command.” (Leibniz, Philosophical Texts, p. 213) Spoken here against occasionalism with its
discrete interventions by God, the doctrine amounts to the produced “tendency” or disposition at the level
of force and substance. Again, however, it is not metaphorical in the metaphysical context. A “nature” is
both its own property and a gift (from God).
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given affinities is applied. The means for knowledge might remain obscure to us, but our
process of self-discovery is just that: the exploration of an order formed in advance,
dynamic in its confused and even apparently chaotic development, but complete and
finally known in the intuition of God. Organs are implied in this preformationist
metaphor—its use in this context would not emerge until Kant, and then Herder, entered
this discourse given by Leibniz.

I. Reason’s Awakening: Kant’s “Epigenesis of Reason” and the Methodological
Organ

Ins Innere der Natur dringt Beobachtung und Zergliederung der Erscheinungen, und man kann nicht
wissen, wie weit dieses mit der Zeit gehen werde. Jene transzendentale Fragen aber, die ueber die Natur
hinausgehen, wuerden wir bei allem dem doch niemals beantworten koennen, wenn uns auch die ganze
Natur aufgedeckt waere, da es uns nicht einmal gegeben ist, unser eigenes Gemuet mit einer andern
Anschauung, als der unseres inneren Sinnes, zu beobachten. Denn in dem selben liegt das Geheimnis des
Ursprungs unserer Sinnlichkeit. Ihre Beziehung auf ein Objekt, und was der transzendentale Grund dieser
Einheit sei, liegt ohne Zweigel zu tief verborgen, als dass wir, die wir so gar uns selbst nur durch innern
Sinn, mithin als Erscheinung, kennen, ein so unschickliches Werkzeug unserer Nachforschung dazu
brauchen koennten, etwas anderes, als immer wiederum Erscheinungen, aufzufinden, deren nichtsinnliche
Ursache wir doch gern erforschen wollten.123

Kant’s contribution to this metaphorology—and indeed, his contribution to
Enlightenment philosophy at large—was driven, in my reading, by a single question: how
is it that we are rational in a world whose proper rationality we must remain agnostic
about? From the 1760s onwards, when the Academy forced the issue of metaphysical
certainty with its prize competition of 1760-3, Kant pursued this question. Developing a
critique of rationalist and eclectic124 metaphysics simultaneously, Kant noted that they
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The “eclectic” school—starting with Thomasius, finding its great proponent in Kant’s favored Crusius—
included also such figures as Lange, Rüdiger, and Hoffmann. They formed the principle, pietistic
opposition to the rationalists. See Beck, Early German Philosophy, and Wundt, Die Schulphilosophie. On
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shared a lack of an articulated means by which cognition was to fit with being. By prying
open that question—by bracketing, if not completely, the world—Kant opened a field of
methodology in metaphysics of which, I shall claim here, his own articulation of the
critical philosophy was but one possible result. At the opening of that field, the organon
for metaphysics was a possibility. The critical standpoint, however, rejected such an
organon in favor of a canon (of the understanding), and a discipline based on that canon.
Our rationality, whatever the status of the world, was self-guiding and developing, its law
capable of explicit statement. But the reason for its laws—what an instrument of Reason
was meant to provide—remained necessarily obscure. Kant cast this problematic in terms
of biological debate, writing that the understanding’s contribution to the world of its
cognition was an “epigenesis of pure Reason.” The metaphor of the rational organ
emerges, then, with Kant, but remains an unexplored possibility. Leibniz had supplied the
metaphorological field; Kant would offer the critical methodology.
At the methodological apex of the KdrV, Kant writes that the result of his
“transcendental deduction” of the categories is a sort of “system of epigenesis of pure
reason.”125 The Leibnizian problematic of the origin of necessary truths was always
central to Kant too. Indeed, he begins the introduction to the B edition of the KdrV with a
translation of Leibniz’s revision of Aristotle: “Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis
mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung.”126
The paradigmatic case is causality: the necessity inherent to the causal judgment cannot
accrue slowly in experience, as Hume had had it. Experience is necessary for empirical
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the Lange-Wolff controversy, see Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University
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causal judgments, of course, but the element of necessity cannot be derived from that
experience: order does not come from phenomenal presentation but from intentional
representation. This problematic reveals why Kant uses the metaphor from the life
sciences: as he reasons at §27, either experience makes necessary ideas possible, or those
ideas make experience possible. The first alternative is characterized as generatio
aequivoca, the inexplicable generation of one kind of substance from another. The second
alternative is embraced: the system of pure reason is epigenesist because there is a
genuine formation-process between intuitions and concepts, and this mixing process
actually constitutes experience. Guiding the process is the “system” of that epigenesis, its
own origins obscure but its rules organized around the categories and beyond doubt for us
humans, like an “animal body, the growth of which adds no member but which, without
changing its proportion, makes each member stronger and better suited to its
purposes.”127 Kant embraces epigenesis as a metaphor—how completely, we will see
below—to characterize the constitution of experience, the “legislation of nature” which
the understanding performs. Yet in the elaboration of the “architectonic” of pure reason,
his metaphor ambivalently reaches to the preformationist model, which dictates the
persistent proportion and pre-existence of the parts. No plastic organ is entertained, then,
in the final account, and Kant even speaks of the elaboration of a science of pure reason
as an “idea” which “lies like a seed in reason, in which all the parts, still quite wrapped
up and hardly recognizable under microscopic investigation, lie hidden.”128 The
elaboration of the science of pure reason, the justification of which is the transcendental
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deduction, is the transformationist model of preformation.129 The deduction itself defends
an epigenetic model for reason, then, while its elaboration has an invisible but original
model to follow. Like the epigenetic models of the late 18th century in general, Kant starts
medias in res: the form of reason (or of the organic being) is the given object of
investigation. Our lack of insight into its ultimate origin cannot speak against our
investigation. We cannot determinately know the world to be rational; our system of
judgments, however, is a rational architectonic. Insofar as those judgments make
synthetic contributions to our experience of that world, metaphysical rationality is both
called into skeptical question and made genuinely possible. Kant’s de-rationalization of
the world and intended full rationalization of human cognition and action proceded by
way the metaphorology of the organ. It would take the disintegrative and systemic textual
efforts of the Romantics to observe that metaphorological possibility after Kant
nevertheless rejected its speculative possibilities.
The transcendental logic is based on principles for empirical cognition,130 rules
for judgment regardless of content. Kant describes this logic as a canon, excluding the
term organon intentionally:
Der größte und vielleicht einzige Nutzen der reinen Vernunft ist also wohl nur negativ; da
sie nämlich nicht, als Organon, zur Erweiterung, sondern, als Disziplin, zur
Grenzbestimmung dient...131

Terminologically, criticism is based on a turn from a synthesizing (actually metaphysical)
organon to the positive law indicated by the term canon. The canon of the
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This is even more explicit in the foreword to the B-edition: “In den Sätzen selbst und ihren
Beweisgründen, imgleichen der Form sowohl als der Vollständigkeit des Plans, habe ich nichts zu ändern
gefunden; welches teils der langen Prüfung, der ich sie unterworfen hatte, ehe ich es dem Publikum
vorlegte, teils der Beschaffenheit der Sache selbst, nämlich der Natur einer reinen spekulativen Vernunft,
beizumessen ist, die einen wahren Gliederbau enthält, worin alles Organ ist, nämlich alles um eines willen
und ein jedes einzelne um aller willen, mithin jede noch so kleine Gebrechlichkeit… sic him Gebrauche
unausbleichlich verraten muß.” (KdrV B xvii-xxxviii; my emphasis.)
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KdrV B200/A161, the “table of principles.”
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understanding—as opposed to the organon of pure reason (see the section on Lambert
infra)—is the „Inbegriff der Grundsätze a priori des richtigen Gebrauchs gewisser
Erkenntnisvermögen überhaupt.“132 “Canon” serves as shorthand for the principled nonknowledge about the ultimate source of our cognition’s activity. We can produce
legitimate knowledge through self-generated rules of the understanding, but we cannot go
further than that—for that, we have “ein zu unschicklickes Werkzeug.”133
The canon allows us to determine our knowledge of objects fully, while not
determining those objects qualitatively at all. It thus responds to Kant’s imperative of
rationality in a world lacking its own indices (for us) of rationality. If an organon—in this
conception, necessarily metaphysical and dogmatic—had once been in Kant’s program,
by 1781 it was gone. organon was now
der Inbegriff derjenigen Prinzipien..., nach denen alle reine Erkenntnisse a priori können
erworben und wirklich zu Stande gebracht werden...134
Um deswillen ist [die reine Logik] auch weder ein Kanon des Verstandes überhaupt, noch
ein Organon besonderer Wissenschaften, sondern lediglich ein Katharktikon des
gemeinen Verstandes.135

Pure logic’s role is made purely negative, while transcendental logic bases itself on a
syntheses fixed in the derivation of the table of categories from the table of principles.
Judgment gives itself form, but this form is pre-determined by the possibilities of
judgment. The examination of judgment’s forms reveals a complete table of categories—
and indeed, justifies their use—but the transcendental cause of their unifying activity
(their production of objects) lies hidden within their very genesis, invisible to us.
The systematic location of the two terms reveals that the biological metaphor
complements the rejection of the organon: we cannot know the genesis of the forms of
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judgment—we must start with them as a totality (or a table), and ask only such questions
as they themselves legitimate. The epigenesis of pure reason is also a kind of generic
preformation. Whatever methodological restrictions are placed on investigation here,
Kant’s metaphors bring reason very close to the organic, indeed to possessing organs.

The “Pre”-Critical Field of Methodology

Already in the 1760s, Kant had established the contour of his philosophical
program: the search among cognitive and especially judgmental forms for the ultimate
sources of our experience.136 A number of documents (published texts, fragments, and
also Herder’s lecture notes) bear witness to this turn of mind. By examining this period
(up to 1770) with respect to the term organon, we can better understand the double
valence of Kant’s metaphorology, opening up the methodological field to organicist
metaphor on the one hand, and continuing in the Critical system as a version—albeit a
canonical one—of that field’s potential.
The question, for Kant, was whether there could be an internally justified
means for carrying out the work of metaphysical speculation. He called this means an
organon, writing in his Announcement for his lectures in Winter Semester 1765/6:
Auf solche Weise füge ich zu Ende der Metaphysik eine Betrachtung über die
eigentümliche Methode derselben bei, als ein Organon dieser Wissenschaft…
Der Lehrer muß freilich das Organon vorher inne haben, ehe er die Wissenschaft
vorträgt, damit er sich selbst darnach richte, aber dem Zuhörer muß er es niemals anders
als zuletzt vortragen. Die Kritik und Vorschrift der gesamten Weltweisheit, als eines
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Ernst Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, transl. James Haden (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1981), p. 43: “One should not look to this period for fundamental and ultimate philosophical judgments, for
everything it contains shows it to belong to the process of intellectual orientation which Kant had first to
work through for himself.” He continues, p. 55: “The essential novelty [after 1763] lies in the fact that now
whenever Kant attends to a given subject, he is never occupied with it alone, but requires a justification of
the essence of the type of cognition through which we are aware of it and which makes it knowable.”
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Ganzen, diese vollständige Logik, kann also ihren Platz bei der Unterweisung nur am
Ende der gesamten Philosophie haben, da die schon erworbene Kenntnisse derselben und
die Geschichte der menschlichen Meinungen es einzig und allein möglich machen,
Betrachtungen üben den Ursprung ihrer Einsichten sowohl, als ihrer Irrtümer anzustellen,
und den genauen Grundriß zu entwerfen, nach welchen ein solches Gebäude der Vernunft
dauerhaft und regelmäßig soll aufgeführt werden.137

As we shall see, Kant would come to reject the concept of an organon entirely.
Here, he not only entertains it, but employs it in his pedagogical vision in a demoncratic
manner, suggesting that a new metaphysics may come into being on its basis. As Giorgio
Tonelli has made exhaustively clear, this usage of the terminus technicus “organon” is
among the first distinctive mentions in Kant’s corpus.138 In the preceding passage, Kant
divides between “general logic” or a catharticon, a “purifier” of the understanding, and
local logics or organa—tools for the investigation of specific slices of the phenomenal
(the logics of “disciplines”).139 Tonelli notes that this particular organon—for
metaphysics—can only come at the end of philosophy, but there is more to the story than
this. For it belongs to the nature of this particular organon to be not simply a purifier of
the understanding but its fulfillment. Since metaphysics is the study of the “most general
predicates of being,” its specific logic is not merely also the most general—it is the
meeting point of the specific and the general. It is the “manner of application” of the two
classes to each other. The desired organon would be what the philosophies Kant was
weaned on failed to investigate: where method and being could be one. In addition to
having the formal characteristics necessary for metaphysical warrant, the organon
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M. Immanuel Kants Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre, von
1765-1766,” in Immanuel Kant, Vorkritische Schriften bis 1768/2 (Werkausgabe Band I/II). Band II, ed.
Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1960), pp. 905-917, here 912-13.
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Giorgio Tonelli, Critique/Logic, see pp. 37 ff.
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imagined here is also synthetic.140 This key term will play a role throughout Kant’s career
(and throughout our investigation here). Indeed, in this passage, the organon comes close
to the formal definition of “organ”: a special logic is meant not only to inform us of the
nature of the discipline over which it has jurisdiction, but is also supposed to supply the
synthetic principle by which we move from representation to action (in the sciences, the
pragmatic “action” is usually judgment). Thus, Kant separates between the type of logic
we mean when we say that P and Not-P cannot obtain simultaneously, and that type of
logic we mean when we say that there is a “logic” to, for example, sartorial selection or
“modernity.” While the first type of logic serves as adjudicator of judgments and nothing
more (has only a negative use), the second type, which Kant thinks is operative in each
discipline, serves as the fulcrum from which we pass to reflection on the method of a
discipline to its performance. Thus the conceptual proximity of the organ and the
organon: each is a function, both organizing or synthesizing material and containing rules
for that organization. Liminally, even the pre-critical Kant contributed to the
metaphorology of the organ.
In the 1760s, Kant never explicitly brought these two terms together.141 But in
establishing this terminological basis on which to consider the question of metaphysical
methodology, Kant opened what I will call a “methodological field” or a distinct genre of
philosophy to which Romantic metaphysics bears a familial resemblance.142 Metaphysical
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Paul Guyer points to synthesis as one of Kant’s perennial concerns, even before the development of the
Critical philosophy. See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), pp. 1-25.
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As we shall see, he never truly considered them side by side. But in the critical period, they were
brought into an unmistakable methodological proximity, the broader contour of which is visible in the early
work.!!
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Thus, in a debate focused on whether the movement from Criticism to German Idealism was “internal”
(Robert Pippin) or “external” (Paul Guyer), I turn to the early Kant to show that possibilities were opened
up in the buildup to the Critical system which were capitalized on by the next generation.
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investigation needed an organon, one it lacked. This organon would be synthetic and
specific to metaphysics, meaning it would provide the means to see the general in the
particular. Kant was increasingly led to the problem of judgment to fill out the formal
characterization he had offered of the desired instrument.
It is characteristic of the pre-critical Kant to maintain that judgment is the
paradigmatic form of cognition.143 Kant’s targets were Crusius and Wolff144: and in spite
of the wide differences between them on metaphysical and theological grounds, Kant
managed, as he would later do with Hume and Leibniz, to critique them on a common,
deep-seated methodological point. While Crusius held that some sentences were true but
indemonstrable, and Wolff held that all truths were derivable from the proper highest
premise, Kant pointed to their common failing to investigate the means by which they
claimed to know. Neither had an elaborated argumentative doctrine of judgment, or
rather, of judgment in operation. What warrant was there for judgmental claims? How did
judgments interact with their putative objects? The investigation of the forms of judgment
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I am not hereby saying that the full consequences of the “methodological clue” (that the “I think” is
potentially precedent to any cognition we can have) of the First Critique were clear to Kant in the 1760s.
Quite the contrary: I think that the clue’s ramifications were never fully exploited, as we shall see. Falsche
Spitzfindigkeit makes the general point clear: Kant is focused on the middle term between inferences and
concepts: judgments, or the capacity to judge: the complete concept requires no other “Grundkraft der
Seele” than the distinct does, and “eben so leicht fällt es auch in die Augen, daß Verstand und Vernunft, d.i.
das Vermögen, deutlich zu erkennen, und dasjenige, Vernunftschlüsse zu machen, keine verschiedene
Grundfähigkeiten sein. Beide bestehen im Vermögen zu urteilen; wenn man aber mittelbar urteilt, so
schließt man.” (Kant, Vorkritische Schriften II, p. 612) And so, similarly, “daß die obere Erkenntniskraft
schlechterdings nur auf dem Vermögen zu urteilen beruhe. Demnach wenn ein Wesen urteilen kann, so hat
es die obere Erkenntnisfähigkeit.” This is used to deny that animals can have distinct concepts, because
their distinctness is not merely an external quality. A32: “Nicht darin besteht die Deutlichkeit des Begriffs,
daß dasjenige, was ein Merkmal vom Dinge ist, klar vorgestellt werde, sondern daß es als ein Merkmal des
Dinges erkannt werde.” “Ich gehe noch weiter und sage: es ist ganz was anders, Dinge von einander
unterscheiden, und den Unterschied der Dinge erkennen. Das letztere ist nur durch Urteilen möglich...”
Kant, Vorkritische Schriften II, pp. 612-13)
144
AA XXVIII, p. 5. Kant holds that some propositions are unproveable (Crusius), but they are few. Wolff
wants to prove the unproveable, and Crusius makes too many propositions into unproveable ones.
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alongside the search for an organon: these elements, albeit the latter a failure,
accompanied Kant throughout his career.145
This program is clear in Der einzig mögliche Beweis (1763),146 where Kant frames
his debate in the terms of rationalism and eclecticism. Kant here confronts the Wolffian
doctrine that being is the complement or completion (Ergänzung) of possibility, asking
what determining factors complement possibility in order to make its object real.
Baumgarten, according to Kant, had filled this in with predicates: the possible differs
from the real by an “inner determination” in which predicates are superadded to the
possible, increasing it. Kant responds that this is vague: the addition of predicates is
precisely what occurs in the possible (that is, in our judgmental consideration), and offers
no proof whatsoever of being.147 Crusius has fared no better, however, in proposing that
every existing object must have a time and a place: Kant brushes this off by pointing out
that this is true of possibles as well: the “eternal Jew Ahasverus” is “without a doubt a
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This problematic has been treated by Dieter Henrich, “Kants Denken 1762/3” in Studien zu Kants
Philosophischer Entwicklung (Hildesheim: Olms, 1967), pp. 9-39. He writes summarily that “Alle Urteile
stehen unter dem Formalprinzip der Identität. Die Beziehung der Ursache zur Wirkung kann aber aus
diesem Prinzip nicht verstanden werden. Sätze über Realgründe können also nicht solche Sätze sein, in
denen einem Subjekt mit dem Charakter der Ursache ein Prädikat mit dem Charakter der Wirkung
beigelegt wird. Sie sind vielmehr Sätze, in denen einem Subjekt, das noch gar nicht als Ursache gedacht
werden darf, das Prädikat zugesprochen wird, Ursache einer gewissen Wirkung zu sein. In dieser
Interpretation ist die Relation des Realgrundes kein spezieller Fall unter der Grundbedingung der formalen
Relation in jedem Urteil. Sie ist nur ein Begriff, ein Prädikat, das gewissen Sachverhalten zugesprochen
werden kann. Ihnen dies Prädikat zusprechen heißt behaupten, daß sie in der Relation des Realgrundes zu
anderen Gegenständen stehen.” (p. 32) Henrich thus shows that Kant was already aware, in the 1760s, of
the necessary contribution of judgments to truth-claims. When we claim that one thing causes another, we
are applying a universal concept (causality itself) to a predicate. The location of this internally judgmental
activity as a problem for philosophy is the contribution of the early Kant to rationalism—and an early sign
of his impending successful attack on that system.
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This essay, which deals with proofs of God, contains a prologue on judgment to which I will restrict
myself here. For the scope and argumentation of the larger essay see Martin Schönfeld, The Philosophy of
the Young Kant: The Precritical Project (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 219 ff.
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Kant, Vorkritische Schriften II, pp. 635-6.
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possible human.”148 None of these marks (Merkmale) is sufficient to show that an object
is, and is not merely in potential.
These polemics are meant to justify the thesis of Der einzig mögliche Beweis:
“Das Dasein ist gar kein Prädikat oder Determination von irgend einem Dinge.”149
All of the properties of a being, even ones like position and time, can be thought together
and of a single being without deciding if it exists or not. Thus it cannot be merely the
addition of a predicate that makes something exist.
On the one hand, this raises a serious question about the nature of being, and if
Kant had been prepared to try questions of ontology on the terms set by his predecessors,
perhaps he would have given a definition. But on the other, this is precisely what he did
not do—instead, he focused his ontological investigation on a different problem: what is
being in judgment?150 With this question, Kant has shifted the grounds of ontological
debate: rather than defining or describing being, ontology must now include a reflectively
judgmental assessment of its own justification. This methodological requirement is the
most general version of what is often called Kant’s reduction of metaphysics to
epistemology. What is important to see is that he is not merely taking up the position that
we do not know what being is: he is encapsulating the question of the knowledge of
things in the question of the means of that knowledge. Thus, the first question to be
answered is the one about judgment, and Kant answers it as follows:
Das Dasein ist die absolute Position eines Dinges und unterscheidet sich dadurch auch
von jeglichem Prädikate, welches als ein solches jederzeit bloss beziehungsweise auf ein
ander Ding gesetzt wird. Der Begriff der Position oder Setzung ist völlig einfach, und mit
dem vom Sein überhaupt einerlei. Nun kann etwas als bloß beziehungsweise gesetzt, oder
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Kant, Vorkritische Schriften II, p. 636.
Kant, Vorkritische Schriften II, p. 630.
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Kant, Vorkritische Schriften II, p. 631: “Es ist aber das Dasein in denen Fällen, da es im gemeinen
Redegebrauch als ein Prädikat vorkömmt, nicht so wohl ein Prädikat von dem Dinge selbst, als vielmehr
von dem Gedanken, den man davon hat.”
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besser bloß die Beziehung (respectus logicus) von etwas als einem Merkmal zu einem
Dinge gedacht werden, und denn ist das Sein, das ist die Position dieser Beziehung nichts
als der Verbindungsbegriff in einem Urteile. Wird nicht bloß diese Beziehung, sondern
die Sache an und vor sich selbst gesetzt betrachtet, so ist dieses Sein so viel als Dasein.151

Reality as a judgmental category is “thesis,” and in this respect is not comparable to any
other predicate (which can be attached to the posited object). Being (Sein) is general
positing, while the local positing of a characteristic or a predicate makes the original
being into the background against which the synthetic activity of reality-positing works
its limited effect. When this relation is established and considered as a whole, the result is
Dasein.152 The positing, limiting, and resultant reality-effect in judgment is thus the
analysis by which we must get at ontological questions. There is no ontology except in
the form of judgment, and thus the search for a scientific ontology must go by way of
judgment.
Yet he has not determined precisely what conditions count as canonical for that
judgment’s validity. The question of synthesis still includes the possibility of an organon
for metaphysics, one functionally similar to the organ. In Blumenberg’s terms, Kant has
not yet given up on metaphysics in favor of metaphorics.153 Criticism was only one
possible narrowing of the methodological field of the pre-critical vision, one favoring a
metaphorics of the organ(on) to the exclusion of its potential metaphysics.
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Kant, Vorkritische Schriften II, p. 632.
This process is reflected in the KdrV in the categories of quality: the logical functions of quality
(“affirming,” “negating,” and “infinite”)—at B95/A70—become, in transcendental logic, reality, negation,
and limitation, the third of which is a combination of the first two— B106/A80.
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Note such hopeful statements as the following, from Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, usually taken to be the
most “critical” of the “pre”-critical works: "Wir müssen also warten, bis wir vielleicht in der künftigen
Welt durch neue Erfahrungen neue Begriffe von denen uns noch verborgenen Kräften in unserm denkenden
Selbst werden belehrt werden... dass es wohl am ratsamsten sei, wenn sie sich zu gedulden beliebten, bis sie
werden dahin kommen.” (AA II 373). The work speaks, of course, of metaphysics as the science of the
“limits” of human cognition—“In so fern ist die Metaphysik eine Wissenschaft von den Grenzen der
menschlichen Vernunft...” (AA II, p. 368)—but it is not yet clear what limits, and whether that limiting is
final for our cognition.
152
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A New Organon? Lambert’s Material Principles and the End of the Organon for
Metaphysics

In 1764, Johann Heinrich Lambert published his Neues Organon, defining:
Die Natur eines Organons bringt es an sich mit, daß es in jeden Theilen der menschlichen
Erkenntniß, und daher in jeden Wissenschaften angewandt werden könne, und daß man
in dem Gebrauche desselben eine Fertigkeit erlangen müsse, wenn man nicht zurücke
bleiben will.... Diese Voraussetzung ist um desto natürlicher, weil ein Organon, so weit
man es auch in den Wissenschaften bringt, immer aufs neue anwendbar ist.154

An organon—the tool for a discipline—is essentially a matter of application, indeed of
invention, proceeding always synthetically to the new. It is a necessity for the practitioner
because it bridges the gap between theoretical and pragmatic knowledge.
In the case of Lambert, the organon should help us to bridge the gap Kant was
struggling with: we should arrive at a genetic picture of the categories of human
understanding, including our knowledge of the material world, and that picture should put
our knowledge on sure speculative footing.155 Indeed, in doing so, Lambert included a
class of judgments that would become paramount for Kant, a class he too had been
probing in the 1760s with relatively little progress: “material” judgments, or those
judgments which did not stand under the principle of contradiction.
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Johann Heinrich Lambert, Neues Organon, “Vorrede,” (pages unnumbered).
Beck notes (Early German Philosophy, p. 404) that Lambert had described the addition of intuition and
construction to philosophical method in a letter to Kant of 3 February 1766 (X, 64, Kants ges. Schriften).
Lamber had read Euclid and realized that his method differed from Wolff’s precisely with respect to the
initial inclusion of intuitive materials in his constructions. He thus meant to combine genetic method
(Locke) and analysis (Leibniz/Wolff), thinking he would arrive either way at simple concepts. Beck writes
of Crusius, Lambert, and Tetens collectively: “Perhaps their most important contribution, therefore, was to
use openly a kind of connection between concepts which Wolff had used surreptitiously but which Hume
seemed to show to be impossible.” (p. 412) Crusius and Lambert realized there was a class of necessary
judgments not based on the principle of non-contradiction. They could “not be thought otherwise.” “But
neither Crusius nor Lambert nor the young Kant knew how to establish necessary judgments which were
not logically grounded in the laws of identity and contradiction, how they could be systematically
discovered, or how to justify their application to reality.” (p. 421)
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Kant had already very early separated between “logical” and “material” truths,
and indeed sought a principle to unite them.156,157 He thus recognized that Lambert’s
efforts were connected to his, for Lambert had sought a manner—or better, a tool—for
understanding the application of judgments and concepts and intuitions to their putative
objects. He called this tool an organon. Lambert began a short correspondence with Kant,
one which, while not producing the intended collaboration between the authors, bears the
traces of a sharpening of Kant’s notion of the “material” of judgments, and shows us the
historical reason for his rejection of the term organon in the KdrV.
On 13 November 1765 Lambert wrote to Kant, acknowledging the overlap
between their methodological projects. Having read Kant’s Der einzige mögliche Beweis
(and having clearly focused on the material I have presented above), Lambert addressed
the issue of the application and origin or the non-logical elements of our judgments: we
must indeed seek amongst the first principles of human cognition, and
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Crusius’s had been found lacking, although his virtue was at least to have addressed the issue. Crusius
uses the measure, “was ist nicht anders als wahr denken kann, das ist wahr.” Kant agrees with him that
many “material” conditions of truth have been passed over by the Wolffians, but points out that this is not a
Grund but only a rule for determining what is true. See Kant, Vorkritische Schriften II, pp. 765-7.
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Already in the Nova Dilucidatio (1755), Kant had marked out this problematic: “Vires certe spirituum et
earum ad ulteriores perfectiones perennatura progressio hac lege exemptae esse videntur. Sed, quod mihi
quidem persuasum est, eidam adstrictae sunt. Procul dbio infinita, quae semper animae interne praesto est,
quanquam obscura admodum totius universi perceptio, quicquid cogitationibus postmodum maiore luce
perfundendis inesse debet realitatis, iam in se continet, et mens attentionem tantummodo postmodum
quibusdam advertendo, dum aliquibus parem detrahit gradum, illas intensiori lumine collustrans, maiori in
dies potitur cognitione, non ambitum quidem realitatis absolutae extendens, (quippe materiale idearum
omnium e nexu cum universo profectum manet idem), sed formale, quod consistit in notione combinatione
earum vel diversitati vel conenientiae applicata attentione, varie certe permutatur.”
[“Gewiß scheinen die Kräfte der Geister und ihre andauernde Steigerung zu weiteren Vollkommenheiten
von diesem Gesetz ausgenommen zu sein. Aber, nach meiner Überzeugung wenigstens, sind sie daran
gebunden. Zweifellos enthält der unendliche Begriff des ganzen Alls, der der Seele immer innerlich,
wenngleich nur dunkel gegenwärtig ist, schon alles in sich, was den Gedanken, auf die später ein größeres
Licht fallen soll, an Realität innewohnen muß, und die Erkenntniskraft gewinnt, indem sie später die
Aufmerksamkeit lediglich einigen zuwendet und, während sie anderen den gleichen Grad entzieht, sie mit
einem stärkeren Licht beleuchte, eine täglich größere Erkenntnis, wobei sie zwar nicht den Umfang der
unbedingten Realität ausdehnt (denn das Materiale aller Vorstellungen, das aus der Verknüpfung mit dem
All hervorgegangen ist, bleibt dasselbe), aber das Formale, das in der Vereinigung der Begriffe und der auf
ihre Verschiedenheit oder Übereinstimmung gerichteten Aufmerksamkeit besteht, gewiß mannigfach
verändert wird.”] (Vorkritische Schriften I, pp. 478/80//479/81.)
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… zwar nicht nur die Principia, welches von der Form hergenommene Gründe sind,
sondern auch die Axiomata, die von der Materie selbst hergenommen warden müßen, und
eigentlich nur bey den einfachen Begriffen, als die für sich nicht widersprechend und für
sich gedenkbar sind, vorkommen, und die Postulata, welche allgemeine und unbedingte
Möglichkeiten der Zusammensetzung und Verbindung der einfachen Begriffe angeben.
Von der Form allein kommt man zu keener Materie, und man bleibt im idealen, und in
bloßen Terminologien stecken, wenn man sich nicht um das erste und für sich
Gedenkbare der Materie oder des obiectiuen Stoffes der Erkenntnis umsieht.158

Lambert’s attempt to agree with Kant reveals two terminological faultlines with
methodological consequences, pointing up both the true openness of Kant’s early
systematic writings and his departure from Lambert’s approach. On the one hand, the
problem of the “material” in judgments is a matter of true agreement between the two
thinkers: it is not obvious which principles can legitimately be used in such judgments.
The obvious need to exclude the principles of logic was already in the rationalist
tradition—but what other principle (or axioms) could be used?159 Lambert suggested the
answer should be sought in judgmental syntax160: the way we produce and synthesize
“simple concepts” (imagined, with Locke, as immediate qualia, like extension, duration,
existence, motion, etc) is our true source—our true instrument—for legitimizing
cognitive claims.
On the one hand, this system or organon addressed a problem Kant had identified
as unaddressed across the spectrum of contemporary philosophy: the problem of the
forms of judgment insofar as they were applied to “material” and not merely other
judgments or concepts. Indeed, it seems Kant was prepared to pursue this path a great
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AA X 52.
For a general account of the particular categories in the pre-critical period, see Heinz Heimsoeth, “Zur
Herkunft und Entwicklung von Kants Kategorientafel,” Kant-Studien Ergänzungsheft 100 (1970), 109-32.
160
He uses this term in the same letter (AA X 64-66), where he puts the problem in the following words:
“Wenn auch die Form schlechthin keine Materie bestimmt, so bestimmt sie doch die Anordnung
derselben.” Proceeding from “simple concepts,” Lambert claims that the possibility of their connection
must be included within them. Thus, the genetic investigation of these simples and the manners of their
connection will be the Organon itself, determining what is true (alethiology), separating truths and
falsehoods in perception (phenomenology), determining word-use and the rules for symbolic cognition
(semiotics), and (chronologically first, and closest to Kant’s concerns), establishing the general rules of
thought (dianoiology).
159
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distance. Yet he perceived something else, yet another hidden assumption—in fact, the
same assumption merely transferred to the area both men thought might hold the solution.
This hidden assumption was that somehow this judgmental syntax also could justify the
isomorphism it claimed between the concepts it dealt in and their real-world referents.
While Lambert had gone to great trouble to analyze just that piece of the rationalist
puzzle Kant thought undertreated, he had simply put the assumption Kant wanted
addressed into that syntax: the organon synthesized, producing real metaphysical
knowledge, but it did so—as Kant would later put it—dogmatically.
This dogmatism is the reason for Kant’s rejection of the very term organon in the
KdrV. And indeed, by the time Kant came to name this problem left unaddressed by
Lambert (the problem, that is, of the legitimate application of judgment to the material of
experience), he had a new term for it, under which a new concept of the “material” was
housed. The term was “transcendental logic,” and the conception of the “material” had
been reduced to the “material of sensation” as it was received by the cognizer and
(pre)organized into intuitions (Anschauungen).
What Kant calls “transcendental logic”161 is that specific logic for which the
canon of the understanding (which we are about to explore) replaces the organon of
reason (Lambert’s dogmatic judgmentalism), and thus the point at which the
metaphysical reduction of Criticism is performed—as Kant puts its, where “the proud
name of ontology giving way to a mere analytic of the understanding.”162 But this
moment of grandiose theoretical creation—a confluence of efforts with effects almost
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Defined in the Notes: “Transcendental logic deals with cognitions of the understanding with respect to
their content, but without determination with regard to the way in which objects are given.” (This is from
the Duisburg Nachlass, note 4675, 20 May 1775 (10:182). Immanuel Kant, Notes and Fragments, transls.
Paul Guyer et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 163.
162
KdrV B303/A247.
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literally unparalleled in the history of philosophy—really included two innovations
which, for the next generation, did not seem necessarily linked. On the one hand, the
efforts to produce criticism had shown that attention to the dynamic interactions between
concepts and judgments were a condition of serious metaphysical efforts. And indeed, as
the conversation with Lambert had shown, analysis was not enough: some warrant was
needed for the ontological security of these investigations. On the other hand, the Critical
system included a specific source for that security: the intuition, modeled on the space
and time of the geometers and astronomers, but formed in fact as a primitive element of
our own cognition.163 Thus, when Kant came to reject Lambert’s organon of reason for
his own “canon of the understanding,” he was combining a generic philosophical creation
(the pre-critical analysis of concepts and judgments combined with a sense of the need
for warrant) with a determinate version of that genre—one we might call “intuitionism.”
Although the pre-critical writings were unavailable to them, it is a strange achievement of
the Romantics to have separated out these two elements and to have pursued the original
project on different terms. They thus expanded the genre of “Criticism” without agreeing
with Kant’s own version of it.

The Canon of the Understanding
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This doctrine is what Kant calls “transcendental idealism,” the notion that time and space are the a
priori or necessary forms of our intuitions, but have no (certain) claim on whatever the “material” of
sensation is, i.e. cannot be said by us to be a necessary element of things-in-themselves. I have found
Michael Friedman most helpful on this issue: Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992), pp. 1-55.
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According to Paul Guyer, the signal contribution of the KdrV is the “invention of
the understanding,” der Verstand.164 What then is then understanding, and why does Kant
attach to it a canon rather than an organon? As we have seen, the organon was
historically articulated as a dumb instrument, a tool to which the problems of method in
metaphysics had been merely transferred. Kant’s own attempt to solve this problem went,
after 1769, by way of the elaboration of a fundamentally different kind of knowing he
came to call intuition (Anschauung).
The separation of two “roots” of our cognition165 was, in fact, a response to
rationalism, for which, as we have seen, knowing exists in a continuum rising from
obscurity to adequacy. Starting in 1770, however, with his Inaugural Dissertation, Kant
disagreed: presentational knowledge of concrete phenomena was a different basic source
(Grundquelle) for knowledge than the concepts and judgments he had been so focused on
in the 60s. It is important to see that this is a specification of the search for “material
principles” in judgments. Indeed, the Dissertation is famous for just this, the first
statement of “transcendental idealism,” the doctrine that the forms of intuition (space and
time) are necessary but ultimately cognizer-based elements of phenomena, not of
“things” as they “are” or noumena. In one sense, Kant is saying to Lambert (obliquely)
“yes, basic concepts, unanalyzables: but why are we calling these “concepts” at all?”166
This is a moment in which Kant departs from his rationalist tendencies and training,
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See Guyer, Claims, pp. 18 ff.
The “transcendental logic” opens with: “Unsre Erkenntnis entspringt aus zwei Grundquellen des
Gemüts, deren die erste ist, die Vorstellungen zu empfangen (die Rezeptivität der Eindrücke), die zweite
das Vermögen, durch diese Vorstellungen einen Gegenstand zu erkennen (Spontaneität der Begriffe); durch
die erstere wird uns ein Gegenstand gegeben, durch die zweite wird dieser im Verhältnis auf jene
Vorstellung (also bloße Bestimmung des Gemüts) gedacht. Anschauung und Begriffe machen also die
Elemente aller unsrer Erkenntnis aus, so daß weder Begriffe, ohne ihnen auf einige Art korrespondierende
Anschauung, noch Anshcauung ohne Begriffe, ein Erkenntnis abgeben können.” (KdrV B74/A50)
166
Recall that amongst Lambert’s concepts, “duration” and “extension” figure—as they would continue to
for Herder, following this middle-phase rationalism.
165
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permanently giving up on the putative rationality of things (while not abandoning our
potential rationality). As Giorgio Tonelli has put it, the realization of 1769 was that of the
“separation of sensibility from the understanding.”167 As Tonelli recognizes, Kant is
asking a question about the legitimacy of “non-rational” judgments, or judgments not
deriving their truth from logical statements. The result is that, in addition to the “syntax”
offered by Lambert, there is a “parataxis” offered by another source: the intuition. The
intuition functions to offer us the singularity and particularity of the object-world, not, as
Tonelli puts it, “well-founded phenomenon” (Leibniz’s phaenomena bene fundata) but a
“phenomenal generality.”168
This doctrine of intuition does not solve the problem Kant was asking with
Lambert, but it does specify what kind of combinative effort is taking place in “material”
judgments. What Kant calls “transcendental logic” or the “canon of the understanding,” is
the manner of syntactic judgmental application of concepts to the “material” of intuition.
Thus, defining that discipline, Kant writes (much as he had in the Announcement of 1765)
that there is pure logic—a “catharcticon” [sic] of the common understanding abstracting
from all content in favor of the purely formal—and “applied logic,” the specific logics of
different disciplines. Further, there is that mixed breed we identified above as the specific
logic of generality itself. That logic is called “transcendental” because it neither deals in
mere empirical experiences nor in relations of ideas: it treats the possibility of the
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Giorgio Tonelli, “Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant,” Kant-Studien (54) 1963, pp. 369-75, here p. 369.
Tonelli’s article is deservedly a classic in the field, but tends to treat the progression from “material
principles” to “intuitions” as an analytical achievement rather than a limiting specification, as I think here.
168
Tonelli, “Umwälzung,” pp. 371-2. In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant completes the intuitionist insight,
the concrete condition of possibility of knowledge for which he had been searching. And yet this condition
is never the instrument for which he had been searching. The organon becomes the canon in the KdrV,
where in the Inaugural Dissertation pure intellectual knowledge is still entertained precisely in this
function: “Mathesis itaque pura, omnis nostrae senstitivae cognitionis formam exponens, est cuiuslibet
intuitivae et distinctae cognitionis organon…” (AA II, pp. 397-8)

!

!!79!
!
application of the latter to the former.169 There will ultimately be twelve functions
allowing this application, and they are dubbed “the categories.”
Transcendental logic is the name for the discipline of the understanding itself, and
its content is the “canon” of that understanding. Kant takes the word “canon” in its
traditional sense—“body of positive law”—and thereby restricts what he had found in
Lambert to be a synthetic rational organon. This reduction is at stake in the
metaphorology of epigenesis. That metaphor is, in fact, a characterization of the status of
the canon: autonomously truthful, fully legitimate, and given in its form without rational
insight into its origin. Judgments gain validity through the canon, the means by which
categories functionally unify concepts and judgments. And this sort of activity is the only
kind which counts as cognition: we are, in fact, capable of many other types of
intellectual and volitional activities (indeed, we are capable in this way because our truly
cognitive, or constitutive, activity is limited thus)—but they not make up the world we
experience, they do not “give nature the law,” in the famous formulation. That work is
done by the epigenetically metaphorized bearer of “being” itself: the understanding. As
we saw above, that understanding is autonomous and self-formed, yet its form, being
given, is “generically pre-formed.” Where, in the KU Kant approvingly reproaches
Blumenbach for giving a name to problem without analyzing that problem—thereby
shifting a charge to Blumenbach that Blumenbach himself had leveled against Wolff—
Kant seems to reproduce the problem in the intertwined realm of epistemology and
ontology here. The understanding’s form—the categories ruled by the unity of the “I
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169

That is, it treats not the content of intuitions (immanent) nor the potentially transcendent “ideas” of
reason, but the way in which concepts play a role in the establishment of experience itself, that is: “nur die
Erkenntnis, daß diese Vorstellungen gar nicht empirischen Ursprungs sind, und die Möglichkeit, wie sie
sich grleichwohl a priori auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung beziehen können.” (KdrV B81/A56)

!

!!80!
!
think” and in exclusive application to intuitions—is the law of cognition, but its origin
remains obscure.

Canonical Cognition: The Deduction Between the Void and Brute Fact

The canon-law of the understanding provided legitimacy but relinquished the
principled search for reason’s grounding at precisely that moment where it touched upon
the real: neither at the pole of the “thing in itself” nor at the ultimate origin of the intellect
could determinate grounds be given for or by the intellect. The human cognizer, as the
anthropological discourse of the 18th century had it, was a “middle-being,” caught
between the twin unrationalizable extremes of the noumenal “world” and the noumenal
“soul.” This, in fact, was the message of the Transcendental Deduction itself: between the
sempiternal fact of judgment (the “I think” with its capacity to accompany any cognition)
and the synthetic unity170 of intuitions as they are received contingently by us cognizers,
the understanding does its legitimate unifying work. This is the realm of the properly
human judgment about the world—the answer to the problem of “material” judgments,
written as a judgmental capacity, indeed, the judgmental human capacity.171 That
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The “I think” establishes “analytic unity”—that the whole of my perception is included under the mark
of that apperceptive judgment—while the intuited matter presents a “synthetic” unity, unified amongst
itself and genuinely informative for the apperceptive being (I). As Paul Guyer puts it: “He then argues that
the “I think” of pure apperception “must be able to accompany all my representations,” and that it too must
be the product of an “act of spontaneity,” or more speciﬁcally express not merely an analytic unity among
my representations – that is, that they each severally belong to me – but a synthetic unity among them, that
they each belong to me because of some substantive connection among all of them, which is itself the
product of an act of synthesis on the part of my understanding (§16, B131–3).” (Paul Guyer. “The
Deduction of the Categories: The Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions,” in ed. Paul Guyer,
The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), pp. 118-51), here p. 140.
171
The reading that emphasizes this element of Kant’s doctrine most is Béatrice Longuenesse’s in her Kant
and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic in the Critique of
Pure Reason, transl. Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Her focuse is based

!

!!81!
!
capacity, whatever its origin, is characterized as the “epigenesis of pure reason,” a
designation of the fundamental spontaneity of the capacity to judge (the understanding)
as the type-basis on which experience (combinations of concept and intuition) would
“develop.” This term thus places experience foremost in the methodological register—at
least one of Kant’s lines of thinking is simply devoted to the analysis of experience—and
curbs investigation into the ends that form this experiential middle. In biology, the
ultimate source of type is not knowable—in epistemology, the same is true of the
ultimate source of our sensibility (in particular) and our categories. Critical procedure
must start medias in res, taking the formative middle as its most basic object of
investigation.
That fundamentally middle status was curiously formed as an inheritance from the
17th-century’s logical tradition. When we attend to Kant’s final table of capacities
(Vermögen), we find that, after “intuition” (the independence of which had been
championed by Baumgarten, but the specific constitution of which was original to
Criticism), the “understanding” and “reason” are written in accord with a discourse
stretching back to the Port Royal Logic. Here we find—as we do with Kant—that the
“understanding” consists in simple propositions, essentially the predication of concepts
one to the other, while “reason” deals in syllogisms, in the reflective action of judgments
on judgments. As in the course of the KdrV we leave the realm of the simple, constitutive
judgments making up the understanding, we enter a realm of complex syllogistic
judgmental stylings fundamentally connected to that simpler realm but also removed
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on Kant’s definition of the understanding as das Vermögen zu urteilen. I share her sense that the epigenesis
metaphor reflects this inscrutable combinative capacity, but I think the Romantics were less than satisfied
with what she calls the “human standpoint.” They were fascinated by the judgmentalism, but thought that it
was in direct conflict with the doctrine of intuition. See also Longuenesse’s Kant on the Human Standpoint
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), esp. pp. 17-81.
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from it by the absence of that element, intuition, which had conferred secure status on the
former. Kant calls this unintuitable realm that of the “ideas”—a basically “dialectical” or
truthless place which can only be regulated, not known. This was his name for those
disciplines—rational psychology, cosmology, and rational theology—which were known,
in the Wolffian system, as “special metaphysics.”
But it is the transition to that realm of ideas that interests us here, for it is at that
moment, where the possibility of intuition falls away and the formal similarity of
judgments, whether those of the understanding or those of reason, comes to light.
The KdrV is a notoriously difficult book, but there is one confused issue that
derives, I think, from the “specification”-thesis I have offered above. The Transcendental
Deduction is plagued by a central difficulty: it is meant to provide information about how
we legitimately separate between “objectively valid” and other types of judgments.
Having stated in the lead-up to the argument that the understanding is itself the “capacity
for judging,” and that the categories are the functions of unification within that
judgmental sphere, Kant has circumscribed his argument with a focus on judgment that,
as we have seen, goes back to the 1760s. The unifying functions (Kant groups twelve
categories under four headings: quantity, quality, relation, and modality) must be seen, in
the course of the argument, to apply to any and all experience we might have. Because
the “I think” is attachable to any cognitive content, Kant is at pains to describe the
relationship of the categories to the “I think” (which is termed the “transcendental unity
of apperception”—which means, in English, the unity of consciousness which is a
condition for our awareness of anything at all). As Paul Guyer has observed, the different
versions of the Deduction follow different strategies. The B edition of 1787, however,
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attempts to prove that this link between the functions of unity and the sempiternality of
the unity of apperception conditions all our experience, intuitive or not (although nonintuitive experience doesn’t count as constitutive knowledge of the world).172 Here the
argument hits a kind of snag, however: if that link operates (and operates legitimately)
outside the intuitive sphere, then the “objective validity” of its claims seems to derive
ultimately from judgment itself, in its connection to consciousness (in its judgmental,
apperceptive form). This leaves us, to use contemporary language, “spinning in a void,”
unsure on the question of to what our judgments might apply. Kant never goes the full
way towards this argument, as, for example, the “Refutation of Idealism” shows, arguing
for the necessity of the presented object-world for the very syntax of judgment we are
otherwise exploring in itself.173 On the other hand, if this presentation-in-intuition, and
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As Paul Guyer explains: “But Kant’s language throughout the Transcendental Deduction, even if not in
these initial programmatic statements, makes it clear that the goal of the argument is to establish more than
that the pure concepts of the understanding that are discovered through reﬂection on the logical structure of
judgments have “objective reality” in the sense of having some legitimate application, which could easily
be demonstrated by showing that we have at least some knowledge of objects somewhere in our
experience; in fact, what Kant wants to demonstrate is that these concepts necessarily apply to any and all
experience that we might have, which is what he actually means by saying that he wants to demonstrate the
“objective validity” or “lawfulness” of these concepts… The strategy of the Transcendental Deduction is
then to demonstrate that the use of the categories is the necessary condition of transcendental apperception,
of the ascription of any of one’s representations to the one and the same self that is the subject of all of
one’s representations. The obscurity of both of Kant’s versions of the Deduction, however, arises from the
fact that in neither version does Kant execute this strategy very clearly: he does not succesfully exploit the
“clue” to the discovery of the categories by clearly expounding the connection between apperception and
judgment. More precisely, in the ﬁrst-edition version of the Deduction, Kant omits any explicit account of
the connection between apperception and judgment, while in the second edition, clearly having become
aware of this problem in the interval, Kant burdens his argument with a problematic conception of
judgment itself and an account of the connection between apperception and judgment that undercuts the
original premise of the ubiquity of apperception itself.”” (Guyer, “Transcendental Deduction,” pp. 121,
123)
173
Guyer: “Whatever the details, the Refutation is clearly supposed to work by showing that empirical selfconsciousness actually consists in judgments about the relations of one’s own experiences in time that in
turn depend upon judgments about the temporal relations of external objects distinct from one’s own
representations of them, and if – following the clue suggested by the relation of the two halves of the
second-edition Transcendental Deduction – the empirical self-consciousness of the Refutation is taken to be
the empirical realization of the abstract concept of transcendental apperception, then the result of the
Refutation would be to demonstrate that apperception ultimately consists in judgments about the self that
use the categories and that in turn depend upon judgments about objects outside the self that use the
categories. On this account, the difference between transcendental and empirical apperception would not be
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not the link between the categories and apperception, is the measure of validity, then the
stated argument of the Deduction fails, since its conclusion will only be valid in and
because of the nature of our intuitionism. Kant, then, is here forced to make a decision
between judgmentalism and intuitionism—just at the moment when the two are supposed
to be epigenetically combined,174 the absence of a principled knowledge of the origins of
the form of the understanding—that is, the absence of a genetic account of the categories
themselves—undermines the argument at its apex. If we go the intuitionist route, we get
the so-called “schematism” of the next section of the Analytic, in which the arguments of
the Aesthetic cash out: the categories, as they are combined with the conditions of time
especially, give rise to fundamental “schemata” which are used to make sense of the
world’s lawfulness. The conceptual contribution to experience is secured, but only for a
world in which we are finally beings of intuition.
The attractiveness of this argument notwithstanding, it does not respond to the
stated intent of the Deduction. It is not trivial that the latter is meant to prove that the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
a distinction between two numerically distinct forms of self-consciousness, but rather the difference
between an abstract characterization of the unity of self-consciousness and its concrete realization.” (Guyer,
“Transcendental Deduction,” p. 149)
174
Longuenesse, Human Standpoint, p. 29, argues that it is this combinative ability that “generates” the
categories from the mixture of intuition’s empirical constraints and the ability to judge spontaneously as
such: “What makes the generation of the categories unique is that although they are generated (both as rules
for synthesis and as discursive concepts) only under empirical conditions, their content is determined
independently of these empirical conditions and, indeed, is an a priori condition for the generation of any
representation of empirical objects at all.” This reading seems correct to me—both its metaphorological and
systematic consequences were matters of disatisfaction in the next generation. In Kant and the Capacity to
Judge, she had written: “Where the categories are concemed, I understand this model in the following
manner: the categories are the “germ” which is present from the outset in experience, but which only
discursive reflection can transform into a “developed organism”–namely, universal concepts governing a
system of cognitions according to principles. I have extended the model of epigenesis to the forms of
intuition, although Kant does not explicitly use the term in this case. Here, the “germ” is what I have called
the “potentiality of form” contained in receptivity and thus in the manifold that it “gives.” The developed
organism is the form of sensible intuition or of appearances, “developed” under the influence of both outer
affection (impressions) and the affection of spontaneity (the figurative synthesis).” (Longuenesse, Kant and
the Capacity to Judge, pp. 221-22, footnote 17.) I think that what is “developed” epigenetically is the
judgment’s result: experience. To the extent that Longuenesse is detailing the features of that experience as
a priori forms that develop from the germ, I am in agreement.
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categories apply to all experience of any kind—in fact, this argument grounds the
separation between the understanding and reason, since they are on its basis a single
capacity applied to different material (intuitions, on the one hand, and judgments
themselves on the other). This formal similarity would be undermined if the categories
were only valid under the conditions of intuition (and this would also arose the suspicion
that the categories are empirically derived, which is clearly unallowable). Thus Kant’s
opposing argument, the one which comes closest to judgmentalism: that even the
synthetic unity of intuitions is ultimately grounded in the transcendental unity of
apperception. This argument, running as it does the other way, is a re-statement of the
early concern that, whatever the content and rules of material judgment (that is, whatever
kind of world passes before us and whatever categories we have to apply to it),
ultimately, our paradigmatically rational minds control cognition. When we see that our
capacity in this respect is essentially a matter of judgment, we see that judgment itself
must play the role of truth-warrant if the understanding is to remain autonomous
(according to the epigenesis-metaphor). Again, however, this leaves us in danger of
“spinning in a void,” a void that cannot be filled out with some source of factual warrant
without, as Kant had observed from the beginning, stripping us of our autonomous truthperceiving faculty, the understanding itself.
Since it is clear that the Romantics approached this problem with judgment and
intellect in mind most centrally, I will treat the potential judgmentalism of the KdrV here.
I realize that I break from Kant in doing so175: his Critique is literally meant to to hang in
suspension, as it were, between the organic autonomy of the metaphor of epigenesis and
the fixed forms of the categories. The balance is meant to provide a rational system to
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explore the empirical world, and to orient ourselves in the non-empirical. Its focus on
judgment as the central authority in methodology, however, bore different fruit in the
next generation. Thus we can say that, running against the textual grain of Kantian
history, the Romantics actually analyzed out the impulse towards judgment-based
idealism from the KdrV, and abandoned the finalism of intuitionism. In Kantian terms of,
this represents a return not to one of the sources of cognition (concepts and intuitions) but
to the methodological impulse which treats primarily their unification in judgment. It
meant reaching backwards to the impulse that resulted in the specific form of the Critical
system, to mine this impulse for new theoretical and pragmatic insights. It meant finding,
in the methodological version of the metaphorology of the organ, a metaphysics of
organological judgment. The Romantics de-specified the Critical system and located the
methodological motivator which had instigated Kant’s life-work. And in elaborating a
generically related but systematically different philosophy, they drew not only on their
own insights, but also on hints, in both Kant and Herder, of the possibility of an
organology.

The Organ of Judgment: On the Split between the Understanding and Reason

We have now explored the metaphorology of the organ in two respects, both of
which restrict the possibility of organology. In Leibniz, we saw a metaphysical use
opening to a metaphor, both of which keep the technological term in the boundaries of a
pre-established order, a mere instrument. In Kant, we saw a methodological flirtation
with the term organon, combining in its very rejection in the KdrV with the metaphor of
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epigenesis to describe the intellect itself. In its restriction to intuitive experience and its
autonomous yet fixedly formed categorical apparatus, this understanding was awarded
only a canon, not, as Lambert had wanted, an organon. Being was proscribed from
judgment, literally written out of cognition itself.
Or was it? On the one hand, Kant had thrown out the traditional category of being
as the “thing in itself” as a mere putative assertion, the essence, in fact, of dogmatism.176
The world in its materiality was unrationalizeable, while our cognition was, up to the
generic limitation of the epigenetic understanding, fully rational. On the other hand, the
very categories that made up that rationality had to include at least the assertion of being.
Kant brought this element into his system under the heading of the categories of
“modality,” and they were treated as a special case from the very beginning.
Recall that the categories are not concepts (as in the somewhat misleading phrase,
“pure concepts of the understanding”), but rather functions of unification (of concepts
and intuitions) in judgment. The categories are literally the instruments of that
judgmental apparatus which Kant had found so woefully undertreated in the philosophies
he had been weaned on. In the Introduction’s famous distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments, judgment itself is first characterized. Analytic judgments merely
analyze their concepts—Kant calls them “explicative.” Synthetic judgments deserve their
name because they add information to their components, furthering our knowledge. (Thus
the famous formulation of the metaphysical judgment: synthetic a priori, or both
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It was Jacobi who first drew attention to this problematic, stating famously that he could not enter the
Critical system with the thing-in-itself, but could not remain in it without it. See “Über den
transzendentalen Idealismus,” appended to David Hume über den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realismus
(Breslau: Loewe, 1787), pp. 209-30.
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informative and necessary.) Here, a surprising formulation occurs: describing the
synthetic judgment a posteriori that “bodies are heavy,” Kant points out that
Es is also die Erfahrung, worauf sich die Möglichkeit der Synthesis des Prädikats der
Schwere mit dem Begriffe des Körpers gründet, weil beide Begriffe, ob zwar einer
nicht in dem andern enthalten ist, dennoch als Teile eines Ganzen, nämlich der
Erfahung, die selbst eine synthetische Verbindung der Anschauungen ist, zu
einander, wiewohl nur zufälliger Weise, gehören.177

If we abstract momentarily from the doctrinal point Kant is making (that the tertium
comparationis of a posteriori predication is experience itself), we can notice that the
concept of experience in this passage is 1) a matter of judgment and 2) that that judgment
operates as a synthetic whole. A synthetic whole, however, is no mere “aggregate”: it
does not operate according to the mechanical laws of juxtaposition or mere parataxis.
Instead, this synthetic whole itself shares a quality with the concept of the organic whole
we above saw treated in Kant’s analysis in the CPJ of the epigenesis-debate: true
synthetic holism attaches to both concepts. A characteristic of internal equilibrium, of
necessary connection obtains in both cases. And while the causal model projected within
constitutive judgments about the world is paradigmatically mechanical, the relation of
parts to wholes within the judgment cannot be. If it were, no synthesis would take place:
our “knowledge” of the world would have to be pre-implanted, as it was for Leibniz (so
Kant) and for Crusius. That this is not so gives us the hint of a methodology immanent to
judgment.
This turn of phrase—it is little more—becomes something like an undercurrent in
the argument of the text when Kant approaches the problem of judgment-internal
assertion of being, or the categories grouped under the heading “modality.” We saw the
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roots of this approach in Der einzig mögliche Beweis, but here the argument is put in
quasi-metaphorical terms that point up a possible organicity of judgment itself.
The categories of modality are “problematic, assertoric, apodictic.”178 Kant
immediately marks them as separate:
Die Modalität der Urteile ist eine ganz besondre Funktion derselben, die das
Unterscheidende an sich hat, daß sie nichts zum Inhalte der Urteile beiträgt… sondern
nur den Wert der Kopula in Beziehung auf das Denken überhaupt angeht.179

Judgments as to the possibility, existence, or necessity of those things asserted in
judgment are both circumscribed as to their dogmatic contents (things-in-themselves are
not determined by such judgments) and also express a relationship to the whole of
thought. This is (yet) another way of expressing the basic reduction of metaphysical
claims that the Critiques are meant to systematize: while “being” cannot be determined in
any way by cognition, cognition’s rules determine, at some level, the manner of assertion
of being itself. Two mereologies, then: that of the synthesis of judgments themselves, and
that of the relation of a set of their unifying functions (categories) to the totality of human
cognitive activity.
This line of thinking continues when Kant comes to apply the categories to
empirical experience in the section on “schematism.” The notion here is that each
category generates a set of “schemata” in combination with the strictures of the a priori
form of intuition for the inner sense (time). These schemata are transcendental: without
this overlay of pictures, recognition of individual objects (and judgmental subsumption of
the same under concepts—“this is a plate”) could not occur. With respect to modality, the
schemata are: 1) possibility as “the agreement of the synthesis of differing representations
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with the overall conditions of time”; 2) existence as “being in a determinate time”; and 3)
necessity as “being (of an object) at all times.”180 These schemata are meant to determine
the Zeitinbegriff (roughly, the “essence of time-content”181) of all possible objects. They
express the determining and determinate set of possible relations of judgmental assertion
to the whole of cognition (here restricted to intuitive cognition).
Recall that we are, for judgmentalist purposes, abstracting from the content of
“time” that here takes the lead in determining the form of the categories. As Kant’s
argument continues, he deepens this relationship, establishing a “system of principles” on
the basis of the transcendental schematism. These principles (of judgment) fall into
“mathematical” (or intuitively determinative)—the categories of quantity and quality—
and “dynamic”—the categories of relation and modality. The latter are dynamic because
they do not determine the form of our experience but are applied according to rules
(regulatively) as the flow of our experience demands. They go, as Kant puts it, to the
existence (das Dasein) of the objects of experience. The categories of modality are, in
this context, the basis for the “postulates of empricial thinking in general.” That is to say,
we assert, more or less in a void, the possibility, reality, and necessity of the objects of
experience according to the rules of the a priori form of time.182,183 In this context again,
Kant writes that:
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KdrV B184/A144-5.
KdrV B185/A145. Guyer translates “sum total of time” (Kant, Critique, p. 276).
182
Which latter element is supposed to take us out of the void: but as Kant himself puts it, the point of
calling them “postulates” is to indicate their independence from empirical experience: “Die Grundsätze der
Modalität sind aber nicht objektiv-synthetisch, weil die Prädikate der Möglichkeit, Wirklichkeit und
Notwendigkeit den Begriff, von dem sie gesagt werden, nicht im mindesten vermerhen, dadurch daß sie der
Vorstellung des Gegenstandes noch etwas hinzusetzen. Da sie aber bleichwohl doch immer synthetisch
sind, so sind sie es nur subjektiv, d.i. sie fügen zu dem Begriffe eines Dinges (Realen), von dem sie sonst
nichts sagen, die Erkenntniskraft hinzu, worin er entspringt und seinen Sitz hat, so, daß, wenn er bloß im
Verstande mit den formalen Bedingungen der Erfahrung in Verknüpfung ist, sein Gegenstand möglich
heißt; ist er mit der Wahrnehmung (Empfindung, als Materie der Sinne) im Zusammenhange, und durch
181
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Die Kategorien der Modalität haben das besondere an sich: daß sie den Begriff, dem sie
als Prädikate beigefügt warden, als Bestimmung des Objekts nicht im mindesten
vermehren, sondern nur das Verhältnis zum Erkenntnisvermögen ausdrücken.184

Even in the most intuitionist portion of the KdrV, then, Kant continues at the level of his
text to assert the doubly mereological nature of judgment and its cognizing agent (its
“faculty”), asserting thereby the liminal organicity of his synthetic model of judgment
itself.
This argument—or discursive strategy—cashes out only in the opening of the
Transcendental Dialectic, where Kant explores the transition of cognitive function from
constitutive, world-based, intuitively secure judgments to those of a more reflexive
nature, judgments about the non-intuitable “absolute wholes” of special metaphysics: the
soul, the cosmos, and God.
Where the understanding was defined as the faculty of “rules,” reason is defined
as the unifying faculty of “principles.” And indeed, the unity it imposes is not on nature
(the understanding has already done this), but on the understanding itself. Its action is to
unify and systematize, and its form of knowledge is always proposed as a “cognition
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dieselebe vermittelst des Verstandes bestimmt, so ist das Objekt wirklich; ist er durch den Zusammenhang
der Wahrnehmungen nach Begriffen bestimmt, so heißt der Gegenstand notwendig. Die Grundsätze der
Modalität also sagen von einem Begriffe nichts anders, als die Handlung des Erkenntnisvermögens,
dadurch er erzeugt wird. [Postulat ist bloß die Verfahrensweise des Verstandes in der Setzung eines
Begriffes, in der Mathematik.]... So können wir demnach mit eben demselben Rechte die Grundsätze der
Modalität postulieren, weil sie ihren Begriff von Dingen überhaupt nicht vermehren, sondern nur die Art
anzeigen, wie er überhaupt mit der Erkenntniskraft verbunden wird.” (KdrV B286-7/A233-5)
183
Time is emphasized here because the modalities express the relationship to the “inner sense,” which is
characterized by time as transcendental form (where “outer sense” includes space as well). The relation to
“cognition in general” can clearly not include space, although that cognition obviously does. In the
Anthropology, Kant points out that “inner sense” is not, as the outer senses are, characterized by multiple
organs, but that instead “die Seele ist das Organ des inneren Sinnes.” (AA VII, p. 161). This secularizing
gloss points again to the liminally organological character of Kant’s texts. The phrase does not re-occur,
and cognitive uses of organ in the Anthropology are otherwise limited to the literal sense-organs. Cultural
uses, especially pertaining to the Bible, are investigated in their relation to Novalis in chapter IV of the
present study.
184
KdrV B 266/A219.
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from principles… because I here know the particular in the general through concepts.”185
This faculty is the metaphysical faculty, then, but it is fundamentally severed from the
content it nevertheless works upon in its object (simple judgments of the understanding).
Its always failing function is to propose the known (or conceptual) encounter between the
particular and the general—which would have been the function of the organon, had it
not been restricted by intuition. Kant nevertheless proposes that what replaces this
desired synthesis of reason (that is, “dialectical” or illusory knowing) retains the form of
metaphysical knowledge, applying itself epiphenomenally to the understanding and
thinking in the understanding (and not beyond it) to the general in the particular. This is
possible, indeed, because it is the action of judgment upon judgment: so far as we do not
propose the noumenal truth of these second-level judgments, we remain within the
“discipline of pure reason.” It is precisely the limited extension of judgments of reason to
judgments of the understanding that allows for this curtailed form of “metaphysical”
knowledge.186 Concepts of reason thereby become what Kant dubs “ideas”—necessary
unities reason imposes on the rules of the understanding, without any experiential
component. Without intuition and the possibility of synthesis, these ideas follow strictly
from the form of reason as it is (correctly) disciplined to act upon the understanding, not
producing cognition but acting formally metaphysically within that cognition, unifying it
and pushing it towards the absolute. In this manner—which opens onto the practical,
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KdrV B357/A300.
“Der Verstand mag ein Vermögen der Einheit der Erscheinungen vermittelst der Regeln sein, so ist die
Vernunft das Vermögen der Einheit der Verstandesregeln unter Prinzipien. Sie geht also niemals zunächst
auf Erfahrung, oder auf irgend einen Gegenstand, sondern auf den Verstand, um den mannigfaltigen
Erkenntnissen desselben Einheit a priori durch Begriffe zu geben, welche Vernunfteinheit heißen mag, und
von ganz anderer Art ist, als sie von dem Verstande geleistet warden kann.” (KdrV B359/A302)
186
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since it connects intentional, rule-based, and potentially free volition with quasi-cognitive
acts—reason serves the understanding, in an expanded sense, as a canon:
Ob wir nun gleich von den transzendentalen Vernunftbegriffen sagen müssen: sie sind
nur Ideen, so warden wir sie doch keinesweges für überflüssig und nichtig anzusehen
haben. Denn, wenn schon dadurch kein Objekt bestimmt werden kann, so können sie doc
him Grunde und unbemerkt dem Verstande zum Kanon seines ausgebreiteten und
einhelligen Gebrauchs dienen, dadurch er zwar keinen Gegenstand mehr erkennt, als er
nach seinen Begriffen erkennen würde, aber doch in dieser Erkenntnis besser und weiter
geleitet wird. Zu geschweigen, daß sie vielleicht von den Naturbegriffen zu den
pracktischen einen Übergang möglich machen, und den moralischen Ideen selbst auf
solche Art Haltung und Zusammenhang mit den spekulativen Erkenntnissen der Vernunft
verschaffen können.187

The promised “transition” occurs first in the “doctrine of method” of the KdrV (and then
in the Critique of Practical Reason—KpV). Here, however, I am interested in the
transition proposed from “concept” to “idea,” both occurring in judgmental form (as
proposition and syllogism). That there is an expanded canon of orientation within
cognition already shows us what the critique of general metaphysics (canon of the
understanding) implies for special metaphysics: relegation to orienting but necessary
unities we must reflectively impose upon our empirical experience. This is the transition
to the “practical,” which will be partially re-written in the KU (as we shall see in the
following chapters, with Hölderlin and Schelling).
Kant here states that the form of reason’s judgment is the syllogism, which
imposes a kind of logic on propositions. These can proceed towards the particular
(ensyllogisms) or towards the conditions of the ensyllogism (prosyllogisms). Kant
proposes that reason strives to find, in all cases, the “totality of conditions,” or the final
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prosyllogism.188 Reason thus formally unifies the understanding in the direction of an
“absolute whole.”189
The non-synthetic action of reason on the understanding—its imposition of
unity—is nevertheless not the mere “juxtaposition” of connection. Recall that a
preformationist metaphor is used to characterize the “system of pure reason.” Indeed, at
all levels and in spite of the projected constitutivity of the causal nexus effectivus,
judgment follows a mereological model of metaphorically organic heritage. The nexus
effectivus is the world-picture belonging to an organized reason guided by the nexus
finalis in its very form and self-relation. The Romantics, sensitive to potentially organic
metaphorical models for reason itself, will not have missed this. They did not have to
reach forward exclusively to the KU for their notion of an organ. They found, in the very
rejection of the organon, the desired etymological and metaphorological basis in one
thread of Kant’s metaphysical methodology itself. Wholes and parts, and their mutual
interaction, formed a judgmentalist research program in the next generation. That this
was so, of course, implied a need for1) an organic and developmental model of
metaphysics, and 2) a notion of perception (what Kant dubbed intuition) that was not
finally separate from conceptuality. They thus returned to the rationalist unity of
knowledge. But this unity was attended by historicity and the possibility of categorial
innovation, and those elements could be supplied only by the last and most dedicated
metaphorizer of the organ: Johann Gottfried Herder.
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KdrV B379/A322 ff.
And indeed, the three absolute wholes are those of propositions in respect to the self (rational
psychology), objects (cosmology), and all things (the phrase is taken from Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik,
but here implies the Urwesen: God, or rational theology). See KdrV B391/A334 ff.
189
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IV. Genesis of and by Organs: Herder’s Analogies of Nature and Reason
If Leibniz contributed the metaphysical sense of the word organ, and Kant
supplied a methodological critique of that metaphysics that nevertheless retained and
developed its key metaphorical terminology, it was Johann Gottfried Herder who
supplied its metaphorical content. He did this by globalizing the term’s use throughout
his writings, speaking of organs analogically in metaphysical, epistemological, and
cultural spheres indifferently.190
Leibniz and Kant contributed to the metaphorology of the word, but Herder did
far more: he seems to have introduced the word into the German-speaking public
sphere.191 But not, as we might expect, into the French public sphere, from which Herder
himself seems to have borrowed the term.
The entry in Diderot’s Encyclopédie for organe is of unknown authorship.192 It
covers, however, the etymological background, but then opens the term up to a
recognizably modern use: l’usage ordinaire is that of a functional part of the body, any
part that carries out an operation. The article goes on to divide them between primary
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The centrality of the term for Herder is the more striking for the lack of attention it has received in the
literature. The study which comes closest to seeing its fundamental importance is Hermann Timm’s Gott
und die Freiheit: Studien zur Religionsphilosophie der Goethezeit (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1974). I
will take issue with Timm’s interpretation below.
191
This conclusion is quite tentative at this point. The only relevant literature on the topic, however, is
Wolf, Der Begriff, pp. 38-43, who points to Kant’s determinative contribution. Since—as he correctly
notes—the word’s organicist use flourished first during the 1780s and 1790s in the discourse about
Lebenskraft (for more on which, see Chapter 2 below), Kant’s influence should not be neglected. But
Herder’s use—which can obviously not be discounted as an influence on the Lebenskraft movement—
predates Kant’s. Indeed, since the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit contains—as
we will now see—a robust doctrine centered on the word, and since Kant’s critical review of that work in
1785 critiques the method but not all elements of the Weltbild of that work, we might even think that Kant’s
use is conditioned by Herder’s. I will not argue this philologically here, and—to be clear—this does not
mean that I endorse Zammito’s argument that the KU is largely a reaction to Herder. That is not implied by
the possibility that there is a terminological borrowing.
192
This entry plays an unfortunately negligible role in Wolf’s history. Even its unknown authorship seems
to point to the generality of the term in the French world (especially Histoires naturelles).
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organs (built for a single function of similar materials—the veins, arteries, and nerves)
and secondary organs composed of the primary—the hand, the fingers, etc.193 A further
entry on “organe des sens” clarifies that these are the parts of the animal “au moyen de
laquelle il est affecté par les objets extérieurs.”194 These are sometimes divided into an
“internal” organ (the brain) and “external” organs—the ears, eyes, etc.
Thus a recognizably literal sense of the term was given as early as 1765 in the
French world. Yet this common usage had not passed into Germany—for that, the young
Herder would need Kant’s gentle push—also in the mid-60s—to internationalize his
reading habits. And it was indeed, it seems, in some back-alleys of his French itinerary
that Herder culled the word for his own use.
Herder’s Ideen, which he wrote in the early 1780s and began to publish in 1784,
is a revision of precisely the genre of writing from which he took the term Organ—
Histoire naturelle, Naturgeschichte, the Enlightenment genre of narrating nature’s whole
course of development. The Comte de Buffon’s monumental Histoire naturelle (1749 ff.)
was a European best-seller and paradigm for the genre for more than a century.195
Herder’s entry into this scene196 was marked by his fascination with the problems of force
and structure in nature’s development. If Herder’s signal contribution was the
historicization of nature and culture,197 it will have been in the productive tension
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Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc., eds. Denis Diderot and
Jean le Rond D'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2011 Edition),
Robert Morrissey (ed), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/, visited 6 October 2011.
194
Encyclopédie.!!
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See Reill, Vitalizing, pp. 33-71.
196
Op. cit., pp. 186-99.
197
This is a general conclusion of much scholarship on Herder, but see, for its origins, Friedrich
Meinecke’s Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook (London: Routledge and Kegal & Paul,
1972), p. lv: "it must be said that historism is nothing else but the application to the historical world of the
new life-governing principles achieved by the great German movement extending from Leibniz to the death
of Goethe." !
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between force’s developmental self-expression and the structure that force took on and
imposed that this conception was developed.198
It was in the interstices between these two concepts—static structure and dynamic
force—that Herder also placed his half-borrowed, half-invented Organ. The Ideen’s
narration of formation—Bildung as the combination of structure and force—begins with
matter itself, and ends with the plurality of particular human cultures. This all-embracing
monism, however, needed a way for the apparent contradiction of the static and the
dynamic to be put into motion, literally to develop mutually. The system needed to allow
for the concrete to emerge from an apparently unsynthesizable duality. The instrument of
synthesis was given the name das Organ. Thus, at the end of the first volume (1784),
Herder inserted a general chapter on natural form and natural-historical method, giving it
the name Kraft und Organ.
Summarizing his doctrine with respect to the debate on preformation and
epigenesis, Herder wrote
Siehet man diese Wandlungen, diese lebendigen Wirkungen sowohl im Ei des Vogels als
im Mutterleibe des tiers das Lebendige gebäret: so, dünkt mich, spricht man uneigentlich,
wenn man von Keimen, die nur entwickelt würden, oder von einer Epigenesis redet, nach
der die Glieder von außen zuwüchsen. Bildung (genesis) ists, eine Wirkung innerer
Kräfte, denen die Natur eine Masse vorbereitet hatte, die sie sich zubilden, in der sie sich
sichtbar machen sollten. Dies ist die Erfahrung der Natur: dies bestätigen die Perioden
der Bildung in den verschiedenen Gattungen von mehr oder minder organischer
Vielartigkeit und Fülle von Lebenskräften: nur hieraus lassen sich die Mißbildungen der
Geschöpfe durch Krankheit, Zufall oder durch die Vermischung verschiedner Gattungen
erklären und es ist dieser Weg der Einzige, den uns in allen ihren Werken die Kraft- und
Lebenreiche Natur durch eine fortgehende Analogie gleichsam aufdringt.199
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Herder’s earliest engagements with the issue of force come from his time in Königsberg under Kant’s
tutelage. Kant’s lectures of that period—indeed, those extant in Herder’s hand—are filled with
considerations of force, especially as that concept plays a role in mind-body-relation problems. See
Herder’s earliest-known philosophical fragment, the Versuch über das Sein, which places the intensive
feeling of force at the center of speculation. This consideration remained determinative throughout Herder’s
career, as has been convincingly argued in a careful reading of that fragment by Marion Heinz,
Sensualistischer Idealismus: Untersuchungen zur Erkenntnistheorie des jungen Herder (1763-1778)
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1994).
199
Johann Gottfried Herder, Werke in zehn Bänden, Band 6: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit, Martin Bollacher, ed. (Frankfurt/Main: Klassiker 1989).
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This passage contains the kernel of Herder’s ontological teaching. With concrete
reference to the empirical details of the epigenesis debate, he makes clear the
philosophical stakes of that debate. Force is at issue, and the debate—as the
historiography also confirms—goes to the philosophical issue of the constitution of force
itself, and therefore of matter. Up to Herder, epigeneticists had tended to defend the
division between dead and living matter. As Herder notes here, this conception is
etymologically proper to epi-genesis, formation “on top of.” So Blumenbach’s
determination, but not Herder’s.200 Herder’s doctrine should be called “geneticism” or
“generationism,” and must be philosophically separated from its natural-scientific
counterparts in Wolff and Blumenbach. As Herder would go on to make clear in his Gott
(1787), apparently lifeless matter was just a particularly durable structure in a
fundamentally organic universe. And “organic” always meant filled with organs.
This concept, developed both in the Ideen and in Gott, was that of a selfexpressive universe, an organic Being in constant unfolding, always in motion and
always taking on form, continuous and perfectible. The human stood at the crossroads
between its natural and spiritual expressions—for Herder, the problem of commercium
mentis et corporis was resolved analogically. Chapter 5 of the Ideen is both ontological
and methodological, and this cross-disciplinary simultaneity can be seen at the end of the
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The literature on this issue is not subtle enough, in my opinion. The two dominant positions about
animal formation are complemented by all manner of possible conceptions of the universe, matter, and
organs. Zammito and Reill, for example, want to see Herder on the epigenetic side of the debate. This
assertion is not wrong, but too simple. Herder is an organicist, not merely a “vitalist.” Indeed, it was just
this conception that led to the organicism of the next generation, which Reill emphatically deplores. See
Reill, Vitalizing, pp. 1-17 and 199-237.!!
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passage above: the “only way” nature shows herself to us is through this penetrating
analogy which forces itself upon us in all her works.201
If analogy was the answer to the problem with which Kant had confronted the
young Herder, it was simultaneously the answer to the difficulty of nature’s structure and
nature’s history. Herder had received this problem from his French reading, perhaps most
decisively from Jean-Baptiste Robinet. In his De la nature, volume 4 (De l’animal)
(1766), the third book is entitled De l’organisme universel. Chapter I is poignantly called:
De l’organisation: ce que c’est qu’un organe. This chapter is a polemic against the
notion of lifeless matter—its title’s qualifier is to be taken literally. The atomists conceive
a brute nature which cannot possible exist: “Rien n’est simple, tout est composé dans un
monde matériel; un atôme de matière simple, répugne comme une étendue sans
étendue.”202 The monism here cuts against the atomists and the spiritualists at the same
time: extention without extension reads like a gloss on the contradictions attaching to the
soul-body question.203
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Herder’s term, “die Analogie der Natur” (see Ideen, p. 176: “Doch die Metaphysik bleibe bei Seite; wir
wollen Analogien der Natur betrachten”) makes clear this overlapping of ontology and methodology. Since
humans stand in the center of this analogy, our view of being and our methods for investigating it coincide
in the organ of thought. This term is used throughout the Ideen, although its full force is not often
recognized. Heinz also argues that Herder tries to draw this analogy though the human, thereby anticipating
Naturphilosophie’s attempt to spiritualize nature and naturalize spirit. See also John Zammito, “Herder,
Kant, Spinoza und die Ursprünge des deutschen Idealismus” in: ed. Marion Heinz, Herder und die
Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), pp. 107-145. I cannot, however, agree
with his tendency to oppose Kant and Herder as sharply as in the following: “Die Analogie deutet für
Herder zugleich auf die Aussichtslosigkeit einer apriorischen Gewißheit und auf die Kreativität aller
menschlichen Erkenntnis hin. Dies schärft seine Skepsis gegenüber dem Versuch Kants, eine rigorose
Trennung zwischen dem philosophischen und dem poetischen Denken vorzunehmen.” (p. 141)
202
Jean-Baptiste-René Robinet, De la nature (IV) (Amsterdam: van Harrevelt, 1761), p. 78
203
Indeed, this is how Kant frames his intervention in this debate in his Träume ienes Geistersehers,
published the same year.
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But in a world which is therefore “organic” (in the sense of being organs all the
way down204), what is then the constitutive part which receives the name organ?
Robinet’s contribution—which has earned him much ridicule in the scholarship205—is
that the organ is the prototype of all being, and that scattered organs constitute the
anthropomorphic universe. And Robinet does not shy away from supplying a concrete
vision of this essential part:
Un organe est un trou allongé, un cylindre creux, naturellement actif: l’organisation la
plus compliquée se réduit à cette idée simple. Le corps humain, le chef-d’oevre de
l’organisation, n’est qu’un systême de tubes pliés, entrelacés, doués d’une force
intrinseque qui résulte de leur structure.206

With the human body as its finest production, organization is literally simply the
universal existence of organs—hollow cylindrical tubes which are fundamentally active.
Intertwined and endowed with instrinsic force, they proliferate through the plenum of
being and are its basic type.
Herder’s own fascination with the problem of type may have been partially
inspired by his early reading of Robinet.207,208 Yet the organ both held the universe
together and progressively broke it down. The term’s meaning came to stretch not only
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Yolton correctly emphasizes that the pre-established harmony was not well-received outside of
Germany, but we have here a clear case of terminological influence. For Leibniz’s general impact in France
see W. H. Barger, Leibniz in France, from Arnauld to Voltaire; a study in French reactions to
Leibnizianism, 1670-1760 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1955).
205
See, for example, Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936/1964), pp. 277-83.
206
Robinet, De la nature, p. 78.
207
See H. B. Nisbet, “Herder, Goethe, and the Natural “Type”” in Publications of the English Goethe
Society vol. XXXVII: Papers Read Before the Society 1966-67, eds. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson et al (Leeds:
W.S. Maney and Son, 1967), pp. 81-119. Nisbet is careful in his philology. Herder mentions Robinet only
once, and then in 1776 (SW VII 75, cited in Nisbet). Earlier scholarly comparisons of their work were based
on a passage in the Ideen which may be of different intellectual heritage. Herder’s use of the term organ in
the sense we are about to explore provides, however, suggestive evidence that he was familiar with
Robinet. In any case, Robinet’s use is by far the most interesting in the ontologies of Histoire naturelle, and
Herder’s is, by parallel, the most interesting in the German context prior to the 1780s.!
208
As we shall see, Herder’s adoptions of both organ and organon come from readings around 1766
(Robinet and Lambert, in addition to Kant and Baumgarten from a few years earlier). The readings seem to
have born first fruit in the early 1770s—for example, the fourth Kritisches Wäldchen is the first of the
Wäldchen to contain the word organ—and then only become a programmatic term in the 1780s with the
return to ontology.
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analogically across the matter-spirit divide, but also temporally beyond the limits of
Leibnizian figure of progress within ultimate stasis.209
Herder’s first sketch of this problematic210 takes its cue primarily from the animal.
Basic principles are set forth: any effect in nature must be accompanied by force; where
there is Reiz (impulse), this must be felt “internally.” Should these two principles not
obtain, “so hört … alle Analogie der Natur auf.”211 Where there is artifice, there must be
an artificer—this gloss on the techne-phusis analogy is rooted in the ontological premise
of analogy itself. Where any creature shows intention in its movement, there must be an
“internal sense, an organ, a medium of this anticipation…”212 There may be more media
than we have organs,213 and thus the world of invisible forces is stranger than our
organological sensibility. Nevertheless,
Die ganze Schöpfung sollte durchgenossen, durchgefühlt, durcharbeitet werden; auf
jedem neuen Punkt also mußten Geschöpfe sein, sie zu genießen, Organe, sie zu
empfinden, Kräfte, sie dieser Stell gemäß zu beleben. Kein Punkt der Schöpfung ist ohne
Genuß, ohne Organ, ohne Bewohner: jedes Geschöpf hat also seine eigne, eine neue
Welt.214

A world of force is analogized—the sense is ontological—into an “internal” resonance of
that force through the creature and its organ. This complex of organs determines the
milieu of the creature, its own world, fundamentally new because immersed in an
expansive force always differently concentrated in its particularizing organs.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Herder receives only one mention (p. 280) in Lovejoy’s chapter on “The Temporalizing of the Great
Chain of Being,” The Great Chain, pp. 242-288. To be sure, some notion of non-static time was introduced
by figures like Robinet (and the early Kant, as Lovejoy emphasizes), but Herder’s concept of the
fundamentally new (as it was conditioned by the proliferation of organs in the force-field of the world)
seems to me a determinative moment in this history. !
210
And if not the first, then certainly a major step in the late-18th-century borrowing of the term for German
use. The epistemological and linguistic senses of the word—presented below—were adumbrated in
writings of the 1770s, but this ontological sense seems to be original to the Ideen.
211
Herder, Ideen, pp. 87-8.
212
Herder, Ideen, p. 88.
213
This idea is anticipated in a late fragment by Lessing called “Daß mehr als fünf Sinne für den Menschen
sein können…” Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Werke. Band 8 (Munich: Hanser, 1970 ff.), pp. 557-560.
214
Herder, Ideen , pp. 88-9.
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This sense of the term is broadened in the 5th book. Force is incorruptible, and
only its instrument can degenerate. Here Organ and Werkzeug are equated
etymologically: life cannot pass out of existence, although a flower or a tree (life’s
organs) can. Herder echoes the tradition in which the body is the soul’s organ: soul is
force, incorruptible.215 The general point is drawn:
Wo wir eine Kraft wirken sehen, wirkt sie allerdings in einem Organ und diesem
harmonisch; ohne dasselbe wird sie unseren Sinnen wenigstens nicht sichtbar:
mit ihm aber ist sie zugleich da und wenn wir der durchgehenden Analogie der
Natur glauben dürfen, so hat sich sich dasselbe zugebildet. Präformierte Keime,
die seit der Schöpfung bereit lagen, hat kein Auge gesehen; was wir vom ersten
Augenblick des Werdens eines Geschöpfes bemerken, sind wirkende organische
Kräfte.216

The harmony between force and organ is thus not static—whatever necessity obtains in
nature must be united with a dynamic field of organic forces. Herder uses the term in the
sense it had in the early 18th century: “having organs.”217 Force is essentially organic, or,
as we might say, organological.218 And yet, organ is not force—a duality obtains between
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Herder, Ideen, p.167-70. Herder uses this doctrine to anticipate the linguistic sense he will give to
organ: “Nur ein Sinnloser kann Schall und Wort für einerlei nehmen; und wie diese beiden verschieden
sind, ists Körper und Seele, Organ und Kraft. Das Wort erinnert an die Idee, und bringt sie aus einem
anderen Geist zu uns herüber; aber es ist sie nicht selbst, und eben so wenig ist das materielle Organ
Gedanke.” (Ideen, p. 182)
216
Herder, Ideen, p. 171.!
217
This sense is used, for example, by Caspar Friedrich Wolff in his Theorie von der Generation (see
supra), pp. 131-2 and 210. Especially the latter citation makes clear that, for Wolff, the progressive
inclusion of non-organic parts (read: moria) into the organism’s functional complex is what makes up
“organic” being itself. Herder activates the term organ for a thoroughly ideological organicism. The term
arrives in Germany under the auspices of genetic organicism, not those of epigenesis. My thanks to Sarah
Eldridge of the Princeton German department for pointing out these passages to me.
218
One of the few uses of the term “organological” which comes close to mine is that of Hermann Timm,
whose Gott und die Freiheit emphasizes the proto-dialectical element of Herder’s ontological thought.
Because force is fundamentally expressive, it always stands in a simultaneously unified and divided state to
its own substance. And this occurs in real development, in time. This reading shows us perhaps most nearly
what the next generation took from Herder, along with the term organ. Yet it misses the ontologicomethodological overlap of analogy, and by doing so, gives a sense to the organ-doctrine which cannot fully
anticipate the Romantic attitude. By seeing analogy as central, we can see why Herder’s was not an
organology in the Romantic sense. Timm describes Herder’s God as having “eine instrumentierende
Offenbarung seiner inneren Kraft…” (p. 325) This instrument, which particularizes as it reveals, founds an
analogical discipline of speculation which is rooted in unity and treats duality as corruptible. This line of
thinking was to be radicalized using Kant’s “dualisms” and Herder’s ontological terminology in Early
German Romanticism.!!
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them which makes their harmony possible. In the basis of nature are light, ether, and heat,
a welter of organs in genesis. Herder calls this a “divine current of fire” which pours its
forces down to us through a Vehikulum. This word—taken from physiological
descriptions of the nerves and their electricity—recalls Robinet: concrete form is resisting
the chaos of expansive forces. Indeed, their self-restriction is indicated by their name:
organic. The human body is the result of this organological restriction, this essentially
dual force which is yet more essentially one. As the organization becomes more comlex,
its media and organs become finer, eventually resulting in Geistesempfindung. Finally,
the organs complete an internalization or reversal, establishing sensibility.219
Entweder hat die Wirkung meiner Seele kein Analogon hienieden; und sodenn ist weder
zu begreifen, wie sie auf den Körper wirke? noch wie andre Gegenstände auf sie zu
wirken vermögen? oder es ister dieser unsichtbare himmlische Leicht- und Feuergeist,
der alles Lebendige durchfließt und alle Kräfte der Natur vereinigt. In der menschlichen
Organisation hat er die Feinheit erreicht, die ihm ein Erdenbau gewähren konnte:
vermittelst seiner wirkt die Seele in ihren Organen beinah allmächtig und strahlte in sich
selbst zurück mit einem Bewußtsein, das ihr Innerstes reget.220

Again, the analogical nature of the organic universe is seen in its genesis of its highest
(physical) form: the human body in its relation to spirit. Consciousness itself is organic,
and this organicity responds to the problem of body-soul interaction. In the crucible of
living forces, the soul meets its organs through an analogon. Reason is organic, literally
without reason (ana-logon means “upon” reason, but could easily be taken to mean
“without” reason) at the moment of its genesis, and yet determinative of its counterparts
(organa) as it both is informed by them and returns to itself. This dual gesture stands on
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The language here is taken from Albrecht von Haller, whose separation of the “irritable” (contractile)
and “sensible” (representative) nerve-excitations Herder had re-written in his Vom Erkennen und
Empfinden der menschlichen Seele. That essay runs roughshod over Haller’s science, but builds the sense
of unification (In-Eins-Bildung, Einbildung) that became organic in the Ideen. For Herder’s use of Haller
see Simon Richter, “Medizinischer und ästhetischer Diskurs im 18. Jahrhundert: Herder und Haller über
Reiz,” in Lessing-Yearbook (25) 1993, pp. 83-97. The earlier essay also emphasizes the reversal
which results in consciousness, but is not rooted in the discourse of the organ.
220
Herder, Ideen, p. 174.
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the brink of Romantic organology, yet founds, instead of a metaphysics, an anthropology,
even an anthropomorphic metaphysics. The organ is not the method: it is ontological,
sensible, and spiritual, but its very being and our very knowing are rooted in analogon,
the unified point where all manner of force meets, underpinned by God.
God, for Herder, may well be Urkraft, expressive force, but he also has organs
and the true center of the analogy of nature is the inner human as the final natural organ
built (through love) into the divine organ. This is the final sense of “analogy” in Herder’s
work, the theological end of his naturalistic game. In this vision, God and man share an
organ—indeed, the human becomes the analogical organ of the godhead. This unification
has been the reality and the goal of history.
Any dynamic force in nature “wirkte als ein Organ der göttlichen Macht, als eine
tätig gewordne Idee seines ewigdaurenden Entwurfs der Schöpfung.”221 This passing
mention of a divine organ recalls Herder’s radical assertion in his Vom Erkennen und
Empfinden der Menschlichen Seele that the human and his world are God’s sensorium
(the traditional Latin translation of Greek aistheterion, the seat of the sense we have
come to call “organ”), expressed through a love described well by John the Evangelist yet
better by the “even more divine” Spinoza.222 Herder here takes the terms of the Leibniz!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Herder, Ideen, p. 175.
Herder, Vom Erkennen, p. 363. This assertation shows us that the human analogy is based on the biblical
version of the phusis-techne analogy, God’s making the human in his image: “Nur er ist Bild Gottes, ein
Auszug und Verwalter der Schöpfung: also schlafen in ihm tausend Kräfte, Reize und Gefühle; es muß also
in ihnen Ordnung herrschen, daß Alle aufwachen und angewandt werden können, daß er Sensorium seines
Gottes in allem Lebenden der Schöpfung, nach dem Maße es ihm verwandt ist, werde.” (Vom Erkennen und
Empfinden der menschlichen Seele, in Johann Gottfried Herder, Werke in zehn Bänden, Band 4: Schriften
zu Philosophie, Literatur, Kunst und Altertum eds. Jürgen Brummack and Martin Bollacher
(Frankfurt/Main: Klassiker 1994), p. 361.) An early use of the term in the treatise: “Auch die
Verschiedenheit der Menschen sowie aller Produkte der Erdkugel muß sich also nach der spezifischen
Verschiedenheit des Mediums richten, in dem wir wie im Organ der Gottheit leben. Hier kommt es nicht
bloß auf Einteilung der Zonen nach Hitze und Kälte, nicht bloß auf Leichtigkeit und Schwere des
drückenden Luftkörpers, sondern unendlich mehr auf die mancherlei wirksamen geistigen Kräfte an, die in
222
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Clarke debate and inserts them into pre-organological development of his ontology.
When Leibniz had attacked Newton through his proxy Clarke, he had objected that
Newton’s God was like a watchmaker who needed to intervene periodically to re-set the
watch. He based this assertion on Newton’s claim that (absolute) space and time were
God’s sensorium.223 That debate—which embittered relations between already hostile
camps—stood at the beginning of the confrontation about forces in natural science and
philosophy which has accompanied us through this chapter. Herder, by referring to this
debate and activating the Newtonian phrase for a Leibnizian force-conception, presents
us with the metaphorology of the organ in its highest instance. God’s image is his very
organ: the human exists in a divine milieu which is in constant progress towards the new,
his experience fundamentally a matter of analogy within an analogical welter of organs
across a single substance—God in his expression—which is love. The human is
perfectible: his inversion into spirit continues until a full “innerer geistiger Mensch” is
formed, “der seiner eignen Natur ist und den Körper nur als Werkzeug gebrauchet, ja der
seiner eignen Natur zufolge, auch bei den ärgsten Zerrüttungen der Organe handelt.”224
The organs are corruptible, yet formed in organic necessity. The human forms himself
slowly into the essence which is the divine organ, the godly analogy of nature. The
human becomes humanity.225
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
ihr treiben, ja deren Inbegriff eben vielleicht alle ihre Eigenschaften und Phänomene ausmacht.” (Herder,
Ideen, p. 38)
223
It appears that Leibniz had an edition without the metaphorical tanquam preceding the phrase. See
Alexandre Koyre and I. Bernard Cohen, “The Case of the Missing Tanquam: Leibniz, Newton & Clarke”
Isis, (52: 4) 1961, pp. 555-566. See also Hans Blumenberg, Legitimacy, pp. 80-2.
224
Herder, Ideen, p. 183.
225
“Das hellere Bewußtsein, dieser große Vorzug der menschlichen Seele, ist derselben auf eine geistige
Weise und zwar durch die Humanität allmählich erst zugebildet worden.” (Herder, Ideen, p.183) I deal with
the significant uses of organ in the Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität in chapter 3, where they
anticipate Schelling’s ethical use of the term. This depiction of God is also clearly a precedent for
Schelling’s ontology.
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It is from this point—the self-genesis of the human as godly organ and analogy—
that Herder’s cultural analysis takes off. Cultures themselves becomes organic in this
literal sense: they are complexes of organs, traditions of individual organological
formation.226 Herder’s historicism was not merely organic, but (proto-)organological.227
In this quasi-organological conception of everything—von allen Dingen
überhaupt, to put a Wolffian metaphysical point on the reach of Herder’s Histoire
naturelle—the analogy also provides the basis for the final step in Herder’s
terminological innovation: the rational and linguistic senses of the organ. That there
should be an organ of reason is already a matter of controversy. That Herder should have
thought seriously about one seems implausible. And yet he did; and his thinking on this
issue, based in his theory of language, displays the same methodology as his ontological
speculation. Reason has an organ—language—which provides for its self-genesis
through inversion and a resulting consciousness. This genesis reveals the location of
reason’s encounter with the non-rational—in an ana-logon, without or around reason—
and makes that encounter productive and innovative for reason itself. And yet the notion
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“Hätte auch nur ein einziger Mensch die Erde betreten, so wäre an ihm der Zweck des menschlichen
Daseins erfüllt gewesen, wie man ihn bei so manchen einzelnen Menschen und Nationen für erfüllt achten
muß, die durch Ort- und Zeitbestimmungen von der Kette des ganzen Geschlechts getrennet wurden. Da
aber alles, was auf der Erde leben kann, solange sie selbst in ihrem Beharrungsstande bleibt, fortdauret, so
hatte auch das Menschengeschlecht, wie alle Geschlechte der Lebenden, Kräfte der Fortpflanzung in sich,
die dem Ganzen gemäß ihre Proportion und Ordnung finden konnten und gefunden haben. Mithin vererbte
sich das Wesen der Menschheit, die Vernunft und ihr Organ, die Tradition, auf eine Reihe von
Geschlechtern hinunter. Allmählich ward die Erde erfüllt, und der Mensch ward alles, was er in solchem
und keinem andern Zeitraum auf der Erde werden konnte.” (Herder, Ideen, p. 667) It is clear that two major
lines of thinking were based on passages such as this one. First, the hermeneutics of culture after Dilthey
and especially after Gadamer’s re-application of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of Being to cultural studies.
And second, historicism itself. The political stakes of this conception are not univocal. See, for example,
Hannah Arendt’s claim that the particularization of cultures is salutary for the thinking of tolerance.
“Aufklärung und Judenfrage” in Die verborgene Tradition: Acht Essays (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
1976), pp. 108-127.!
227
Friedrich Meinecke set the tone for that particularization early: “The essence of historism is the
substitution of a process of individualising observation for a generalizing view of human forces in history”
(Meinecke, Historism, p. lv). I am thus here able to show the terminological basis on which the
organicization of history took place.

!

107!
!!
!
of real contradiction, actual duality—so important to the Romantics—is never included in
this sliding analogical scale. Herder contributed not only the term and the picture of the
universe, not only the ontology and the theology—he also gave the Romantics a picture
of reason as itself organic, rooted in a dynamic or organological relation of language and
reason. But he did not supply the methodology, for he rejected the Kantian problematic in
favor of his analogical overlap between knowing and being.
In his Metakritik, Herder definitively rejected his former teacher’s KdrV. The
sprawling text takes issue, among other things, with the fixity of Kant’s categories. Recall
that Kant’s conception of judgment was an important anticipation of Romantic
organology: the mereology of the judgment, split between constitutive and regulative use
by the intuition, is the instrument of the canon of the understanding. This canon is the
categories themselves, and Herder’s sense that experience provides ontological
innovation runs counter to this legalization of our cognition. Thus, when Herder writes
that language is the Organon of reason,228 he means to organicize experience itself, to
give the human a milieu that is nevertheless characterized by generality. He is rejecting
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Johann Gottfried Herder, Werke in zehn Bänden. Band 8: Schriften zu Literature und Philosophie, 17921800, ed. Dietrich Irmscher (Frankfurt/Main: Klassiker, 1998), p. 321. The phrase occurs in Hamann’s own
Metakritik (1784): “… language, the only, first, and last organon and criterion of reason, with no
credentials, but tradition and usage.” Johann Georg Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language,
Kenneth Haynes, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 208. Herder seems to be drawing
on this passage in the quotation in note [135—die Vernunft und ihr Organ, die Tradition] supra. Hamann
cites Herder’s Essay—the passage which I cite next—at p. 121, and his citation is from Fall 1772. Since
Hamann’s Metakritik was written in 1784, the order of events seems to be as follows. Herder first uses the
concept of language as the organ of reason, which Hamann cites and then includes in his objections to the
KdrV. These objections, which give us the important notion that the meeting of the a priori and the a
posteriori meet in language, are then used again by Herder in his own Metakritik (1799), now uniting his
own phrase with his friend’s linguistic objection to Kant. Tradition is given a different sense in Herder’s
Ideen (1785)—not merely what is handed down, but the organic unities of nations. The phrase was picked
up by Wilhelm von Humboldt and used in his language-theoretical writings. See Siegfried J. Schmidt,
Sprache und Denken als sprachphilosophisches Problem: von Locke bis Wittgenstein (The Hague: Nijhoff,
1969).

!

108!
!!
!
Kant’s division between the a priori and the a posteriori. And in doing so, he makes the
special mark of the human its ability to name especially itself. He writes that
Es wird so nach die Sprache ein natürliches Organ des Verstandes, ein solcher Sinn der
menschlichen Seele, wie sich die Sehekraft jener sensitiven Seele der Alten das Auge,
und der Instinkt der Biene seine Zelle bauet.229

Objecting to Süßmilch’s notion of a divine origin of languages and to the empiricist
derivation of language from noise simultaneously, Herder asserts the self-genesis of
reason through human language as a “natural organ.” Yet this organ only obtains for
humans. Indeed, Herder’s concern here for the autonomous validity of meaning is parallel
to Kant’s concern about truth in the passage on the epigenesis of reason. Locke serves as
the empiricist foil for both—he imagines a parthenenogenetic origin of consciousness and
of language. For Kant, representation itself would be undercut in this picture, while for
Herder, language would simply not exist—Schall und Wort are separated by the organic
development of the human species as speaking. Süßmilch’s divine gift of language, on
the other hand, is like Crusius’s (or Leibniz’s) pre-establishment of truth for Kant. If
truth, or language, were given, we would no way to determine their correctness. In the
same passage, Herder notes that logos means word and reason, concept and word, and
language and cause, all at once. Alogos means dumb just as much as non-rational. The
human is homo loquiens: as speaker he is able to name himself speaker, to see into his
species-essence because he possesses an organ which, inverting the ontological
proliferation of organic forces, serves as the instrument of reason.230
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Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, Johann Gottfried Herder: Werke in zehn Bänden: Band 1:
Frühe Schriften 1764 – 1772, ed. Ulrich Gaier (Frankfurt a.M.: Klassiker, 1985), p. 733.
230
I agree with the basic sense of Charles Taylor’s argument that, for Herder, language possesses
“irreducible rightness.” See “The Importance of Herder,” in Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 79-100. Perhaps the dissent from this essay in Michael
Forster’s After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010) can be resolved by noting the Hamannian point that a priori and a posteriori are mixed in
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In the Ideen, Herder went on to make this notion work for psychology, describing
the psyche’s laws as organic:
Daß [die Verbindung von Begriffen] jedesmal ihrem Organ gemäß und demselben
harmonisch geschehe, daß wenn das Werkzeug nicht taugt, auch die Künsterlin nichts tun
könne u.f.; das alles leidet keinen Zweifel, ändert aber auch nicht im Begriff der Sache. Die
Art, mit der die Seele wirkt, das Wesen ihrer Begriffe kommt hier in Betrachtung.231

Herder puns on “kind” (Art as “manner” but also as “species”) to characterize the selfknowing human organ. The essence of the soul’s operations—and the essence of its
concepts—actually is the Merkmal of the human (where bleating, so far from mere noise,
is the essence of the sheep for the human). The species which can name itself performs
this separation—literally passes from animality to spirituality—by way of its organ. That
origin of that organ—language—is therefore the moment at which the a priori and the a
posteriori are first, and genetically always—separated. Our hope for knowledge is in this
always available separating origin. And that origin is a matter of universal narration, or
organic natural history. The human analogy, nested in the divine sensorium and
emerging from first a concretizing proliferation and then an inversion of organs which
gives rise to the self-naming organ, is the basis of human history. Herder fulfills his
promise to offer a philosophy of the history of humanity. This history finds its necessary
home in the overlap between ontology and methodology, in the “grand analogy of
nature.”
It was in fact Herder’s reliance on analogy that Kant attacked in his Rezension of
the Ideen in 1785. As pointed out above, Kant had asked if the Bildungstrieb was not
merely a name for a problem rather than an explanation: was this name not “die

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
language. Taylor correctly notes that language establishes an index of the feeling of truth, while Forster
points to the tradition after Herder (Schleiermacher et al) that instead emphasized its plasticity.
231
Herder, Ideen, p. 181.
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Erklärung eines obscurum per aeque obscurum”?232 He pushed back against Herder,
translating his Latin into German and accusing his former student of confusing
preformation and epigenesis233 and ultimately resting his doctrine on unexperienceable
forces
… wie bloße, weiter nich erklärliche Einschränkungen eines sich selbst bildenden
Vermögens, welches letztere wire ben so wenig erklären oder begreiflich machen
können.234

In this key confrontation, Kant slips back into his terminology: Herder’s Organ becomes
a self-generating Vermögen. The organ’s delimiting role in being is just as obscure as the
Kraft which makes use of it.
To bring his polemic to its methodological point, Kant writes that
Der vernünftige Gebrauch der Erfahrung hat auch seine Grenzen… auch kann keine
Analogie die unermeßliche Kluft zwischen dem Zufälligen und Nothwendigen
ausfüllen.235

The human, who would be that analogy, cannot reconcile being’s structure with history’s
development. For us, contingency attaches to the flow of phenomena while the canonical
rules of their presentation are absolutely necessary. The necessity of history is in no way
graspable—indeed, whether there is necessity is the object of the insoluble Third
Antinomy (solved in the “other order of things,” practical reason, by postulate). Rejecting
both Herder’s method (analogy) and his terms (above all “organ”), Kant effectively
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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AA XIII 400.
“Er will einerseits das Evolutionssystem, andererseits aber auch den blos mechanischen Einfluß äusßerer
Ursachen als untaugliche Erläuterungsgründe abweisen und nimmt ein innerlich nach Verscheidenheit der
äußeren Umstände sich selbst diesen angemessen modificirendes Lebenprincip als die Ursache derselben
an, worin ihm recensent völlig beitriff, nur mit dem Vorbehalt, daß, wenn die von innen organisirende
Ursache durch ihre Natur etwa nur auf eine gewisse Zahl und Grad von Verschiedenheiten der Ausbildung
ihres Geschöpfs eingeschränkt ware (nach deren Ausrichtung sie nicht weiter frei ware, um bei veränderten
Umständen nach einem anderen Typus zu bilden), man diese Naturbestimmung der bildenden Natur auch
wohl Keime oder usprüngliche Anlagen nennen könnte, ohne darum die erstern als urangänglich eingelegte
und sich nur gelegentlich auseinander faltende Machinen und Knospen (wie im Evolutionssystem)
anzusehen…” (AA VIII, p. 61.)
234
AA VIII, pp. 61-2.
235
AA VIII, p. 57. !
233
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silenced Herder’s philosophical voice, which increasingly took the form of what seemed
an outdated polemic against his former teacher. And yet, Herder’s contribution to the
thought of the next generation was not only oblique, it was also terminological. He
donated the decisive chapter of our metaphorology, supplying the content if not the
method of Romantic organology. The ontological sense already covered the basic
semantic field—in human exploration of Being, the question of force’s development in
the space between the general or structural and the concrete or developmental was
concentrated in the Greek and French borrowing. But Herder also started the trend of
engaging physiology contemplatively, and indeed spoke of an “organ of reason,”
language, by which the human made itself into humanity by giving itself a species-name.
When Kant attacked Herder—and Herder responded—the full palette of the philosophical
and natural-scientific stakes of the imminent organological debate were given. In a
metaphysical context first established by Leibniz, the question of methodology was
brought philosophical center by Kant in conversation with Newton. Finally, the richness
of the empirical and its potential organic newness—the becoming of the world and of
reason—were put in place by Herder analogically. Romanticism inherited the term organ
from 18th-century natural-scientific and metaphysical crises which dovetailed in their
production of antinomies with the political upheaval following the Republican
revolutions. As they saw the fragmentation of the political world reflected in the
increasing isolation of the disciplines, they turned to this terminological context to
respond.
!
!
!
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Chapter II: Dialectical Organs the Metaphysics of Tragedy: Hölderlin

Hölderlin is the inaugural thinker of Romantic organology.236 The story of his
intellectual development has been told in rich detail, with twin focuses on his reaction to
Kant and Fichte, on the one hand, and the emergence of his poetic theology—starting
with faith, proceeding through a pantheism, and emerging with both Christ and Dionysos,
devotion to nature’s whole and mythology—on the other. The history I construct here
unites these diverse elements. Indeed, in a neglected chapter of Hölderlin’s
development—his reception of the term organ from Samuel Thomas Soemmerring’s
controversial 1796 Über das Seelenorgan—I find the origins of that historiographical
dualism. Hölderlin is and has often been shown to be a thinker of contradictions. But his
innovative use of the term organ shows that he is this in a far deeper sense than is often
recognized. Organs become dialectical in his thought,237 in precisely the technical sense
later conferred upon that term. They are at once structure and development, at once
sensual and rational, at once form and content. Precisely because they are this unity of
opposites—as Hölderlin puts it, das Eine in sich selber Unterschiedene238—they are also
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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I do not mean here to take sides in the debate about whether Hölderlin or Novalis (or indeed Friedrich
Schlegel) was first to the Romantic philosophical insight. This issue—which indeed hinges significantly on
the interpretation of that insight—has been hotly debated by Dieter Henrich (whose researches into
Hölderlin’s context set the stage in the historiography), Manfred Frank (who argues for Novalis’s
precedence), and more recently Frederick Beiser (who argues that the first systematic expression of
Romantic philosophy was in Schlegel’s Vorlesungen über die Transzendentalphilosophie in 1800). Indeed,
I place Hölderlin first because his use of the term organ is more limited than that of Schelling or Novalis.
As we will see, it is restricted to a cluster of writings from the late 1790s, later than the first Romantic uses
of the term (in Schlegel and Novalis), but coming to programmatic form earlier than the others.
237
Here I share a conviction with Panajotis Kondylis, that it was in Hölderlin’s context that the modern
classical form of the dialectic itself emerged. I do not necessarily therefore affirm his strong thesis about
dialectic as Vereinigungsphilosophie proceeding from Enlightenment monisms and religious concerns in
the Germanies—more work to assess his thesis directly is needed. See Panajotis Kondylis, Die Enstehung
der Dialektik: Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung von Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel bis 1802
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), and ipsus, Aufklärung.
238
GSA III, p. 81, with reference to Heraclitus.
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the instruments of structural dissolution and reunification. They are temporal, to be sure,
but they are more than that. Where time traditionally resolves the logical issue of the
coincidence of opposites,239 organs confer real contradictions on the world, and also
resolve those contradictions. They are antinomial and univocal both simultaneously and
in succession. For this reason, they offer a particular kind of answer to the Kantian
deadlock about the understanding. Where Kant had rhetorically asked the tradition to
justify its application of logical judgments to real states of affairs, Hölderlin responded—
unexpectedly—with the notion of an Organ des Geistes,240 explicitly in contradiction to
its unified pairing Seyn, which Hölderlin came to call das Aorgische in order to
underscore its logical opposition to the organ. By expanding the range of contradictions
in our cognition and then focusing those contradictions in the flexible lexeme organ, he
pointed the way towards a metaphysics of judgment, a post-Kantian approach to the
problems Kant had left behind when he shifted from a possible organon to his canon of
the understanding. Hölderlin saw in the form-content unity of judgment a unified frame, a
locus of investigation. The structure of the world opened in its very development in that
frame—what Kant had called “intellectual intuition” found an organ, again unexpectedly,
in the tragedy. The tragedy became the genre of presentation of the totalizing opposition
between “organ” and das Aorgische in historical form. Tragic writing was an invitation to
new forms of absolute cognition. Hölderlin broke the deadlock of post-Kantian theorizing
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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A classical formulation of this dictum is in Herder’s notes on Kant’s metaphysics lectures: “Das post in
der definition ist inexplicabel: oder man könnte die Succeßio so erklären: contradictorie opposita si
exsistunt succedunt – Denn die praedicata contradictorie opposita können nicht bei einem Ente simultaneo
wohl aber succeßivo seyn.” (Herder Metaphysik, pp. 18-19) This passage in turn relies on Baumgarten
(whose Metaphysica Kant used for his lectures on metaphysics throughout his career): “Succedunt sibi,
(successiua sibi sunt) quorum vnum post aliud exsistit. Determinatio entium, qua sibis successiua sunt, est
eorum successio.” (Baumgarten Metaphysica, §124) Hölderlin would have read the formulation in the
KdrV: “Veraenderung ist Verbindung kontradiktorisch entgegengesetzter Bestimmungen im Dasein eines
und desselben Dinges.” (B291-92)
240
GSA IV: 1, p. 249
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in Jena in two gestures: first, with the notion of a dialectical organ; second, with the turn
from pure philosophy to genre-theory.241 This latter move made tragedy a privileged
organ of absolute knowledge in concrete and historical form. Literature was
instrumentalized, and metaphysics renewed: the first form of Romantic organology took
shape between the speculative organ and that instrument of literary expression, genre.
Tragedy was both philosophically classical and epistemologically actual—it was meant to
provoke a new (organological) form of consciousness into existence. The figure of an
organ of intellectual intuition addressed and attempted to resolve three real contraditions:
the critical opposition of judgment and being; the biological deadlock between the
mechanical and the organic; and an emergent struggle between nature and art, physis and
techne.
Disciplinary Organs: Kant after the Inauguration of Criticism
!
To understand Hölderlin’s moves, we must return to our narrative (from chapter I
above) about philosophical organs, and observe their passage into a literal register. When
Hölderlin began to write of an organ, the literal term was new, and not intellectually
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The refrain in the Hölderlin literature to the effect that poetry inherited the task of philosophy—a claim
that is also widespread for the Jena movement and the Goethezeit more generally—is one that needs
differentiation on just this basis. Take, for example, Charles Larmore’s statement that: “Hölderlin saw in
the limits of philosophy reason to believe that poetry fares better in expressing the full reality of the human
condition. The superiority of poetry was one of his deepest convictions…” See Charles Larmore,
“Hölderlin and Novalis,” in ed. Karl Ameriks, The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 141-161, here p. 149. Rather than a wholesale shift
from philosophy to poetry, I see the emergence of a mutual instrumentality between these discursive
options, which results in the privileging of genre-theory as the connection between the two. Here I am
closer to Kondylis, who writes that “Wenn Hölderlin überhaupt dazu gekommen ist, eine Theorie der Töne
und der Dichtarten zu entwickeln, dann nur deswegen, weil er den metaphysisch fundierten Gluaben an die
Existenz harmonischer Strukturen hegte bzw. den Wirkungen und Abzweigungen des im höchsten
ontologischen Prinzip verwurzelten Geistes auf die Spur kommen wollte. Den Philosophen gegen den
Dichter oder umgekehrt auszuspielen, ist in Hölderlins Fall sinnlos, und außerdem hinder e suns, den
tieferen Charakter des nachkantischen Idealismus zu erfassen.” (Kondylis, Enstehung, p. 261)
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distant from the metaphorology I have detailed above. This prepared the stage for the
term’s eccentric use: caught between metaphor and concept, its power was wide-ranging.
Hölderlin was the first to exploit that semantic power fully. Hölderlin’s efforts can be
better specified against a large-scale backdrop, one which I will now describe, before
coming to Hölderlin’s organology.
The metaphorical, philosophical and natural-scientific groundwork for organology
had been laid by 1790 at the latest. Herder’s Gott had supplied a cosmology of organs,
while Kant had supplied the methodological uses of the terms organ and organon. The
concretizing effect of the organ on force in Herder was complemented by the
concretizing rhetorical choice of canon in Kant’s notion of the understanding.
Meanwhile, Blumenbach’s argument for epigenesis in Über den Bildungstrieb had won
the upper hand. By the mid-1790s, however, the organ’s strange absence from or
eccentricity to biological debate in Germany gave way to a sudden proliferation: “organ”
was now on everyone’s lips. Herder was central to this shift.242 Recall that it was in fact
Herder who introduced the “generationist” position into the debate on preformation and
epigenesis. Herder advocated, in an influential and yet (still) neglected way, giving up the
notion of simple mechanical force altogether. A “generationist” was someone who took a
position on the implicit debate between Newtonian mechanicists and quasi-Newtonian
vitalists.243 This position never denied the phenomenon of mechanical causality, but
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As I pointed out in chapter I, Jörg Wolf Henning unfortunately neglects Herder’s influence in his
otherwise excellent Der Begriff „Organ,“ an absence the more remarkable as it was likely Kant, as well as
Platner and french naturalists, who impressed the importance of the term upon the young Herder.
243
In the terms established by Peter Hanns Reil, Herder foreshadows the move from “vitalism” (which
remains within the Newtonian paradigm) to “organicism,” which reverses the prejudice in favor of the
fundamental nature of mechanical matter (this also proceeds from Newton, since for him forces must be
calculable to be manifest). Thus Herder’s introduction of the category “generationist” pushed the debate
about the formation of organic being backwards into the debate—which was always metaphysical—about
the nature of force itself. This conjuncture goes a long way to explaining the re-emergence of metaphysical
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rather denied it fundamental status. Herder introduced a differentiated Spinozan Being
into the debate, a being that pullulated forces and their specifiying organs. “Organ” came
into its own as a scientific term in Germany—in the writings of Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer,
Joachim Dietrich Brandis, Johann Christian Reil, Alexander von Humboldt, Johann
Wilhelm Ritter, and Samuel Thomas Soemmerring—on the basis of a renewal of the
debate about the nature of force that Newtonians (mechanicist or vitalist) felt had been
put to rest. At just the moment Kant’s system seemed to foreclose on any future
metaphysics (excepting the special metaphysics of the critical system), the struggle
between epigenesis and preformation gave way to a struggle for the soul of the life
sciences, a debate between the epigenetic model and a “generationist” or organicist
model of being itself.244
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speculation after Kant, and that for two reasons. First, the renewed debate about force addressed a
perceived primary weakness in Kant’s philosophy: its reliance upon the Newtonian cosmological model
(broadly speaking), or its prejudice in favor of determinative judgments over “reflecting judgments.”
Second, the re-awakened interest in the metaphysics of force provides circumstantial evidence for why the
Spinoza-renaissance was more than the literary scandal Jacobi forced among die Freunde Lessings. Interest
in Spinoza as well as Leibniz is deeply connected to this post-Kantian debate on the knowability and nature
of force.
244
Indeed, this conflict over the soul of the emergent discipline is still present in the historiography.
Timothy Lenoir, following a division between Kantian, Schellingian, and Hegelian Naturphilosophien
originally proposed by Dietrich von Engelhardt, focused his Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in
Nineteenth-Century German Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) on figures like
Blumenbach and Kielmeyer (see also his ground-breaking “The Göttingen School and the Development of
Transcendental Naturphilosophie in the Romantic Era,” Studies in the History of Biology 5 (1981), 111205). Lenoir proposes that a “vital mechanist” research agenda was created in German at the end of the 18th
century, which—at the distance of several developments—eventually led to the classical discoveries of
19th-century biology. This reading is based on the notion that what unites Blumenbach and Kant is their
Newtonian reticence about the knowledge of forces: the vital mechanist can search for more and more
specific manifest mechanics in living beings, but does not hope to clarify vitality itself. That there can be
“no Newton for a blade of grass,” as Kant put it, does not prevent serious work in biological explanation. It
is easy to see how this program anticipates the mechanical developments in biology of the 20th century: the
genetic code is only the deepest mechanism yet found, and thus represents another temptation to fall behind
the Newtonian docta ignorantia about forces. More recently, Richards, Romantic Conception has proposed
that the “Kantian” branch of this proto-biological movement actually foreclosed on the possibility of a real
biology. Because the KU makes judgments about organic beings regulative—i.e. not constitutive of the
canonical world of the understanding—there can be, so Richards, no true science of life. Richards therefore
recuperates a similar cast of figures (Kielmeyer, Reill, etc.) in the name of Schellingian (and even
Goethean) “biology.” This revised history then also leads to the development of Darwinian evolution. What
strikes us here about this historiography is that it repeats the terms of the debate which occurred in the
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“Organ” came, in the mid-1790s, to its full range of literal expression in the
German language. The metaphorical uses I examined in chapter I were largely borrowed
from French, English, and Latin sources. But as the word came to have its now intuitive
meaning in German—“functional part,” an element in a complex system both existing in
mutual determination with the system as a whole—its metaphorical range broadened.
And it was in the interplay between an emergent, broad literal sense and a new field of
potential metaphor that Romantic organology made its home. As metaphysics entered a
new crisis—one determined by the disciplinization of the very knowledge it sought in a
profoundly uncertain political Europe—“organ” would come to have a sliding scale of
literal values. Hölderlin, Schelling, and Novalis entered the terminological fray,
intentionally shifting the open fields of literal and metaphorical meanings of organ in
order to build a modern metaphysics.
“Organ” came quickly to be associated, in proto-biological discourse, with the
developmental aspect of life.245 Thus Johann Christian Reil could write, in 1795, that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1790s: should the life sciences be considered their own discipline, or should the also emergent university
discipline physics do much the work to understand organic phenomena?
245
The key texts in this development (the list is not meant to be exhaustive) are: Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer,
Ueber die Verhältnisse der organischen Kräfte unter einander in der Reihe der verschiedenen
Organisationen, die Geseze und Folgen dieser Verhältniße, eingeführt von Kai Torsten Kanz (BasilikenPresse: Marburg an der Lahn 1993); Johann Dietrich Brandis, Versuch über die Lebenskraft (Hannover:
Verlag der Hahn’schen Buchhandlung, 1795); Johann Christian Reil, Von der Lebenskraft (Leipzig: Johann
Ambrosius Barth, 1910); Alexander von Humboldt, Aphorismen aus der Physiologie der Pflanzen, transl.
Gotthelf Fischer (Voß und Compagnie: Weimar, 1794), a translation of Alexander von Humboldt, Florae
Fribergensis specimen plantas cryptogamicas praesertim subterraneas exhibens / Accedunt aphorismi ex
doctrina physiologiae chemicae plantarum. Cum tabulis aeneis (Rottmann: Berlin, 1793); Johann Wilhelm
Ritter, Beweis, dass ein beständiger Galvanismus den Lebenprocess in dem Thierreich begleite. Neben
neuen Versuchen un Bemerkungen über den Galvanismus (Verlag des Industrie-Comptoirs: Weimar,
1798); Samuel Thomas Soemmerring, Über das Organ der Seele (Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1796).
I pass over two contexts here. First, Schiller’s training under Abel at the Hohe Karlsschule in Stuttgart led
to early uses of organ in his medical dissertations. These dissertations went long unread, however, and the
likelihood that the word arrived in Stuttgart by way of Platner’s anthropology also overlaps with Herder’s
early uses. See for the context Wolfgang Riedel, Die Anthropologie des jungen Schiller: Zur
Ideengeschichte der medizinischen Schriften und der „Philosophischen Briefe“ (Würzburg: Königshausen
und Neumann, 1985). Second, I pass over the very important contributions of Karl Phillip Moritz and
Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Their uses of organ—proceeding, as I show in chapter V, from the so-called
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“Organ und Organisation ist also Bildung und Struktur belebter Körper.”246 Reil returns
in this moment to the Aristotelian question of the homogeneous parts and heterogeneous
parts—and we can recall that Haller’s physiology had also addressed this issue, without
using the term organ. Here even homogenous parts (like “Faser”—the fibers of the body)
are named “organs,” insofar as they are complex. Thus Reil establishes an organic
system—as a living combination of “matter and form”—in which we have organs all the
way down to the divide with “dead” matter. It is as though Leibniz’s system has been
tempered, included in it a purely homogeneous substance which cannot be organ-filled.247
Live matter is purely organic, even where it homogeneous, since it already there involves
structured development. Organs, then, interact with substances outside the live body on a
scale from grob to fein. With the introduction of the interactive feines Organ, we can see

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“Spinoza summit” in Weimar—overlap to a significant extent with, and probably derive from, Herder’s
uses. I will point out Goethe’s uses peripherally where they seem determinative, and reserve the fuller
history for the final chapter, where this discourse had the most influence. !
246
Reil, Lebenskraft, p. 21. I argue in chapter V that Goethe unites both structure and development in the
term organ in his 1790 essay, Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen.
247
Much of the debate about Reil’s affinities (Lenoir classes him as a Kantian, while Richards sees an
organicist) comes from the way in which he approaches the problem of matter. This approach, it seems to
me, is indeed Kantian, but in a sense emphasized by neither Lenoir nor Richards. Reil tries to include the
Newtonian attempt not to define forces with Kant’s agnosticism about “supersensible substrates.” The
problem—which is a properly Kantian problem, as the KU reveals—is that we definitely know that we are
dealing with two unknowables in dead and living matter—a contradictio in adiecto which Reil, to my
reading, does not resolve. He writes: “Vorstellungen sind der Erfahrung nach nicht anders, als in
Verbindung mit Organen möglich. Von einer unmittelbaren und von Organen unabhängigen Wirkung einer
Seele haben wir keine Erfahrung, also auch keinen reellen Begriff. Und von dieser Art müßte die Fähigkeit
einer Seele sein, die sich Organe bildete, ehe Organe vorhanden sind. Materie, sagt man zwar, sei, soweit
wir sie aus Erfahrung kennen, ein totes Wesen, von welchem wir kein Leben ableiten können. Allein
belehrt uns nicht die tägliche Erfahrung, daß es eine Materie (die tierische) gibt, die Leben hat? Warum
wollen wir nicht auch in der belebten, sowie in der toten natur, die Erscheinungen derselben der Materie
zuschreiben? Etwa weil wir den absoluten Grund der Erscheinungen belebter Wesen nicht aus ihrer Materie
erkennen können? Das können wir aber bei den toten Körpern auch nicht.” (Reil, Lebenskraft, p. 4) He then
flips this argument on its head, emphasizing the complexity of “dead” matter—its formal qualities (crystals,
magnets, etc.). The primary representable quality of live matter is, so Reil, that it is “plastic.” That
plasticity, as the passage above intimates, is a matter of the development and contribution to further
development of organs. This somewhat confused passage is an excellent example of the metaphysics
which, after Kant and Herder, became unavoidable even amongst the most sober practitioners of the life
sciences.
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Herder’s influence—but here there is no shift into talk of cognitive organs.248 “Organ”
has become the point where structure and development meet: organ is Bildung, but
structure is also organization. The term has entered a field of meaning from which it will
not again be withdrawn, but which supplies the basis on which the analogy between
organic processes and rational forms could become more than metaphorical. In all the
talk of Bildung, Trieb, and Kraft—which has been so much (and so deservedly) discussed
in the literature—a term came into the German public discourse (philosophical, naturalscientific, and literary) to name simultaneously several conceptual pressure-points.
Gathered around the local problem of structure and development—which itself refers
back to the larger problem of generation—were, suddenly, problems of force and
expression, cognition and its object, mechanics and organics, physis and techne.249
The crises in school metaphysics from the beginning of the 18th century (see the
Introduction above) seemed, therefore, to haunt its end. The Romantics came of
intellectual age in this reiterated crisis-atmosphere, in which the speculative stakes of
individual and seemingly isolated areas of knowledge (disciplines) were the explicit topic
of debate. Hölderlin would be interested to rehabilitate metaphysics, and to do that, he
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Here Reil also relies heavily on Brandis’s 1794 writing of nearly the same name—Versuch über die
Lebenskraft. Soemmerring, as we will see below, will also make use of Brandis, as he will of Platner’s
1772 Anthropologie, which Reil also cites here. Perhaps the most interesting citation here is from Gotthelf
Fischer’s translation of Humboldt’s plant-physiological aphorisms. In the notes to this edition, Fischer
writes: “Die Grundlage derjenigenKörper, welche durch die Zeugung das Leben bekommen, ist
durchgängig äusserst klein gegen der zu ihrer Vollkommenheit gediehenen Grösse derselben. Alle diese
Zunahme und Vervollkommung [sic] muss das Leben aus dem Körper selbst, von auswerts in ihn gelangten
Dingen, durch alle seiner Art zukommende Stufen bewirken. Zur Bewirkung dieser fremden in ihn gelanten
Dinge, um sie für ihn schichklich zuzurichten, gehören Werkstäte und Werkzeuge, die je nach der
verschiedenen und mannifgaltigen Bestimmung und Bedürfnissen, verschieden und mannigfaltig sind.
Diese werden besonders Organe genennt [sic].” (Humboldt, Aphorismen, p. 135.) Thus the entire spectrum
of processes and parts discussed so widely without a name in the epigenesis/preformation debate became
organs.
249
Reil himself continues to speak of the “machine of nature,” which has organs. See e.g. Lebenskraft, p.
21.
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would have to reject Kant’s notion of Disziplin as applied and extended to the university
in the Streit der Factultäten.
If there is any doubt that this struggle over the general and the particular—this
crisis about emergent institutions playing out in metaphysical discourse—was also felt to
be political, we need look no further than Kant’s 1798 Streit der Facultäten. Originally
written in 1794 and withheld due to the Prussian censors (whom Kant had crossed in
1793 with his Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft), the two halves of
this writing tie university reform to the notion of republican government after the French
Revolution. Arguing that the regulative, moral teleology of the human race must
ultimately recognize its progress in the republicanism, Kant defends—as he had more
generally in 1784 in Was heißt Aufklärung?—the notion of a “philosophical faculty”
which represents public reason and the interest of the truth alone. This traditionally
“lower” faculty—which would replace the theological faculty at the academic helm of the
university250—necessarily occupies a privileged position in a university appropriate to
republican government. Its privilege results from its distance from the state’s interests,
and that very autonomy comes from its relationship to truth. Here Kant returns to the
terms I investigated in Chapter I of this study: the “laws” which are set forward as a
canon of each faculty with respect to government—one thinks of the modern use of the
Hippocratic oath—are distinguished from the rules which bodies of professors give
themselves for the practice of their individual disciplines. Although these self-regulatory
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Kant’s proposal is to divide the medieval “higher faculties” (theology, law, and medicine) according to
the object of their social role in producing human happiness. The theological faculty aims at general
happiness; the juridical at bourgeois welfare; and the medicinal at the well-being of the body. I characterize
the philosophical faculty as “public” (in keeping with Kant’s famous definition from 1784) because it is the
furthest from being instrumentalized by the state, and thus forms the autonomous center of the university.
See AA VII, pp. 20-23. The parallel with the Enlightenment-essay is clear, as has also been noted by Paul
Guyer (Kant (New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 291-93).
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statutes seem to be essential to the concept of each faculty, they have no governmental
authority. Indeed, writes Kant, each can serve merely as an organon—an aid—for the
present state of each faculty’s practice.251 This division is then used again to distinguish
within the theological faculty between reine Religionslehre (the philosophical canon) and
Kirchenlehre (the theological organon).252 Autonomous, public reason is identified with
the canon, which should produce disciplinary organa according to the heteronomous
functions of each faculty. The philosophical faculty’s antagonism to the others lies in its
ability to make this distinction: it disciplines the disciplines by referring them always to
the most general human interest. Looking back to the KdrV, we can see that “canon” is
used univocally across these texts: a body of positive law establishing the legitimate use
of judgment for the constitution of our world here finds its social expression in
application to the practice of the socially embedded faculties.
The Streit thus takes pride of place in a particular genre of writing Kant engages
in after establishing Criticism. I would propose the term “disciplinary” for this Kantian
genre. The review of Herder’s Ideen is only among the more polemical of these
writings.253 They take their cue from the last sentence of the KdrV (“Der kritische Weg
steht allein noch offen…”), and they rigorously apply the notion of Disziplin worked out
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“Von dem Gesetzbuch, als dem Kanon, sind diejenigen Bücher, welche als (vermeintlich) vollständiger
Auszug des Geistes des Gesetzbuchs zum faßlicheren Begriff und sicherern Gebrauch des gemeinen
Wesens (der Gelehrten und Ungelehrten) von den Fakultäten abgefaßt werden, wie etwa die symbolischen
Bücher, gänzlich unterschieden. Sie können nur verlangen als Organon, um den Zugang zu jenem zu
erleichtern, angesehen zu werden und haben gar keine Autorität; selbst dadurch nicht, daß sich etwa die
vornehmsten Gelehrten von einem gewissen Fache darüber geeinigt haben, ein solches Buch statt Norm für
ihre Fakultät gelten zu lassen, wozu sie gar nicht befugt sind, sondern sie einstweilen als Lehrmethode
einzuführen, die aber nach Zeitumständen veränderlich bleibt und überhaupt auch nur das Formale des
Vortrags betreffen kann, im Materialen der Gesetzgebung aber schlechterdings nichts ausmacht.” (AA VII,
pp. 22-23)
252
AA VII, pp. 36-37.!
253
We might include Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie (AA: VIII, pp.
387-423), and Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich
gemacht werden soll (AA: VIII, pp. 185-253), to name only the most obvious. Volume VIII of the academy
edition contains most of these writings.
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in the Methodenlehre, the final section of the Critique. Those uses of reason which lead
away from the canon of the understanding—in fact, that uses which allow organa to
become statements about truth rather than about disciplinary practice (constitutive rather
than regulative)—are to be excluded from philosophy. Indeed, they are to be excluded
from the university, and ultimately from the public sphere altogether.254 After all, the
inaugural disciplinary writing had been directed at Herder, and its point of contention had
been a metaphysical problem (that of force). Hölderlin came of intellectual age in the
very resurgence of the force-debate in metaphysical terms, which “conflicted”—and not
accidentally—with Kant’s program in the 1790s
The word organon, then, is demoted to its non-metaphysical use in this context.
Kant has now dismissed the problem had exercised him for several decades, that of an
organon for metaphysics, or formal rules for general cognition. Simultaneously, however,
the very problem which articulated for him the heart of a conflict of the faculties—the
problem of the cognition of force—came into natural-scientific prominence and brought
the word organ to the fore. In this context, the word was literal, but its meaning was not
yet fully determined. For that determination, some settling of accounts in the
metaphysical debate would be necessary. Der Streit der Facultäten painstakingly
socialized Criticism even as it intentionally left out the metaphysical conflict associated
with Kant’s own earlier use of the term organon. But between the essay’s composition
(1794) and its publication (1798), the issue would be forced into public view by the
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John Zammito’s writings about Kant are perhaps closest to this depiction. There are two points of
difference, however, between his notion and mine. First, I would not include the KU in this genre, and his
Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment does not compel us, I think, to do so. Second, his depiction is
polemical. Kant was, according to him, in some sense wrong to do this, at least insofar as he obscured other
approaches to the problems he investigated (especially Herder’s—see Kant, Herder, and the Birth of
Anthropology). My remarks are not intended in this way. I am merely pointing out that Kant saw fit to put
his philosophical program into social action at the university and state levels, and that this required a
certain generic shift in his writing.
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Göttingen physiologist Samuel Thomas Soemmerring with his 1796 Über das
Seelenorgan. This literary-scientific event—reactions to his writing, mostly negative,
came from all sectors and faculties—effectively brought organ and organon into the same
discourse, quite without any intention on the part of Soemmerring or the writer of the
afterword to his study: Immanuel Kant.
!
Towards a New Metaphysics: From the Soul’s Organ to Organology
Soemmerring’s Über das Seelenorgan was published under these disciplinary
conditions, which dovetailed with the renaissance of metaphysical problems described
above. This conjuncture set the stage for Hölderlin’s combination of monism and
dialectical thought—the work was pressed upon him by his self-designated literary father,
Wilhelm Heinse (see note 271 below)—which found final expression in his theory of
tragedy. Amongst the seemingly passé problems that found renewed interest was that of
the location of the spirit in the body. The three systems of body-soul commerce—influxus
physicus, Leibniz’s pre-established harmony, and the post-Cartesian occasionalist
system—had driven this discourse from the collapse of scholastic Aristotelianism in the
late 17th century through the middle of the 18th.255 The question had not gone away—nor
has it—but the circulating answers in German public discourse had shifted significantly
by 1790.256 Scholastic frameworks had fallen away, and the question of locality—
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See chapter I above for rejections of force-interactions between body and soul couched in organ-terms.
There were primarily two kinds of responses in Germany as the 19th century approached. First, there was
an anthropological answer, one emphasized by writers like Ernst Platner and Herder. Second, there was a
critical answer, emphasized by Kant and his followers, especially Reinhold and then Fichte. In a sense, this
latter discourse was not an answer, since it took its departure from the logical deadlock the terms of the
question. John Zammito has described the emergence of criticism as a deviation from a more general
anthropological discourse which the early Kant had participated in. He writes: “German anthropological
discourse crystallized in three distinct manifestations around the year 1772: first, Ernst Platner’s
publication of Anthropologie fuer Aerzte und Weltweise; second, Kant’s inaugural course in anthropology
256
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especially with respect to the brain—had gained traction as the physiological enterprise
became both technologically and analytically more complex.257 This shift meant that the
terms Werkzeug and Organ could now be used to describe functional locations in the
body, and especially in the brain. If the body was the soul’s organ, this meant something
immediately material and functional. And the soul’s organ could now be investigated for
information about that functioning—if only there could be agreement about what that
organ was.
Kant had addressed the locality question in his Träume eines Geistersehers in
1766, arguing that the soul cannot be conceived in the same terms as the body.258 It was,
however, Ernst Platner who spearheaded the re-awakening of the question of the “soul’s
organ,” which his 1790 Neue Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise.259. This re-worked
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at the University of Königsberg; and third, the publication of Herder’s prize-winning Essay on the Origins
of Language. Herder was among the earliest and most radical advocates of supplanting philosophy with
anthropology, and he devoted his life’s work to that endeavor, with all its promise and perils.” (Zammito,
Origins, p. 3) The increasingly bitter relations between the founders of these discourses—especially as
Kant became more polemical in his writings in the 1790s, and Herder began to attack his former teacher—
gave way to more reconciliatory gestures with Fichte’s 1794 lecture-courses on Platner’s aphorisms, which
Hölderlin attended.
257
Among the famous attempts to understand the brain’s role in cognition in the 18th century are Haller’s,
Soemmerring’s and Franz Josef Gall’s doctrines, which were characterized as “phrenology.” The period
between the metaphysical discourse which focused on the soul and the mid-19th century positivism which
discovered localization of brain-functions is characterized by a striking openness, and it is in this
indeterminate atmosphere that the organ emerged as the term for the instrumentalization of the body by the
soul. See Michael Hagner, Homo cerebralis: Der Wandel vom Seelenorgan zum Gehirn (Frankfurt a.M.:
Suhrkamp, 2008), and Jan Verplaetse, Localizing the Moral Sense: Neuroscience and the Search for the
Cerebral Seat of Morality, 1800-1930 (New York: Springer, 2009).
258
Kant already uses Platner’s later term Nervengeist to describe the transmission of Cartesian ideas
materiales in the Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (AA II, p. 345).
Kant also talks about organs of the brain (p. 339), distinguishing them from sense-organs (in an early use of
“organ” for the senses in German) and naming the central organ a Sensorium der Seele, which, as we have
seen, may have influenced Herder. The term Seelenorgan does not occur, and would have a very different
context—precisely that of Wolffian metaphysics—if it had. His consideration leads to the fundamentally
insoluble relation of body and soul—an anticipation of the notion of an antinomy—but also the
“inclination” to make the soul an immaterial spirit. See pp. 325-7 for Kant’s rejection of the soul’s general
presence in the body and in the brain in particular.
259
His 1772 Anthropologie had used the term organ—as we have seen—and even Seelenorgan, but the
renewed effort devotes some 50 paragraphs to the problem of the Seelenorgan, compared with only a
handful in the earlier edition. See Ernst Platner, Neue Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise mit
besonderer Rücksicht auf Physiology, Pathologie, Moralphilosophie und Aesthetik (Crusius: Leipzig,
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and amplified version of the 1772 Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise introduced the
term Seelenorgan firmly into the public sphere.260 The Seelenorgan is two-fold in two
separate senses, folding an animal and a spiritual nature into the essence of the human,
which is itself both recognitive and active.261 The body—even its organic parts—cannot
be counted as the seat of the soul, and Platner polemicizes against those who
misrecognize the nerves themselves as this locus.262 This presents the reader with a
strange dualism: Platner, who insists for holistic reasons on the unity both of the
Seelenorgan and the human more generally, also points to competing and even seemingly
contradictory structures in the body, in the soul, and in their relation.263 Thus Platner—
especially through his continued use of the term influxus physicus—introduces not the
general “organ” but the organ of the soul in a metaphysically discursive manner. And it is
precisely the problematic of the dual and the unified that Hölderlin would take up and
radicalize. If “organ” had been literalized, it had also been, in a parallel discourse,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1790), pp. 58-91. Note that Reil, too, had made an uncommonly direct claim that the brain itself was the the
Seelenorgan. See Reil, p. 48: “Daß das Seelenorgan (das Gehirn) und nicht die Nerven das eigentümliche
Werkzeug der Vorstellungen sei, ist wohl unleugbar.” The preceding pages have an account of nerve’s
action in relay to the brain and the muscles, which are the reactors that allow for sensation and voluntary
motion after intital excitation.
260
The 1772 edition contains a discussion of the sense-organs, and even a discussion of the Sitz der Seele,
but does not emphasize the term Seelenorgan. The organs work in both versions by mediating their formal
impressions to the Nervengeist, which communicates directly to the brain. The Gehirnmark (1772) or the
Nervengeist (1790) is the sensorium, the basis of all perception and indeed the soul’s point of
communication with the body and the world. But it is not an organ, at least not yet in 1772.
261
“Der Mensch ist sofern die Seele allein, wiefern die Seele allein fähig ist des geistigen Lebens und
Bewußtseyns, und der Körper ihr bloß dient zum Werkzeug ihrer leidentlichen [sic], und selbstthätigen
Wirkungen.” (Platner, Neue Anthropologie §175, p. 58)
262
§83 involves a complex reception of the British moral philosophical discourse which speaks of
empathies in particular as resonances like those of the strings of musical instruments. The seat of the soul
must be “invisible,” according to Platner. See, on the soul as string, Riedel, Schillers Antropologie. Platner
concludes that talk of the body as the organ of the soul makes loose sense nevertheless, because of the
mediated relation of the Nervengeist to the body and its felt world: “so ist es, in dieser Rücksicht, zuläßig,
Gehirn und Nervensystem, ja überhaupt den ganzen Körper, das Organ der Seele zu nennen.” (Platner,
Neue Anthropologie §186, p. 61)
263
Platner, Neue Anthropologie, §200 ff. defends influxus physicus (or rather assumes it, referencing his
Aphorisms), and attacks Kant’s critical system explicitly for complicating this seemingly straightforward
point.
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metaphysicized again. Where the conflict between physics and biology had gained
obliquely metaphysical proportions, the traditional problem of commercium mentis et
corporis, had been re-metaphysicized just as Kant sought polemically to force a different
(canonical, disciplinary) solution.
Platner set the tone for the entire interaction Hölderlin would have later in the
decade primarily with Soemmerring (and the latter’s friend Heinse) and Kant (through
Fichte):
Weil die menschliche Seele, so wie wahrscheinlicher Weise alle endliche Geister [sic],
den Stoff der ihrer Art des Daseyns angemessenen und von der Gottheit bestimmten
Vorstellungen weder aus sich selbst hervorbringen, noch auch unmittelbar aus der
vorliegenden Welt nehmen, vielweniger unmittelbar in die vorliegende Welt einwirken
konnte: so bedurfte sie eines Mittelwerkzeuges, durch welches sie theils ihrem Verhältniß
gemäß sich die Welt vorstellen, theils gemäß diesen Vorstellungen in die Welt einwirken
könnte. Seelenorgan.264

Not only the structure of Hölderlin’s dialectical metaphysics, and in fact not only its
terms were given here, but in fact the definitional task of the Romantic organ was
described by Platner, perhaps for the first time. For we can see here, in an argumentative
style that attracted neither Fichte nor the Romantics, both the metaphysical and the
political or ethical dimensions of the interventionary tool of Romantic organology. The
Mittelwerkzeug, which both cognizes and acts and is the principle of any possible unity
between these two human activities, is also defined as the possibility of human cognition
of the world itself. The division in cognition which prevented this unified instrument in
Kant’s criticism is here itself criticized. The Seelenorgan was, as we shall see, the
predecessor of the Romantic attempt to systematize the absolute knowledge that Kant had
called “intellectual intuition.”
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Platner, Neue Anthropologie §177, p. 59.
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Soemmerring was not exactly alone, then, when he proposed that the “fluid” in
the nervous system was the sensorium Descartes had once located in the pineal gland.
Soemmerring did, as Hagner has pointed out, recall the literal terms of the Cartesian
debate, by citing liberally from authors from Descartes himself to the novelist (and his
friend) Wilhelm Heinse. If it seemed that the question of the seat of the senses could be
separated from that of the location of the soul, Soemmerring incautiously equated the
two.265 He thus broke the discursive rules of the resurgent metaphysics, making its terms
explicit and violating Kant’s warnings about the separation of the faculties. As we have
seen, he was not alone in continuing to ask about their connection. Yet his literary
archive, a kind of panorama of “old” metaphysics, provoked vehement rejections of his
proposal from perhaps the two most dominant cultural figures at the time: Goethe and
Kant. It took Hölderlin’s eye to recognize, through the prism of Soemmerring’s citations
of Heinse—as we shall see—the connection between post-Kantian philosophical
concerns and post-Spinozan theological anxiety (especially in the wake of the Lessing
controversy). Hölderlin’s most central philosophical gesture—the dialectical figure of
real, developmental contradiction captured in a greater unity—emerged not from his
reading of Fichte, but from his realization that Fichte (or Kant) and Spinoza (or Lessing)
could be united only by a metaphysics of contradiction: organology. The cosmic picture
thats emerged as the necessary correlate of this complex thought is what is usually
referred to as Hölderlin’s classicism, for it was only the Greek tragedy that reflected the
one pole of his contradictory picture of developmental ontology. And it was only the
possibility of a contemporary tragedy that could fulfill the organological promise, the
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See Hagner, Homo cerebralis, and also, on the separation of the two problems, Werner Euler, “Die
Suche nach dem „Seelenorgan.“ Kants philosophische Analyse einer anatomischen Entdeckung
Soemmerrings,” Kant-Studien 93 (2002), pp. 453-80.
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promise of mutual interpenetration of the absolute and the particular which had eluded
him in Hyperion.266
Dividing the nerves into twelve pairs, Soemmerring focuses on the interface of
the “fluid” in the “cavities” of the nerves (Nervenhöhlen) with the ends of those nerves in
the brain. Detailed drawings and descriptions of especially the sensory nerve-pairs lead to
the larger question: how can sensation arise from hard matter? Soemmerring’s answer is
that it is precisely a soft kind of matter that allows this: water. Citing widely from
Descartes to Kant to Wilhelm Heinse (on which more in a moment), Soemmerring asks
after a medium uniens that connects soul to matter in perception. His answer is the
dynamic fluid in the nerves. Where Platner had rejected a “visible” locale of this
interaction, Soemmerring incautiously proposed a point where physiology and
metaphysics could meet.267 In doing so, he prepared not only the term organ for a more
complex use, but also gathered a citational web which Hölderlin went on to exploit.
Important among his sources are not only Descartes and Kant, but also Platner, Brandis
and Herder. The argument culminates in a rhetorical question (“Warum soll also nachher
noch eine dem Anscheine nach homogene Feuchtigkeit unseres Geist nicht enthalten, ihm
nicht als Organ dienen können?”268), which is then followed by a citation of Herder
(“keine Kraft der Natur ist ohne Organ…”269) Herder’s use of the term, as the passage
suggests, was the most present for the shift that occurred in the 1790s. And yet, as
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I follow most of the literature in this claim, but Hyperion’s closing words (nächstens mehr...) make very
clear that systemic closure is far from achieved in the novel. See Sämtliche Werke (Große Stuttgarter
Ausgabe), dritter Band. Hyperion, ed. Friedrich Beißner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1957), p. 227. Cited
hereinafter as GSA III, p. 160.
267
Soemmerring was aware of this discursive transgression, as is clear from Soemmerring, Seelenorgan, p.
38, where he cites Kant’s rejection of any crossing of the boundary between the physiological and the
transcendental.
268
Soemmerring, Seelenorgan, p. 43.
269
Soemmerring, Seelenorgan, p. 44.!
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Soemmerring makes clear, he is not addressing the question about force directly: he is
interested to show where it is appropriate to talk of the soul’s instrumentalization of the
body. That interface—the location of the sensorium commune, the proton aistheterion,
and the sedes animae—is in the literal waters of the nerves.
Soemmerring’s predominant interest in the physiological question about the
soul—its organs, not its status as or as interacting with force—did not prevent his treatise
from bearing on the debate about the unity of nature and the plurality of forces. Indeed,
his writing is singular amongst those I have identified as shifting the discursive use of
“organ” in the 1790s. This is because he thematizes the mediation of the complex
physical organ (rather than the question of the organ’s relation to force). He emphasizes
the organ itself, the medium of communication, rather than the Newtonian problem of
force. And the very choice of water as that medium was textually charged. Recalling the
pre-Socratic teachings on the elements, Soemmerring cites not Thales himself but
Wilhelm Heinse’s Ardinghello (1787), which novel’s fourth and penultimate part consists
of a canonical and ideological debate about philosophy between the protagonist and a
certain Demetri, who commands much attention as a marketplace philosopher in Rome.
Soemmerring’s citation is from Demetri’s explanation of his complex pantheism, which
relies on a long history of natural philosophy. Thales, according to Demetri, found the
divine in water, in the moistness of the earth, which in itself lacked life and spirit. The
emergence of order from chaos was correctly thought by the Greeks to come from
elemental organizations, from animated fluids—and modern philosophers lack
understanding of this basic truth.270
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
270

Soemmerring, Seelenorgan, pp. 39-40. The absence of Empedocles is the more remarkable because of
the focus on the doctrine of the elements, of which the former was and is taken to be the founder.
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Empedocles—who would come to be the subject of Hölderlin’s own, modern
tragedy—receives no mention in Ardinghello. And yet his distinctive doctrines, as they
came down to Hölderlin (and to us) through Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of
the Philosophers, are clearly recognizable in the text.271 Demetri’s argument is that the
elements are explanatory of the tension in all naturalist holism or pantheism: if all is one
and one all, then where does movement and tension come from? This problem—which
was also Herder’s question confronting Spinoza through Jacobi’s and Lessing’s
incitement—receives a solution, not merely a report, from Demetri himself. Ardinghello
takes the novelistic position, as it were, that the development of form (and this includes
the problem of epigenesis272) is an intra-divine necessity. The universe takes form in
order to enjoy itself, which it can only do as discrete entities endowed, ultimately, with
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Hölderlin’s association of the Heinse passage’s philosophical content with Empedocles was, as we shall
see, no great leap.
271
Indeed, a key passage explores the various “single-element” doctrines of the pre-Socratics, without
mentioning Empedocles, who was, according to Aristotle, the founder of the “four elements” doctrine. The
protagonist soliloquizes: ““Die großen Dichter dieser hohen Zeiten für die Menschheit,” fiel ich ein,
“hatten um eine Stufe natürlichre Metaphysik und nahmen das Sinnlichre und Nähere. Sie meinten, wir
schöpften die bewegende Kraft mit dem Atem, und sie sei in der Luft befindlich, und nannten
sie Zeus, nach dem wörtlichen Sinn, wodurch sie lebten; und einige Philosophen schlugen sich zu ihrer
Partei. Sophokles sagt: “Zeus, der alles faßt, in alles dringt, uns näher verwandt ist als Vater, Mutter,
Bruder, Schwester.” Und an einem andern Orte: “Welcher Menschen Übermut, o Zeus, hemmt deine
Macht, die der uralte Schlaf nicht ergreift und die unermüdlichen Monden! Unalternd durch der Jahre
Wechsel nimmst du Herrscher den strahlenden Glanz vom Olymp ein; dir ist der Augenblick, die Zukunft
und Vergangenheit untertan.” Und Euripides sagt geradezu: “Siehst du über und um uns den unermeßlichen
Äther, der die Erde mit frischen Armen rund umfängt? Das ist Gott!” Und Aristophanes, sein Antagonist,
ruft ebenso aus: “Unser Vater Äther, heiligster, aller Lebengeber!” Und Pindar ging schon vorher noch
weiter und singt stolz in lyrischer Begeisterung: “Eins das Geschlecht der Menschen! Eins das der Götter!
Alle beide atmen von einer Mutter.” Wilhelm Heinse, Ardinghello und die glückseligen Inseln (Leipzig:
Insel, 1961), pp. 248-49. This passage was clearly very important to the young Hölderlin, as his frequent
use of the Aether and Vater Aether as glosses on Zeus as a natural force and god make clear. This issue has
received an excellent treatment from Max Baeumer in his “Hölderlin und das hen kai pan,” Monatshefte
59: 2 (1967), pp. 131-47, which also provides valuable assessments of Hölderlin’s relationship to Jacobi
and Lessing, and a remarkable history of the topos one and all. Demetri reports this topos in the following
way (with clear reference to the Lessing-controversy): Andre suchten in der Folge den Widerspruch
wenigstens im Ausdrucke zu vermeiden und setzten für irgendein Element überhaupt: Eins ist Alles und
Alles Eins.” (Heinse, Ardinghello, pp. 262-63.)
272
See Heinse, Ardinghello, pp. 269 ff.
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freedom.273 Thus a certain metaphysics is given, a pantheism in which a mundane God
gives rise to free forms as the elaboration of his enjoyment of himself.274 Demetri’s
argument hardly supplies any argumentative force to the assertion that the one
differentiates itself—Heinse thus omits the factor which Herder had called “organ”—but
one passage clearly addresses the problem of organicity.
Discussing the understanding in this pantheistic framework, Demetri reports that
the cognitive faculty must have its “own material” according to Plato and Aristotle,
relying on Anaxagoras.275 The mind must be the place of forms, and in its thinking,
judging, perception, the creator of those forms. Insofar as it does this work, it is its own
material. Its application to bodily substance makes part of its activity, however,
corruptible—memory, perception, thought about the world, are not the essence of this
mind. Demetri draws the conclusion: “Folglich ist die Seele, als Verstand betrachtet, nur
unsterblich, insofern sie nichts denkt.”276 This notion would receive a strange echo in the
Fichtean/Schellingian doctrine that the fullness of cognition—intellectual intuition—
could only be unconscious (see the next section of the present chapter). The free-standing
mind, however, is not fully identical with the soul. Indeed, soul becomes, in this passage,
the functional interface between mind and body, between part and whole:
Die Seele des Auges ist das Sehen, die Seele des Ohrs das Hören und so die des Gefühls
das Fühlen. Die Seele des Baums ist, daß er wächst und seine Nahrung mit den Wurzeln
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With respect to God, and with clear reliance on Spinoza, Demetri says: “Wenn Eins Alles ist, so ist jede
Form desselben ursprünglich freie Handlung; denn es läßt sich kein Grund denken als seine Lust, warum es
aus sich so mancherlei wird. Und Allgenuß seiner Kraft ist die höchste Freiheit.” (Heinse, Ardinghello, p.
287)
274
For the development of Heinse’s controversial religious views, see Max Baeumer, “Wilhelm Heinse.
Zur Frage seiner Konversion und religiösen Anschauung,” PMLA 78: 3 (1963), pp. 214-24.
275
Heinse, Ardinghello, p. 265. Demetri makes sense of the De anima on his own terms: “… dessen
[Aristoteles’] Meinung ich freilich nach meinem eignen Begriff erklärte.” See the Introduction above for
Aristotle’s agreement with Anaxagoras and consequent rejection of an organ for the mind.
276
Heinse, Ardinghello, p. 266.
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einsaugt. Sie ist in allem Lebendigen dieselbe. Kraft in Ausübung ist ihm Seele, und kein
Körper, kein Element ohne Seele.277

This passage, had it been written ten years later (than 1787), would almost certainly have
used the term organ where Seele appears. Indeed, Herder’s Ideen uses the example of the
tree (as an organ of life), and perhaps also lies at the basis of the claim that soul is force
in application. Placed in the discursive context I have established, the passage begs for
the concept organ to make its gloss on Aristotle clearer. Where the confusion for
Demetri—as it had for Aristotle himself—lies in the relation of the mind to the soul, the
name for this problem, and the beginning of its solution, would come hardly a decade
later to be called “organ.” The question of function, applied to the one and the all, the
mind and the body, became the center of the new metaphysics.
Soemmerring’s reliance on Heinse is thus important for Hölderlin for two reasons.
First, it makes clear that the organ and especially the epistemological question attached to
it was part of the debate about the nature of being which had polarized the German
literary public since Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s 1785 Briefe über die Lehre des
Spinoza.278 Jacobi claimed that Lessing had confessed to having turned away from a
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Heinse, Ardinghello, p. 266.!
278

Hölderlin’s notes on Jacobi’s text are at GSA IV, 1, pp. 207-10, but are mostly excerpts. Manfred Frank,
Philosophical Foundations, has tried to show that the reading of Jacobi helped Hölderlin to the insight that
“the actual precedes the possible” (see note 303 below). Jacobi’s notion that a “ground” for the chain of
logical causes is needed is clearly present in Hölderlin’s thinking in the 1790s, but I cannot agree that this
justifies the dictum about precedence, nor that this makes Hölderlin into an “anti-foundationalist.” Perhaps
the most convincing assessment of Hölderlin’s complex relationship to pantheism is Wolfgang Riedl,
“Deus seu Natura. Wissensgeschichtliche Motive einer religionsgeschichtlichen Wende – im Blick auf
Hölderlin,” Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 31 (1998/9), pp. 171-207. Note that Hölderlin’s famous citation of
Phillipians 4:7, ein Frieden, der höher ist denn alle Vernunft, in the introduction to the penultimate edition
of Hyperion is likely taken from the only occurrence of the organ (except for quotations from Leibniz)in
the Spinoza-Büchlein. Jacobi writes that “Geist meiner Religion ist also das: der Mensch wird durch ein
göttliches Leben Gottes inne; und es gibt einen Frieden Gottes, welcher höher ist denn alle Vernunft, in ihm
wohnt der Genuss und das Anschauen einer unbegreiflichen Liebe.” (Fritz Mauthner, ed., Jacobis SpinozaBüchlein nebst Replik und Duplik (Munich: Müller, 1912), p. 167.) In a footnote he continues, citing
Aquinas: “Wie Gott in allem ist, so ist hinwiederum alles in ihm. Denn das Göttliche in uns bewegt alles.
Nicht die Vernunft selbst ist das Prinzip der Vernunft, sondern etwas Höheres: was ist aber, ausser Gott,
das Erkenntnis überträfe? Tugend ist das Organ der Seele. Daher haben die Alten den Namen der
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personal notion of God and embraced a pantheism rooted in the motto hen kai pan (one
and all). Jacobi used this putative confession to attack systems of “reason” which could
not, according to him, do other than cannibalize all being into their categories, erasing
independent being and especially any reverence for God.279 The resulting debate—
Herder’s Gott was a reaction to Jacobi’s work—came to focus on what made the unity of
being dynamic, what started the cosmic motor. Indeed, Herder replaced Spinoza’s notion
of power with that of force for just this purpose: force is always in expression, always
concretized in an organ, and its centrality in Herder’s cosmology thus names the desired
dynamism. As we have seen, the question of how this dynamism operates—and indeed,
the continuing question of its justification philosophically—drove the debate in the
1790s. What we need to see here is merely that Soemmerring’s citation of Heinse
(Ardinghello was composed at the height of the initial controversy, and published as
Herder and Jacobi had become increasingly embittered in 1787) reaches into the Greek
origins of a contemporary debate in order to raise the philosophical stakes of a
physiological project. The question arising from the relation of these texts becomes, what
parts of the natural world are capable of true functionality in the rational soul? And this
epistemological question overlapped with the ontological question of the generation of
activity, the differentiation of Being into forces and complementary organs. Soemmerring
collected these problems in a web of citations around the term organ and in the substance
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Glücklichen denen beigelegt, welche, ohne durch ihre Vernunft und ihren Willen bestimmt worden zu sein,
richtig zu Werke gegangen waren; denn sie hatten in sich ein höheres Prinzip, als Verstand und Willen.”
Aristot. Opp. Omn. Tom. II. Ethic. ad Eudemum. Lib. VII. Cap. 14.” I will return to the morality of the
soul’s organ in both chapters III and IV of the present study.
279
The classical treatments of the “pantheism controversy” are Timm, Gott und die Freiheit, and Frederick
Beiser Fate of Reason. Timm’s focus on the theological stakes is complemented by Beiser’s insistence on
the secular elements of an emergent reason. Both thematize the great desideratum of late Enlightenment
metaphysical thought: dynamic unity in being. The latter is perhaps most comprehensively treated by
Kondylis, Aufklärung. !
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water, and Hölderlin (who had also read Ardinghello) could see that web as a glimmer of
hope for a new metaphysics.
The responses to Soemmerring were largely negative.280 Goethe wrote to his
erstwhile friend281 on 28 August 1796, complaining that he had mixed up his duties as
physiologist and philosopher. He would have done better to “leave the philosophers
completely out of the game” and to have ended with §26, the last “empirical” section of
the writing. Ideas about nature were mere instruments for research, organs for
appropriating from nature an understanding which might never demonstrably correspond
to the reality it attempts to encompass. This organ—an early Goethean metaphorical
use—is quite clearly the limited organon which Kant had envisioned for practice in and
out of the university disciplines. Organs of the soul stood in stark and public
contradiction to the use-value of concepts as metaphorical instruments in empirical
research.282
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The best sources on Soemmerring are in eds. Gunter Mann et al, Samuel Thomas Soemmerring und die
Gelehrten der Goethezeit (New York: Fischer, 1985). See on the reviews in particular Peter McLaughlin,
“Soemmerring und Kant: Über das Organ der Seele und den Streit der Facultäten,” pp. 191-203, esp. pp.
192-94. On the more general and biographical relation between Soemmerring and Heinse, see Manfred
Dick, “Der Dichter und der Naturforscher: Samuel Thomas Soemmerring und Wilhelm Heinse,” pp. 203229.
281
For the complexities of the relationship Goethe/Soemmerring, see Manfred Wenzel, “Johann Wolfgang
von Goethe und Samuel Thomas Soemmerring: Morphologie und Farbenlehre,” in ed. Mann, Gelehrten der
Goethezeit, pp. 11-35, Seelenorgan discussed briefly at p. 28. !
282
“Eine Idee über Gegenstände der Erfahrung ist gleichsam ein Organ, dessen ich mich bediene, um diese
zu fassen, um sie mir eigen zu machen. Die Idee kann mir bequem sein, ich kann Andern zeigen, daß sie es
ihnen auch sein werde: aber es läßt sich nach meiner Vorstellungsart nur sehr schwer, und vielleicht gar
nicht beweisen, daß sie wirklich mit den Objecten übereinkomme und mit ihnen zusammentreffen müsse.”
(WA IV 11, p. 175.) Goethe’s skepticism about the metaphysical possibilities of science wavered
throughout his life. As the phrase “mir eigen machen” makes clear, Goethe neither rejects the usefulness of
ideas nor has any certainty about their general communicative value. Chapter V of the current study
undertakes to show that the organ became increasingly essential to Goethe’s theory of science, and indeed,
that his eventual position recognizes a kind of social necessity in the organological enterprise.
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Soemmerring had used his connections in Göttingen to procure an afterword for

his study by “our Kant,” to whom he dedicated the Seelenorgan.283 Kant’s assessment of
the work is divided into two points: a rejection of the metaphysical pretensions of the
physiological enterprise, and a welcoming of the possibility of discovering where
sensation occurs.284 Relying on his earlier position in the Dreams and its development in
the Paralogisms of the KdrV,285 Kant rejects the notion of a locale for the soul, but finds
the notion of an organ comparatively interesting. The notion of water as the element
which makes sensation possible is intriguing, according to Kant, because the fluid
dynamics of the medium indeed suggest the alternatingly binding and separating factor
that is required for such sensation to arise.286 Here “organ” gains its literal meaning,
intentionally reduced to its material element (from its Aristotelian ambivalence—see the
Introduction above) and regarded as the dynamic source of empirical perception. The
rejection of the locality of the soul is, however, not as straightforward as it seems. It
relies on two notions, which together present a clarifying conjuncture of the disciplinary
and theoretical programs of the late Kant. First, the notion of the locality of the soul is
said to be an “error of subreption”287 in which a confusion of faculties (Vermögen)
occurs. What the Träume had discussed as eingeschlichene Begriffe had been revealed in
the KdrV as moments of the failure of critique, moments where a concept (such as “soul”)
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
283

See McLaughlin, “Soemmerring und Kant,” 194 ff. For Kant’s more general contacts with the scientists
in Göttingen, see Timothy Lenoir, “Göttingen School,” pp. 111-205. !
284
As McLaughlin notes, this puts Kant in the interesting position of exercising facultative power from
within his own discipline, but then freely speaking as a layman in the area of physiology. See McLaughlin,
“Soemmerring und Kant,” pp. 198-99.
285
On the development of these doctrines, the tone-setting work has been Karl Ameriks’s Kant’s Theory of
Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982/2000), esp.
pp. 27 ff.
286
Soemmerring, Seelenorgan 82. For the quasi-naturphilosophisch speculations of the late Kant, see
Eckart Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis: Essays on the Opus Postumum (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2000).
287
Soemmerring, Seelenorgan, p. 82. Kant’s afterword is printed in the text of the Seelenorgan; see also the
various letters between the two in AA XII. !
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is combined in a judgment with an intuition (such as “locale”) in such a way that there is
a genuine conflict between them.288 What is here called “subreption” is simply a hurried
combination of judgments which, when their origins in their relative faculties are
properly revealed, can be shown to conflict so basically that the judgment must be
relinquished. This theoretical objection is reflected at the level of university politics:
Soemmerring’s proposal pushes the medical and philosophical faculties into Streit
through the attempt at a coalition where none is possible. The second half of the
afterword becomes more interesting precisely through this lens, since Kant speaks there
not merely as a layman, but as the voice of the philosophical faculty and its public reason.
The philosophical and medical faculties are divided by their relative positions of
autonomy with respect to the state—and by their internal rules for practice—but also has
the right to organize the results of the other faculties in keeping with truth itself. The task
of philosophy, which is founded on an essential separation from the other disciplines,
reflects its metaphysical pretensions on the social level.289 If there was any Kantian
conclusion which the Romantics wanted to move beyond, it was this one.
I return now to Hölderlin, on the basis of this preparatory analysis of discourses.
Hölderlin made this pretension clear in his reaction to Soemmerring—perhaps the only
positive response to Soemmerring’s metaphysical suggestion. He composed two poems
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This is clearest in the addendum to the Analytic of the Understanding, the Amphibolies of the Concepts
of Reflection.
289
This is one way to describe the disciplinary genre itself. After dividing the faculties and singling out the
understanding as the world-constituting canon in the KdrV, Kant moves from the notion of “regulative
ideas”—areas where we can have orientation but no determination—to the regulating of just those ideas.
But in regulation comes a different sort of determination—social prescription—which in turn requires such
regulative beliefs as the progress of society, the amenability of nature to human aesthetic and scientific
purposes, etc. Thus Kant’s later works present us with a kind of social mirror of the former metaphysical
enterprise.
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and sent them to Soemmerring,290 expressing discontent with the German public’s
response to Soemmerring’s efforts:
SÖMMERINGS SEELENORGAN UND DAS PUBLIKUM
Gerne durchschaun sie mit ihm das herrliche Körpergebäude,
Doch zur Zinne hinauf werden die Treppen zu steil.
SÖMMERINGS SEELENORGAN UND DIE DEUTSCHEN
Viele gesellten sich ihm, da der Priester wandelt’ im Vorhof,
Aber ins Heiligtum wagten sich wenige nach.291

Hölderlin aimed at a metaphysics.292 Indeed, this metaphysics was both the pinnacle
(Zinne) and the sanctuary (Heiligtum) of cognition. These two poems, as instrumental as
they are, bring the major themes of organology together in a first step. Both the
progressive investigation of nature towards its metaphysical grasping in the question of
the Seelenorgan and the holy site of being itself (as the point of overlap between
traditional metaphysics and theology) come into view for Hölderlin through
Soemmerring’s writing. Kant and Heinse are suddenly brought into a single frame. The
theoretical and political separations of the understanding from reason—indeed, the entire
doctrine of the antinomies—are re-focused on the traditional problem of the nature of
being as being. And those problems are immediate German political problems in a space
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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They were found in Soemmerring’s own copy of Über das Seelenorgan. See Hölderlin, GSA I: 2, p.
227.
291
GSA I: 1, p. 227. The second of these recalls the polemical characterization from An die Deutschen:
“thatenarm und gedankenreich.” (GSA I: 1, p. 256) Hölderlin later reports to his brother that “Heinze, der
Verf. des Ardinghello, hat bei Dr. Sömmering sich sehr aufmunternd über Hyperion geäußert.” (Hölderlin
to his brother, 2.11.1797; GSA VI: 1, p. 255)
292
This controversial claim will be defended against much secondary literature on Hölderlin in what
follows. Here I would simply like to draw attention to a basic agreement with Frederick Beiser on this
score, one which I think is confirmed by the context I have established for the two poems Hölderlin sent to
Soemmerring. Beiser writes that “... Hölderlin's general intent in “Urtheil und Seyn” is to provide
something on par with a transcendental deduction of Spinoza's concept of substance, and so to avoid any
charge that he is simply relapsing into metaphysical dogmatism.” (Beiser, German Idealism, p. 391) Beiser
has marked out the patent contradiction of a Spinozan but also Kantian (or Fichtean) metaphysics as the
essence of the Early German Romantic project. See Frederick Beiser, Romantic Imperative, pp. 131-153.
Violetta Waibel stands, as far as I can see, more or less alone in her claim that Hölderlin sketched a
metaphysics. See Violetta Waibel, Hölderlin und Fichte. 1794-1800 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000), pp.
199-230.
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opened by the French Revolution293—indeed, Hölderlin had met Heinse, and through him
Soemmerring, while fleeing the revolutionary wars.294 Metaphysics was needed,
politically as well as theoretically. Hölderlin saw, through this web of texts and the crises
in metaphysics and politics around him, that a new kind of knowledge must be created,
one which could allow reason both to grasp and determine the world without having first
created it. Metaphysics and politics needed to be brought together for social and
theoretical reasons simultaneously. Reason needed instruments of cognition and action.
Intellectual Intuition: Judgment, Being and the Beginnings of Hölderlin’s
Metaphysics
Recall that Platner had set the stage for an organ of the soul thats would unite real
cognition (for him, the passive capacity of the organ) with action (the ability to influence
the organ-mediated world). Hölderlin set his sights on just such an epistemological
figure, which he found in the Kantian/Fichtean notion of “intellectual intuition.” He
wrote to the Jena philosopher Niethammer on 24 February 1796:
In den philosophischen Briefen [Schiller’s recently-published Über die ästhetische
Erziehung des Menschen] will ich das Prinzip finden, das mir die Trennungen, in denen
wir denken und existiren, erklärt, das aber auch vermögend ist, den Widerstreit
verschwinden zu machen, den Widerstreit zwischen dem Subject und dem Object,
zwischen unserem Selbst und der Welt, ja auch zwischen Vernunft und Offenbarung, —
theoretisch, in intellectualer Anschauung, ohne daß unsere praktische Vernunft zu Hilfe
kommen müßte. Wir bedürfen dafür ästhetischen Sinn, und ich werde meine
philosophischen Briefe »Neue Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen«
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Amongst the literature on Hölderlin’s political views, I would single out Theo Stammen’s ““Die
Revolution des Geistes” – 1789 in der deutschen Literatur,” in Theo Stammen, Goethe und die politische
Welt. Studien (Würzburg: Ergon, 1999), 107-143, Hölderlin at pp. 131-32: “… es geht [Hölderlin] sichtlich
darum, in der Auflösung oder dem Untergang des Vaterlandes eine Hoffnung auf eine mögliche neue
Ordnung festzumachen – nicht als Zufall, sondern als geschichtliche Notwendigkeit und daher als so [sic]
sicher zu Erwartendes. Die Funktion der geschichtsphilosophischen Konzeption wird somit deutlich: sie
hat die Funktion der Überwindung der Krise der Gegenwart durch die Konzeption eines Geschichtsbildes,
in dem auch das Vergehen in sich ein Werden statuiert, das sich zukünftig entfaltet und den Grund einer
neuen politischen (vaterländischen) Ordnung gibt.”!!
294
See Gottfried Borrmann, “Der Anatom und der Dichter,” in Freunde der Universität Mainz 23/24
(1974/75), pp. 73-79.
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nennen. Auch werde ich darin von der Philosophie auf Poesie und Religion kommen.295

The New Letters never came to be, but Hölderlin pursued the project laid out here
throughout the years leading up to 1800. Hölderlin makes clear that Schiller has laid out
the “principle” for resolution of contradictions between subject and object, self and
world, theory (philosophy) and practice (poetry and religion)—but Schiller has not
elaborated the doctrine which this principle makes possible.296
Writing to Schiller five months before his letter to Niethammer, Hölderlin seems
to agree:!
Das Mißfallen an mir selbst und dem was mich umgiebt hat mich in die Abstraction
hineingetrieben; ich suche mir die Idee eines unendlichen Progresses der Philosophie zu
entwikeln, ich suche zu zeigen, daß die unnachläßliche Forderung, die an jedes System
gemacht werden muß, die Vereinigung des Subjects und Objects in einem absoluten —
Ich oder wie man es nennen will — zwar ästhetisch, in der intellectualen Anschauung,
theoretisch aber nur durch eine unendliche Annäherung möglich ist, wie die Annäherung
des Quadrats zum Zirkel, und daß, vim ein System des Denkens zu realisiren, eine
Unsterblichkeit eben so nothwendig ist, als sie es ist für ein System des Handelns. Ich
glaube, dadurch beweisen zu können, in wie ferne die Skeptiker recht haben,und in wie
ferne nicht.297

Note, however, that Hölderlin shifts the tone out of the anthropological register (Mensch,
Anschauung der ganzen Menschheit) and cleaves closely to Fichte’s vocabulary. In the
letter to Niethammer, he has changed his mind: Fichte’s “practical” reason should have
pride of place over a theoretical intellectual intuition, and Schiller’s representational and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
295

Hölderlin to Niethammer, 24.2.1796; GSA VI: 1, p. 203.
The sense that Schiller has not filled in this doctrine is likely attached to passages like the following.
Schiller argues famously that two “drives” (the intellectual and the sensual) must be put into a
Wechselverhältnis (with explicit reference to Fichte’s notion of Wechselbestimmung through the Spieltrieb.
The parallax between the self and the world as points of human focus, however, means that this
reconciliation is always a corruptible presentation. Art—which is the highest form of that reconciliation—
provides a regulative picture of the cognitive peace Schiller aims at, but resolves nothing at the level of
reality: “Gäbe es aber Fälle, wo er diese doppelte Erfahrung [of self and world in reconciliation] zugleich
machte, wo er sich zugleich seiner Freiheit bewußt würde und sein Dasein empfände, wo er sich zugleich
als Materie fühlte und als Geist kennenlernte, so hätte er in diesen Fällen, und schlechterdings nur in
diesen, eine vollständige Anschauung seiner Menschheit, und der Gegenstand, der diese Anschauung ihm
verschaffte, würde ihm zu einem Symbol seiner ausgeführten Bestimmung, folglich (weil diese nur in der
Allheit der Zeit zu erreichen ist) zu einer Darstellung des Unendlichen dienen.” (Friedrich Schiller,
Sämtliche Werke. Band 5 (München: Hanser, 1962), p. 612; emphasis in original.)
297
Hölderlin to Schiller, 4.9.1795; GSA VI: 1, p. 181.
296
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corruptible reconciliations are not enough. What is needed is a metaphysics to ground
artistic practice, and an artistic practice with synthetic (literally, antinomy-resolving)
materials to offer that philosophy. Perhaps, I note in passing (and in anticipation of the
exception at the end of the current chapter), the most striking element of this exchange is
the lack of organ in Schiller’s vocabulary. Trained as a physiologist and by
anthropologists, his adopted vocabulary does not seem to have contained this term in the
1790s.298
Hölderlin, however, wanted to push beyond both Fichte (who rejected absolute
knowledge in intellectual intuition) and Schiller, towards the resolution of real
contradictions in both thought and in existence. This would require actual intellectual
intuition—an instrument with which to resolve real contradictions in both spheres—and
“aesthetic sense.” The interaction of these two figures—which Hölderlin would come to
call “organs”—anchors the remainder of Hölderlin’s theoretical efforts.
The locus classicus for consideration of Hölderlin’s notion of “intellectual
intuition” is a short fragment entitled Urtheil und Seyn.299 Here Hölderlin—who had been
attending Fichte’s lectures in Jena—draws a false etymology of the word Urteil as UrTeilung, original separation.300 Judgment relies on pre-judgmental unity, but is itself
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Again, see below in the current chapter. For Schiller’s early use of the term organ, and for his
anthropological discourse more generally, see Riedel, Anthropologie des jungen Schiller.!!
299
For the involved publication history of this fragment, for which the terminus ante quem is 20 April,
1795, according to statistical analyses of Hölderlin’s orthography, see Dieter Henrich, “Hölderlin über
Urteil und Sein. Eine Studie zur Enstehungsgeschichte des Idealismus,” Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 14 (1965-66),
pp. 73-96, translated as “Hölderlin on Judgment and Being: A Study in the History of the Origins of
Idealism,” in Dieter Henrich, The Course of Remembrance and Other Essays on Hölderlin, ed. Eckart
Förster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 71-90. This study serves to place the writing of the
fragment quite early, and forms the basis for the “primacy” argument between Hölderlin and Novalis,
historiographically. For the Novalis standpoint, see Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of
Early German Romanticism, transl. Elizabeth Millàn-Zaibert (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), pp. 151-77.
300
The Fichtean background—which ultimately goes back to Platner—of this suggestive etymology has
been examined by Waibel, Hölderlin, pp. 140-63.

!

141!
!!
!
(first) separative. It is only possible to judge on the basis of an original separation:
elements of judgment must be given, and for that, they must not be unified.301 Their unity
pre-exists the judgment, and is based on the ur-separation “des in der intellectualen
Anschauung innigst vereinigten Subjects und Objects.”302 Judgment’s hidden capacity is
to create the separated environment of subjectivity itself, on the basis of which original
separation other factors for judgment can be offered to analysis and synthesis.
The counterpoint to the ur-separation is Being. As Hölderlin stresses, “identity”
(even that of A=A, the first judgment derived from self-identity in Fichte’s WL) is not the
intrinsic unity which exists only in intellectual intuition. The latter is a figure of absolute
identity, one which forms a true contradiction with the original separation at the basis of
human consciousness, judgment. The opposition, we can note, is a really existing
contradiction—it occurs at the basis of whatever we might name reality, and it is not a
circumstantial opposition, but rather a necessary one (or a contradiction). The structure of
self-consciousness—the awareness of the self, where the self is both subject and object of
that awareness—directly contradicts the notion of pure unity. Judgment—which Kant had
made the universal medium of our cognition—encountered real opposition.303 And where
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Of course, judgment is also unifying, since its structure is such that it brings together two separate
factors (subject and predicate) in various possible categorical ways. Kant’s definition of judgment as the
unification of concept and intuition provides the general context for this determination. Fichte’s notion of
judgment as interaction between concept and intuition was, as we shall see, also key for Hölderlin’s
elaboration of the notion presented in Urtheil und Seyn.
302
GSA VI: 1, p. 216.
303
I stress this contradiction here because I want to avoid emphasizing either judgment or being to the
detriment of the other for Hölderlin’s method. Urtheil und Seyn is so short and conceptually unelaborated
as to have been a strange choice for the amount of attention it has received. Readers agree that the fragment
contains a critique of Fichte—which is clear—and a gesture towards ontology singular in the post-Kantian
atmosphere. Manfred Frank has contextualized the fragment amongst the anti-foundationalist efforts of
Niethammer in particular in Jena—see Philosophical Foundations, p. 125: “This is the initial idea that, in
my opinion, expresses the basic convic- tion common to the early German Romantics. It consists in the
supposition that Being—as the simple seamless sameness (Einerleiheit), in contrast to the identity of the
Kantian-Fichtean cogito—cannot be understood on the basis of the relations of judgment and reflection, all
of which are occupied with reuniting original divisions and can always merely presuppose an original
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Kant had called that contradiction “generic preformation” or “epigenesis of pure reason,”
constituting but unavailable to the understanding itself, Hölderlin shifted the burden of
metaphysical inquiry to that contradiction, the interface between judgment and being.
“Intellectual intuition” was to become the figure of this mysterious interface.
The term “intellectual intuition” was coined by Kant, and is a terminological key
to his revision of rationalism. Rationalist epistemologies have corresponding figures of
absolute (or absolutely certain) knowledge. So, for example, Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva,
in which the rational order of being is reflected in an intuitive leap or immediate
presentation of the logical chain of events. The logical conclusion is not arrived at
rationally—instead, the rational is immediately presented as truthful.304 As we saw in
chapter I, Leibniz used a version of this logic to cap his epistemological tree, calling it
“intuitive adequate knowledge,” or knowledge of the ultimate ingredients and full
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
simple unity… there can in principle be no consciousness of the absolute unity that is at work only
mediately in the play of reflection.” He draws the conclusion that “… one could speak of the primacy of
Being over thinking: the light in which consciousness subsists does not arise from itself, but from a (noncausally conceptualized) ground, which consciousness itself can never entirely illuminate. It can be
portrayed as such—as reflexively unrepresentable—by the darkness (semantical inexhaustibility of
aesthetic representation; therein consists the superiority of the artistic over the speculative mode of
expression.” (Philosophical Foundations, 126) Frank also draws the conclusion that Hölderlin disagrees
with Kant and supports the Aristotelian maxim that “actuality precedes possibility.” Frederick Beiser has
argued against any absolute primacy of Being over thinking in the fragment, calling Hölderlin’s work an
attempt at a “transcendental deduction” of something like Spinoza’s substance. The recognition of the
definitional cognitive status of intellectual intuition is important, and yet Beiser’s conclusion is still that, on
the basis of the identification of beauty and unity in Hyperion, “[t]he priority of being over the ego—its
more basic role as the fundamental condition of experience—is then tantamount to the primacy of the
aesthetic itself.” (Beiser, German Idealism, p. 391) I do not think that Urtheil und Seyn can really bear the
weight of these interpretations. As we shall see, I disagree with that Hölderlin holds to the following
primacies: being over judgment; actuality over possibility; aesthetic representation over speculative
thought. Urtheil und Seyn can easily be read without these assumptions, while still acknowledging its
critique of Fichte and its implicit move beyond Kant. By placing a real contradiction between judgment and
being, Hölderlin puts them both—including their own complex structures—in a single frame. It is that
frame which interests me here, and which is, I think, the lightest way of treading on this over-interpreted
page-and-a-half.
304
Spinoza’s famous example is of a trader intuitively understanding the law of proportions, “seeing” that
2:3 as 4:6. The number 6 is arrived at not by the logical steps (4 is twice 2; twice three is…), but by
“intuition” or immediate presentation. Spinoza ultimately argues that this kind of knowledge is reflective of
the love which binds the unity of nature or god together. See Ethica I prop. 42 scholium, and V more
generally. Intuere is Latin for “observe, look at, admire”—thus the presentational element of this form of
knowledge, and thus Kant’s translation in his German works, anschauen.
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composition of complex objects. The stakes of this epistemological figure were high.
What God could know was always part of the question, making the figure of absolute
knowledge a theoretical parallel to the physis-techne analogy (which is based on the
difference between divine and profane making). God’s knowledge—the figure of total
synthesis and analysis simultaneously—differed, for the rationalists, in extent but not in
kind from ours.
Kant’s term—intellectual intuition—is based precisely on a rejection of that
parallelism. Our knowledge is not merely different in kind from a putative divine or
absolute knowledge—our analysis of our own faculties leads to the conclusion that the
figure of such knowledge can only serve as a negative example, as something we can
positively see that we do not possess. The canon of the understanding excludes precisely
the figure that an organon of reason would have given us: metaphysically certain
knowledge.305 This separation of our cognitive capacity from traditional figures of
absolute knowledge was based on a specific reaction to rationalism after Leibniz. Kant
rejected the notion that clarity and distinctness existed on the same progressive plane—
for him, there were two separate roots of cognition, intuitions and concepts. The
separation of these two justified the mysterious characterization of pure reason as
“epigenetic”—a passage between two fundamentally different orders had to occur
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This is perhaps clearest in the chapter of the KdrV on the division between phenomena and noumena,
e.g.: “Der Begriff eines Noumeni, bloß problematisch genommen, bleibt demungeachtet nicht allein
zulässig, sondern, auch als ein die Sinnlichkeit in Schranken setzender Begriff, unvermeidlich. Aber
alsdann ist das nicht ein besonderer intelligibler Gegenstand für unseren Verstand, sondern ein Verstand,
für den es gehörte, ist selbst ein Problema, nämlich, nicht diskursiv durch Kategorien, sondern intuitiv in
einer nichtsinnlichen Anschauung seinen Gegenstand zu erkennen, als von welchem wir uns nicht die
geringste Vorstellung seiner Möglichkeit machen können. Unser Verstand bekommt nun auf diese Weise
eine negative Erweiterung, d.i. er wird nicht durch die Sinnlichkeit eingeschränkt, sondern schränkt
vielmehr dieselbe ein, dadurch, daß er Dinge an sich selbst (nicht als Erscheinung betrachtet) Noumena
nennt. Aber er setzt sich auch sofort selbst Grenzen, sie durch kein Kategorien zu erkennen, mithin sie nur
unter dem Namen eines unbekannten Etwas zu denken.” (KdrV B 311 ff.)
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(mechanical and organic matter, literally; the forms of intuition and the pure concepts,
metaphorically). The limiting possibility of an “intellectual intuition”—the presentation
of an object in the absence of an externally grounded perception—implied a violation of
the theoretical physis-techne differentiation. If we could intellectual intuit the world, it is
hard to see how we would not be then also implicated in its production.306
If the stakes were as large as the possibility of human ontological production and
the question of the cosmos’s proper rules (divine or not), there were two other problems
which confronted Hölderlin in his adopted term. The first was that of the quasi-antinomy
between mechanical and organic nature. The second he had managed to identify and
include in his earliest mention of the term: the relation of subject to object as a function
of the relation of judgment to being. The first was given in Kant’s reverse-coinage of
“intuitive understanding” in the KU; the second by Fichte’s early flirtations with the term
as a gloss on self-consciousness.
In the KU, Kant laid the framework for a philosophical approach to judgment
itself. As essential as the doctrine of judgment had been to the KdrV, his focus there had
been on the twin roots of judgment’s cognitive work, intuition and concept. The KU,
then, takes its start from a refinement of the model of judgment. The judgment as defined
in the KdrV had been a matter of “subsumption,” literally the subordination of an
intuitive complex to a conceptual determination with the aid of over-arching forms of that
unity (categories). In the KU, Kant calls this subsumptive activity “determinative
judgment” (bestimmende Urteile), and names a new kind of judgmental activity,
“reflecting judgments” (reflektierende Urteile). This type of judgment operates in the
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temporary absence of the correct determinative unifier. While a unity is produced in the
judgment and given to the mind (for reflection), its proper status as determined (with
respect to our faculties) is not yet included in the judgment. This allows space for
reflective activity, for the pursuit of higher unities among complexes of judgments.
Indeed, Kant singles out three areas in which reflective judgment is necessary: the
progressive determination of scientific laws in general, the judgment of taste (including
natural and artistic beauty), and the special case of the organic. It is the last of these that
causes the KU to re-address the issue of simultaneously intuitive and conceptual
cognition. Hölderlin, while using the term intellectuale Anschauung, would make use of
both conceptual formulations in his notion of an organ of intellectual intuition.
Subsumptive judgment, Kant reasons, is good enough for most natural
determinations. Even where reflecting judgments are needed, they are often temporary—
we need to reflect so long as the higher unity for subsumption is not discovered, but only
just that long. The discovery allows the constitutive determination of the natural world to
progress. This model encounters an obstacle, however, when it comes to judgments about
organized beings. The difficulty stems from the model of judgment in the KdrV, which
holds to effective causality as paradigmatic. We understand and constitute the world
where cause and effect are unilinear—indeed, that effective causality is one of the
essential conceptual ingredients we supply to nature. When we observe organized beings,
however, we notice that their parts—as we have seen above—seem to have a causal
feedback loop into their wholes. The form of our understanding does not allow for that
type of judgment to constitute our world, however: as Kant claimed, there can be no
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Newton for even a tiny blade of grass.307 Reserving subsumption, we can easily produce a
reflecting judgment about organic beings, but this is not enough. There must be some
analysis of what unity in judgment is appropriate to these mutually causal beings.
Intuition for Kant is the representation of particulars without anything “general.”
It is therefore always of the senses, because the general can only be contributed to
knowledge by the concept. On this basis, Kant polemicizes against any possible
“intellectual intuition,”308 that is, representation of noumena. But Kant makes a famous
regulative exception in the name of biology in KdU §§76 und 77. Here, Kant describes a
mode of knowledge which does not (a) conclude to a whole from its particular parts, but
(b) for which the whole is first given, and which can therefore derive the particulars from
this whole. Kant calls (a) “analytic-general,” and it is our type of knowing: we
understand the whole from its parts, and we can therefore analyze the conceptual/general
infinitely, without being able to clarify the connection in the other direction. We can take
the whole apart, but we cannot deduce the parts from the whole—the whole that would
determine its parts is not an object for us. And yet, such a determination is precisely what
we observe in organic beings: the whole appears to influence and even determine the
parts according to some greater concept. Kant calls this parallel mode of knowledge
“synthetic-general.” Were we able (b) to know the whole as determinative of the parts,
then we could construe (even “construct,” in the specific sense that Kant excludes) the
conceptual-general in its synthetic connecting of the parts. Our knowledge would be
“synthetic” in precisely this metaphysical sense, reproducing the actual order of
connection we observe in the organic world. We have to assume this mode of knowledge
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for the sake of understanding living beings—but the connection of the “goal” (of life
itself, its “concept”) of the whole to its parts (in e.g. the phenomenon of growth) is not in
our constitutive ken. Our type of (synthetic) knowledge subsumes particulars (intuitions)
under a general concept. This constitutes (a) a whole that can be analyzed, but no insight
that would (b) allow for the synthetic construction of the individual (the connection of the
parts according to a rule, or better, a concept). Such a synthetic “construction” would
make possible a kind of intuition within the conceptual, an intuition of the parts of the
concept-representation as parts of the concept. Kant thus calls this mode of knowledge
“intuitive understanding.” The problem with intellectual intuition from a critical
standpoint—the possibility of our (co-)production of the world—is thus different from
the problem with intuitive understanding. The latter would give us something else we do
not have: a world-constituting form of mutually causal cognition. Recall that the form of
reason is indeed organic in Kant, but through its separation from the understanding fails
to constitute our experience of the world. That constitution, which dovetails but is not
identical with the problem of intellectually intuiting and thereby producing the world’s
content, would give us something very like what Leibniz had thought as “intuitive
adequate knowledge”: truthful cognition of the mutuality of the organ-world. We might,
in this case, still “make” the world, raising concerns about the physis-techne analogy. We
would definitely, however, have insight into our own manner of synthesizing
knowledge—Kant’s primary critical exclusion. The point at which judgmental forms find
rational grounding thus runs into two distinct contradictions: the difference between the
order of being and the order of representing, and the line between mechanical and organic
matter.
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But hidden in these two contradictions is a third, more basic, opposition: that
between judgment as already internally contradictory structure and being, as Hölderlin
had described in Urtheil und Seyn. That the latter fragment is a critique of Fichte is as
well historiographically witnessed as it is textually clear: Fichte does not use the figure
“intellectual intuition” even once in the WL.309 He had, however, considered using it both
before and after the canonical 1794/5 WL.310 Fichte’s texts invited Hölderlin into this
conceptual problematic, and Hölderlin seems to have tarried there at least until about
1800.
The popularization and development of Kantianism was fast.311 Fichte, publishing
in 1794, was already reviewing efforts to refute the second generation of Kantians.
Reviewing a skeptical work directed against Kant’s popularizer Karl Leonard Reinhold,
Fichte defended the possibility of “closing” Kant’s system by supplying a common root
for intuition and concept. Reinhold had proposed Vorstellung as a generic category
binding the two,312 but Fichte rejected this solution as a mere description, with no binding
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His use of the term “Wechselwirkung” (and sometimes “Wechselverhältnis”) for various oppositional
relationships within the generative Ich is not irrelevant, of course. See Violetta Waibel’s
“Wechselbestimmung. Zum Verhältnis von Hölderlin, Schiller und Fichte in Jena,” in ed. Wolfgang
Schrader, Fichte und die Romantik. Hölderlin, Schelling Hegel und späte Wissenschaftslehre (Amsterdam:
Rodolpi, 1997), pp. 43-71. The sole passage which relates interaction to Anschauung in the WL is the
following: “Wechselwirkung der Selbstaffection des anschauenden, und einer Affection von aussen ist die
Bedingung, unter der das anschauende ein anschauendes ist.”
Johann Gottlieb Fichtes sämmtliche Werke. Band 1, Berlin 1845/1846, pp. 227-246, here p. 239. This
passage applies the recursive logic of judgment to intuitions in a larger deduction of representation itself,
but makes no gesture towards a foundational intellectual intuition.
310
The later use of the term is in his 1797 Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, by
which time Hölderlin, Schelling and Novalis were all using the term independently. (Fichte, Johann
Gottlieb. Neue Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, in Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Schriften zur
Wissenschaftslehre. Werke I, ed. Wilhelm G. Jacobs. (Frankfurt/Main: Klassiker Verlag), pp. 205-17. Here
Fichte proposed a thought experiment meant to prove that intellectual intuition must be the basis of
discursive subjectivity, which I examine in more detail in chapter III with respect to Schelling below.
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Reinhold’s popularizing letters on the critical philosophy were published just as the pantheism
controversy began to pick up steam in 1786. The classic history is given by Dieter Henrich, Between Kant
and Hegel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
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Reinhold’s doctrinal sentence reads: “Im Bewußtseyn wird die Vorstellung durch das Subjekt vom
Subjekt und Objekt unterschieden und auf beyde bezogen.” (Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Rezension
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argument. Simultaneously rejecting the outright skepticism of the work he was reviewing
(Schulze’s Aenesidemus), he wrote of a different solution:
wir [realisiren] [diese transcendentale Idee] durch intellectuelle Anschauung, durch das
Ich bin, und zwar: ich bin schlechthin weil ich bin...313

This hermetic combination of the self’s putative necessity and intellectual intuition was
informed by an insight that had a great impact on the next generation, even if it was not
this writing that carried it there. Fichte’s move was simple: true criticism was actually
“negative dogmatism,” the radical bracketing of all “things-in-themselves.” In that
methodologically thingless space, the possibility of intellectual intuition could not be
excluded. Instead, forms of judgment needed to be investigated without the assumption of
the source of those forms. The I was to be the focus of Fichte’s formal investigation, and
this investigation re-opened the question of an organon for metaphysics—because Fichte
allowed no elements of the Nicht-Ich to be determinative methodological factors, the
possibility that there was a general tool for knowledge in the WL was all too real. In the
Aenesidemus-review, Fichte went on to state a principle that would survive the
discontinued use of the term “intellectual intuition” in the WL: “Das Ich ist, was es ist,
und weil es ist, für das Ich.”314 The formal investigation of this structure is contained in
the first three paragraphs (the Grundlage) of the WL. Here we need only see that the
entire structure is für das Ich. By connecting the I’s consciousness of itself as I to the
notion of an intellectual intuition, Fichte thought to solve Kant’s problem. All knowledge
would have to go by way of this recursive and self-supporting structure, and the
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Aenesidemus, in: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Band 2. Werke 1793-95,
eds. Reinhard Lauth et al (Stuttgart/Bad Canstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1965), p. 43, footnote 12.
Hereinafter as: RezAen 43 (n.12).
313
Indeed, most of the above reading comes from the key passage from RezAen, pp. 49-60, esp. pp. 56-57,
here p. 57.
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P. 57.
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methodological exclusion of “things” meant that finite knowledge was underpinned by
the self’s giving of itself—and its actual knowledge—to itself. To be clear, even here
Fichte did not go so far as to suggest that we could know intuitively in this sense. That
activity was unconscious, reflected in finite knowledge.315 By creating a sphere of selfjustifying knowledge—consciousness for itself, as Hegel would later dub this structure—
and excluding “things” from its purview, Fichte offered Hölderlin an opening to wade
into the cascade of contradictions surrounding the term “intellectual intuition.”
In a first step, then, Hölderlin returned the term to its objective provenance:
absolute being. But he did so by way of logical contradiction, making the judgment’s
recursive structure antinomic to that of being itself. He thus placed himself between Kant
and Fichte. Returning to the question of being meant regressing behind Fichte’s “negative
dogmatism,” while re-introducing the question of being and judgment meant asking
whether there were not other critical answers to Kant’s system-question (how can we
judge rationally about things?). Hölderlin thus approached metaphysics with a framework
both real and contradictory, addressed not only to the Critical question, but also to the
opposition between physis and techne, and that between mechanics and organics. Such
was the anticipatory step taken in Urtheil und Seyn—its elaboration would have to wait
for Hölderlin’s genre-theoretical writings from the late 1790s.
The danger Kant wanted to avoid—and which Fichte had seemed to embrace—
was two-sided. Excluding “intellectual intuition” served simultaneously to ward off
charges of nihilism (the absolute as knowledge would lead to the lack of a concrete
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world) and to prevent the possibility of ideal determination of that world.316 For Kant, the
latter concern was determinative: we set the conditions for experience of the objectworld, but we do not determine the flow of phenomena out of which we condition those
objects.
Hölderlin, by placing himself between Kant and Fichte, managed to inaugurate
organology by maintaining both the rationality of the “for itself” in judgment and the
open flow of phenomena in its real contradiction, being. By including a cascade of
antinomical structures in this single framework, Hölderlin re-opened the question of
metaphysics in a context where “organ” could suggest itself as the bearer of such
structures. Dialectical organs were to come from the confrontation of these post-Kantian
concerns with problems about the unity of nature, stemming ultimately from Spinoza and
the Greeks but mediated by Heinse and Soemmerring.

Tragic Organs: The Genre-Theoretical Metaphysics of Judgment
I. The Procedures of Spirit: Judgment and Being
The highest contradiction remains that between judgment and being. But if this
contradiction is to be more than a permanent antinomy,317 then figures of its resolution
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Both efforts ran aground on Jacobi’s generalized attack on reason-based systems. Indeed, Jacobi coined
the term nihilism during the “atheism controversy” which led to Fichte’s dismissal from the university in
Jena in 1800. See ed. Werner Röhr, Appellation an das Publikum. Dokumente zum Atheismusstreit, Jena
1798/99 (Leipzig: Reclam, 1991). See also Waibel, Hölderlin, pp. 233-87, on the intersubjectivity of the I
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must exist. In Hölderlin’s aesthetic and genre-theoretical writings, these figures are
“intellectual intuition,” the “pure,” and “organ.”
The essay Die Verfahrungsweise des poetischen Geistes starts from the premise
that poetic activity is deeply ontological. Hölderlin marks out a series of basics insights
that the poetic spirit must possess before it succeeds in its production. The spirit itself
idealizes and generalizes the material it works on, and yet the particularity of that
material is itself ideal. The reversal of predicates seems to follow on the derivative nature
of the aesthetic task: material is ideal because it is already in the spirit of the poet when it
first is worked on. Likewise, the activity of the poet is concrete, although his cognitive
capacity is discursive, ur-teilen. What becomes clear over the course of the essay,
however, is that this first impression is incorrect. The activity of the poet is rather placed
in the order of being itself. This placement does not resolve the central contradiction
already outlined in Urtheil und Seyn, however. Indeed, the problem outline here is
precisely the problem associated with intellectual intuition in general. In Hölderlin’s
terms, the difficulty is that, while the spirit both splits being and unites it—and while
being itself is both one and differentiated—the means of true interaction between these
analogous forms (das harmonischentgegengesetzte Eine) is not only uncertain, but quite
apparently impossible. The problem is that the oneness of the conscious apparatus cannot
be presented to itself, since presentation is discursive, is based on ur-teilen.
Representations of all kinds of structures are possible, but access to the original unity—
intellectual intuition—seems impossible. This impasse had been noted by Kant, of
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Waibel, Hölderlin, pp. 205-31. A particularly clear explanation of Fichte’s treatment of Kant’s categories
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course—it is at the basis of the “paralogisms” in the KdrV—and subsequently by
Fichte.318 Hölderlin puts its this way:
[die unendliche Einheit] ist also nie blos Entgegensezung des Einigen , auch nie blos Beziehung Vereinigung des Entgegengesezten und Wechselnden, Entgegengeseztes und
Einiges ist in ihr unzertrennlich. Wenn diß ist, so kann sie in ihrer Reinheit und
subjectiven Ganzheit, als ursprünglicher Sinn, zwar in den Acten des Entgegensezens und
Vereinigens, womit sie in harmonischentgegengeseztem Leben wirksam ist, passiv seyn,
aber in ihrem lezten Act, wo das Harmonischentgegengesezte als Harmonisches
entgegengeseztes, das Einige als Wechselwirkung in ihr als Eines begriffen ist, in diesem
Acte kann und darf sie schlechterdings nicht durch sich selbst begriffen, sich selber zum
Objecte werden, wenn sie nicht statt einer unendlich einigen und lebendigen Einheit, eine
todte und tödtende Einheit ein unendlich positives gewordenes seyn soll.319

The activity of the poet is infinite unification, a process underlying both judgment and
being. And yet this unification is not merely the synthesis of judgment, the joining of
juxtaposed elements, however deeply. Its infinite quality makes it positive in a strong
sense, one we should call dialectical. For its unity includes both a contradictory duality
and a further unity. Infinite unity swallows the negative in a further positivity. And yet, as
it occurs in the procedure of the poet, this unity is an impossibility. This is because the
object of consciousness—any consciousness—is precisely that: an object. The fixity of
the object’s unity contradicts, however, the harmony of opposites in the greater, infinite
unity. Lest this talk of infinite unity sound too mystical, we should say that the problem is
not that some asserted “higher unity” is at stake. Instead, the problem is that the structure
of the harmoniously opposed one is not merely taken as the structure of both
consciousness and for being. The separative-yet-unifying unity, which is indeed valid for
both judgment and being, is, at the moment of the poet’s reproduction of the order of
being, reproduced (not merely represented). Thus we have something like a contradictory
unity uniting two separate contradictory unities. Mimesis is the technical reproduction of
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unity-in-duality such that this structure reflects itself literally infinitely. The task of the
poet is a reproduction of the real contradiction between judgment and being which is at
the root of all cognition. To complete that task, he must objectify in representation the
simple yet infinite interface between judgment and being. The objectification of that
process is contradictory—it is an impossible task, or an infinite approximation320—
because the limited unity which can only be its result cannot contain the infinite unity
from which it will be torn. The object of the aesthetic unification of opposites is not a
simulacrum of human freedom, pace Schiller, but the affirmation of absolute cognition. It
is only that affirmation which can confirm the desired freedom.
In that actual freedom, Hölderlin finds the metaphysical determination he had
confirmed as early as his poems to Soemmerring. Hölderlin’s imperative for the poet
reads:
Seze dich mit freier Wahl in harmonische Entgegensezung mit einer äußeren Sphäre, so
wie du in dir selber in harmonischer Entgegensezung bist, von Natur, aber unerkennbarer
weise so lange du in dir selbst bleibst.321

The actuality of the infinite reflection between judgment and being—the dialectical
determination that unity-in-duality is reproduced as an infinite unity, or a higher
contradiction—can only be realized in the cognitive act of the reproduction of that
infinite unity. In other words, mimesis is the moment where reproduction and
representation are identical. And as long as they are not in that unity—as long as
representation is merely a reflection of one or the other of these unities—an infinitely
discursive oscillation is the basically human property. Thus the product of objectification
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does not count as the poet’s essential task, since this product is merely an indeterminate
admixture of these two perspectives. Instead, the procedure—das Verfahren—of that
objectification reacts on the objectifying consciousness. The choice to produce an
aesthetic object thus passes through the contradictory structure of being itself—its ideal
particularity and its real generality—in order not merely to produce but to capture its own
process as reproduction of the infinite task of aesthetic production. Freedom emerges in
this process, and points simultaneously to its theoretical solution—in an organ of
intellectual intuition—and to its genre-theoretical home in the tragedy.
“Organ”s appears suddenly in the Verfahrungsweise. Hölderlin states that the
poetic effort to grasp life is characterized by an immediate conflict (Widerstreit) between
the individual (or material), the general (or the formal), and the “pure.” He continues:
Das Reine in jeder besondern Stimmung begriffenes widerstreitet dem Organ in dem es
begriffen, es widerstreitet dem Reinen des andern Organs, es widerstreitet dem Wechsel.
Das Allgemeine widerstreitet als besonderes Organ (Form), als charakteristische
Stimmung dem Reinen, welches es in dieser Stimmung begreift, es widerstreitet als
Fortstreben im Ganzen dem Reinen, welches in ihm begriffen ist, es widerstreitet als
charakteristische Stimmung der zunächst liegenden. Das Individuelle widerstreitet dem
Reinen welches es begreift, es widerstreitet der zunächst liegenden Form, es widerstreitet
als Individuelles dem Allgemeinen des Wechsels.322

This triple conflict is “life,” which Hölderlin equates here with both the object of poetic
representation and being insofar as it is organized. The problem arises not from the
conflict within that order of being, but in the poet’s attempt to work on his subject, on
life. The first opposition is that between the “pure” and the organ, which, in the next
clause, gains its own “pure” element. Then the general is also named “organ,”s such that
the antinomic conflict between the general and the particular—the expected opposition,
metaphysically—is shifted into a conflict between grasping or conceptualizing organs
(begreifende Organe) and change (Wechsel). The various ontological determinations—
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pure, general, individual—are shifted into a struggle between organs as forms and the
development from one form to the other, living change. Reil’s determination that organs
were developmental and organization structural is here reversed—the organ is the formal
structure, and is caught in a contradiction with change. Since the result of change is new
organs, the organ’s struggle as it grasps the various categorical levels of being and
represents them is a struggle with more organs. The poet is caught between organs and
more organs.
This is, however, far from the end of the poet’s task. Indeed, his task will be the
presentation—in fact, reproduction—of intellectual intuition.
Hölderlin now sets a condition on the organ. The organ is “directly opposed to
spirit,” but is also the container of that spirit, and that which makes all opposition
(Entgegensetzung) possible.323 This organ must now be grasped as having several
opposed functions. First, it is definitionally that which allows formal opposition to be
introduced into harmonies. This is an organological gloss on the doctrine of the ur-theil:
the organ is assigned the judgment’s function of analyzing or separating within larger
connected wholes. The obverse of this function also belongs to judgment: it binds this
second, representational whole together formally. Having analyzed, it synthesizes; from
the ur-theil comes the Urteil.
Hölderlin now adds new conditions. The organ must also be grasped as materially
opposing disharmonious moods (Stimmungen) while formally binding them together.
This function seems to mirror the notion of synthetic judgments a posteriori in Kant—
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taking arbitrarily occurring phenomena and binding them through a disjunctive judgment
(corresponding to the negative of the category of interaction). The organ sets up a frame
in which various elements are opposed materially, dissociating them in terms of content
but joining them in the judgment—in the organ—itself. The obverse of this capability is
in turn added to the organ’s definition: the organ also materially binds these moods while
formally opposing them. This is, then, the true metaphysical organ in a post-Kantian
mood: the organ synthesizes the very material of its object while introducing formal
opposition within it. The totality of the synthesis is the object of analysis, and at the basis
of its activity is a generalized but concrete—organological—synthetic judgment a priori,
the production of cognition itself. The organ becomes the basis of what we can call a
metaphysics of judgment, or organology. Hölderlin places the frame of philosophical
inquiry in the forms of judgment, rejecting the premise that the “material” elements of
that judgment should be treated as external to those forms. This is, to be sure, an
idealism—indeed, it is the beginning of German idealism—but it does not commit the sin
Kant wanted to avoid. The organ of judgment does not determine the world it perceives,
but exists in a dialectical co-determination out of which autonomous and truthful
cognition can emerge. The task of the poet is fundamentally connected to this larger
metaphysical task: the concrete production of consciousness through the organ’s
conceptualizing (begreifende) objectification, which is freedom.324
As a binding element in cognition, the organ thus produces “formal life,” while as a
separative element it cognizes that production. This leads Hölderlin to the most general
requirement for the organ:
…wenn das Organ des Geistes könnte betrachtet werden als dasjenige, welches, um das
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harmonischentgegengesezte möglich zu machen, receptiv seyn muß so wohl für das eine,
wie für das andre harmonischentgegengesezte, daß es also, insofern es für das rein
poetische Leben formale Entgegensezung ist, auch formale Verbindung seyn muß, daß
es, insofern es für das bestimmte poetische Leben und seine Stimmungen material
entgegensezend ist, auch material verbindend seyn muß, daß das begränzende und
bestimmende nicht blos negativ, daß es auch positiv ist, daß es zwar bei harmonisch
verbundenem abgesondert betrachtet dem einen wie dem andern entgegengesezt ist, aber
beide zusammen gedacht die Vereinigung von beiden ist, dann wird derjenige Act des
Geistes, welcher in Rüksicht auf die Bedeutung nur einen durchgängigen Widerstreit zur
Folge hatte, ein ebenso vereinigender seyn als er entgegensezend war.325

The organ, that which had been “directly opposed to the spirit,” is that very spirit’s
property. Das Organ des Geistes—the inauguration of Romantic organology, rejecting
centuries of opposition to this conceptual possibility (see chapter I of the present study)—
must be receptive, and this even as it is formal. This dual quality is the basic dialectical
property of the organ. As a cognitive function, it binds the opposed notions given as
“organ” and “organization” in the life sciences, problematizing development within itself.
The term serves as a contradictory conceptual unity, but this literal contradictio in
adiecto is cast as philosophically salutary. But it is not merely biological development
that is problematized. Instead, it is the representation of being—poetic and cognitive
activity—which reflects the problem of change. “Poetic life” is determined, both
generally and concretely, as this chiasm of separation and synthesis both formally and
materially. The organ of spirit captures the problem of the location of the soul in terms of
judgment’s forms and activity. Like Kant, Hölderlin can point here to contradictions
arising from the forms of judgment. Intellectual intuition, as we saw above, is for
example a seeming impossibility because of the way in which objects are presented in
judgments, with reference to an infinite unity not included in their determination in
representation. Yet Hölderlin transforms the disciplinary organ into a dialectical organ.
This transformation needed only the recognition that the conflict between the
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philosophical and medical faculties—the determination of the nature of body and soul—
is a real contradiction which is represented and reproduced in the organ, in judgment.
This is why Hölderlin goes on to characterize the limiting activity of organ of spirit as
“positive.” The passage from organ to organ goes by way of the positive production of
limitation—of represented objects or events.326 This act of the spirit is thus the point of
coincidence of synthetic and analytic cognitive activities. That point is called organ.
Point is indeed Hölderlin’s gloss on this formal yet receptive possibility of
absolute knowledge. Proceeding from the conditions of the organ to its concrete
elaboration, he writes that:
Wie wird er aber in dieser Qualität begriffen? als möglich und als Nothwendig? Nicht
blos durch das Leben überhaupt, denn so ist er es, in so fern er blos als material
entgegensezend und formal verbindend, das Leben direkt bestimmend, betrachtet wird.
Auch nicht blos durch die Einigkeit überhaupt, denn so ist er es, insofern er blos als
formal entgegensezend betrachtet wird, aber im Begriffe der Einheit des Einigen, so daß
von harmonischverbundenem eines wie das andere im Puncte der Entgegensezung und
Vereinigung vorhanden ist, und daß in diesem Puncte der Geist in seiner
Unendlichkeit fühlbar ist,327 der durch die Entgegensezung als Endliches erschien, daß
das Reine, das dem Organ an sich widerstritt, in eben diesem Organ sich selber
gegenwärtig und so erst ein Lebendiges ist, daß, wo es in verschiedenen Stimmungen
vorhanden ist, die unmittelbar auf die Grundstimmung folgende nur der verlängerte Punct
ist, der dahin, nemlich zum Mittelpuncte führt, wo sich die harmonisch entgegengesezten
Stimmungen begegnen, daß also gerade im stärksten Gegensaz, im Gegensaz der ersten
idealischen und zweiten künstlich reflectirten Stimmung, in der materiellsten
Entgegensezung (die zwischen harmonisch verbundenem im Mittelpuncte
zusammentreffendem, im Mittelpuncte gegenwärtigem Geist und Leben liegt), daß
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This possibility has been shown by Violetta Waibel—her description is facultative, focusing on the
understanding and reason, and the priority of the latter—in Hölderlin, pp. 220-28.
327
The connection between organ and intellectual intuition is implicitly given here, as we can see by
juxtaposing the following passage: “Denn diß ist allein in schöner heiliger, göttlicher Empfindung möglich,
in einer Empfindung, welche darum schön ist, weil sie weder blos angenehm und glüklich, noch blos
erhaben und stark, noch blos einig und ruhig, sondern alles zugleich ist, und allein sein kann, in einer
Empfindung, welche darum heilig ist, weil sie weder blos uneigennüzig ihrem Objecte hingegeben, noch
blos uneigennüzig auf ihrem innern Grunde ruhend, noch blos uneigennüzig zwischen ihrem innern Grunde
und ihrem Objecte schwebend sondern alles zugleich ist und allein seyn kan, in einer Empfindung, welche
darum göttlich ist, weil sie weder bloßes Bewußtseyn, bloße Reflexion (subjective, oder objective,) mit
Verlust des innern und äußern Lebens noch bloßes Streben (subjectiv oder objectiv bestimmtes) mit Verlust
der innern und äußern Harmonie, noch bloße Harmonie, wie die intellectuale Anschauung und ihr
mythisches bildliches Subject, Object, mit Verlust des Bewußtseyns, und der Einheit, sondern weil sie alles
diß zugleich ist, und allein seyn kan, in einer Empfindung, welche darum transcendental ist und diß allein
seyn kan, weil sie in Vereinigung und Wechselwirkung der genannten Eigenschaften weder zu angenehm
und sinnlich…” (GSA IV: 1, p. 259) The point, here as above, is that intellectual intuition must be
objectified in a paradoxical cognitive/mimetic activity for which an organ of spirit is necessary.
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gerade in dieser materiellsten Entgegensezung welche sich selbst entgegengesezt ist (in
Beziehung auf den Vereinigungspunct wohin sie strebt), in den widerstreitenden
fortstrebenden Acten des Geistes, wenn sie nur aus dem wechselseitigen Karakter der
harmonischentgegengesezten Stimmungen entstehen, daß gerade da das Unendlichste
sich am fühlbarsten, am negativpositivsten und hyperbolisch darstellt, daß durch diesen
Gegensaz der Darstellung des Unendlichen im widerstreitenden Fortstreben zum Punct,
und seines Zusammentreffens im Punct die simultane Innigkeit und Unterscheidung der
harmonischentgegengesezten lebendigen zum Grunde liegenden Empfindung ersezt und
zugleich klarer von dem freien Bewußtseyn und gebildeter, allgemeiner, als eigene Welt
der Form nach, als Welt in der Welt, und so als Stimme des Ewigen zum Ewigen
dargestellt wird.328

The goal is clear: the contradiction between the “pure” and the organ should be unified in
a feeling of spirit’s own infinity. This can only be achieved organologically—the
realization of the human task is only possibly through tools which are not incidental to
that human. The organ is the essence of the antinomy between judgment and being. Every
rhetorical turn, each reversal of terms in this passage is merely one more fold in the
organ’s capacity to know and to produce knowledge. And it is through the acts of the
spirit, occurring in its organs, that “mere life” is exceeded, the mirror of the contradiction
of organic developing forming a hyperbola, occurring on opposite sides of the y- and xaxes simultaneously, and each containing two infinite approximations or asymptotes.
This figure includes an “extended middlepoint,” where finally spirit and life coincide. But
this coincidence is itself strictly identical with the moment where the unifying and
separating activities of the organ are also identical, and only where these identical
activities are most material. Finally, this “simultaneous inwardness and differentiation” is
felt as the development of the spirit itself in its chosen material—its freedom. The poetic
spirit’s activity is, then, not only mimetic reproduction of the rules of an order, of a
world. This activity literally redounds onto the spirit itself, making it a world within the
world. In other words, as material (both ideal and material) is given poetic form (both
concrete and abstract), the organs that make up consciousness become active in both of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
328

!

GSA IV: 1, 249-50; emphasis in original.

161!
!!
!
their contradictory activities—synthesis and analysis—simultaneously. Organology’s
first notion of mimesis comes into view. This is a notion of the production of an order of
things, the invention of rules. Let us bracket the issue of the origin of those rules, and
focus only on the point that is made here for organology as a metaphysics of judgment.
The metaphysics of judgment does not exclude other capacities, just as Kant’s
critical focus on the understanding did not exclude other faculties. In Kant, we see the
priority of the faculty of the understanding providing a set of rules for the use of the other
faculties (which a partial exception for the forms of intuition—see chapter I above). If I
am right to point to organology as a metaphysics of judgment in Hölderlin, then it is not a
matter of excluding, for example, sensation. In the passage above, it is a certain
senstation or feeling (Empfindung) at which the poet aims, and it is this production which
results in the religious feeling described, die Stimme des Ewigen zum Ewigen. The point
is not to take away from that goal—ultimately the new mythology—but to see that it is
rooted in an overlap between speculative and aesthetic tasks which alters both discourses.
This approach is distinctively organological: organs provide the conceptual basis on
which to make use of generically different discourses (metaphysics, aesthetics, poetic
form, genre-theory) and the “facultative” (really organological) bridges between them.
On the metaphysical side of this question, Hölderlin certainly aims at a
knowledge which Kant had rejected (but not before he had defined and suggested it). The
overlap between aesthetic and metaphysical activity is the moment where representation
becomes (re-)production. The whole procedure of the poetic spirit is the re-production of
the infinite interactive capacity of the spirit in its organs. Rather than a representation,
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one gets a reproduction in the sense that a world is constructed, a world in the world.329
In a sense, we should call this metaphysics of judgment technological, since it defends
the notion of work on being—on the “most material”—both metaphysically and
aesthetically.330 Organology has something akin to metaphysical bricolage, using
historically-prepared tools and developmentally formed beings to form new unities with
new generalities. It makes the cognizer and the poet equally participants in the dialectic
of history, which is dialectical precisely because of that participation, because of those
human organs.
Yet the metaphysical problem remains. The greatest concern for Kant—as for
Kantians—must be that this type of participation lacks a legitimation, an argumentation
for its connection of judgment and being—in short, a deduction. The focus on judgment
as form and content allows this argument; its operational term is “organ.” The worry
remains, however, that in such a system judgment determines its phenomena, that the
world is simply now dependent on the spirit, with all the attendant problems attaching to
idealism. Let us take just the problem of determination, leaving the problems of organic
judgment and world-production for the following sections of the current chapter.
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See Waibel, Hölderlin, pp. 278-85, for Hölderlin’s “constructionism” with respect to Kant and Fichte. It
seems to me that Hölderlin’s discussion here is not too far from Kant’s notion of the genius’s “aesthetic
idea” in the KU, but again, my point is that the re-centering of the metaphysical system on judgment allows
this idea to take on ontological significance. See also Ulrich Gaier, Krumme Regel: Novalis’s
“Konstruktionslehre des schaffenden Geistes” (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1970), for the more general
stakes.
330
The Heideggerian notion of poeisis suggests itself, especially given the phrase “Welt in der Welt.” Yet I
think we should avoid reading too quickly forward to Heidegger’s attempts to stand in the “clearing” of
being, to produce or manifest beings’ Being through alteration of our subjectivity. It is precisely Hölderlin
whom Heidegger uses to point to what little hope there is, in the technological world-age, for such a
project. See Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology,” from Martin Heidegger: Basic
Writings from "Being and Time" (1927) to "The Task of Thinking" (1964), rev. ed., edited by David Farrell
Krell. Harper: San Francisco), pp. 307-43, esp. pp. 340 ff. And yet, as I am showing, Hölderlin’s
organology seems to run in a different direction. Rather than revealing a world within the world, it
constructs and builds an order within a greater order, and suggests with that gesture the possibility of
intervening in the greater order—something which is entirely excluded in Heidegger from start to finish.
Thus, something like a technological metaphysics, and not a worlding, is at stake.
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Kant defends a robust conditioning contribution of conceptuality to experience, as
we have seen, but is careful to disallow the determination of the dynamic of experience
by that conceptuality. Indeed, this is what the phrase “transcendental idealism and
empirical realism” is meant to capture. Any metaphysics lacking the external
conditioning provided, in Kant’s case, by the material of sensation combined with the
forms of and then actual intuitions, runs the risk of just such a determination. In the case
of organology, the fear must be that, by placing the ontological and epistemological
burdens simultaneously in a single term, we speculatively free the human to determine a
world in which he then lives wrongly. We produce the illusion of control.
The organ, however, should do precisely the opposite of this. Its cognitive and
representational abilities are traced back, in the Verfahrungsweise, to a productive ability
which can only exists because of its simultaneous implication in two systems of
contradiction-in-development. Ultimately, however, the highest contradiction is that of
judgment and being. And yet judgments have content—they aim at or allude to being,
however partially they fulfill their task. What Hölderlin claims to discover is that the
feared “determination” is mutual—thus his reliance on Fichte’s Wechsel-philosopheme.
But rather than simply conflating two orders of being (or of judgment), Hölderlin is
making a deeper claim. He is claiming that the relation established in the overlap between
cognition and being is not representational, but instead on the order of ideal production.
The production of a world within a world is the signal of this deep-seated capacity, and it
cannot occur without the organological structure, without judgment’s basic contradiction.
In the moment of representation, the organ separates and binds simultaneously, producing
a cognitive object. In that very production is contained the infinity of the organ itself, its
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own self-knowledge as knowing or forming itself in the material it chooses to produce. It
is as though Hölderlin has taken the formula for the differentiated monism of the 1780s—
Jacobi’s Seyn in allem Daseyn—and transferred it into epistemology. Das Wissen in
allem So-Wissen would be the formulation of a critical monism. Judgment does not but
can determine its phenomena, but only insofar as it exposes its categorical apparatus to
that external sphere—the sphere of its own contradiction, and thus exposes itself to the
possibility of development. And that development is a matter of passage—from organ to
organ.

II. Organization and its Discontents: Genre-Theory and Intuitive Understanding

An intellectual intuition must lie at the root of every tragedy, according to
Hölderlin.331 This means that the highest contradiction—that between judgment and
being—must be presented in the tragic form. And yet, in the late 1790s, the concept Seyn
came to have a further, specifically tragic, term: das Aorgische. With this etymological
invention, Hölderlin both introduced yet another real contradiction and specified its
sphere of application in the tragic form. Das Aorgische is logically opposed to any
organization—the problems of intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding, as they
had been given by Kant, thus appear as different versions of the same problem. On the
one hand, the contradiction between judgment and being needed the judgmental organ as
its frame of developmental and dialectical resolution. On the other hand, the specific
contradiction between the mechanical and the organic was already a matter of the forms
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“Das tragische, dem Schein nach heroische Gedicht ist in seiner Bedeutung idealisch. Es ist die
Metapher einer intellectualen Anschauung.” (GSA IV: 1, p. 266)
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of judgment for Kant. For Hölderlin with his metaphysics of judgment, it was a matter of
sharpening this contradiction—in a first gesture, by making it a logical contradiction—
and then finding its resolution in the theory of tragedy. And this shift into the genretheoretical had it stakes in 18th-century theory of tragedy.
Classical tragedy theory emerged from mid-century metaphysical debates.
Lessing’s famous break with Gottsched and the French School was prepared by his
collaborations with Moses Mendelssohn in the 1750s. In 1755, Lessing and Mendelssohn
had collaborated on a number of writings, prominently the essay Pope ein Metaphysiker!
There the general question of poetic form and speculative reason had been broached, with
the argument that poems cannot be treatises (and thus that Pope was not a “Leibnizian”).
Meanwhile, Mendelssohn had published his own Philosophische Schriften in the same
year, which included a consideration of “mixed sentiments” to address the problem of the
enjoyment of tragedy. The collaboration reflected a deep intellectual affinity and
friendship. When Friedrich Nicolai raised the parallel problem of the morality or
pedagogy of poetry—claiming that the intent to teach should be removed from tragic
writings in particular—this provoked a disagreement between Mendelssohn and Lessing.
Nicolai collected their letters debating the topic, and published them as Briefwechsel über
das Trauerspiel. The disagreement came down to metaphysics.
The important point for the present context is a difference of task assigned to the
tragic form. Mendelssohn held a strictly rationalist line.332 Tragedy—as all art—is finite
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As noted in chapter I above, Mendelssohn’s Evidenz-Schrift (1763) has been characterized by Beck as a
paradigm of Leibnizianism. That Mendelssohn was able to use that system to address such apparently
“lower” capacities as Empfindungen merely reflects the rationalists’ drive to include problems of an
apparently non-logical nature in their systems. I am not taking a position on Mendelssohn’s contribution to
secular aesthetics here. See Beiser, Diotima’s Children, pp. 196-244, and Wellbery, Lessing’s “Laocoon,”
for differing treatments of the development of rationalism in Mendelssohn.
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imitation of the perfectiones (Vollkommenheiten) of God’s universe. We are presented in
the poetic form with human attempts at adequate intuition, pointing towards Urbilder
which underlie the phenomenal world. These images of perfection contain the morality
which Nicolai had sought to remove, and thus must play a role in producing what he calls
Bewunderung, the uniting of lower and higher sensations in the tragic presentation
(Darstellung). Thus tragedy occupies a relatively high rung on the “progressively
semiotic” ladder, offering a taste in the finite, human order of the adequate intuition that
is proper ultimately only to God. United in that intuition would be Tugenden and the
reciprocal, organ-based333 perfections of the metaphysical universe. The picture is
thoroughly Leibnizian, down to the metaphorology investigated in chapter I above.
Mendelssohn writes of intuition grasping the Vollkommenheiten of the world in its own
reciprocal gesture, mimicking the organicism of the metaphysical universe. This
metaphor establishes the organico-rational stakes of the metaphysical debate about
tragedy.
Lessing objects by shifting the ground of the debate to tragedy, first removing the
metaphysical assumptions. Rather than Bewunderung, tragedy’s task is to awaken
Mitleid. Both men had agreed to the proposition that “der best Mensch ist der mitleidigste
Mensch,” and Lessing accordingly makes his theory depend on the technics of producing
sympathy. He thus re-introduces pedagogy into tragedy without the Leibnizian
background. Indeed, what he advocates could be called moral technologies, attempts to
intervene in the moral sensibility through poetic representation. Removing the moralmetaphysical Urbild or perfectio, he argues that the end—the tragedy should produce the
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I have yet to find a use of “organ” in Mendelssohn’s writings. I use the word in its Leibnizian
provenance here.
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most sympathetic human—must not be conflated with the means. Mendelssohn, it
follows from Lessing’s presentation, has done just this: the goal is moral perfection, and
the example of moral perfection must therefore be contained in the tragedy. Lessing
objects: where we have the end, we have no necessary connection to the means. In
knowing the goal, we do not know how to get there. If we grasp the means, on the other
hand, the possibility that the end will emerge is a real one.334 This points to the
technology of producing morality, to the possible future synthesis of moral capacities.
Lessing writes:
Wenn es also wahr ist, daß die ganze Kunst des tragischen Dichters auf die sichere
Erregung und Dauer des einzigen Mitleidens geht, so sage ich nunmehr, die Bestimmung
der Tragödie ist diese: sie soll unsre Fähigkeit, Mitleid zu fühlen, erweitern. Sie soll uns
nicht bloß lehren, gegen diesen oder jenen Unglücklichen Mitleid zu fühlen, sondern sie
soll uns weit fühlbar machen, daß uns der Unglückliche zu allen Zeiten, und unter allen
Gestalten, rühren und für sich einnehmen muß.335

For Lessing, then, the human has a future, and this future is in a moral synthesis that must
still be produced by art (tragedy) and reason, without a representational model towards
which we could work. If we follow the metaphorical stakes in Mendelssohn, we find that
Lessing’s text suggests a developmental organic model for the pedagogy of tragedy.
Rejecting representationalism between means and ends, Lessing makes the task of
tragedy open-ended progress: it is literally for moral purposes, and it is obliquely
grounded in the metaphorical organicism of Mendelssohn’s arguments.
At the risk of anachronizing, we could say that eine Fähigkeit erweitern
anticipates the Kantian notion of a synthetic judgment—it extends, gains, wins more unto
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This is a very early expression of the dynamism which makes Lessing so relevant for the next
generation, in such writings as Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, where a progression in the forms
of reason is defended. As we saw above, Jacobi’s questionable presentation of Lessing’s pantheism
strengthened this impression. See also Wulf Koepke, “Der späte Lessing und die junge Generation,”
Humanität und Dialog. Beiheft zum Lessing-Jahrbuch (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), pp.
211-22.
335
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Werke. Band 4, ed. Herbert G. Göpfert (Munich: Hanser, 1973), p. 163;
emphasis in original.
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itself as it progresses. Of course, sympathy will not have been a priori, neither for Kant
nor for Lessing. But Hölderlin—and I am not claiming that he knew this passage—would
find a way to unite this moral technology with absolute knowledge. For that, he would
need to characterize the tragedy as a very particular organ: an organ of intellectual
intuition. Combining Kant’s two prohibited forms of metaphysical knowledge—
intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding—in an organ of judgment, Hölderlin
could descend from the contradiction of judgment and being to the contradiction between
the organic and the mechanical, and from there begin to suggest the way towards a tragic
metapolitics.
Hölderlin divides poetry into its classical triad—lyric, epic, and dramatic (which
he reduces to tragic). Each has an appearance in productive tension with its “meaning.”336
Tragedy’s meaning is rooted in a “metaphor of intellectual intuition,” while its
appearance is heroic. Thus the narrative aspect of tragic form combines the apparent ideal
mood of the lyric poem with the naïve appearance of the epic tale. Underlying this
combination, however, is our familiar figure of absolute knowledge. In the elaboration
which follows, we can see that Hölderlin is in fact dealing with the alternative figure of
the intuitive understanding, the regulative “synthetic-general” judgment of beings with
organs (and thus reciprocal causality) described in the KU. Hölderlin writes:
Das tragische, in seinem äußeren Scheine heroische Gedicht ist, seinem Grundtone nach,
idealisch, und allen Werken dieser Art muß Eine intellectuale Anschauung zum Grunde
liegen, welche keine andere seyn kann, als jene Einigkeit mit allem, was lebt, die zwar
von dem beschränkteren Gemüthe nicht gefühlt, die in seinen höchsten Bestrebungen nur
geahndet, aber vom Geiste erkannt werden kann…337
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“Das lyrische, dem Schein nach idealische Gedicht ist in seiner Bedeutung naiv. Es ist eine fortgehende
Metapher Eines Gefühls. Das epische, dem Schein nach naive Gedicht ist in seiner Bedeutung heroisch. Es
ist die Metapher großer Bestrebungen. Das tragische, dem Schein nach heroische Gedicht ist in seiner
Bedeutung idealisch. Es ist die Metapher einer intellectuellen Anschauung.” (GSA IV: 1, p. 266)
337
GSA IV: 1, p. 267.
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We can recognize the shift from intellectual intuition to intuitive understanding both in
the mereological characterization and in the immediate reference to das Lebendige.
Further, the genre—the specific manner of uniting form and content—of tragedy
demands that this knowledge be a unity only cognizable by Geist. As we have seen
above—the language follows that of the Verfahrungsweise quite exactly—Geist must
perform its dialectical task with the aid of its organs to arrive at the cognitive production
that unites judgment and being. Here, the poet is given the further, specifically tragic task
of uniting his presentation with the totality of life.
If it is right to think of Hölderlin as moving to the figure of intuitive
understanding in this passage (while retaining the gloss “intellectual intuition”), then we
must note a shift from Kantian doctrine. As Hölderlin continues, his description of the
task of tragedy retains the characteristic explored above more generally, that of
contradiction. He will etymologize this distinction in the Grund zum Empedokles,
opposing das Organische to its privative opposite, das Aorgische. Here we can see this
move at the level of tragic form. If the content of the tragedy has to do with elemental
organization and disorganization, its form must reflect this in the organs of the poetic
spirit. No pause is possible, Hölderlin writes, in the tragedy, because it must be always
engaged in material synthesis and separation in order to operate effectively. If the first
task—one common to the forms of poetry—is the unification of parts into a greater
whole, this whole must, in the tragedy, gain the same concreteness that the individual
parts possess. The whole thus gains content while the parts gain Innigkeit. This process is
the literal opposite of the tragic plot. The hero’s apparent fall is, in fact, a devolvement
into chaos—the parts of his life must be pushed into the greatest possible disarray and
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tension. The less organized the parts in this sense, the grander the synthesis at the level of
the whole. The mood of the lyrical individual—apparently ideal, but based on sensuous
suffering—is then felt in the whole. The disorganization is thus guided by an eventuallyfelt whole which produces the tragic effect. Hölderlin points to his conclusion from the
Verfahrungsweise: intellectual intuition can only exist as the extreme of absolute
knowledge in an organ, or “insofar as it goes out of itself,” because its unity, which must
be infinite, cannot brook the contradiction of a limitation, even where it is in fact limited.
That process—the general dialectical process of cognition—has a privileged place in the
tragedy, which thus takes metaphysical cognition as its hidden ground:
Und hier, im Übermaaß des Geistes in der Einigkeit, und seinem Streben nach
Materialität, im Streben des Theilbaren Unendlichem Aorgischern, in welchem alles
organischere enthalten seyn muß, weil alles bestimmter und nothwendiger vorhandene
ein Unbestimmteres, unnothwendiger Vorhandenes nothwendig macht, in diesem Streben
des Theilbaren Unendlichern nach Trennung, welches sich im Zustande der höchsten
Einigkeit alles organischen allen in dieser enthaltenen Theilen mittheilt, in dieser
nothwendigen Willkür des Zevs liegt eigentlich der ideale Anfang der wirklichen
Trennung.338

The tragedy as genre—as poetic form, as meaning—presents us with the attempt of spirit
to concretize itself, just as we saw above. Now, however, it is confronted with the
specifics of its nature as organized and organizing, even as the absolute knowledge
contained in its efforts to objectify the world push it towards the an-organic, to the
indeterminate.339 As Hölderlin continues, he makes clear that the tragedy’s form must
present continuing separations reaching towards the apex where intellectual intuition—
Seyn, das Aorgische—originally becomes organized even as it becomes as poem a higher
unity. It thus presents dialectical unity in its privileged human or organological form.
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The foregoing paragraph is taken from GSA IV: 1, pp. 267-69, present quotation from p. 269.
That Hölderlin glosses separation-in-unity as Willkür des Zeus is no accident. Zeus is the figure of the
aether (which is at a low level of organization) mentioned in connection with Heinse above. There may also
be an allusion to Aristophanes’s speech in the Symposium, where Zeus separated the gender, originally
united in dual-sexed ball-figures, with his word and his will.!!
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This presentation makes clear reference to Kant’s passages on intuitive
understanding. The problem that makes intuitive understanding a regulative necessity is
that of organized beings, literally beings which seem to posses reciprocal causality
between their parts and their whole. For Hölderlin, the contradiction between
organization and non-organization plays out in the tragedy. And yet it does so slightly
differently than it could for Kant. In the KU, the pair mechanical/organic makes a
candidate for an antinomy, a contradiction which occurs because its object is made of
parts from different faculties which cannot interact according to the canon of the
understanding. Kant’s examples—freedom, the infinity of the world, etc.—are generated
by reason’s drive to the absolute as applied incorrectly to objects of intuition. So for
example, the “world” can have an intuitive sense, but its determination as the totality of
phenomena stems from the faculty of reason. When reason tries to answer the question of
the size of that world, it should be disciplined by the canon to perceive that this question
has two mutually facultative roots. Quantity cannot be applied both infinitely and
intuitively at the same time.
The same does not hold, however, for the distinction between the mechanical and
the organic. The judgment, which can be applied subsumptively (constitutively, in
keeping with the canon) or reflectingly (anticipatorily), cannot produce an antinomy
because it does not by itself produce real ontological determinations. The opposition
between mechanics and life is thus given at the judgmental level, but made—by the
designation of intuitive understanding as regulative—merely oppositional, not truly
contradictory. Indeed, the KU is built on this delicate balance between two forms of
judgment and their respective sphere of application. The supersensible substrate, and the
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regulative conclusion to God’s existence—Kant’s teleology—are founded on that nonlethal divide.340
In a founding gesture of Romantic organology, Hölderlin first shifts the critical
focus to judgment, bracketing the question of the ontological status of its contents in
favor of an exploration of its forms (organs). He thus makes the judgmental opposition
mechanical/organic into a contradiction, but one based in the forms of judgment itself.
This means that the question of organization is opened up to a new kind of investigation,
one which uses the formal-receptive organs of spirit to ask after the point of
differentiation of the two orders. The “antinomy”341 thus becomes resolvable, but can
also be generated. Contradiction gains a history; in other words, dialectics come into
being.342 And it is immediately concretized in genre-theory, addressing the Kantian
problem of judgments of reciprocal causality—of organic beings—in the tragic form.
Tragedy becomes the organ of an investigation into the origins of organization out of
contradiction, of dialectical determination. Genre-theory is, then, given pride of place in
this second part of Hölderlin’s metaphysics.343
Epochal Twists: Empedocles and the Romantic Ethics of Tragedy
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For the disciplinary and historiographical stakes, see notes 243 and 244 above.
Which is no longer an antinomy in Kant’s sense. See, for the background, Waibel’s ““With respect to
the antinomies, Fichte has a remarkable idea.” Three Answers to Kant and Fichte: Hardenberg, Hölderlin,
Hegel.”!
342
Hölderlin thus anticipates Hegel’s generalization of the antinomies in the Encyclopedia: “Die
Hauptsache... ist, dass nicht nur in den vier besonderen, aus der Kosmologie genommenen Gegenständen
die Antinomie sich befindet, sondern vielmehr in allen Gegenständen aller Gattungen, in allen
Vorstellungen, Begriffen und Ideen... diese Eigenschaft macht das aus, was weiterhin sich als das
dialektische Moment des Logischen bestimmt.” (W: 8, pp. 127-8)
343
Without wanting to emphasize this point too much, one could point to the analogous nature of genre and
organ. Both are formal but also in development, and so in some sense receptive of the new. The genretheoretical is thus itself theorized, as the genre becomes an organ. !
341
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Hölderlin chose the philosopher Empedocles as the subject of his own attempt at
tragedy. Empedocles was, then as now, a figure of philosophical legend, perhaps most
famous for his putative suicide in the active volcano Mt. Aetna. His doctrines, such as
Hölderlin could reconstruct them,344 ran closely parallel to the ancient monism Hölderlin
had encountered in Heinse’s Ardinghello. Empedocles wrote a cosmology345 based on the
four elements (indeed, he is usually considered the founder of the latter doctrine).
Separating these elements is one of two basic forces—conflict—while love binds them.
The welter of the world is thus what Hölderlin would call harmonischer Widerstreit, a
productive conflict in the elements.
The fragments of Der Tod des Empedokles—the tragedy remained incomplete—
do not focus on the doctrines, preferring the biography. Not only the suicide, but also the
putative self-proclaimed apotheosis and subsequent banishment from Agrigentum are
thematized. The hero Empedocles is biographically suited to Hölderlin’s definition of
tragedy. His self-identification as nature’s god leads earns him the descriptor
“unbeschränkter Sinn,” an echo of the genre-theoretical descriptions of the poet. The plot
occurs—in all three versions—between his self-apotheosis and his suicide, in the period
of greatest political tension in Agrigentum. The people are taken with his personality, but
the leaders and priests of the city fear he will undermine all urban order. He takes his
disciple Pausanias into exile with him and prepares for his re-unification with nature in
the volcano. The suicide itself is never depicted (although plans for its depiction are
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Uvo Hölscher’s groundbreaking work in this area showed that Hölderlin had access to most of what is
now gathered in the Diels/Kranz source. See Uvo Hölscher, Empedokles und Hölderlin, ed. Gerhard Kurz
(Eggingen: Edition Isele, 2001), pp. 11-22.
345
Hölscher’s claim that the debate about cosmogonie (generation of the universe) was actually a
cosmology (presentation of the lawful universe) remains important in Hölderlin’s context. See Hölscher,
Empedokles, p. 36. The strong biological and medicinal focus of Hölscher’s interpretation syncs well with
the material I have presented in the current chapter.
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extant).
The project is an attempt at a modern tragedy.346 Hölderlin was translating
Sophocles (the Antigone and the Oedipus cycle) as well, and Empedocles is thus chosen
as a paradoxically modernizing figure.347 Where Antigone’s struggle with law and custom
reflects a Greek necessity, and where Oedipus’ tragedy circles around problems of
knowing,348 Empedocles is singled out for actual tragic production as the representative
of Western (non-Greek) modernity.
Or is he? As much as the logic of classicism349 seems to drive the choice, within
the organological framework we can detect a complex mechanism of that classicism
which makes the tragedy formally effective for modern and metaphysical purposes. The
Empedocles became, as I will now show, the organ of a metaphysical metapolitics based
on a break with the physis-techne analogy. With modern metaphysical tragedy, the
radically new came into view.
The material presented in the tragedy—the “heroic” narrative—is focused on the
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In a famous letter to Böhlendorff of 4 December 1801, Hölderlin describes the addressee’s tragic work
in the following way: “Das hat Dein guter Genius Dir eingegeben, wie mir dünkt, daß Du das Drama
epischer behandelt hast. Es ist, im Ganzen, eine ächte moderne Tragödie. Denn das ist das tragische bei
uns, daß wir ganz stille in irgend einem Behälter eingepakt vom Reiche der Lebendigen hinweggehn, nicht
daß wir in Flammen verzehrt die Flamme büßen, die wir nicht zu bändigen vermochten.” (GSA VI: 1, p.
426) This obvious reference to his own efforts makes clear that a modern tragedy must depict precisely the
devolvement into the Aorgische described above, for which Empedocles was particular appropriate.
347
Dennis Schmidt writes about this choice that “… the modern experience out of which art arises, and that
to which it is directed and which it thus seeks to express, is the reverse of that which one finds in ancient
Greece. Thus one must say that what is natural to Greece is foreign to us, and consequently our struggles to
represent ourselves to ourselves are the photographic negative of the struggles that animate Greek art. This
means that Greek art is not to be understood according to a model that takes antiquity as the childhood of
our present where we find a sort of naive and innocent form of the art of the present; rather, it is to be
understood as the realm in which what is most our own appears in the guise of something foreign, almost
according to a model which regards Greek art as having transposed what for us is conscious and
unconscious.” (Dennis J. Schmidt, German and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 140.)
348
See Schmidt’s excellent depiction, Germans, p. 144 ff.
349
Think of Winckelmann’s paradigmatic statement that “imitation” of the Greeks is the only way to a truly
national culture: “Der einzige Weg für uns, groß, ja, wenn es möglich ist, unnachahmlich zu werden, ist die
Nachahmung der Alten…” (Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band (Berlin/Weimar: Aufbau, 1969), p. 2.)
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highest point of possible contradictory tension in human life, presented in Empedocles’
decision to politicize his total identification with nature as elemental power. The decision
is antediegetic, such that the plot is driven by both the theoretical tension of the
identification itself and the political consequence. Thus Hölderlin politicizes the
description given in the Grund zum Empedokles:
…wo dann das aorgisch gewordene organische sich selber wieder zu finden und zu sich
selber zurükzukehren scheint, indem es an die Individualität des Aorgischen sich hält,
und das Object, das Aorgische sich selbst zu finden scheint, indem es in demselben
Moment, wo es Individualität annimmt, auch zugleich das Organische auf dem höchsten
Extreme des Aorgischen findet, so daß in diesem Moment, in dieser Geburt der
höchsten Feindseeligkeit die höchste Versöhnung wirklich zu seyn scheint.350

We can see here what the New Letters on Aesthetic Education would have contained. By
allowing the contradiction to emerge in the tragedy and to find its resolution in that
organ, Hölderlin demonstrates how theoretical and practical philosophy can be combined
in intellectual intuition. The unification of theory and praxis occurs in the cascade of
produced real contradictions—starting with that between judgment and being, proceeding
to that between the organic and the mechanical (here concretized in Empedocles’ selfidentification with physis itself as the an-organized), and ultimately finding its metapolitical point in the production of a contradiction between physis and techne.
Hölderlin writes in the Grund that “Natur und Kunst sind sich im reinen Leben
nur harmonisch entgegengesezt.”351 This opposition is the particular basis of the
depiction of Empedocles, and it is this opposition in particular that makes him into the
figure of his nation:
So ist Empedokles ein Sohn seines Himmels und seiner Periode, seines Vaterlandes, ein
Sohn der gewaltigen Entgegensezungen von Natur und Kunst in denen die Welt vor
seinen Augen erschien… ein solcher Mensch kann nur aus der höchsten Entgegensezung
von Natur und Kunst erwachsen … So ist Empedokles, wie gesagt, das Resultat seiner
Periode, und sein Karakter weist auf diese zurük, so wie er aus dieser hervorgieng. Sein
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GSA IV: 1, pp. 153-54.
GSA IV: 1, p. 152.
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Schiksaal stellt sich in ihm dar, als in einer augenbliklichen Vereinigung, die aber sich
auflösen muß, um mehr zu werden.352

As has often been recognized, Empedocles has a national and epochal task in his
theoretical and political contradictions.353 His destiny, however, is defined by a given
contradiction between nature and art, as Hölderlin repeats here. As I have elaborated in
the Introduction of the present study, nature and art were often analogized, the latter
contained within the former’s rules. Why, then, do they emerge here—in the epochal
tragedy of modern destiny—in opposition?
If Empedocles’ “unbeschränkter Sinn” can be read as a gloss on intellectual
intuition, then we can see the emergence of a third contradiction essential to that figure.
As I showed above, intellectual intuition both carries with it the danger of an ideal
determination of the phenomena and also makes a theoretical parallel to the physis-techne
analogy. If we possessed intellectual intuition, this would suggest something like an
ability to make the world. As we have also seen, however, the first contradiction—
between judgment and being—addressed in Hölderlin’s philosophical writings shifted
from a representational model to a reproductive model of cognition and aesthetic
production. In that shift, the possibility of a contradiction between physis and techne
becomes possible. When the poet establishes a world within a world, there is no
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GSA IV: 1, pp. 154-55.
See Schmidt, Germans, pp. 154 ff. See also Véronique M. Fotì, Epochal Discordance: Hölderlin’s
Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), who writes (p. 46): “In “Concerning the Tragic,” the
hybristic moment is no longer a personal transgression, but rather an individual’s destinally provoked
attempt to reconcile the opposed principles of Nature and Art in his or her sheer singularity. The tragedy
now revolves upon the destinal role and sacrifice of the singular in the face of the antagonistic principles
that are hostile to singularity. The aorgic principle effaces singularity by indifferent unification and the
organic by a subsumptive ordering which recognizes only the particular. In the Empedocles complex,
Hölderlin is not… hostile to singularity; rather, the singular individual becomes, for him, a sacrificial and
tragic figure insofar as he or she seeks heroically to resolve a given historical modality of the conflict at the
core of manifestation by reconciling the warring principles in his or her own person.” While I do not agree
that the focus here is on “singularity,” the focus on question of destiny, and its particular application to
Hölderlin’s contemporary world, is salutary. It is perhaps clearest in the third attempts, in Empedocles’s
conversation with Manes.
353
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guarantee that the laws of the two worlds will coincide. Indeed, one could argue that they
must not, if development—from organ to organ—is to occur.
The epochal destiny of Empedocles is, then, defined by a third contradiction
produced by the figure of intellectual intuition, that between nature and art. This firmly
confers metaphysical relevance to the poet’s project: if nature and art are opposed, and
thus exposed to the cycle of separation and unification of dialectical organs, then the
possibility of metaphysical innovation is present in the tragic form.
Empedocles—at the level of heroic narrative—must be destroyed by these
contradictions, as the Grund makes clear. Recall, however, that the heroic narrative of
tragedy is its appearance. Its “meaning”—tragedy as organ—must be sought in
intellectual intuition. And yet, in Der Tod des Empedokles, the heroic narrative (the
content) coincides with the designated meaning of any tragedy (the underlying
intellectual intuition). This is captured in the formula of the contradiction between nature
and art. What is a given contradiction for Empedocles must be reproduced for Hölderlin’s
present. Art must be raised into opposition with nature, precisely through the narration of
their coincidence—Empedocles’ intellectual intuition, replete with political
consequences. The tragedy’s task is to produce this contradiction, and it can do this only
by becoming the means of cognition in the present of intellectual intuition proper,
epochally, to ancient Greece. The tragedy, as the finite bearer of the dialectical process of
ancient cognition, becomes the desired organ of intellectual intuition. Tragedy literally
objectifies the infinite, and in doing so presents the present (um 1800) with its destiny.
More than merely the immanence of absolute knowledge in every objectification is thus
presented. The Empedocles becomes the chosen sphere of self-objectification of
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intellectual intuition itself. It raises the possibility of the application of metaphysical
knowledge to concrete situations. And it does this formally yet with openness to any
possible arising phenomena: it does this organologically. The Empedocles presents us
with the possibility of the intentional, systemic yet aesthetic intervention into the order of
beings, the production of new categories. These are conjured by the figures in the play
who seek to understand Empedocles. It is their limited sensibilities, and that of the
chorus, that present the audience with the clarion call for dialectical thinking—as we
shall see. Furthermore, the Empedokles crosses, as it were, from a metaphysics into a
metapolitics, maintaining a theoretical space for necessary contradictory encounters
between spirit’s highest knowledge and history’s most concrete contingencies.354 It marks
out the tragedy as the beginning of Romantic organology.
Before leaving Hölderlin and turning to Schelling, let me point to a technique
Hölderlin uses to realize the epochal significance of his Empedocles. This technique
involves the concrete presentation of the contradiction between organs and intellectual
intuition—the epochal struggle of the tragedy—in the figures surrounding Empedocles. I
read this technique as a final reaction to Schiller, one which takes the latter’s own theory
of tragedy into account.
If Empedocles has an unbeschränkten Sinn, those around him do not. Even those
sympathetic to him—his disciple Pausanias and the devoted youths Delia and Panthea—
are presented as severely limited in their understanding of his internal process. Especially
Delia and Panthea, who never actually speak with Empedocles, emphasize this limited
relation, and thus the status of the contemporary observer of the Empedocles as
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The political and epochal relevance of the doctrine is also clear in the fragment das Werden im
Vergehen.
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distantiated from the narrative hero. These middle figures, these sympathetic spectators,
are the aesthetic means by which the underlying organological message of the play comes
to view. This message, I contend, runs directly counter to that narrative witnessed by the
spectator, and thus makes a concrete contradiction with epochal significance the very
fabric of the play.
Schiller’s theory of tragedy is, like his more general aesthetic theory, in deep
dialogue with Kantian categories. In tragedy, Schiller finds a path to the socialization of
Kant’s theories of freedom,355 both at the level of narrative and at the level of reception.
The narrative contradiction—the suffering of the good—in the tragedy is reflected in our
mixed pleasure in that which is not zweckmäßig, in das Zweckwidrige. Following Kant,
Schiller claims that the presentation of natural teleology confirms our sense of the true
moral teleology.356 Tragedy does this by allowing pleasure to emerge from the
presentation of the non-natural.357 Schiller addressed one technique of this presentation of
contradiction (with the goal of the presentation, as always, of our freedom as humans in
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For example: “Für die Würdigung der Kunst ist es aber vollkommen einerlei, ob ihr Zweck ein
moralischer sei, oder ob sie ihren Zweck nur durch moralische Mittel erreichen könne, denn in beiden
Fällen hat sie es mit der Sittlichkeit zu tun und muß mit dem sittlichen Gefühl im engsten Einverständnis
handeln; aber für die Vollkommenheit der Kunst ist es nichts weniger als einerlei, welches von beiden ihr
Zweck und welches das Mittel ist. Ist der Zweck selbst moralisch, so verliert sie das, wodurch sie allein
mächtig ist, ihre Freiheit, und das, wodurch sie so allgemein wirksam ist, den Reiz des Vergnügens. Das
Spiel verwandelt sich in ein ernsthaftes Geschäft; und doch ist es gerade das Spiel, wodurch sie das
Geschäft am besten vollführen kann. Nur indem sie ihre höchsteästhetische Wirkung erfüllt, wird sie einen
wohltätigen Einfuß auf die Sittlichkeit haben; aber nur indem sie ihre völlige Freiheit ausübt, kann sie ihre
höchste ästhetische Wirkung erfüllen.” (Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke, Band 5: Philosophische und
vermischte Schriften, (Munchen: Hanser, 1962 ff.), p. 360) See also Frederick Beiser, Schiller as
Philosopher: A Re-examination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
356
“Die Naturzweckmäßigkeit könnte noch immer problematisch sein, die moralische ist uns erwiesen. Sie
allein gründet sich auf unsre vernünftige Natur und auf innre Notwendigkeit. Sie ist uns die nächste, die
wichtigste und zugleich die erkennbarste, weil sie durch nichts von außen, sondern durch ein innres Prinzip
unsrer Vernunft bestimmt wird. Sie ist das Palladium unsrer Freiheit.” (Schiller, Sämtliche Werke 5, p. 364)
357
And thus contains an element of the sublime: “Das Rührende und Erhabene kommen darin über ein, daß
sie Lust durch Unlust hervorbringen, daß sie uns also (da die Lust aus Zweckmäßigkeit, der Schmerz aber
aus dem Gegenteil entspringt) eine Zweckmäßigkeit zu empfinden geben, die eine Zweckwidrigkeit
voraussetzt.” (Schiller, Sämtliche Werke 5, p. 362)
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reason) in the preface to his Die Braut von Messina, Über den Gebrauch des Chors in der
Tragödie.358
The chorus of ancient tragedy is the means by which the poet finds the proper
balance between sense and reason, between telos and chaos. Schiller writes:
Die alte Tragödie, welche sich ursprünglich nur mit Göttern, Helden und Königen abgab,
brauchte den Chor als eine notwendige Begleitung, sie fand ihn in der Natur und brauchte
ihn, weil sie ihn fand. Die Handlungen und Schicksale der Helden und Könige sind schon
an sich selbst öffentlich und waren es in der einfachen Urzeit noch mehr. Der Chor war
folglich in der alten Tragödie mehr ein natürliches Organ, er folgte schon aus der
poetischen Gestalt des wirklichen Lebens. In der neuen Tragödie wird er zu einem
Kunstorgan; er hilft die Poesie hervorbringen.359

The chorus as natural organ existed in the ancient tragedy to balance the violent effects of
the plot. Schiller suggests that this organ was given by the social form of the polis, itself a
representative of that aesthetico-political balance. In the modern tragedy the poet (one
imagines the sentimental poet, in his terms) must create this organ, which, by providing
the means to the desired balance, helps the poet in turn create his poem. The distance
created by the chorus is one of framing. As a quasi-spectator—but one in possession of
full knowledge of the tragedy—the chorus rescues the spectator from any possible excess
of violence, guiding him towards his realization of his own freedom. From a production
angle, this device ensures the poet a first distantiated balance.
It is possible for the poet to misplace this balancing device, however:
Die Abschaffung des Chors und die Zusammenziehung dieses sinnlich mächtigen Organs
in die charakterlose langweilig wiederkehrende Figur eines ärmlichen Vertrauten war
also keine so große Verbesserung der Tragödie, als die Franzosen und ihre Nachbeter
sich eingebildet haben.360

The figure of the confidant—also a kind of ersatz-spectator—is a poor replacement, for
Schiller, for the chorus. Perhaps this is because of the chorus’ expected bird’s-eye view
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This piece appeared in 1803, thus after Hölderlin’s major efforts on the Empedocles. I use it here
because it makes the stakes of the tragedy-theory Hölderlin did know particularly clear.
359
Schiller, Sämtliche Werke 2, p. 819; emphasis in original.
360
Schiller, Sämtliche Werke 2, p. 819.
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of the plot and the fate of the hero. However that may be, Hölderlin was unsure about
which organ to use.
Only the third version of the tragedy contains hints about how Hölderlin might
have used an actual chorus. In a plan for the continuation of the third version, we find
Chor written throughout, always accompanied by an enigmatic question mark, and once
with the laconic “Zukunft.”361
In the third version itself, a sketch of the chorus’ role follows the discussion
between Empedocles and Manes. Indeed, the third version has only three scenes. First,
Empedocles soliloquizes. Next, he confides in Pausanias, rejecting his confidant’s desire
to follow him into death.362 Finally, the conversation with Manes determines
Empedocles’ epochal destiny, justifying his suicide.363 Only at this point does the chorus
enter—and Hölderlin wrote only a sketch of their contribution. Their words run:
und es hängt, ein ehern Gewölbe
der Himmel über uns, es lähmt Fluch
die Glieder den Menschen, und die stärkenden, die erfreuenden
Gaaben der Erde sind, wie Spreu, es
spottet unser, mit ihren Geschenken, die Mutter
und alles ist Schein O wann, wann
schon öffnet sie sich
die Fluth über die Dürre.
Aber wo ist er?
Daß er beschwöre den lebendigen Geist364

The chorus fills the role later ascribed by Schiller. It sings the generality of Empedocles’
destiny, helping the spectator to the tragic insight. So far from the aesthetic realization of
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GSA IV: 1, pp. 167-68.
The Plan speaks of “das geheime Band, das ihn und Empedokles bindet, das Gefühl der ursprünglichen
ungewöhnlichen Anlage, und einer beederseitigen tragischen Bestimmung” (GSA IV: 1, p. 164)
363
“Manes, der Allerfahrne, der Seher erstaunt über den Reden des Em- pedokles, und seinem Geiste, sagt,
er sei der Berufene, der tödte und 15 belebe, in dem und durch den eine Welt sich zugleich auflöse und
erneue. Auch der Mensch, der seines Landes Untergang so tödtlich fühlte, könnte so sein neues Leben
ahnen. Des Tags darauf, am Saturnusfeste, will er ihnen verkünden, was der lezte Wille des Empedokles
war.” (GSA IV: 1, p. 168)
364
GSA IV: 1, p. 141.
362
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Kantian freedom, however, the chorus as organ here offers the epochal destiny of
Empedocles as the unification of the general and the particular. The mockery of the world
lies in light of Empdocles like chaff before us, and the world disappears into illusion. An
aching for the fullness of time is present in the metaphor of the flood washing away
aridity, and the chorus finishes with the subjunctive command that Empedocles (?)
conjure the figure of dialectical unity, neither mere life nor mere consciousness, but the
living spirit.
The passage is prefaced by by the words “Neue Welt.” It is unclear whether we
should read this as an impossible stage-direction or as a note for earlier lines from the
chorus. What is clear, however, is that the highest unity or reconciliation is here given in
the organ of the tragedy, itself an organ of intellectual intuition. Here the higher
contradictions of that problematic are encapsulated: if the intuitive understanding
achieves its conjuring of living spirit in the resolution of the contradiction between the
an-organic and the organized, and if the condition of that resolution is the metaphysical
production of the Verfahrungsweise, then the world within the world here produced is
fundamentally new. The chorus points up the tragedy’s task in metaphysical innovation.
It suggests—barely—that co-operation in the production of a new order of things is the
intellectual intuition at the basis of the attempted modern tragedy. It suggests that the
produced contradiction between physis and techne can be resolved only by the reproduction and alteration of both orders. The world within the world alters the former,
framing world.
This alteration and intervention is not Empedocles’ destiny, but ours, for
Hölderlin. The Bedeutung of the modern tragedy is its contribution to the ability to
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change the world systemically. Tragedy is the organ of a radical metapolitics. This
becomes even clearer in Hölderlin’s proleptic violation of Schiller’s rule about the
chorus, in the formal presentation of the tragedy’s meaning in the sympathetic character
Panthea.
Panthea is the daughter of Agrigentum’s leading politician, Kritias, whose
hostility towards Empedocles is barely tempered by the latter’s antediegetic medical
treatment of his daughter.365
In the opening scene, Panthea describes Empedocles, whom she worships, to
Delia, the daughter of the visiting priest Hermokrates. The two find themselves in
Empedocles’ garden, but in his absence. Panthea opines about the unlimited sensibility of
the prophet, describing his spirit in very much the terms of the genre-theoretical works.
He binds the organic world together and to himself, and his potion has awakened a
similar feeling in Panthea herself:
Der Ton aus seiner Brust! in jede Sylbe
klangen alle Melodien! und der
Geist in seinem Wort! - zu seinen Füßen
möcht' ich sizen, stundenlang, als seine Schülerin,
sein Kind, in seinen Aether schaun, und
zu ihm auf frohlokken, bis in seines Himmels
Höhe sich mein Sinn verirrte.366

In the course of the scene, Delia expresses reservation at Panthea’s apparent desire to
imitate Empedocles367—the impending suicide strikes the reader or spectator
immediately. Panthea distances herself368 from this danger with heavily philosophical,
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GSA IV: 1, pp. 4-5, 11.
GSA IV: 1, p. 5.
367
“Du opferst dich - ich glaub es wohl, er ist
Zu übergroß, um ruhig dich zu lassen,
Den unbegränzten liebst du unbegränzt…” (GSA IV: 1, p. 7)
368
“O mache mich
Nicht stolz, und fürchte wie für ihn, für mich nicht!
Ich bin nicht er, und wenn er untergeht.
366
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indeed organological, consequences. Panthea’s distance from Empedocles is the distance
from mimesis to representation.
Empedocles, as should be clear by now, is involved in the productive
devolvement into the an-organized. His destiny is the heroic dissolution of himself
through identification with the elements, ostracization from his society, and physical
disintegration in lava. Read with the genre-theoretical writings, this highest, heroic
reconciliation is a regression into the common root of consciousness, into the intellectual
intuition that allows cognitive activity to be more than representational. Empedocles
reaches into the depths of consciousness to find the productive root of mimetic activity
itself.
Not so Panthea, who is caught in the organs of finite consciousness. She expresses
the deadlock as follows:
O ewiges Geheimniß, was wir sind
Und suchen, können wir nicht finden; was
Wir finden, sind wir nicht.369

Her finite attempt to grasp the unlimited sensibility which has partially lit her
consciousness meets an impasse, the impasse of self-cognition in intellectual intuition.
We find only that which we are not, while we strive for that which we cannot find.
Indeed, this creates a contradiction in the finite organs of consciousness:
Ich sinn ihm nach - wie viel ist über ihn
Mir noch zu sinnen? ach und hab ich ihn
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So kann sein Untergang der meinige
Nicht seyn, denn groß ist auch der Tod der Großen
was diesem Manne widerfährt,
Das, glaube mir, das widerfährt nur ihm,
Und hätt' er gegen alle Götter sich
Versündiget und ihren Zorn auf sich
Geladen, und ich wollte sündigen,
Wie er, um gleiches Loos mit ihm zu leiden,
So wärs, wie wenn ein Fremder in den Streit Der Liebenden sich mischt.” (GSA IV: 1, pp. 7-8)
369
GSA IV: 1, pp. 8-9.
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Gefaßt; was ists? Er selbst zu seyn, das ist
Das Leben und wir andern sind der Traum davon.370

Nachahmung here becomes Nachsinnen—mimetic reproduction and its organological
possibilities are reduced by the spectator-consciousness of the adoring Panthea to
reflection. She thinks him in every way possible, but even if she grasps him, she says, it
does not matter. The figure she represents gives only the feeling of not existing, of being
an illusion derivative of Empedocles. There can be no representation of intellectual
intuition.
Panthea’s predicament is the organological key to the Empedocles. For it is in her
speech that the contradiction between organs and absolute knowledge is generated for the
spectator. The sympathetic figure—precisely the organ which does not, like the chorus,
guide the audience through the narrative—reflectively pursuing but failing to grasp the
infinity of Empedocles’ as destiny becomes the epochal signifier in the modern tragedy.
The contradiction produced, that of an organ of intellectual intuition, is the desideratum
of the organological tragedy. The play opens with the generation of this contradiction (in
the first version). If it also closes (in the third version) with the choral reassurance of the
newness of the world, then we can see the tragedy’s meaning (in Hölderlin’s terms) as the
creation of an organ for the third task of intellectual intuition: metaphysical innovation.
The mission of Platner’s Seelenorgan had been simultaneous receptivity and
external influence at the same time. This dual task is conferred, after detours through
Heinse and Soemmering’s interventions in late 18th-century pantheism and (post-)Kantian
epistemology, onto the Romantic organ. That concept here comes into its transcendental,
literal own: it makes possible an absolute knowledge as a tool of historical change. It
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introduces the notion of transcendental technology into the European theater. The
metaphysics of judgment, or organology, thus created a new genre of post-Kantian
metaphysics. This metaphysics was based in the notion of a dialectical organ, the ability
to generate and resolve real contradiction. In philosophy, this meant tracing cognition to
its reproductive roots. In genre-theory, this meant finding a home in tragedy for the
unification of mechanical and organic orders of being. And in the tragedy itself, this
meant actually generating new contradictions pointing towards a fundamentally new
world. Organology was inaugurated as the metaphysics of judgment in passage to a
radical metapolitics.
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Chapter III: Electric Organs and the Romantic Metaphysics of Morals:
Schelling
"Was ist denn nun jenes geheime Band, das unsern Geist mit der Natur verknüpft, oder jenes verborgene
Organ, durch welches die Natur zu unserm Geiste oder unser Geist zur Natur spricht?”371

Introduction
If Romantic organology was inaugurated by Hölderlin, it was brought into its
classical form by his roommate from the Tübinger Stift, Schelling. The full confrontation
between metaphysics, science, and disciplinarity would have to wait, however for
Novalis’ version (see chapter IV below). But where Hölderlin had drawn his term from
physiological and metaphysical debates (and applied it to genre-theory and to the
meaning of tragedy), Schelling found himself an essential part in shaping those debates.
The debate recognized and recuperated the return of metaphysics in the re-iterated
confrontation between biology and physics. Schelling’s dialectics of nature, derived from
his early readings of Kant and Fichte, came to be the basis of a European
Naturphilosophie372—a dedicated mixture of speculation and empiricism—which died
out in Europe only in the 1830s and 1840s (for more on which, see chapter V of this
study). Taking the logic of the instrument to its transcendental limit, Schelling’s organ
offers a different take on his series of early systems than has otherwise been possible. By
returning to Kant’s rejection of the organon for metaphysics, Schelling’s texts reveal an
etymological “indifference point” (Indifferenzpunkt) between knowledge and being
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Weiß (Leipzig: Eckardt, 1907), p. 151. Cited as Schelling, Ideen, p. 151. !
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For an introductory overview of the many scientists influenced by Schelling’s doctrines, see Thomas
Bach and Olaf Breidbach, Naturphilosophie nach Schelling (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: frommann holzboog,
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(Nature), one which ultimately allows metaphysical action in two senses: metaphysical
construction and metapolitical deed.
With Schelling, the instrumentalization that organology made possible applies
itself across three separate fields—science (and electricity specifically), metaphysics (the
explicit re-introduction of an organon now in interaction with ideal organs), and theology
(reaching into the metaphorical register of the body as mind’s organ and the world and its
humans as organs of the divine). “Organ” becomes an analytical tool capable of synthetic
intervention in its field of potential. The concept of the organ—by this time fixed in a
relatively stable sense in biology—is thus returned to its not-so-distant etymological past.
The metaphorology of the organ (see chapter I above) becomes organology by way of
transcendentalization and simultaneous application.
Schelling’s organology makes use of science for the re-establishment of
metaphysics. The organ as Schelling makes use of it allows us to see that his
Naturphilosophie, his metaphysics, and his theology result in, but do not presume, the
metaphysical picture he re-awakens.373 In the first step of Schelling’s organology, a
dialectical picture of nature itself (Nature) is developed.374 This picture is meant to serve
as a “proof of idealism”375—Schelling’s conviction is that truly scientific natural science
should arrive at reason as the result of its activity. Idealism, or the real inclusion of reason
in Nature, is the result of doing science. That is because true natural science is rooted in a
general organ (that which makes the organism organic, mereologically), but plays out in
the constructed natural world in a specific organ (actual organs as bearers of electrical
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In this claim, I mean to make good on a constant refrain of the Schelling literature, to the effect that he
does not “regress” into pre-Kantian or dogmatic metaphysics.
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Here I follow Kondylis, Enstehung, pp. 558 ff.
375
This is emphasized repeatedly by Beiser, German Idealism. See, for example, pp. 480, 497-98, 501, 506,
and 556.
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qualities). Schelling thus reconstructs Leibniz’ physics across the Kantian divide and in a
post-Herderian context (especially in dialogue with Kielmeyer). By doubling organs,
making them internally oppositional, and by reducing the logic of organic judgment and
re-doubling its representational activity, Schelling re-develops the Leibnizian
fundamental, metaphysical organ on the other side of Criticism. This is only possible in
the post-Herderian context because histories of organs come into view, not in a general
sense but as the resolutions of rolling sequences of oppositions and resolutions. This
picture does not, as is so often suggested, result in some sort of “emergence-theory” of
mind,376 but analogizes and opposes mind to nature.
The second step—ideal organs—submerges the mind in nature by analogizing
nature’s most general and most specific reciprocal cause (Organ, or, as in the epigraph
above, Band) with the tools of philosophy. This analogical reasoning, which is meant to
recuperate and include all of Fichte’s achievements in a new metaphysics, results in a
system (the System of transcendental Idealism—StI) that seeks to objectify
consciousness, producing itself as aesthetic product. That process—intellectual
intuition—can certainly never come to an end, and thus a fundamental agreement
between Schelling and Hölderlin underscores their differences from the 1790s.377 Where
Hölderlin had turned to the figures of absolute knowledge in their tense but productive
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
376

This is suggested quite often, even by subtle interpreters of Schelling. I mean to apply reverse pressure
to the claim. Where Schelling’s attempt to derive Nature and Self from each other is—and certainly can
be—read as a sort of mutual emergence-theory resulting in the absolute reason of the identity philosophy,
this readings stands in tension with Schelling’s own claims to be critical in this sense. My reading is based
on the conviction that the neglected word organ is where that critical claim cashes out.
377
Accounts of that conflict—based on Schelling’s comparatively longer attachment to Fichte’s basic
derivation of the Not-I from the I—can be found in Dieter Henrich, Der Grund im Bewußtsein:
Untersuchungen zu Hölderlins Denken (1794-1795) (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), pp. 127-35, and
Kondylis, Enstehung, pp. 540-51. The latter account maintains—and I agree—that the conflict between
them cannot lie in their respective attitudes towards intellectual intuition or reflexive thinking, nor in their
lavish re-formulations of the concept “nature.” See Kondylis, Enstehung, p. 549, footnote, for the
possibility that the misunderstanding arose because of differing paces of familiarization with Fichte’s (then
very new) philosophy.
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relation to finite literary form, Schelling turned to the finite products of scientific
knowledge, and ultimately to aesthetics as well. The theoretical punch of his speculation
moves in the same direction that Hölderlin’s had: towards the possibility of intervention
in the mutual and analogical rules that support the increasingly dialectical double-system
of Naturphilosophie and transcendental idealism. Aesthetic intuition becomes
ontologically relevant because it points towards metaphysical innovation. Indeed, the
admixture of organ and organon in a productively aesthetic intuition was the discursive
moment that allowed organology to emerge as a doctrine.
Organology starts with the theoretical deadlock of intellectual intuition, conceives
of it in strict judgmentalist terms, produces a world-picture within that judgment, and
then proposes the possibility of its alteration. This will be as true, in different contexts,
for Schelling as it had been for Hölderlin. The final step—towards “practical
philosophy”—does not occur in the early work,378 but in the first “late” work, the
Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (Freedom essay). If we freeze
Schelling’s development in 1809, we can see the remnants of organology in tension with
what later became his positive theological philosophy. The meta-politics of organology
emerges against the background of hermetic theology, which, in its first phase, defends a
stillborn “Romantic Metaphysics of Morals.” This strand of the Freedom essay is derived
from Schelling’s Munich readings in Christian theology, not least those inspired by Franz
von Baader. The stakes of the debate, however, lie with Hegel, whose rejection of his
former friend’s system in 1807 left its mark on the rest of Schelling’s career both
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Pace Michael Rudolphi, Produktion und Konstruktion: Zur Genese der Naturphilosophie in
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internally and externally.379 Where Hegel rejects any innovative use of organ, Schelling’s
last idealist breath points to a doctrine of the metaphysical act based in quasi-theological
organicity. Organology assimilated to itself a metapolitics—not a positive doctrine of
government, but a theoretico-practical substrate for the establishment of a systemic
position toward the ream of the political. Schelling came to think that the rational deed
itself could be the locus for the interface between reason and non-reason. The structure of
that deed would allow persons to become organs of the play between the general and the
particular metaphysically, but also with respect to the will. No positive political program
emerged (yet), but instead a doctrine of the conditions for politics, or an organological
metapolitics.

The Organs of Organization: Intuitive Understanding
Hölderlin hoped to found a humanistic journal that would span the various parts
of his project in a scholarly commons. He wrote to Schelling in 1799 in the hopes of
bringing his friend in to the philosophical side of the publication:
Dir, der mit dieser nur zu seltenen Vollständigkeit und Gewandtheit die Natur des
Menschen und seiner Elemente durchschaut und umfasst, wird es ein Leichtes seyn, Dich
auf meinen beschränkteren Gesichtspunct zu stellen und durch Deinen Nahmen und
Deine Theilnahme ein Geschäfft zu sanctioniren, das dienen soll, die Menschen, ohne
Leichtsinn und Synkretismus, einander zu nähern, indem es zwar die einzelnen Kräfte
und Richtungen und Beziehungen fasslich und fühlbar zu machen sucht, wie sie innig
und nothwendig verbunden sind, und wie jede einzelne derselben nur in ihrer
Vortrefflichkeit und Reinheit betrachtet werden darf, um einzusehen, dass sie einer
andern, wenn die nur auch rein ist, nichts weniger als widerspricht, sondern dass jede
schon in sich die freie Forderung zu gegenseitiger Wirksamkeit und zu harmonischem
Bau, die allen Gliedern gemein und jedem eigen ist, kein einziges allein seyn lässt, dass
auch die Seele nicht ohne die Organe und die Organe nicht ohne die Seele bestehen
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Not only is the Freedom essay itself in part a reply to Hegel, and not only are the later, unpublished
systems of “positive philosophy” obviously responses to Hegel’s doctrines on negativity—the call to Berlin
in 1841 included among Schelling’s university duties the eradication of “the dragon-seed of Hegelian
pantheism.” See Dale Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism (State Univ. of New York: Albany 1996), p.
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können, und dass sie beede, wenn sie abgesondert und hiermit beede aorgisch vorhanden
sind, sich zu organisieren streben müssen und den Bildungstrieb in sich voraussezen. Als
Metapher durfte ich wohl dieß sagen.380

The passage anticipates the now colloquial sense of organ given to journals and
periodicals (organs of the regime, organs of critique, etc.). Juxtaposing Seele and organ—
and thus drawing on the metaphorical complex he had discovered in Heinse’s
Ardinghello (see pp. 131 ff. in chapter II above)—Hölderlin uses this “metaphor” to
describe the elements of admixture that go into all organization, separating it from the
aorgic. The words will have fallen into a context already in development in the young
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie.
If the disagreement between the Stiftler had been about Schelling’s attachments
with Fichte, by 1799 the textual record could have brushed those concerns aside.
Schelling had, by that time, written no fewer than three systems of speculative naturephilosophy, the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797), Von der Weltseele (1798),
and Erster Entwurf einer Philosophie der Natur (1799, still in progress at the time of the
letter). These efforts constituted a singular systemic move in the rapid development of
German Idealism. Inspired by Kant, Fichte, and the immediate natural-scientific context
(especially the work of Kielmeyer and Alexander von Humboldt), Schelling was
attempting to fill in perceived gaps on both sides: Idealism needed a stronger doctrine of
nature, and science needed idealist underpinnings if it was to be called science at all. In
elaborating these interventions, Schelling mades organs general—the most literal terms in
his “organic” system, returned to their Leibnizian metaphysical provenance—and
particular, coagulations of electrical qualities in the developing world. In both uses, he
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emphasized dialectical structures of duality and triplicity, preparing the analogical and
isomorphic way for his eventual combination of organs and organon.
In the Erster Entwurf, Schelling throws his lot in with the epigenesis movement:
“Alle Bildung geschieht durch Epigenesis.”381 The developmentalist perspective382 should
allow, for Schelling, a comparative physiology.383 Comparative anatomy merely attends
to the structures of various organs, not to their role in the formative process (Bildung).384
The new science would be based on the specifics of the organ, defined once as the
general relation of the universe to itself (Natur), and again as the functional part caught in
the larger force-field of that Nature. The conceptual basis of this program is captured as
follows:
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Friedrich Schelling, Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie zum Behuf seiner Vorlesungen
(Jena/Leipzig: Gäbler, 1799), p. 58. Indeed, although through Reil and others (see chapter 2 above), organ
seems to have come to into general use in the now generally agreed-upon epigenetic system, Schelling’s
systems make this development patent. Statements such as the following, from the Weltseele, make this
clear: “Ja sehen wir nicht, wie in einer und derselben Organisation die Stärke der Reproduktionskraft
abnimmt, wie die Individualität und Festigkeit der Organe allmählich zunimmt? Daß (nach Blumenbach)
die Stärke des Bildungstriebs im umgekehrten Verhältnis mit dem Alter abnimmt, läßt sich nicht anders
erklären, als weil mit dem Alter zugleich jedes Organ immer mehr individualisiert wird; denn erfolgt nicht
der Tod vor Alter allein wegen der zunehmenden Starrheit der Organe, welche die Kontinuität der
Lebensfunktionen unterbricht, und indem sie das Leben vereinzelt, das Leben des Ganzen unmöglich
macht?” Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Schellings Werke. Auswahl in drei Bänden. Band 1, ed.
Otto Weiß (Leipzig: Eckardt, 1907), pp. 627-28; emphasis in original. Cited as Schelling, Weltseele, pp.
627-28. In the Entwurf, this is modified: “Die organische Gestalt und Structur z.B. wohin auch die
Mannichfaltigkeit einzelner Organe gehört, deren jedes sich seine besondere Funktion nimmt, ist die
einzige From, unter welcher die inner Thätigkeit gegen die äussre sich behaupten kann. Die Bildung
derselben ist also selbst schon eine Wirkung jener allgemeinen organischen Eigenschaft der Reizbarkeit
(der Erregbarkeit durch äussre Einflüsse), womit auch die Erfahrung übereinstimmend befunden wird.
Umgekehrt auch wird das äussre durch organische Reaction zu einer höhern Wirkungsart gleichsam
gesteigert, und so allein erhebt isch das Organische über das Todte.” (Schelling, Entwurf, p. 87.) In this
very specific sense, Schelling is not a “generationist” on Herder’s model—he reformulates the epigenetic
tradition’s insistence on the difference between the living and the dead (see chapter 1 above). Perhaps the
best way to make clear why he can do this is to point to his concept of Potenz, orders of organization at
different “powers.” Because Schelling separates Potenzreihen from each other, he can claim that there is
qualitative generation between them, or out of each other. This re-spatializes and de-hierarchizes the sense
of epi in epigenesis. We might call that doctrine “morphogenesis.”
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Richards argues that Schelling maintained a “dynamic evolution” that saw general ideal types in optimal
but real development. See Richards, Romantic Conception, pp. 289-307. See also chapter II above, and
chapter V below. For the elaboration of Richards’s argument about Naturphilosophie and evolutionary
science in Goethe, see Richards, Romantic Conception, pp. 407-503.
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See chapter V below for a discussion of the end of Naturphilosophie in the context of Cuvier’s
establishment of comparative anatomy.
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Schelling, Entwurf, pp. 60-61.
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[Einzelne Teile] würden sich also zur ganzen Organisation zugleich wie Ursache und
Wirkung ihrer Thätigkeit verhalten. Was aber zur Organisation (als einem Ganzen sich so
verhält, heisst Organ. Es müssten also, wo in einer Organisation entgegengesezte
Funktionen vereinigt sind, diese Funktionen an verschiedne Organe vertheilt seyn. Je
mehr daher im organischen Naturreich die Mannichfaltigkeit der Funktionen zunimmt,
desto mannichfaltiger müsste das System der Organe … sich entwickeln – insofern diese
Organe jedes seine eigenthümliche Function, ausübte, käme ihnen ein eignes Leben (vita
propria) – insofern aber die Ausübung dieser Funktion doch nur innerhalb jenes ganzes
Organismus möglich ware, nur gleichsam ein gebergtes Leben zu, und so muss es dem
Begriff der Organisation nach seyn. Wenn also die möglichen mannichfaltigen
Proportionen der organischen Funktionen a priori abgeleitet werden könnten, so würde,
weil von dieser Proportion selbst die organische Struktur abhängt, damit zugleich die
ganze Mannichfaltigkeit möglicher Organisationen abgeleitet seyn.385

This passage not only lays out the fundamentals of Schelling’s system of nature, but also
clarifies his relationship to Kant in that context, and that on three separate levels. Moving
backwards through the quotation, we can see that the first point is that Schelling opens
the possibility here that life-science could be constitutive, that is, that the prospective
comparative physiology could proceed a priori, making up an essential cognitive
condition for humans. That is, of course, precisely what Kant had rejected in premise and
tried to recuperate in the Critique of Teleological Judgment, as we have seen.386 He does
this for reasons profoundly in keeping with Hölderlin’s establishment of a metaphysics of
judgment. Comparative physiology would be based on the notion that the world in
organic development (development of and through organs) could be known a priori,
where this a priori takes on an adverbial sense to the productive judgment of the
scientist/philosopher. This would only be possible with the eventual correct sense of the
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Schelling, Entwurf, p. 64.
There is a vast literature on Schelling’s general relationship with Kant. In this context it is perhaps most
helpful to point to Schelling’s correct grasp of a priori as having not to do with the content of propositions
but with the manner of our judgment. See Beiser, German Idealism, 524 ff. and especially p. 527: “ut the a
priori or a posteriori status of a proposition attaches not to the propositions themselves but simply to our
mode of knowledge of them. Hence a proposition that we first know a posteriori through experience can
later become a priori by its role within the system itself.” Schelling’s statement of the philosophical
relationship to experiment makes this—and its connection to what I have called the metaphysics of
judgment clear: “Jedes Experiment ist eine Frage an die Natur, auf welche zu antworten sie gezwungen
wird. Aber jede Frage enthält ein verstecktes Urteil a priori; jedes Experiment, das Experiment ist, ist
Prophezeiung; das Experimentiren selbst eine Hervorbrinung der Erscheinungen.” Schelling, Entwurf
(Einleitung), p. 9. The manipulation of nature through experiment is simultaneously a manipulation of
knowledge, one which can, in principle, result in the a priori, rather than merely deriving from it.
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organ itself, which Schelling sketches here. The second point, then, is that the organ is
dual—its has its own life insofar as it has its own functional unity, but also a “borrowed”
life, insofar as that unity is the direction of a force’s contribution to the great organismal
unity.387 If we return to Kant’s definition of the organ, we can see the full impact of this
point:
In einem solchen Producte der Natur wird ein jeder Theil so, wie er nur durch alle übrige
da ist, auch als um der andern und des ganzen Willen existirend, d.i. als Werkzeug
(Organ) gedacht: welches aber nicht genug ist (denn er könnte auch Werkzeug der Kunst
sein und so nur als Zweck überhaupt möglich vorgestellt werden); sondern als ein die
anderen Theile (folglich jeder den anderen wechselseitig) hervorbringendes Organ,
dergleichen kein Werkzeug der Kunst, sondern nur der allen Stoff zu Werkzeugen (selbst
denen der Kunst) liefernden Natur sein kann: und nur dann und darum wird ein solches
Product, als organisirtes und sich selbst organisirendes Wesen, ein Naturzweck genannt
werden können.388

Kant’s interest, here in the KdU, is in objects in which an idea (Begriff) appears to
precede or determine the order of the parts (thus the juxtaposition of art and organisms).
Schelling’s first step was to challenge the notion that these objects are somehow secondorder. In a framework of judgments as basic elements of investigation, what could lead us
to assume that status? Bracketing that question,389 Schelling develops the picture of
organicity from Kant. Where Kant’s focus falls on the problem of mereological
precedence, Schelling starts medias in res. Given a reciprocally acting whole, the name
for the agent of that reciprocity is organ. And it follows from that slight definitional shift
that the organ must be dual, that is, it must be both a unity (functioning and in itself) and
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Schelling insists on this determination in various places, most commonly when discussing the
Bildungstrieb. Organs are nothing other than the orientation or directionality of (that) force, and yet,
without them, there would be no manifestation of the various forces. That picture is profoundly Herderian,
as we shall see in a moment. See Schelling, Entwurf, pp. 43 ff.
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AA V, pp. 373-4, see chapter I, p. 44, note 74 above.
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Of course, Schelling did not always or ultimately bracket that question. There is some scholarly
agreement that, while the Ideen, the Weltseele, and even the Entwurf are undecided on the point, the
Einleitung to the Entwurf (composed in autumn 1799) finally systematizes a constitutive science of life.
See Beiser, German Idealism, pp. 486 ff, and Dalia Nassar, “From a Philosophy of Self to a Philosophy of
Nature: Goethe and the Development of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie,” Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 92 (3), 2010, pp. 304-321.
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a difference (from the greater whole for which it serves that purpose). The third point
thus emerges from the second and the first: if there is the possibility of making judgments
a priori through experimentation and experience, and if further there is no reason to
assume the cognitive status of the organism as secondary to begin with, then the organ
becomes the object of investigation. Its process, which we encounter in a divided form, as
a duality in development, follows from its definition. And beyond this mere conceptual
conclusion, the organ also serves as a first analogue to judgment itself. After all,
judgment is precisely that function in cognition which produces ambivalent unities, by
Kant’ own lights. That these unities then come to be analyzed into regulative and
constitutive is the result of Kant’s version of Criticism. Judgment’s function with respect
to the fourth modality makes up a rather large part of the organ-metaphorical strain of the
KdrV (see chapter I above). Schelling is merely drawing a consequence from a different
set of assumptions within a generically identical methodology. The preliminary result—
and I emphasize result, where this is often taken to be the premise of Schelling’s
Naturphilosophie—is that the reciprocal causality of the organism mirrors the form of
judgment insofar as it is abstracted from the other faculties. This conclusion set Schelling
up to break with the Critical system in a critical manner, a topic I shall consider below
(section 2 of the current chapter).
The beginnings of this break are clear in a section of the Weltseele that treats the
cognitive status of the organism. The stated intention of the section to investigate the
origin of the concept of organization, and Schelling proceeds according to Kant’s initial
findings in the KdU. Kant had written that the notion of an “end” (Zweck) is “der
Gegenstand eines Begriffs, sofern dieser als die Ursache von jenem (der reale Grund
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seiner Möglichkeit) angesehen wird… Wo also nicht etwa bloß die Erkenntniß von einem
Gegenstand, sondern der Gegenstand selbst (die Form oder Existenz desselben) also
Wirkung nur durch einen Begriff von der letzteren möglich gedacht wird, da denkt man
sich einen Zweck.”390 The notion is that, in the encounter with phenomena that seem to
display objective autonomy or formal independence, the end suggested by the encounter
is merely a concept which appears to exist and determine the object. This concept—
thought to be existing—differs from the concepts at work in the canon of the
understanding, in which the faculty provides and never asserts the reality of the concept
(except as a condition of possible experience). The encounter with such phenomena
receives the name Zweckmäßigkeit, a term that implies the extra work that judgment does
in this case. The spontaneous ascription of reality to the concept—which Kant, as we
have seen, goes on to regulate and discipline—is a case-study in the separation of
subsumptive judgment from reflecting judgment, and grounds the separation of the life
sciences from physics. Yet it also is a necessary part of the judgmental apparatus, without
which we would have no recourse to analyze aesthetic and organismal objects.
Schelling writes that, in the mechanisms of nature, we never perceive anything
which constitutes its own world (“eine eigne Welt bildete”391). Where we encounter what
must eventually be called an organic being, we note the reciprocal causality in our
judgment and its tendency to assert the reality of causality. Schelling literalizes the
mereological element of this thought: for a whole which appears to subsist independently,
the concept which appears to guide it is like a sphere in which the parts interact. The
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sphere is perennial (at least locally): it forms a kind of substrate of the phenomenon.392 In
keeping with Kant’s analysis, Schelling then asserts that this sphere cannot itself appear.
This is because the sphere is not the intuited part of the phenomenon—it is the concept,
“das Monument vorüberschwindenden Erscheinungen.”393 What Schelling does with this
gloss on Kant’s conception of cognition of organisms anticipates his future work with the
term “intellectual intuition.” He reduces the framework for investigation of this
phenomenon to its judgmental basis, that is, he attends to both the intuition and the
concept at work without making an assumption about their respective ontological
statuses:
Da der Begriff dieses Produkts nichts Wirkliches ausdrückt, als insofern er der Begriff
zusammenwirkender Erscheinungen ist, und da umgekehrt diese Erscheinungen
nichts Bleibendes (Fixiertes) sind, als insofern sie innerhalb dieses Begriffs wirken, so
muß in jenem Produkt Erscheinung und Begriff unzertrennlich vereinigt sein.394

The concept, the substrate, the monument of appearances, is not actual, but makes up a
real cognitive condition for the play of those appearances. Only within that concept can
these appearances be such as they are, unified as a field of intuitions. The conclusion—
that in the organic product, appearance and concept are inseparable—slides subtly out of
the Kantian conclusion it appears to mirror. Kant agrees—for regulative reasons—that
intuitions and concepts are united at a higher level in the cognition of the organism. But
for Schelling, it is not intuition (Anschauung) but appearance (Erscheinung) which unites
with the concept. The concept’s status as non-actual is partially contradicted by its
necessity in not merely unifying appearance (that is what intuition does), but in providing
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The term substrate seems to derive here less from Kant (for whom the “substrate” is the supersensible
ground, which we must consider regulatively) than from Aristotle, whom Schelling quotes to describe the
substrate-concept as “in se teres et rotundum.” (“in itself smooth and rounded”), Weltseele, p. 612. The
citation appears to be from De generatione, beginning of section 4, and has clear resonances in Schelling’s
gloss (“in sich selbst Ganzes und Beschlossenes”) with classical aesthetic theory.
393
Schelling, Weltseele, p. 612; emphasis in original.
394
Schelling, Weltseele, p. 612; emphasis in original.
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a field of possible play for those appearances, a substrate. This first conclusion leads
Schelling to differentiate types of matter. Matter—the proposed substrate—must be of
different kinds if it is to support different sorts of appearance-fields (different Potenzen,
as he will come to say). But the concept of matter requires it to be permanent and
divisible. Schelling’s investigation thus leads to a conception of different matters
divisible infinitely in themselves but qualitatively whole and distinct from one another:
Sie muß teilbar sein, wie jede andere Materie, ins Unendliche, unteilbar, als diese
bestimmte Materie, gleichfalls ins Unendliche, d. h. so, daß durch unendliche Teilung
kein Teil in ihr angetroffen werde, der nicht noch das Ganze vorstellte, auf das Ganze
zurückwiese. Der unterscheidende Charakter dieses Produkts (das, was es aus der Spare
bloßer Erscheinungen hinweg nimmt) ist sonach seine absolute Individualität.395

The point for Schelling, at one level, is that matter itself must be organized in order to be
valuable for natural-scientific investigation. The concept of matter must be differentiated
according to its quality, which he here calls absolute individuality (see below for more on
quality). But the passage also has indirect implications for the picture of cognition of
organisms. The judgment which applies must be capable of switching between
conceptions of matter, that is, between concepts which determine the field of play for
appearances. This means that the non-actual status of the concept is not attached to a
subordination to another type of judgment, but instead to the framework of unity
necessitated by experience. Schelling will now immediately refer to the KdU and ensure
that “at least” a regulative use of this conception of matter is necessary. And yet the
concept itself, changing as it must in the reflective process of investigation, undergoes a
process of re-doubling which allows for alteration—just the condition that obtains for all
organisms. Schelling concludes:
Daher folgt denn auch aus dem Begriff der Individualität die doppelte Ansicht jeder
Organisation, die als idealisches Ganzes die Ursache aller Teile (d.h. ihrer selbst
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Schelling, Weltseele, pp. 613-14; emphasis in original.
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als realen Ganzen), und als reales Ganzes (insofern sie Teile hat) die Ursache ihrer
selbst als idealischen Ganzen ist, worin man dann ohne Mühe die oben aufgestellte
absolute Vereinigung des Begriffs und der Erscheinung (des Idealen und Realen) in
jedem Naturprodukt erkennt, und auf die endliche Bestimmung kommt, daß jedes
wahrhaft individuelle Wesen von sich selbst zugleich Wirkung und Ursache sei.396

Intuitive understanding—since that is clearly what Schelling is analyzing—is not only a
higher unity of concept and intuition, but also a duality within that higher unity that
allows for the reflective process of concept-determination to occur in any experiential
context. The reciprocal causality of the organism is literally taken up into the relation
between concept and intuition in the intuitive judgment. The unity of the real and the
ideal in any cognition of nature is both absolute and iterable. It is both determinative of
the appearances and alterable in the face of experience. It unites, in a way that Schelling
did not see in 1798, empirical realism and transcendental idealism in a single judgmental
style, one that paradoxically determines the phenomena and remains open to their
contingent flow. At this point in Schelling’s career, this implicit revision of Kant’s
doctrine of the intuitive understanding is little more than a promise, on which he first
makes good in 1800 (see below).
Before leaving Schelling’s dialogue with Kant and turning to Herder and
Kielmeyer, I want to point to another way in which Schelling makes good on the
Romantic program of reading Kant. As I have argued, this reading constituted an
abstraction from the specific program laid out especially in the KdrV, and a rediscovery
of some pre-critical problems. Much ink has been spilled on Schelling’s revision of
Kant’s dynamic system of physics in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der
Naturwissenschaft (1786). There, Kant develops physics on the basis of the categories,
arguing that the single non-empirical assumption of attractive and repulsive force in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Schelling, Weltseele, pp. 615-16; emphasis in original.
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interaction is enough to ground the science.397 Schelling’s position on this possibility
shifts from whole-hearted agreement to all-out organicist revision.398 I will not re-analyze
this very interesting confrontation about physics here, but point to a methodological basis
for the disagreement which demonstrates both Schelling’s contribution to this generically
new Criticism and shows a point of genesis of Romantic organology from the
metaphorology investigated in chapter I above.
Schelling writes, as we saw above:
Es müssten also, wo in einer Organisation entgegengesezte Funktionen vereinigt sind,
diese Funktionen an verschiedne Organe vertheilt seyn.399

The sentence ensures that organology is not limited to organicism. Opposed functions
contributing to organization are nowhere missing in dynamic physics, neither for Kant
nor for Schelling. The dialectical notion of the unification of opposing quantities, and the
notion that organs are responsible for that unification, could hardly seem less Kantian, in
one sense. And yet the larger Kantian corpus (on which I am not claiming Schelling is
drawing here) reveals that the picture Schelling is developing has affinities with the
questions that generated the Critical program in the first place. To see why something
like a Critical metaphysics to come into existence in Romanticism, we must return to the
pre-Critical work, where anticipations of Criticism were mixed with an open-ended
search for metaphysical methodology.
Two points of reference in the pre-critical work point up the result I am seeking
here. In a sense, they are merely two sides of the same question. Kant’s dissatisfaction
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On Kant and Schelling in this context, see Beiser, German Idealism, pp. 525 ff., and Benjamin Specht,
Physik als Kunst: die Poetisierung der Elektrizität um 1800 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), pp. 91-104.
398
By 1801, we find him claiming that “die unorganische Natur als solche existirt nicht…” (Friedrich
Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling sämmtliche Werke. I. Abt., Bd. 4, Stuttgart/Augsburg 1859, pp. 105-212,
here p. 206.
399
Schelling, Entwurf, p. 64.
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with both rationalism and eclecticism led him to experiment with Newtonian
methodology in philosophy. From that general problematic emerged the parallel
problems of force and causality. Kant took both as methodological problems in his
writings from the 1760s, and Schelling repeats some of its basic gestures in his
appropriation of the Critical system.
In his important Versuch, den Begriff der negative Größen in die Weltweisheit
einzuführen, Kant applied the mathematical logic of the positive and the negative to real
relations. Proceeding carefully, he invited his readers to imagine a ship making its way
through a morning sea. Its movement forward on its path is necessarily retarded by wind,
rain, etc. Assuming its movement in its intended direction can be quantified, Kant argues,
its hindrances can then also be quantified as real negatives (and the sea’s current a real
positive). The reality of the wind is not in question, of course, but its reality qua negative
is not intuitive. And indeed, that reality is contextual. The assignation of + and – is
relative to the real system of opposition that occurs local to the ship’s movement. Forces
can be calculated as real and oppositional, without forcing the metaphysical question of
their absolute values.400 He concludes, in one of his more significant anticipations of
dialectical thinking:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Kant writes that there are two basic rules in this system. First: “Die Realrepugnanz findet nur statt, in so
ferne zwei Dinge als positive Gründe eins die Folge des andere [sic] aufhebt. Es sei Bewegkraft ein
positiver Grund: so kann ein realer Widerstreit nur statt finden, in so ferne eine andere Bewegkraft mit ihr
in Verknüpfung sich gegenseitig die Folge aufheben.” Immanuel Kant, “Versuch, den Begriff der negativen
Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen,”, Vorkritische Schriften bis 1768/2 (Werkausgabe Band I/II),
Hrsg. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1960), pp. 777-820, here p. 788. The conflicting
forces must be in the same subject and cannot be logically contradictory. This allows the system to be
based on an imaginary zero-point: “Demnach müssen in jeder Realentgegensetzung die Prädikate alle beide
positiv sein, doch so, daß in der Verknüpfung sich die Folgen in demselben Subjekte gegenseitig aufheben.
Auf solche Weise sind Dinge, deren eins als die Negative des anderen betrachtet wird, beide vor sich
betrachtet positiv, allein, in einem Subjekte verbunden, ist die Folge davon das Zero.” Kant, “Versuch,” p.
789. The ship example is in the second rule: “Allenthalben, wo ein positiver Grund ist und die Folge ist
gleichwohl Zero, da ist eine Realentgegensetzung, d.i. dieser Grund ist mit einem andern positiven Grunde
in Verknüpfung, welcher die Negative des ersteren ist. Wenn ein Schiff im freien Meer wirklich durch
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Ich sage demnach: ein jedes Vergehen ist ein negatives Entstehen, d.i. es wird, um etwas
Positives was da ist aufzuheben, eben so wohl ein wahrer Realgrund erfordert, als um es
hervorzubringen wenn es nicht ist.401

Generation and corruption stand in a mutual relationship to each on the background of a
zero-value. When such a zero is calculable, the interchangeable reality of positive and
negative ascriptions can be claimed.
Note, however, that Kant here brushes on another topic essential to his early
work, that of the Realgrund. It was the difference between such real reasons (causes) and
“ideal reasons” (Idealgründe or “reasons”) that separated Crusius and his followers from
the Leibnizians. Kant thought neither school had even seen the real problem with
causality in this sense. It was in this problematic, as I have noted above, that Kant
developed his critique of judgment in the largest sense. As Dieter Henrich has shown,402
it was the reduction of causality to a non-logical relation—to the content of a predicate,
rather than the relation of subject to predicate—that helped Kant to articulate his
objection to both systems. But the relations of subject to predicate and cause to effect
are—at least in judgments—both termed nexus, as Kant adopts the term from
Baumgarten.403 The causal nexus was originally also defined by the rationalists as the
relation of objects to each other in causal relations and of the object to itself (of substance
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Morgenwind getrieben wird, und es kommt nicht von der Stelle, wenigstens nicht so viel, als der Wind
dazu Grund enthält, so muß ein Seestrom ihm entgegenstreichen. Dieses will im allgemeinen Verstande so
viel sagen: daß die Aufhebung der Folge eines positiven Grundes jederzeit auch einen positiven Grund
erheische.” Kant, “Versuch,” p. 790
401
Kant, “Versuch,” p. 803. Emphasis in original.
402
See note 145 in chapter I above.
403
Using the following definition from Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, §210-16: “respectus rationis realis erga
accidens est vis.” (Metaphysik Herder, pp. 26-27.) And continuing: “216. respectus substantiae erga
accidens quatenus rationem interne sufficientem ejus in se continet, est vis. Deßwegen wird das accidens
aber noch nicht gleich wirklich wenn diese da ist. Der Grund in der Kraft, kann quoad interna, nicht aber
quoad externa zureichend seyn. // Diese unzureichende Kraft heißt das Vermögen. Eine Substanz hat
Vermögen, in so fern sie den Grund von der Möglichkeit eines Accidens in sich hält. / E. bei einem
Menschen das Vermögen gelehrt zu werden. Receptivitas (Fähigkeit) hat den Grund von der Möglichkeit
zu leiden, in sich. Da alle leidende Substanzen selbst sehr thätig seyn müßen, so schließt die Fähigkeit also
auch das Vermögen leidend zu handeln ein, ohne das es nicht seyn kan. z.E. wenn ein Stein verbrennt.”
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to accident).404 Kant’s intervention was to make the forces that relate objects to each
other and to themselves a non-logical but still cognitive problem for metaphysics. That
problem was distinct from that of propositions’ relations to each other (dialectical logic)
and to themselves (categorical relations).405
These two problems (namely, formal and applied or “transcendental” logic), in
combination, reinforce the argument I made in chapter I above to the effect that a genre
of philosophy exists in the pre-critical work which the Romantics rediscover by despecifying the Critical system as a textual complex. Schelling was able, in a sense, to
reconstruct the problematic that faced the early Kant and to see in it a thread of argument
that, for him, surpassed the Kant of the Critical system. Thus, when he writes of
entgegengesetze Funktionen, he can imagine these to be really contradictory. And by
reducing the logic of the understanding to the open texture of the judgment (bracketed,
for the time being, from the other faculties), he can consider the human mind as actually
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Kant follows Baumgarten here too: “Nexus: der Respectus eines Dinges als eines Grundes gegen das
andre als Folge.” (Metaphysik Herder, p. 12.)
405
This is the central passage: “197. Die Existenz der Accidenzen ist ein Rationatum. Sie fodern einen Real
Grund zur Definition und dies ist der Grund der Inhaerenz. // Der Respectus eines logischen Grundes zur
logischen Folge nach der Regel der Identität wird durch ein Urteil ausgedrükt. z.E. die Folge der
Nothwendigkeit Gottes ist die Unveränderlichkeit: von solchen logischen Urteilen ist die ganze Mathesis
voll. // Eine jede Bestimmung der Dinge aber, die einen Realgrund heischt, wird durch waz anders gesezt,
und der nexus eines Realgrundes mit der Realfolge wird also nicht aus der Regel der Identität eingesehen,
kan auch nicht durch ein Urteil ausgedrükt werden, / sonder ist ein simpler Begrif. z.E. der Wille Gottes ist
der real Grund vom Daseyn der Welt, ist nicht logisches Urteil aus der Regel der Identität. Denn die Welt
ist nicht mit Gott einerlei sondern ein simpler Begrif. Dieser Begrif heißt Kraft [sic] z.E. Körper stoßen
sich: unsere Einbildungskraft bringt ehedem gehabte deutliche Begriffe wieder hervor. Scheint dies gleich
ein logischer Saz zu seyn: so ist ers doch nicht: sondern das praedicat ist selbst hier der respectus des real
Grundes etc. Blos durch Erfahrungen, nicht logisch können wir den nexum des real Grundes einsehen (z.E.
daß ein Waßer flüßig ist nicht a priori durchs Gesicht, sondern a posteriori durchs Gefühl. = = Wie? Der
Mensch kann ja aber ohne Urteile nicht vernünftig denken? = Von den Kräften denken wir blos vernünftig,
wenn wir einen Real Grund einem andern bekanten nach der Regel der Identität unterzuordnen suchen: bis
man auf die Grundkraft komt, den nexum der aus keinem andern herzuleiten ist. Dies ist des Philosophen
Pflicht, und wo er nicht bis auf die Grundkraft kommen kann, doch so wenig Realgründe anzunehmen.) //
Des Autors Definition von der Kraft ist falsch: nicht waz den Grund enthält sondern der nexus des
Grundes. folglich [sic] ist die Substanz (§.199) keine Kraft, sondern hat eine Kraft.” (Metaphysik Herder,
pp. 24-25.) Through the chaos of Herder’s apparent confusion at Kant’s lecture, one can see the separation
of logical grounds from existential causes. Kraft—the later bone of contention between the two authors—is
clearly ascribed to the realm of possible predicates of existence, and thus separated out from propositioncal
logic-structures.
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constituted by the isomorphic and unbridgeable distance between causes and reasons.406
This point will apply to the methodological element of Schelling’s organology in the
Naturphilosophie which follows. Organs, as they were for Hölderlin, are dialectical
things, objects of developmental scrutiny. But they also—and this was the point of my
detour on Kant—provide the first reason to think that a Critical metaphysics might
glimmer into existence. For that, something other than an assertion of mind’s interaction
with being would be needed. But precisely that assertion is lacking in the early
Schelling—instead, tentative analogues, representations and analyses of Critically
differing spheres are produced.
General and Particular Organs: Comparative Physiology and the System of Forces

In the Entwurf, Schelling gives a “general schematic of the sequence of stages” in
his system of Nature:
Organische

Allgemeine407

Anorganische Natur
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The discourse on Gründe in German had be re-activated by Jacobi in the Spinoza controversy, who had
gone so far as to accuse Kant of making the error that motivated the development of Criticism. Schelling,
who refers often enough to Jacobi, has, in the time marked out for investigation here, a much more complex
notion of causes and reasons than Jacobi did. For an account of Schelling that gives Jacobi a fair shake, see
Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction (Routledge: New York,
1993), pp. 15-30. See also Dale Snow, “F. H. Jacobi and the Development of German Idealism,” Journal of
the History of Philosophy 25 (3), 1987, pp. 397-415. On the basis of my argument here, I would suggest
that the pre-Kantian context is more important for interpreting Schelling than is generally assumed. See, for
some exceptions, Edward Booth, O.P., “Leibniz and Schelling,” Studia Leibnitiana 32 (1), 2000, pp. 86104, and Manfred Frank, Unendliche Annäherung: die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), pp. 662-690.
407
The universal unifying force is, of course, the Weltseele in the earlier writing of that name. Schelling
leaves its determination open in all of these writings, positing only that one must conclude to it from the
investigations. In the Weltseele: “Da nun dieses Prinzip die Kontinuität der anorgischen und der
organischen Welt unterhält und die ganze Natur zu einem allgemeinen Organismus verknüpft, so erkennen
wir aufs neue in ihm jenes Wesen, das die älteste Philosophie als die gemeinschaftliche Seele der
Natur ahndend begrüßte, und das einige Physiker jener Zeit mit dem formenden und bildenden Äther (dem
Anteil der edelsten Naturen) für Eines hielten.” Schelling, Weltseele, p. 665. In the Entwurf, as a harbinger
of the next year’s breakthrough: “Es wurd evorausgesetzt, die Natur sey Entwickelung aus Einer
ursprünglichen Involution. Diese Involution kann aber nach dem Obigen nichts Reelles seyn: sie kann also
nur als Act vorgestellt werden, als absolute Synthesis, welche nur ideal ist, und gleichsam den wendepunkt
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Bildungstrieb
Irritabilität
Sensibilität

Licht
Electrizität
Ursache des Magnetismus?

Chemischer Process
Electrischer Process
Magnetismus?408

The task of the Entwurf is to deduce this system, in which, as noted above, includes
separate but interconnected orders, here specified as anorganic, organic, and universal
(Nature). In each order, quantitative and qualitative balances of forces interact, even as
the whole interacts with the other orders. As we can now see, at each level, the points of
interaction are called “organs,” which are the referenda both in general and in particular.
Schelling invented neither the system of forces nor the use of “organ” within that system,
but his contribution to both helped him to develop Naturphilosophie as a branch of
Romantic organology. The system of forces had to be bound by a general concept of the
organ, and complemented by the particularity of the electrical organ. Force had to be
made dialectical, and the organ had to be transcendentalized. The result was that
organology could instrumentalize natural science, as a preface to its intention of
intervening in nature itself.
The notion of the system of forces was always bound, for Schelling, to the
possibility of a comparative physiology. And he explicitly recognized his forebears in
both projects.409 The system of forces had been given first by Herder, and then been
expanded and altered by Blumenbach and Kielmeyer.
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der Transcendental- und der Naturphilosophie bezeichnet.” (Schelling, Entwurf, p. 321; emphasis in
original.)
408
Schelling, Entwurf, p. viii.
409
“Die Idee einer vergleichenden Physiologie findet man schon in Blumenbachs Specimen physiologiae
comparatae inter animaliea calidid et frigidi sanguinis, weiter ausgeführt in der Rede über die Verhältnisse
der organischen Kräfte von Hrn. Kielmeyer deren Hauptgedanken dass nämlich in der Reihe der
Organisationen Sensibilität durch Irritabilität und wie Blumenbach und Sömmering bewiesen haben, zuletzt
von der Reproductionskraft verdrängt werde, aus Herders Ideen zur Philos. der Gesch. der Menschheit…
genommen ist. Wie indess Sensibilität durch Irritabilität und beide endlich durch das Ueber gewicht der
Reproductionskraft verdrängt werden ist noch durch keinen dieser Verusche erklärt worden.” (Schelling,
Entwurf, p. 220; emphasis in original.)
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Herder’s Ideen had been the locus classicus for the systems of forces that
emerged in the vitalist natural-scientific scene in the 1790s. The third book of that work
had proposed, in keeping with the general cosmology analyzed in chapter I of the present
study, a comparative physiology410 on the basis of the interaction of basic forces in the
animal. For Herder, the formative drive (Bildungstrieb) included, as it had for
Blumenbach, both nutritive drive and reproductive drive (the three elements ultimately
united in Wolff’s vis essentialis). In addition to these, Herder included Haller’s irritability
and sensibility. As in his earlier work, Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen
Seele (see chapter I above), irritability and sensibility were made into progressively
concrete versions of a single force. Indeed, in the Ideen, all of these forces were made
part of a single organic force-complex:
Nur ein Principium des Lebens scheint in der Natur zu herrschen: dies ist der
ätherische oder elektrische Strom, der in den Röhren der Pflanze, in den Adern und
Muskeln des Tiers, endlich gar im Nervengebäude immer feiner und feiner verarbeitet
wird und zuletzt alle die wunderbaren Triebe und Seelenkräfte anfacht, über deren
Wirkung wir bei Tieren und Menschen staunen.411

The relation of forces was, for the monist Herder, a proliferation more than a
combination. A single, ultimately divine force, held the cosmos together and displayed
itself in the animal individual and species. As we shall see, the suggestion that aether or
electricity was the basic characteristic of this internally differentiated force reached both
back to the aether-tradition (see chapter II above) and forward to Schelling’s
instrumentalization of electricity. As Herder continued his speculation, he tied the system
of forces and the promise of a comparative physiology to his cosmology. The effects of
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“Wer würde sich nicht freuen, wenn ein philosophischer Zergliederer es übernähme, eine vergleichende
Physiologie mehrerer, insonderheit dem Menschen naher Tiere nach diesen durch Erfahrungen
unterschiednen und festgestellten Kräften im Verhältnis der ganzen Organisation des Geschöpfs zu geben?”
Herder, Ideen, p. 94.
411
Herder, Ideen, p. 82; emphasis in original.
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the force visible in the external world were bound to their ability to find organs of
mediation. Without those organs, the various media of the qualitatively different forcefields could find no external expression.412 Individual animals, including the human,
might not have the right organs for the perception of a given medium, but in principle, the
cosmos is self-perceiving (it is, indeed, God’s self-perception), and thus suffers no
discreet breaks in its force-organ relationship. The cosmos is thus made up of force-organ
relations, built (in this respect) as complex units of animal experience or worlds.413 The
physiology which prospectively follows on this system of forces differentiates animals by
the complex of their organs,414 with the endgame of the human standing erect, open to
sensing, cognizing, and speaking of his world.415 The basis of this system was in the
differentiation of force and organ, in the moment of encounter of the general and the
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“Wo Wirkung in der Natur ist, muß wirkende Kraft sein; wo Reiz sich in Bestrebungen oder gar in
Krämpfen zeigt, da muß auch Reiz von innen gefühlt werden. Sollten diese Sätze nicht gelten, so hört aller
Zusammenhang der Bemerkungen, alle Analogie der Natur auf.“ (Herder, Ideen, pp. 87-88; emphasis in
original) Given the importance of the “analogy of nature” for Herder, the statement implies that, without
organs, the cosmos could not subsist.
413
“Die ganze Schöpfung sollte durchgenossen, durchgefühlt, durcharbeitet werden; auf jedem neuen Punkt
also mußten Geschöpfe sein, sie zu genießen, Organe, sie zu empfinden, Kräfte, sie dieser Stelle gemäß zu
beleben. Der Kaiman und der Kolibri, der Kondor und die Pipa: was haben sie miteinander gemein? Und
jedes ist für sein Element organisiert, jedes lebt und webt in seinem Elemente. Kein Punkt der Schöpfung
ist ohne Genuß, ohne Organ, ohne Bewohner: jedes Geschöpf hat also seine eigne, eine neue Welt.”
(Herder, Ideen, pp. 88-89; emphasis in original) This conception significantly anticipates the notion of
animal milieux. I note here, also, that the universe is necessarily a cosmos for Herder, and its completeness,
which is not in question in Schelling, will come apart in Schleiermacher and Novalis, for which see chapter
IV below.
414
Important in this respect is that Herder ties organs as the determinant factor in identification of species
to the “directionality” of the instinct of the animal, something we will see in the subsequent discourse
again. “Es erhellet, wohin der Begriff einer Tierseele und eines Tierinstinkts zu setzen sei, wenn wir der
Physiologie und Erfahrung folgen. Jene nämlich ist die Summe und das Resultat aller in einer Organisation
wirkenden lebendigen Kräfte. Dieser ist die Richtung, die die Natur jenen sämtlichen Kräften dadurch gab,
daß sie sie in eine solche und keine andre Temperatur stellte, daß sie sie zu diesem und keinem andern Bau
organisierte.” (Herder, Ideen, p. 99; emphasis in original)
415
This is put in organological terms: “Was ihm an Intensität des Triebes abgeht, hat es durch Ausbreitung
und feinere Zusammenstimmung ersetzt bekommen, es ist eines feinern Selbstgenusses, eines freiern und
vielfachern Gebrauchs seiner Kräfte und Glieder fähig worden, und alle dies, weil, wenn ich so sagen darf,
seine organische Seele in ihren Werkzeugen vielfacher und feiner auseinandergelegt ist.” (Herder, Ideen, p.
104-05)
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particular, which, Herder noted, first created the difference between inner and outer.416
This designation, too, would bear fruit in the 1790s, and in particular in Schelling’s
Naturphilosophie.
Schelling marked out another significant predecessor to both projects in the
Stuttgart biologist Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer’s Über die Verhältnisse der organischen
Kräfte untereinander in der Reihe der verschiedenen Organisationen.417 Kielmeyer had
given this speech on the occasion of the Duke’s birthday at the Hohe Karlsschule in
Stuttgart in 1793.418 Kielmeyer marked out five different forces that were distributed for
interaction amongst animal organs: sensibility, irritability, and forces of reproduction,
secretion, and propulsion. He treats these and their relations, trying to derive general laws
of their interactions. Indeed, as Schelling noted, these were laws of compensation419:
where one force preponderated, another was repressed partially. The basis of that effect
was the differing qualities of the forces, but the resulting relations were at least vaguely
quantitative. Ultimately, an inverse proportion between the force of reproduction and that
of sensibility was the result of Kielmeyer’s investigation: where sensibility is afforded the
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Where a medium established by a force is felt in an organ, Herder glosses this organ as “inner[er]
Sinn,” (Herder, Ideen, p. 88). The organ is thus the moment of differentiation between inner and outer.
417
In the Weltseele, Schelling had given this speech iconic status: “Besonders bestätigt sie sich durch
Betrachtung der fortschreitenden Entwicklung der organischen Kräfte in der Reihe der Organisationen,
worüber ich den Leser auf die schon im Jahr 1793 erschienene Rede des Hrn. Professor Kielmeyer über
diesen Gegenstand verweise, eine Rede, von welcher an das künftige Zeitalter ohne Zweifel die Epoche
einer ganz neuen Naturgeschichte rechnen wird.” (Schelling, Weltseele, p. 661; emphasis in original)
418
For the circumstances of the speech, see Kielmeyer, Über die Verhältnisse, pp. 12-13.
419
“Kielmeyer called this dynamic correlation compensation and argued that the differ- entiation of forces
was not, in itself, a source of inequality, since a predominant force in one form balanced a different force in
another, and all forms tended equally toward preservation and destruction. As these remarks indicate,
Kielmeyer's essay is best read as a physiological version of the economy of nature.” (Larson, “Vital
Forces,” p. 242.)
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organism, fewer offspring are possible, and where dozens of offspring are possible, less
force is devoted to the organs of reproduction.420
Blumenbach follows Kant in making organisms reciprocally causal, and dubs this
causality a “system of organs.”421 The organs are the locus of the relations between
forces, which are divided up and conferred upon (verteilt an) these organs. The
physiological struggle between irritability and sensibility noted by Schelling422 plays a
role in the very formation of those organs: “… und was zuvor Irritabilität war, entwikelt
[sic] sich am Ende zur Vorstellungsfähigkeit, oder wenigstens ihrem unsichtbaren
unmittelbarsten materiellen Organ.”423 Organs were not merely passive receptors of their
forces, but actually formed by them. Where Herder had seen a single force differentiating
itself, Kielmeyer saw unified organs differentiated according to a series of forces. And
this enabled him to anticipate another key element of organology: the possible
voluntarism of any organ. Writing of humans, Kielmeyer states that “[m]it der Vernunft,
die sich in seiner Organisation einfand, erhielt [der Mensch] das Vermögen, das
Verhältnis der andern Kräfte, die ihm mit den übrigen Thieren gemein sind, innerhalb
gewißer Gränzen nach Belieben abzuändern.”424 This capacity or faculty (Vermögen)
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See Kielmeyer, Über die Verhältnisse, pp. 33-35. The force of reproduction is also more concentrated in
those creatures with sensibility, allowing for their more complex structure (which will include sensibility)
to be reproduced. Thus compensation occurs at the level of the species as well as phylogenetically. See pp.
63-67 of the introduction, and pp. 35-37 in the text for Kielmeyer’s (possibly first) formulation of the
biogenetic law (“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”) in terms of force-relations.
421
See Kielmeyer, Über die Verhältnisse, p. 4. That Kant is an influence here, as has often been
emphasized, is not in question. See Lenoir, Strategy of Life, pp. 37-35, and Larson, “Vital Forces,” pp. 24143. Especially Lenoir points to the greater system of organs as Kielmeyer continued to develop it in his
later work. I focus on this single text since it is Schelling’s source. See Kielmeyer, Über die Verhältnisse,
introduction pp. 35-41, for an attempt to re-insert Herder’s influence into the historiographical picture.
Schelling seems to have anticipated this corrective.
422
And anticipated by Herder: “Je mehr die Muskelkräfte in das Gebiet der Nerven treten, desto mehr
werden auch sie in dieser Organisation gefangen und zu Zwecken der Empfindung überwältigt.” (Herder,
Ideen, p. 94; emphasis in original)
423
Kielmeyer, Über die Verhältnisse, p. 37.
424
Kielmeyer, Über die Verhältnisse, p. 42.
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gave humans the ability to instrumentalize other species to make room for themselves:
“… daß [der Mensch] mehrere [Gattungen] vom Schauplaz völlig abzutreten noch
zwingen werde, um ihm, als einem auf der andern Seite wieder ersezenden Organ in der
großen Maschine, Plaz zu machen, ist mehr als blos wahrscheinlich.”425 Thus the human
became the organ of a violent but rational evolution, one which would sweep away entire
species to make room for the faculties and organs of reason. The ability identified here
would become an essential part of organology, as we shall see with Schelling, and then
again in chapters IV (Novalis) and V (Goethe) below.
The division of forces to different organs had been a problem in physiology at
least since Haller, but it exercised Schelling especially strongly. Indeed, it was in this
problematic that he saw the positive need to go beyond eclectic observations of nature
and proceed to a systematic philosophy, a metaphysics, of that nature. The missionstatement of Schelling’s still-prospective comparative physiology (as quoted above) had
read, in part:
…insofern diese Organe jedes seine eigenthümliche Funktion, ausübte, käme ihnen ein
eignes Leben (vita propria) – insofern aber die Ausübung dieser Funktion doch nur
innerhalb jenes ganzes Organismus möglich ware, nur gleichsam ein gebergtes Leben zu,
und so muss es dem Begriff der Organisation nach seyn.426

He would go on to call this division a duality of all organs, and it was the spur to his
dialectical organology. Its source, however, was in the third of his named predecessors in
the system of forces and comparative physiology: Blumenbach.427 Blumenbach’s
Institutiones Physicologicae (1786, translation as Anfangsgründe der Physiologie, 1789)
had separated between five forces at work in formation and preservation of organisms:
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Kielmeyer, Über die Verhältnisse, p. 43.
Schelling, Entwurf, p. 64.
427
I treat Blumenbach here consciously out of chronological order, since his contribution is philologically
exemplary for Schelling’s emergent conception of the particular (electrical) organ.
426
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Bildungstrieb (vis formativus), “contractility” (as a property of cells in general, vis
cellulosa), irritability (vis muscularis), a proper function of individual organ-formations
(vita propria), and sensibility (vis nervea).428 The standout here is the vita propria, under
which Blumenbach amasses functions which cannot be attributed to simple contraction,
excitation, or sensing (like the womb’s efforts during labor, the excitability of the nipples,
and the dropping of the testicles). The problematic he raises is precisely that which
fascinated Schelling, and indeed, Schelling appears to be very close to Blumenbach’s
formulation:
At enim vero praeter has quarta adhuc excitanda venit, vita scil. propria; sub qua
denominatione eas intelligo vires, quae singularibus quibusdam corporis partibus,
peculiaribus functionibus destinatis, conueniunt, neque ad ullam priorum virium
communium classem referri possunt.429

But if Schelling took the term vita propria from Blumenbach, he followed the 1789
translation by Eyerel in using the term organ:
Aber außer diesen kommt noch eine vierte Lebenskraft in Betrachtung, nämlich das
besondere Leben, worunter ich dienjenigen Kräfte befasse, die man an einzelnen, zu
einzelnen Verrichtungen bestimmten Organen wahrnimmt, und nicht wohl unter die
vorhergehenden Klassen gebracht werden können.430

Einzelnen Organen here translates singularibus partibus corporis, and the
extended modifier in the German (zu einzelnen Verrichtungen bestimmten)
translates the Latin needed to define “organ” (peculiaribus functionibus
destinatis). This lends support to my thesis that “organ” was still in the process of
translation and domestication in German in the 1780s (see chapter I above), but it
also collates the problematic of that organ as it presented itself to Schelling.
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See Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Institutiones Physicologicae (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1786), pp. 31-38,
and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Anfangsgründe der Physiologie, transl./ed. Joseph Eyerel (Wappler:
Vienna, 1789), pp. 26-31. Larson notes that “the order of enumeration is also the order of successive
formation.” See “Vital Forces,” p. 238.
429
Blumenbach, Institutiones, §47, p. 34.
430
Blumenbach, §47, p. 28.
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Caught up in a system of forces, the organ was the site of concretion of those
forces, a flexible receptor of a various fields of potentiality referring to those
forces. Further, organ was the referendum and relatum of the organized being as
such. Its general determination was in that relation between forces in their
concrete effects,431 and its particularity would have to be discovered by finding a
consistent quality through which those effects were related to each other and to
the larger system. The organ had a dual task, and a dual structure—but it would
quickly come to have a triple task and structure in Schelling’s work. For that, its
electricity had to be taken into account.
Qualität,432 for Schelling in the 1790s, was increasingly electric.433 His turn to
electricity followed developments in experiments especially with “animal electricity.” In
1791, Luigi Galvani published the results of his experimentation with severed frogs’ legs,
believing he had discovered electrical energy—cast in general at the time as “fluid”—in
the tissue of the animal. His discovery had an effect on the lettered spheres in Germany
that can only be described in the metaphorical terms given to his name because of that
very effect: the young generation was galvanized. The galvanic result, however—that is,
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In the Weltseele, Schelling expresses this as follows: “In demselben Verhältnis, in welchem das Band
aufgeschlossen wird, fängt das Verbundene an unwesentlich zu werden, und wird einem immer größeren
Wechsel unterworfen. Das Verbundene, als solches (die bloße Materie), soll nichts für sich sein; sie ist nur
etwas als Ausdruck des Bandes, daher diese beständig wechselt, indes das Organ, d.h. eben das Band, die
lebendige Kopula, die Idea selbst, wie durch göttliche Bekräftigung, besteht und immer dasselbe bleibt.”
(Schelling, Weltseele, p. 470.) See also the epigraph to this chapter.
432
The problem of quality is one of Schelling’s principle reasons for rejecting purely mechanistic physics,
already in the Ideen (1797). If this purely quantitative science is the basis for all the others, how can the
emergence of qualities be explained? See Beiser, German Idealism, pp. 525 ff., and Kondylis, Entstehung,
p. 565: “In den “Ideen” bleibt Schelling im großen ganzen bei der Auffassung der Natur als eines
harmonischen Gleichgewichts stehen; die Natur nicht als bloßes Gleichgewicht, sondern als dialektische
Synthese erscheint erst in seinen späteren naturphilosophischen Schriften, und nur diese fortgeschrittene
Form des hen kai pan bewirkt die Loslösung von Kant.”
433
By 1799, we find Schelling claiming that “the absolute relativity of all quality may be shown from the
electric relation of bodies, inasmuch as the same body that is positive with one is negative with another,
and conversely.” (Schelling, Entwurf (Einleitung), p. 39. See also Specht, Poetisierung, p. 103.
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the very existence of what is now called bioelectricity—remained a topic of scientific
debate until the 1840s.434 Alessandro Volta attacked the results of Galvani’s experiments,
claiming that the various metals used to produce the reaction were the source of the
electrical impulse—“animal electricity” was a non-starter, produced only as a result of
the production of “heterogeneity” in metals. As Karl Rothschuh has shown, the reason for
the confusion was partly an inability to produce a strong enough electric field to
demonstrate the internal electrical current in the muscle-nerve complex. Particularly in
the experiments undertaken by Alexander von Humboldt, however, both purely metal
electricities and internally “animal” electricity were present.435 Volta invented the battery
on the basis of the former; Romanticism dug its heels into its scientific interests, trying to
unite metaphysics with physics, biology, and now chemistry, on the basis of the latter.436
Schelling had used the system of forces and the problem of their expression to reconfigure the notion of an organ. As we have seen, this organ was, in a first step, entirely
general, following Herder’s and Blumenbach’s uses. It was the universal referendum,
applicable to any situation of mereological closure. Those situations were, of course,
legion for Schelling’s concept of Nature. In fact, “Nature” itself was, as I have been
arguing, only legible through the organological cipher. Organs—as they had for
Leibniz—went all the way down. They were the ontological crux of a Critical
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For the background, and the claim that Galvani discovered but did not prove the existence of
biolectricity, see K. E. Rothschuh, “Von der Idee bis zum Nachweis der tierischen Elektrizität,” Sudhoffs
Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften 44 (1), 1960, pp. 25-44. A helpful graph of
relations of influence between experimentalists with electricity can be found at p. 40.
435
For a summary of the events, see K. E. Rothschuh, “Alexander von Humboldt und die Physiologie
seiner Zeit,” Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften 43 (2), pp. 97-113,
especially pp. 101-02.
436
As noted above in chapter II, the term organ is used by the galvanic philosophers, especially Humboldt
(see note 248 in chapter II above), primarily as “irritable” and “irritated” (reizbare und gereizte Organe).
Ritter’s use, which becomes organological after his interactions with Novalis, is treated below in chapter
IV. Schelling’s use expand beyond this now-literal use, as we are about to see.!!

!

215!
!!
!
Naturphilosophie, one which focuses on judgment in the absence of the assumption of
other fundamental faculties. Schelling’s move here required them to be dual (and
eventually triple), dialectical doctrines he developed out of the textual complexes I have
laid out so far in this chapter. As he particularized these organs, he electrified them. In
doing so, he refined the notion of the natural organ and allowed for a mutual
instrumentalization between philosophy and science.
In the Weltseele, Schelling re-poses the problem of force. The system is dynamic,
but where should the force reside? Is it inside the organized body, or outside? Those who
believe in the pure immanence of force in bodies are physiological materialists (the main
object of polemic seems to me to be Reil), and for Schelling, they cannot answer the key
question of the emergence of quality, or of the differentiation of forces from each other.
Those who hold that force is entirely outside of bodies are chemical immaterialists, and
their permanently dualist position cannot explain the interactions of forces and bodies.437
For Schelling, neither position is acceptable, and only one which insists on both
conditions—a simultaneous inner and outer relation of forces to bodies—can form the
correct beginning for investigation. He moves immediately to the organ, which is the
locus of that simultaneity. And his source combined with contemporary discourse puts it
in turn immediately in the context of electricity, since Haller’s notion of irritability was
now being investigated in the terms of the debate on galvanism.438
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See Beiser, German Idealism, pp. 544-48 for an overview.
So Schelling: “Mag es sein, daß Hallers Prinzip in der Physiologie eine Qualitas occulta vorstellt, er hat
doch durch diesen Ausdruck schon die künftige Erklärung des Phänomens selbst gleichsam vorausgesehen,
und stillschweigend vorausgesagt, daß der Begriff des Lebens nur als absolute Vereinigung der Aktivität
und Passivität in jedem Naturindividuum konstruierbar ist.” (Schelling, Weltseele, p. 600; emphasis in
original)
438
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In the Weltseele, the particular and electrical organ is dual and bound to the
question of irritability:
Hätte Haller an eine Konstruktion des Begriffs von Reizbarkeit gedacht, so hätte er ohne
Zweifel eingesehen, daß sie ohne einen Dualismus entgegengesetzter Prinzipien, und also
auch ohne einen Dualismus der Organe des Lebens, nicht denkbar ist…439

The organ440 is the point of differentiation between inner and outer,441 the point of
manifestation of force. Without it, no Nature—and no experience. The a priori
construction Schelling is seeking finds a terminological basis in the duality of the organ.
In the Weltseele, “organ” is associated primarily with irritability (as we shall see in a
moment, the term is transferred to sensibility in the Entwurf). The two forces are opposed
to each other in a quasi-compensation system, as in Herder and Kielmeyer. The two are
active and passive relations respectively to the dual (positive and negative) action of the
world soul itself:
Auf welche Organe die positive, erste Ursache des Lebens
kontinuierlich und unmittelbar einwirkt, dieselben Organe werden als aktive, diejenigen
aber, auf welche sie nur mittelbar (durch die erstern) einwirkt, als passive Organe
vorgestellt werden müssen (Nerven und Muskeln).442
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Schelling, Weltseele, p. 600; emphasis in original.
Haller’s definition uses pars: “Irritabilem partem corporis humani dico, quae ab externo aliquo contactu
brevior sit; valde irritabilem, quae a levi contact, parum quae a Valente demum causa in brevitatem cietur.
Sensibilem partem corposis humani apello, cujus contactus animae representatur…” Commentarii
Societatis Regiae Scientiarum Gottingensis, volume 2 (Göttingen, 1753), p. 116. PDF obtained from
http://gdz.sub.uni-goettingen.de/dms/load/pdf/, 2 April, 2012.
441
“Das ganze Geheimniss beruht auf jenem Gegensatz zwischen Innrem und Äusserm den man zugeben
muss, wenn man in der Natur überhaupt etwas Individuelles zugiebt. Denn nun wird gegen jede innere
Thätigkeit, d.h. gegen jede Thätigkeit, die sich selbst zum Mittelpunkt constituirt, die äussre Natur
ankämpfen. Durch diesen Antagonismus wird die inner Thätigkeit selbst zu produciren genöthigt werden,
was sie ohne denselben nicht producirt hätte. Die organische Gestalt und Structur z. B. wohin auch die
Mannichfaltigkeit einzelner Organe gehört, deren jedes sich seine besondre Funktion nimmt, ist die einzige
Form, unter welcher die innre Thätigkeit gegen die äussre sich behaupten can.” (Schelling, Entwurf, p. 87)
442
Schelling, Weltseele, p. 601; emphasis in original. Schelling is exploiting an ambiguity in the literature.
As Larson puts it: “Unfortunately, Haller's terminology was ambiguous. In defining irritability he stressed
the capacity to respond to a stimulus with a contraction; irritability, then, included both the capacity to
receive and to respond. Sensibility, too, covered two very different kinds of phenomena: it was both the
psychic experience of sensation and an unconscious physiological excitability of nerves.” (Larson, “Vital
Forces,” p. 238.) Larson shows that this ambiguity persisted well into the 1790s.
440

!

217!
!!
!
The internally divided first principle expresses itself in a particular order in the excitable
and sensible organs, which, dual in themselves in order to receive the dual impulses
which delimit their functions, together form a unity-in-duality. That dialectical unity
obtains only for animals, and most particularly for humans. In a fundamental sense, the
organs here are those that relate the most particular (and most complex) products of
Nature to Nature’s original organization. They are metaphysical organs in the most literal
sense.
But they are also transcendental organs. Schelling makes this clear by explaining
what he thinks Haller missed:
Erregbarkeit ist ein synthetischer Begriff, er drückt ein Mannigfaltiges negativer
Prinzipien aus…443

The organs which bear the weight of relating Nature to itself at the general and particular
levels are implicated by a synthetic judgment which is a condition of that system.
Schelling is concerned here to derive that system a priori, or rather, in keeping with my
conclusion from above, to make that judgment a priori. The passage in which Schelling
confronts and alters the Kantian notion of intellectual intuition (see above in the current
chapter) in fact follows this confrontation with Haller. The internally dual organs of
irritability lie at the basis of the conception or organicism, and not vice versa. By starting
with those judgmental and electrical organs, Schelling can conclude to his dialectical
organicism:
… so liegt doch ein solcher Dualismus in den ersten Prinzipien der Naturphilosophie;
denn daß nur Wesen, welche zu Einer physischen Gattung gehören, miteinander
fruchtbar sind, und umgekehrt, welcher Grundsatz das oberste Prinzip aller
Naturgeschichte ist … folgt nur aus dem allgemeinen Grundsatz des Dualismus (der in
der organischen wie in der anorgischen Natur sich bestätigt), daß nur zwischen
Prinzipien Einer Art reelle Entgegensetzung ist. Wo keine Einheit der Art ist, ist auch
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Schelling, Weltseele, p. 602; emphasis in original.
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keine reelle Entgegensetzung, und wo keine reelle Entgegensetzung ist, keine zeugende
Kraft.444

As in the generation of animals, so in the most general and most particular organs: a
dualism based on real repugnance, on the actuality of opposing forces expressed only in
those organs, is the principle of Nature. The unity that runs through this passage, and the
conception of Nature in the Naturphilosophie more generally, must itself ultimately be
differentiated into specific unities that make a third for each such duality. That third is the
capstone on the dialectic of Nature, and emerges in the Entwurf.445
In the most general sense, that third is already the unity proposed as aether in the
Ideen, and metaphorically dubbed the Weltseele in the work by that name. In order for the
truly dialectical picture to emerge, however, it must be specified at different levels of
organization. So, in the most general sense:
Also setzte die anorgnische Aussenwelt selbst wieder eine andre Ausserwelt voraus, in
Bezug auf welche sie ein Innres wäre. Da nun die Thätigkeit des ursprünglich
Organischen allein durch die engegenstrebende Thätigkeit seiner Aussenwelt erregt wird,
diese selbst aber wiederum durch eine (in Bezug auf sie) äussre Thätigkeit unterhalten
wird, so ware das urpsprünglich Organische zusammt der Aussenwelt, welcher es sich
unmittelbar entgegensetzt, wieder gemeinschaftlich entgegengesetzt einem dritten, d.h.
wieder gemeinschaftlich ein Innres, in Bezug auf ein drittes Aeusseres.446

Schelling does not name the organ here, but its presence is clear: the liminal space
between inner and outer is always organ, and this is no exception. Organs are
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Schelling, Weltseele, p. 633.
In a general sense, I agree with Kondylis, Enstehung, that there is a progression from unity/harmony in
the Ideen, to a duality in the Weltseele, and on to a triplicity (which is patent) in the Entwurf. See Kondylis,
Entstehung, pp. 558-96. In drawing attention to the force-system, comparative physiology, and to the
organ’s altering affinities with irritability and sensibility, I am lending deeper contextual support to
Kondylis’s overall thesis: "Es muß also als von einer gegebenen Tatsach davon ausgegangen werden, daß
Schelling die Naturphänomene als den Bereich wählte, auf dem er die dialektische Spekulation des hen kai
pan an Hand konkreten Materials und konkreter Fragestellungen übte und zum ersten Mal in eine
fortgeschrittene dialektischeMethode weiterentwickelte..." (Kondylis, Entstehung, p. 552) I am also going
beyond this thesis in pointing to the way in which the organ as the central term of that method allows for
mutual discursive instrumentalization between philosophy and natural science.
446
Schelling, Entwurf, p. 93; emphasis in original.
445
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simultaneously the separative and binding elements of natural systems. They form the
(general and particular) third, the legitimation of Naturphilosophie447:
Die Zusammensetzung der organischen Materie geht in’s Unendliche, weil jedes Organ
in’s Unendliche wieder organisirt, wieder auf eigenthümliche Art gemischt und gebildet
ist, jedes vom andern durch besondre Qualitäten sich unterscheidet. – Was ist aber
Qualität selbst?448

Quality, as we have seen, is electricity. We can now add that it is electricity in
organological expression. General electrical quality exists only through the mediation of
the specified third between inner and outer, between force and product: the organ. And
the locus of that organ’s operation is now shifted from the excitable formation449 to the
realm of sensibility.
Sensibility and the reproductive force are opposed to each other, as they were
germinally in Herder, and doctrinally in Kielmeyer. Sensibility marks the freeing of the
organs of the animal for the purposes of perception of the environment, and must be
compensated by re-direction of the productive force. It also opens up the animal to the
other realms or orders—and it is from that openness that reason should emerge, on the
basis of organs of sensibility. Because sensibility and the reproductive force form an
opposition mediated by the already-dual irritability, it is easy to see why triplicity
becomes Schelling’s focus.450 The triple structure emerges from dualities in single points
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In this sense, “organ” is the key term in a kind of transcendental deduction in Kant’s sense of a
legitimation of a field of knowledge. The organ is not, however, the highest point in a chain of inferences
(pro- and ensyllogisms, as in the transcendental dialectic), or an attempt à la Reinhold to derive forms of
knowledge from a highest point. It is equally not an abandonment of systematicity, by Schelling’s own
statement. It is something like a rational point of entry for what Paul Franks has called an “organic system.”
See Franks, All or Nothing, pp. 84 pp.. But then, organic system does little more, in this context, than beg
the question.
448
Schelling, Entwurf, p. 77.
449
Which retains, if not the term, the sense of organ: “Kurz: der Organismus (als Ganzes genommen) muss
sich selbst das Medium seyn, wodurch äussre Einflüsse auf ihn wirken.” (Schelling, Entwurf, p. 159;
emphasis in original)
450
“Aber jene Kraft, deren einzige Bedingung Duplictiät, ist wirksam, wo nur ihre Bedingungen gegeben
sind. Ihre Bedingungen aber sind gegeben. Sie wird also fortfahren zu wirken. Was ihr Object war, wird
Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit, oder Ihr Instrument; diess sind die entgegengesetzten Geschlechter.”
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of contact. Reproduction and sensibility both rely on triplicity, while irritability, which is
dual, ties the two together into a larger triad. If we focus on sensibility (which is where
organs occur in the text), we can see why Schelling’s particular organs are
paradigmatically those of (animal) electricity or galvanism.
For Schelling, there are three levels of interaction: the organ, the field of
differentiated forces, and the single organic force itself.451 The single force and the
differences are simply the material fields of inter-level interaction according to the
schema of the universe given above. The contemporary status of natural-scientific
investigation allows only some certainty about these interactions. The organ, however is
the relay between the levels, and between any whole and any part: it makes the system
work. And indeed, the electrical or more properly galvanic organ clarifies the relation of
general to particular in this dialectical Nature.452 This is because the establishment of
qualities requires, in a sense, the interaction of general organs with particular organs.
Nature as a whole—which ultimately includes human reason and allows that reason to
operate successfully—must display, for the Naturphilosoph, the very connections that
make Naturphilosophie possible. Schelling thus shifts the term organ from its physical
meaning in previous writings on electricity to one in keeping with his view of Nature.
The organ becomes the central third that makes natural development, but also cognition
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(Schelling, Entwurf, p. 216.)
451
“Sensibilität ist da, ehe ihr Organ sich gebildet hat, Gehirn und Nerven anstatt Ursachen der Sensbilität
zu seyn, sind vielmehr selbst schon ihr Product. – Die entgegengesetzten System (das iiritable und das
sensible), in welche der Organismus zerfällt, sind nur das Gerüste jener organischen Kraft, nicht die Kraft
selbst.” (Schelling, Entwurf, p. 170; emphasis in original.)
452
On the basis of this claim, reasons for which I will be arguing for presently: “ Nun ist un saber
Sensibilität, obgleich wir alle äussre Ursachen nur durch sie zum Organismus gelangen lassen, doch etwas
nicht minder in Naturursachen gegründetes, obgleich wir bekennen, dass weil wir Sensibilität nur als Quell
aller organischen Thätigkeit kennen, und weil durch sie als gemeinschaftliches Medium alle Kräfte wirken,
sie für uns in die letzten Bedingungen der Natur überhaupt sich verliert, woraus man zum Voraus einsehen
kann, dass Sensibilität wohl allgemeiner Thätigkeitsquell in der Natur, und sonach eine Eigenschaft nicht
der einzelnen Organiszation, sonder der ganzen Natur ist.” (Schelling, Entwurf, pp. 212-13; emphasis in
original.)
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of Nature, possible.
The local organ of animal electricity is, then, triple, or it is the third in a triadic
structure. The debate between Galvani and Volta had been on just this problem. Volta
had proposed a dual structure or “principle of heterogeneity” for electrical phenomena,
which he limited to metals. However, that principle could only operate with three bodies
(two differently charged metals in a conducting medium).453 The operation of this triadic
excitation-system is clear for irritability, which reacts according to its dual nature. In the
Entwurf, irritability is no longer the bearer of the problematic of life, of organs. This is
because Schelling has now located the problematic of life in sensibility and its multiply
triadic structure.
Sensibility exists in the triad of the animal order,454 as we have seen, and it is
expressed in one way through the triadic structure of the galvanic reaction. Yet it is also
the third (das Dritte) between the general and the specific organs: it is that which relates
those two organs to each other. It is the organ of organs in the system of Nature.
Sensibility, for Schelling, disappears behind its appearance. It can only truly be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Schelling puts this point this way: “Dadurch also ware die nothwendige Triplicität im Galvanismus
abgeleitet. Der dritte Körper in der galvanischen kette ist nämlich nur darum nothwendig, damit der
Gegensatz zwischen den beyden andern erhalten werde.” (Schelling, Entwurf, p. 177 ; emphasis in original)
He then goes on to dispute Humboldt’s reduction of the structure to a duality, while strongly agreeing with
Humboldt’s result (that there is an inhering animal electricity): “It is a basic law of galvanism that all
galvanic activity occurs only in a chain of three different bodies. This Voltaic law has indeed been brought
into doubt by Humboldt through a few experiments where only two bodies seem to be in the galvanic
chain. This is the case, e.g., where only homogeneous metals close the chain. Humboldt did not consider
that the final ground of galvanic phenomena lies in the heterogeneity of the organism itself, by no means to
be left out of consideration. Between nerve and muscle there is an opposition.” (I take this citation from the
English translation, which includes later revisions. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of
Nature, transl Keith Peterson (Albany: SUNY, 2004), p. 119.)
454
“Aber Sensibilität ist nicht selbst Thätigkeit, sondern Thätigkeitsquell, d.h. Sensibilität nur Bedingung
aller Irritabilität. Aber Sensibilität ist an sich nicht, ist nur in ihrem Objekt, (der Irritabilität) erkennbar,
und darum freylich, muss, wo diese ist, auch jene seyn, obgleich, wo sie unmittelbar in diese übergeht,
eigentlich auch nur diese erkennbar ist. – … aber ebenso wie Sensibilität Bedingung der Irritabilität, so
hinwiederum Irritabilität Bedingung der Sensibilität, denn ohne Thätigkeit nach aussen auch keine in ihr
Subject zurückgehendse Thätigkeit.” (Schelling, Entwurf, pp. 184-85.)
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known internally. The sensitive part of the reaction to galvanic excitation can in no way
be observed but only inferred in another being. The irritable reaction makes both
reproduction (eventually) and sensibility possible, by providing initial movement and
“protection” respectively.455 Sensibility is thus an internally oppositional field of
potential within certain irritable beings.456 Sensibility—this final stage of the organ
before its ideality emerges from the “proof of idealism”—provides the final natural relay,
the final organ of nature. It produces Nature—and as Schelling is thus done constructing
that Nature, it produces the need for an organ of reflection on that construction, one
which can ensure the initial identity of the production and the construction. Construction
would have to rely on a mirror-organ (or more accurately, a system of organa and organs
for philosophy), which Schelling came to articulate only in 1800.

Ideal Organs: Intellectual Intuition and the Organ-World

Where Schelling had literalized the philosophico-biological organ of the 18thcentury philosophical metaphorology (see chapter I of the current study), he
transcendentalized the metaphor as it applied to human reason. His talk of a “spiritual
organ” began as early as the Ideen (1797), and he developed it into a complex condition
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“Ist Irritabilität oder ihr Product vielmehr, ein homogener Zustand, negative Bedingung der Sensibilität,
und jenen nur dem niedern Organismus eigen, so ist erklärt, wie der Organismus sich selbst das Medium
äussrer Einflüsse wird… und der Galvanismus endlich macht es augenscheinlich, den in ihm erscheint das
irritable System nur als die Bewaffnung des sensiblen, als das Mittelglied, wodurch dieses allein mit seiner
Aussenwelt zusammenhängt.” (Schelling, Entwurf, p. 187.)
456
That such a thing is possible is included in the definition of the specific organ Schellings gives: “Under
the specificity of the excitability of an organ I think nothing more than that the receptivity of this organ for
a stimulus is determined by the dynamical quality of factors out of which the organ is constructed.”
(Schelling, First Outline, p. 127.) Thus if sensibility is involved, the field of potential is established as
sensible, and the organ is the embodied locus of that potential, following the physical/mental ambivalence
in the term given already by Aristotle (see the Introduction to the present study).
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of human cognition in general. This transcendental use of the term allowed Schelling to
revise his early commitment to Kant’s canon of criticism, and to expand Idealism into a
metaphysics based on an organon of reason (the philosophy of art) with the organs of
philosophy (the I) and of that very philosophy of art (the genius). By 1800, Schelling
articulated this program in the System des transzendentalen Idealismus (StI) as a Critical,
historical metaphysics. The Idealism that the Naturphilosophie was supposed to prove
was complemented by the self-objectifying intellectual intuition of the transcendental
philosopher, in whose possession Schelling found a tool that needed realization: the
figure of the third, the Band, copula, or organ of simultaneous knowledge of the self and
of the world. The question was only in what cognitive activity this ground could be
brought to consciousness. Schelling answered this question with the notion that “aesthetic
intuition” was the conscious version of the spiritual organ, and made the philosophy of
art into the core of organological metaphysics. As it had for Hölderlin, art as a mode of
cognition offered Schelling a way of conceiving a world within a world—and it was from
the flexibility of the organ that he first conceived of a non-fit between an encapsulated
world (and art object) and its encapsulating world (the universe). If the laws of the one
did not correspond to those of the other, this could suggest the possibility of theoretical
alteration of the given.
For Kant, the question of synthetic judgments a priori had been about a “third”
(Drittes) which could perform the synthesis. In the case of empirical judgments for Kant,
the third is simply empirical intuition: predication to a subject occurs in a verifiable
sphere that can be checked (is that jacket blue?) at will. Where judgments both extend our
knowledge and do not derive from empirically intuited contents, we need a reliable
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source of synthesis. As we saw in chapter I above, for Kant the two sources of such
synthesis are the a priori forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories. By the
time Schelling’s publishing career had hit its stride in the late 1790s, the possibility that a
single third, a generalized basis of real cognition, could be found, had become the theme
of a movement we now call German Idealism.
Schelling calls that third thing in cognition “organ”:
Was ist denn nun jenes geheime Band, das unsern Geist mit der Natur verknüpft, oder
jenes verborgene Organ, durch welches die Natur zu unserm Geiste oder unser Geist zur
Natur spricht?457

This was indeed precisely the possibility that Kant had come to reject in the KdrV. In the
Amphibolies of Reflexive Concepts, an appendix to the Analytic of the Understanding,
Kant had attacked Leibnizian metaphysical concepts on the basis that they conflate the
two sources of cognition. The dogmatism of the Leibniz school is here formulated as lack
of attention to the boundaries between the sources of judgments. The attribution of
intensive magnitude to monads (with, for example, the consequence that they are
absolutely isolated), is a confusion of extension (based on the a priori form of space, thus
an intuition) with pure intension (which is conferred on objects by the categories, and is
thus ultimately a conceptual quality). Giving his architectonic one more Aristotelian
name, Kant showed how Criticism could operate to elucidate the errors of former systems
by securing conditionals for different types of assertions. This might be the first
application of what Kant would call Disziplin in the Methodenlehre (and which I have
discussed in chapters I and II above).
Indeed, even the self, as Kant would go on to argue in the Paralogisms, is not
both source and object of a single kind of knowledge. Nature (our nature) does not offer
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Schelling, Ideen, p. 151.
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us even the traditional security of the Cartesian ergo sum (see chapter I above for some
rationalist re-formulations of this basic principle). The self and nature both belong to the
single plane of judgment, composed of categorically formed concept-intuition unities.
The possibility of knowing either root of cognition non-judgmentally is denied us. Kant
writes:
Ins Innere der Natur dringt Beobachtung und Zergliederung der Erscheinungen, und man
kann nicht wissen, wie weit dieses mit der Zeit gehen werde. Jene transzendentale Fragen
aber, die ueber die Natur hinausgehen, wuerden wir bei allem dem doch niemals
beantworten koennen, wenn uns auch die ganze Natur aufgedeckt waere, da es uns nicht
einmal gegeben ist, unser eigenes Gemuet mit einer andern Anschauung, als der unseres
inneren Sinnes, zu beobachten. Denn in dem selben liegt das Geheimnis des Ursprungs
unserer Sinnlichkeit. Ihre Beziehung auf ein Objekt, und was der transzendentale Grund
dieser Einheit sei, liegt ohne Zweigel zu tief verborgen, als dass wir, die wir so gar uns
selbst nur durch innern Sinn, mithin als Erscheinung, kennen, ein so unschickliches
Werkzeug unserer Nachforschung dazu brauchen koennten, etwas anderes, als immer
wiederum Erscheinungen, aufzufinden, deren nichtsinnliche Ursache wir doch gern
erforschen wollten.458

Schelling’s verborgenes Organ is a direct answer to Kant’s anthropological charge that
the ultimate ground of sensibility’s reference to objects is zu tief verborgen for our
unschicklickes Werkzeug. “Organ” is thus the (at least) definitional locus of a principled
insight into the common root of cognition. A rather stringent definition of Criticism is at
the basis of this hope. For Schelling, any notion of Nature external to our mind is simply
non-explanatory. We can posit natures and substances arbitrarily, but the emergence of
the idea of such in consciousness is either left unexplained or simply dogmatically
asserted, no matter how complex or sensitive the investigation into the apparatuses of that
uptake. The possibility that we simply ideally confer Nature onto nature is similarly
excluded. It is not the contingency of the assertion of determinate existence that we are
after, Schelling tells us; rather, it is the necessary expression and even realization of the
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laws of our spirit in nature that we are seeking.459 The transcendental sources of
cognition—its conditions of possibility—remain, for Schelling, contingent just so long as
we cannot know their necessity as the expression of laws emanating from their source.
This source can be neither mere willful positing nor a world imprinting a ready-made
consciousness. In one sense, this line of argument extends Kant’s epigenesis metaphor.
Knowing that there is a guiding form that emerges from the real combination of
heterogeneous substances (kinds of cognition) is not enough. In the absence of lawful
cognition of the organizing principle of that combination and subsequent development,
any unity we can confer on that development is always arbitrary.460 That principle, as we
shall see, is an expanded sense of intuition as the non-conceptual contribution to
cognition. Intuition is divided for Schelling into different stages (or “epochs”) of
knowledge and its construction. 461 The substrate of cognition is thus a flexible organ
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“… denn wir verlangen zu wissen, nicht, wie eine solche Natur außer uns entstanden, sondern, wie auch
nur die Idee einer solchen Natur in uns gekommen sei; nicht etwa mir, wie wir sie willkürlich erzeugt
haben, sondern wie und warum sie ursprünglich und notwendig allem, was unser Geschlecht über Natur
von jeher gedacht hat, zugrunde liegt. Denn die Existenz einer solchen Natur außer mir erklärt noch lange
nicht die Existenz einer solchen Natur in mir: denn wenn ihr annehmt, daß zwischen beiden eine
vorherbestimmte Harmonie stattfinde, so ist ja ebendas der Gegenstand unserer Frage. Oder wenn ihr
behauptet, daß wir eine solche Idee auf die Natur nur übertragen, so ist nie eine Ahndung von dem, was
uns Natur ist und sein soll, in eure Seele gekommen. Denn wir wollen, nicht daß die Natur mit den
Gesetzen unsers Geistes zufällig (etwa durch Vermittelung eines Dritten) zusammentreffe, sondern daß sie
selbst notwendig und ursprünglich die Gesetze unsers Geistes nicht nur ausdrücke, sondern selbst
realisiere, und daß sie nur insofern Natur sei und Natur heiße, als sie dies tut.” (Schelling, Ideen, pp. 15152; emphasis in original)
460
Later in the Ideen, Schelling will reiterate the same point in organological terms: “Der letzte Endzweck
aller Betrachtung und Wissenschaft der Natur kann einzig die Erkenntnis der absoluten Einheit sein,
welche das Ganze umfaßt, und die sich in der Natur nur von ihrer einen Seite zu erkennen gibt. Diese ist
gleichsam ihr Werkzeug, wodurch sie auf ewige Weise das im absoluten Verstande Vorgebildete zur
Ausführung und Wirklichkeit bringt. In der Natur ist daher das ganze Absolute erkennbar, obgleich die
erscheinende Natur nur sukzessiv und in (für uns) endlosen Entwicklungen gebiert, was in der wahren
zumal und auf ewige Weise ist.” (Schelling, Ideen, p. 438; my emphasis)
461
“Dies bestätigt die gemeinste Aufmerksamkeit auf das, was beim Anschauen vorgeht. – Was man beim
Anblick von Gebirgen, die in die Wolken sich verlieren, beim donnernden Sturz einer Katarakte, überhaupt
bei allem, was groß und herrlich ist in der Natur, empfindet – jenes Anziehen und Zurückstoßen zwischen
dem Gegenstand und dem betrachtenden Geist, jenen Streit entgegengesetzter Richtungen, den erst die
Anschauung endet – alles das geht, nur transzendental und bewußtlos, bei der Anschauung überhaupt vor. –
Diejenigen, die so etwas nicht begreifen, haben gewöhnlich nichts vor sich, als ihre kleinen Gegenstände –
ihre Bücher, ihre Papiere und ihren Staub. Wer wollte aber auch Menschen, deren Einbildungskraft durch
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which defines human being, knowing, making: intuition on a scale from intellectual to
most sensible.462
This organ became, I am going to argue here, the emblem of Schelling’s specific
version of a Critical metaphysics or organology, a series of systems marked by perhaps
the greatest sympathy with the risk of dogmatism. We can see this already in the dictum
that Nature should be conceived as realizing the necessary laws of cognition. Schelling’s
position within the development of Idealism—the problem of Schelling—is simply this,
that he is the most insistent that the Critical philosophy cannot be completed scientifically
until it offers metaphysical knowledge as knowledge of being qua Nature. His
willingness to confront the categorial systems of Kant and Fichte with that Nature in
philosophical experiment is unparalleled amongst his contemporaries.463 That risk is
expressed as early as 1795, in the Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus. This work
considers both systems valuable, but ultimately leaves no doubt about which possesses
the more salutary methodology:
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Gedächtniskram, tote Spekulation, oder Analyse abstrakter Begriffe ertötet ist – wer, wissenschaftlich –
oder gesellschaftlich – verdorbene Menschen – der menschlichen Natur (so reich, so tief, so kraftvoll in
sich selbst) zum Maßstab aufdringen? Jenes Vermögen der Anschauung zu üben, muß der erste Zweck
jeder Erziehung sein. Denn sie ist das, was den Menschen zum Menschen macht. Keinem Menschen, die
Blinden ausgenommen, kann man absprechen, daß er sieht. Aber daß er mit Bewußtsein anschaue, dazu
gehört ein freier Sinn und ein geistiges Organ, das so vielen versagt ist.” (Schelling, Ideen, p. 121;
emphasis in original.) As Schelling goes on to point out, intuition is for him only possible on the basis of
real opposition within cognition, on the basis of an original contradiction in self-consciousness. Because
self-consciousness has an intuitive register, its deepest form provides the hidden organ Schelling posits to
answer Kant.
462
This will, of course, be the basis of Hegel’s charge of indifferentiability in Schelling’s system.
Difference is the result of negativity, and negativity, for Hegel, is only in the concept. Schelling clearly
posits negativity in the differentiation of types of intuition. Hegel’s charge thus looks like a repetition of
Herder’s against Spinoza, Schelling’s against Herder, and what will ultimately be Marx’s against
Feuerbach: what legitimates our conception of differentiation in any monist system? In one sense, Hegel’s
concept-dialectic is simply an answer to this question.
463
This is perhaps most clearly expressed in the famous introduction to the Entwurf (written after the
completion of the text, and with Goethe’s collaboration): “Jedes Experiment ist eine Frage an die Natur, auf
welche zu antworten sie gezwungen wird. Aber jede Frage enthält ein verstecktes Urteil a priori; jedes
Experiment, das Experiment ist, ist Prophezeiung; das Experimentiren selbst eine Hervorbringung der
Erscheinungen.” (Schelling, Entwurf (Einleitung), p. 9.) This characterization of scientific experiment is
reflexively true of Schelling’s philosophical style.
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Nichts scheint mir auffallender zu beweisen, wie wenig der größere Theil bis jetzt den
Geist der Kritik der reinen Vernunft gefaßt hat, als jener beinahe allgemeine Glaube, daß
die Kritik der reinen Vernunft nur Einem Systeme angehöre, da doch gerade das
Eigenthümliche einer Vernunftkritik das sein muß, sein System ausschliesend zu
begünstigen, sondern vielmehr den Kanon für sie alle entweder wirklich aufzustellen,
oder wenigstens vorzubereiten. Zu einem Kanon aller Systeme aber gehört nun freilich
als nothwendiger Tehil auch die allgemeine Methodologie: aber trauriger kann einem
solchem [sic] Werk wohl nichts wiederfahren, als wenn man die Methodologie, die es für
alle Systeme aufstellt, selbst für das System nimmt.464

This notion of canonicity for the system of Critique re-names not the canon of the
understanding, but the Disziplin that Kant attributed to his methodology. As we have
seen, Kant turned that discipline into a canonical pedagogy, “disciplining” systems after
1785 that did not respect the central Critical insight. Here Schelling imagines something
similar, but marks a certain space for less polemical interactions between systems.
Criticism provides the measure of (all) other systems, but only methodologically. The
process of amalgamating the various systems with the Critical methodology would be
more than merely identification and exclusion. Indeed, what we have seen in the
Naturphilosophie—the careful reading for philosophical content of a broad spectrum of
natural scientists, including Kielmeyer and Blumenbach prominently—is something like
an elaboration of this program.465
If, in the passage quoted above, there is nevertheless some commitment to the
“canon of the understanding” argument in Kant—the delimitation of claims to
correspondence not with putative objects but with the faculties which first make those
objects possible—this Kantian strain in Schelling is shifted backwards, as it were, into
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Schelling, Briefe über Dogmatismus und Krticismus, ed. Otto Braun (Leipzig: Meiner, 1914),
p. 31; emphasis in original.
465
In one sense, this is of course true of Kant, too. But Schelling seems prepared to re-formulate his
methodology on the basis of encounters with differing systems, something I think Kant did not do during
the Critical period. The weakest way of reading this problematic is that we find the young Schelling in the
1790s in similar situation, in terms of systematic exposition, as we find Kant in the 1760s: still gathering
both scientific knowledge and in the middle of elaborating a method. Even if that is so, the two thinkers
will have looked different on the score of systemic openness as the 19th century approached.
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the metaphorological register of the organon by 1800, in the StI. And that recuperation of
the organon in a canonical post-Kantian context combined with the organs of the
Naturphilosophie to allow for a second articulation, after Hölderlin’s, of organology.
Organology made retroactive use of natural science in the service of a new metaphysics.
Through an exploration of intellectual intuition and the non-fit between world and microworld of the artwork, that metaphysics opened onto a doctrine of subtle intervention in
Nature, and ultimately onto a metapolitics of the pure deed.
The introduction to the StI informs us that Schelling is looking for an organ of
transcendental philosophy. The task of the StI (on which more in a moment) is in need of
an instrument. In the final account, Schelling will state clearly that this organ is also itself
in need of an organon, a word he might well have used in the introductory materials to
any system. Instead, however, he allows the biological overtone to hover over his
considerations of consciousness—we will see that this is hardly an accident. What, then,
is this organ, and what is its organon?
The System begins from the premise that knowledge is the combination of a
subjective and an objective element. Knowledge (Wissen) must be of something (its
object); knowledge implies a knower (its subject). The mechanism that causes the
correspondence—or sometimes “combination”—between the two elements is the famous
third (as I indicated above) which, in its various systemic formulations, had been the
leading theoretical question after Kant. Reinhold and Fichte had reduced this third to a
single apparatus (representation; absolute self-identity), trying to solve the Kantian
epigenesis-problem by deducing experience from a single principle. As Manfred Frank
has shown, by the time Fichte had arrived in Jena in 1794, a critique of this single-
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principle deductive form for philosophy was already well underway.466 Schelling’s
contribution—on view in various ways and emerging piecemeal through his systems—
was a combination of this foundational effort with a profound respect for the open texture
of Criticism (the KdrV’s subordinate motto is “empirical realism”).
If there was to be a “single third,” it would have to be available in some cognitive
form. Schelling agreed with Fichte that this principle could not be a mere element of
empirical consciousness, but also adhered to Kant’s distinction between the
“transcendent” (exceeding the bounds of cognition) and the “transcendental” (providing
the conditions of that cognition). He thus writes that “… Philosophie [ist eine]
fortgehende Geschichte des Selbstbewußtseins, für welche das in der Erfahrung
Niedergelegte nur gleichsam als Dokument und Denkmal dient…”467 The latter point is
emphasized as a re-formulation of Kant’s search for that within experience which does
not stem from experience.468 The former point—that the system of idealism is a history of
self-consciousness—opens already a distinctive Schellingian starting-point in this
constellation. True, Fichte had tried to provide a genetic account of self-consciousness,
one which narrates the emergence of logic from the ground of the ability to identify the
self (“A=A” is derived from “I=I”). And as we shall see, the figure of that ground was
anything but simple identity. Yet Schelling’s suggestion that a “running history” of selfconsciousness is the generic basis of transcendental philosophy suggests both that the
structure of self-identification is at least partly alterable or in development, and that the
System itself will be the fulcrum of that alteration. Self-consciousness might take
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Frank, Philosophical Foundations, pp. 23-39.
I cite F. W. J. Schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus (Meiner: Hamburg, 2000), with the
pages of the Originalausgabe given there, here p. VIII.
468
KdrV B1.
467
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different forms, and its true determination might be given first in the activity of the
philosopher (or of his reader). This conceptual attitude (which differs, I think, from
Fichte’s, at least up to 1800469) is textually spread over a series of organs.
A single but historical third, as the mechanism for producing correspondence
between subjective and objective, is needed. The duality (subject and object) in each
judgment allows, however, for two approaches to every cognitive act. If we start with the
object—as we have seen above—we have Naturphilosophie, the goal of which is to prove
idealism, to demonstrate consciousness in Nature. The perspective that starts with the
subjective element of the judgment is that of Transzendentalphilosophie. Its task will
have to be the proof of the reality of consciousness. But since all knowledge—including
self-knowledge—is divided into subject and object, transcendental philosophy will be
that knowledge where the subject becomes its own object. Thus the proper realm of
transcendental philosophy is only the space between judgments and our reflection on
those judgments. All content must be considered only from within this perspective—for
transcendental philosophy, the I is methodologically absolute. Following an invitation
from Fichte, Schelling brackets any possible contribution from the objects of knowledge
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The break between Schelling and Fichte is difficult to pinpoint. See Beiser, German Idealism, pp. 491506. By 1801, Schelling would claim the parity of subject and object in the absolute, something Fichte
could not abide. There may also be a difference—perhaps unnoticed by the two thinkers—in the points
about history and reflexive activity. By 1797/98, Fichte was interested in philosophical activity’s
pedagogical action on the subject. Yet it seems doubtful he could have accepted the risk Schelling
proposed, the philosophical pedagogy of the object (Nature). After his move from Jena in 1800, Fichte
seems to have gone a different path, far deeper into the hermetic subjective pedagogy of philosophy,
holding salons in Berlin as experiences for the philosophically interested among the university and social
elites. In his Bestimmung des Menschen, he introduces the Romantic usage: “D[er] G[eist] Du hast sonach
gleichsam ein Organ, das Bewusstseyn selbst, womit du deine Affection fassest? Ich. Ja.” (Johann Gottlieb
Fichtes sämmtliche Werke. Band 2, Berlin 1845/1846, p. 214) Perhaps, then, organ is the locus of an
expanding methodological difference between Schelling and Fichte, one which persists beyond Fichte’s
adoption of the term from his younger colleague. Fichte’s earlier use of the distinction “higher/lower”
organ, in his Grundlage des Naturrechts (1797), will be treated in chapter IV of the present study, as part
of the lexical background of Novalis’s organology. For Hölderlin’s reception of the Grundlage (which is
not intimately tied to his organology, so far as I can tell), see Violetta Waibel, “Hölderlins Rezeption von
Fichtes “Grundlage des Naturrechts,” Hölderlin-Jarhbuch 30 (1996/97), pp. 146-72.
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to inquire, initially, into knowledge as object.470 For this investigation, there can be no
question of “external” objects. There can be only the conscious activity of object-oriented
reflection (whether the object is a “thing” or consciousness itself) and, Schelling now
continues, an unconscious activity that constructs and construes the object-world. Since,
within the frame of judgmental knowledge, there is only the subject and the object—and
since these are merely the representing and the represented—the two activities cannot be
attributed to an “outside” and an “inside,” but only to differing levels of awareness. Thus
the apparent externality of the object-world is, for transcendental philosophy, merely the
unconscious content of the represented. Two activities are postulated, corresponding to
two apparent worlds—the conscious and the unconscious, the subject and the object. The
StI’s perspective is absolutely subjective, but is open to its own completion in the
absolutely objective response from Naturphilosophie. The object of the system is thus the
subject, and its organ “der innere Sinn.” For Kant, the inner sense is merely that which
occurs only in time, not in both time and space. It is the locus of self-reflection, but is not
otherwise privileged. The empirical self is presented there to the understanding, but this
makes no difference to the latter’s rules (its canon). For Schelling, following Fichte, there
is more to it than that. The inner sense is the locus of coincidence of subject and object.
There are still two selves, or more precisely, there is the self-intuiting-itself (subject) and
the self-intuited-as-itself (subject as object). This structure is called I or selfconsciousness, and its re-production (and ultimately objectification) is the task of the StI.
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This is an excellent example of the Romantic approach to Kant. Where Kant had also sought for
internally valid forms of Reason (as the faculty that reflects on and unifies the judgments of the
understanding)—and even derived the branches of special metaphysics from them—Schelling treats the
mereological complex of judgment as continuous with Reason, bracketing Kant’s commitment to contentproblems in the Transcendental Aesthetic (division of outer and inner sense) and the Transcendental
Analytic (causation and object-formation). See pp. 86 ff. in chapter I above for my analysis of Kant’s
doctrine of judgment with respect to the organological metaphor.
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Schelling compares the inner sense—as the organ of philosophy—to the inner sense of
Kant’s mathematician. For Kant, mathematical objects are constructed fully (but
according to the rules of the a priori forms of intuition)—we make, but not arbitrarily,
the triangle with which we will perform our geometrical proofs. As the Methodenlehre in
the KdrV had had it, we cannot construct the object-world (we can only make it possible
in its form). Schelling points in the opposite direction: the object of the transcendental
philosopher (the subject) is already the constructive activity itself. How far down that
construction goes is left an open question for philosophy, but absolute for the StI. The
unconscious construction of phenomenal objects is in turn the object of the StI—the
organ of philosophy is the intuited activity, on a scale of consciousness from zero
(object) to complete (self-consciousness). Schelling can thus write (and what follows in
the present section will be devoted to an analysis of this central statement):
Die objective Welt ist nur die ursprüngliche, noch bewußtlose Poesie des Geistes; das
allgemeine Organon der Philosophie … die Philosophie der Kunst.471

The statement is very precise, despite its poeticizing sheen. I will summarize the
argument that Schelling will make over the course of his exposition, and then treat it in
detail. What produces the organon is a specific approach to the philosophy of art that
houses deep consequences for the metaphysics suggested by the very phrase “general
organon of philosophy.” Philosophy itself will turn out to need an organ, one which, in
its operation, is the very “poetry of the spirit” in turn serving as the organon. The organ
of philosophy—which will shortly be named “intellectual intuition”—is thus made
concrete only in the exposition of the system. The organ can serve as organon only in the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Schelling, System, p. 19; emphasis in original. And again, p. 21, emphasis in original: “Der eigentliche
Sinn, mit dem diese Art der Philosophie augefaßt werden muß, ist also der ästhetische, und eben darum die
Philosophie der Kunts das wahre Organon der Philosophie.”
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guise of self-objectification in an aesthetic product. Art is, for Schelling, the
objectification of infinitely productive rules. In one sense, these rules must be reproduced (mimesis). In another, they focus our attention on the moment where there can
be no mimesis (the absolute contradiction of the subject as conscious and as
unconscious). The reality of the poetry of the spirit must be proven in aesthetic cognition,
crystallized in an art object, and exhibited as an invitation to the experience of another
subject’s internal cognitive contradiction. This exhibition then serves as the organon for
all philosophy, as a general and unique way of operationalizing its organ (intellectual
intuition). It also suggests, as we will now see, that the self-objectification offers a
flexibility in the mimetic order that must border on ontological freedom, or the ability to
alter the world metaphysically.
The complex self-intuiting-itself/self-as-intuited circumscribes the entirety of
transcendental idealism. This is why Schelling writes that “die intellektuelle Anschauung
ist das Organ allen transcendentalen Denkens.”472 The self’s self-grasping cannot be of
the order of an empirical judgment—it does not combine an empirical intuition and a
concept. In fact, one of the activities it self-perceives is just that: judgment. The ability to
attend to the emergence of judgments cannot itself be simply one more judgment. This
line of thought, which is taken from Fichte, is explained particularly clearly by the latter.
For every object of consciousness, there must be a subject. If this holds, however, for
self-consciousness, we confront an infinite regress of self-subjects and self-objects, none
of which can be called I in the sense of self-identification as both conscious and selfconscious. Because this requirement—that object-reference and subject-reflection should
occur simultaneously in order to make the notion of I legible at all—cannot be grounded
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by the endless separations of subjects from subject-objects, it must take on recursive
immediacy. The self must know itself to know objects and itself simultaneously,473 and it
must do that in an immediate sense.474 Immediate knowledge, Fichte tells us, is called
“intuition.” Since this intuition is clearly not sensible, it must be intellectual intuition (a
decision clearly not as innocent as its terminological derivation).
This structure remains essentially unchanged for the Schelling of the StI. Indeed,
as he dubs this structure the organ of philosophy, he re-iterates the analogy to Kant’s
geometer. Intellectual intuition is the condition of possibility for transcendental
philosophy, as the a priori forms of intuition are for the mathematician.475 And just as the
coordinates of ideal space are a postulate for the Euclidean geometer, intellectual
intuition is a postulate for transcendental philosophy. It fulfills the condition—Schelling
is simply interpreting Fichte—that the point of origin of speculation must be the point of
indifference or co-emergence of form and content, of logic and object.476
If Schelling differs from Fichte here, then it is in subtle textual inflections that
allow his conclusion to raise this intellectual intuition to consciousness—Fichte nowhere
implies that this is really possible—in aesthetic intuition. Those inflections are
terminological borrowings from the Naturphilosophie (especially Produkt, Produzieren,
and even the apparently Fichtean Tätigkeit). Thus, when Schelling writes that “das Ich ist
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Recursive immediacy is my gloss on Fichte’s statement that “das Ich setzt sich als setzend.” The point is
that knowledge of objects and knowledge of the self must be not only combined but also immediately
identified as the self. The minimum requirement for self-consciousness thus looks something like “I know
that I am the one thinking of that object and producing the thought of that object.”
474
This summary is taken from a few comparable passages in Fichte’s writings in 1797/98. See Fichte,
Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftlehre (1797/98), ed. Peter Baumanns (Hamburg: Meiner,
1984), and the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo 1798/99, ed. Erich Fuchs (Hamburg: Meiner, 1994).
Schelling makes reference (System, p. 52) to the “second introduction” in the former volume, which I have
also made use of here, but which is generally less clear than the other expositions.
475
Schelling, System, p. 52.
476
“… jene Anschauung ist es, was im transzendentalen Denken an die Stelle der objektiven Welt tritt und
gleichsam den Flug der Spekulation trägt.” (Schelling, System, p. 51.)
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nichts anderes als ein sich selbst zum Objekt werdendes Produzierien, d.h. ein
intellectuelles Anschauen,” the stakes of the terminological choices are very high. For
Schelling, the activity implied by werdend—self-objectification through systematic
philosophizing—is just as essential as the recursive immediacy at the basis of the
conception. That immediacy is anything but certain on the basis of Fichte’s argument.
The organ of philosophy must be operationalized, it must be recognized as a Produzieren.
All that remains is to find the proper cognitive medium for the realization of that
recursive immediacy, or of the conscious intuition of the self.
That medium is, of course, the philosophy of art. It is of the utmost importance
not to confuse art and the philosophy of art. Just as with Hölderlin, we had to be careful
to distinguish theoretical and generic discourses from the activities of artistic production
and reception, so with Schelling we must be careful not to commit the error of making
“art” the organ of philosophy tout court. Not every human must be a genius in order to be
human, for Schelling; but every human must and can participate in the ontological selfrealization of the Poesie des Geistes.
Intellectual intuition is the organ of philosophy; aesthetic intuition is intellectual
intuition become objective; and the philosophy of art is therefore “das einzig wahre und
ewige Organon zugleich und Dokument der Philosophie…”477 This famous statement
does more than make aesthetic judgments constitutive. As Dieter Jähnig has shown, it
makes aesthetics constitutive for philosophy.478 It makes beauty a factor—or rather a
keystone—in system-building. We should not hurry to conclude that this is an
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Schelling, System, p. 475.
While other philosophies treat art as an object (aesthetics), “als “Organon” jedoch, als Mittel ihrer
Ausübung, ware die Kunst nicht nur ein Gegenstand, sondern ein Bestandteil der Philosophie.” (Dieter
Jähnig, Schelling. Die Kunst in der Philosophie; erster Band: Schellings Begründung von Natur und
Geschichte (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1966), p. 11.)
478
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“aestheticization” of philosophy—it certainly is not that in terms of exposition, as any
reader of the StI can attest. It is not that systematically, either: the philosophy of art—the
reflective medium of art-reception—is the organon, not artworks or art-production. Art is
the object of that organon, that is, it is the source of the rule-book for metaphysics, not
the book itself. Artistic production and artworks allow the StI to link self-consciousness
and object-consciousness into fully conscious, recursively immediate self-recognition in
the philosophy of art. The organon operationalizes the organ—art makes the structure of
the I manifest, objective, in short: cognitively available.
If we return to the claim that the history of self-consciousness (the StI) makes use
of the precipitate of experience as a document, we can see, in a first step, why Schelling
adds the mysterious ellipsis zugleich und Dokument to the famous phrase above. The
philosophy of art will be the organon of metaphysics, concretizing (because making
operate) the self’s intellectual intuition. In doing this, it will serve not merely as the most
general rule for philosophy, but also—as it had been for the pre-critical Kant—as the
singular, objective evidence, the documentation a posteriori (but only for the I) of that
very foundation. The organon—art for the I, or philosophy as reflective of art as
cognitive and material process—is the rule; the document is the preserved material
evidence. Once the human makes art (really, once techne is introduced into the order of
things), the world is fundamentally human—organological.
The organ is intellectual intuition, but is not concrete until it is objectivized (the
goal of the entire system) in aesthetic intuition. Schelling re-iterates his judgment that an
absolute identity of subject and object is an intellectual intuition, and the “Organ aller
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Philosophie.”479 This organ is the means by which the first four parts of the System
(principle and deduction of idealism, system of theoretical philosophy, system of
practical philosophy, and teleology) are established. The conscious and unconscious
activities of the I are first deduced from the principle of self-consciousness, and then
opposed in theory (which examines the unconscious activity as its explicit content) and
practice (which takes the conscious activity as its infinite task). Repeating the framework
of the KdU in the space of about thirty pages, Schelling turns to teleology as the first
possibility of their conscious unification. The opposing tendencies—unconscious, objectconstituting activity as the establishment of brute externality, and conscious, meaningmaking activity as conferring conceptual teloi on that matter—combine to imply an
awareness of the unity of the two activities. The production of Nature can be shown to be
the result of unity the I’s opposed activities. But it can only be shown to be this—it
cannot be immediately so known, or intuited.480
For that we must have recourse to art. The desideratum is “Identität des Bewußten
und Bewußtlosen im Ich, und Bewußtsein dieser Identität.”481 The world—das
Bewußtlose—had been the poetry of spirit. Schelling now separates out Poesie from
Kunst. The general activity of material production does not always contain the regulated
blending of form and content that specifies art. Indeed, not any such combination can
count for Schelling as art. Art must depict an infinite conflict (real opposition) finitely.
The character of the work of art is the finite presentation of infinite contradiction. Poesie
is the formation of a (micro-) world, an integration of the general and the particular
revelatory of the rule of their harmony (which here is infinite conflict or real opposition).
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Schelling, System, p. 472.
Schelling, System, pp. 445-51.
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Schelling, System, p. 452. This, it seems to me, is where Schelling departs from Fichte.
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The most basic contradiction, however, is that between conscious and unconscious
activity in the I. Thus, art is the objectification of the self at its most primitive. It is the
possibility of consciousness of the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness. The
world is populated—haunted—by infinite reconciliation, spiritual satisfaction in material
form. This makes the genius for aesthetics what the I is for philosophy.482 That means
nothing less, of course, than that the genius is the organ of the philosophy of art, itself the
organon of philosophy. The micro-world—seemingly mimetic—that the genius fashions
poetically is actually revelatory of the infinite contradictory unity of the I. But it is so
revelatory only through the organon. The instruments of philosophy—the I and the
genius, constituting the world and the micro-world qua work of art—are united only for
the I, that is, in the mutual support of transcendental philosophy and aesthetics. The
organon for metaphysics unites the general world-activity of the I with the particular
world freely created by the genius. The organon is the link not merely between general
and particular, but between general and particular organs. Because those organs make
worlds, the organon is a candidate for the metaphysical task as such: the insight into the
relation between encapsulated orders of rules and their things.
Let us return to the problem of the phusis-techne analogy: is it certain that, for
Schelling, there is a fit between those general and particular worlds? I will argue that
there is not, but that this consequence is left partly unexplained in the StI. (I will go on to
argue below that the first steps towards a philosophy of freedom are then marked by this
unresolved question, and transition his organology into an ontologically innovative
register.)
Schelling rejects the notion of a Nachahmung der Natur in the following terms:
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Es erhellt daraus von selbst, was von der Nachahmung der natur als Prinzip der Kunst zu
halten sei, da, weit entfernt, daß die bloß zufällig schöne Natur der Kunst die Regel gebe,
vielmehr, was die Kunst in ihrer Vollkommenheit hervorbringt, Prinzip und Norm für die
Beurteilung der Naturschönheit ist.483

The unities of Nature—so perfect as they were in the Naturphilosophie—cannot serve,
for the transcendental philosopher in collusion with the philosopher of art, as the rule for
artistic beauty. That beauty must make the infinite conflict not between Nature and its
organs but that between self and world, between conscious and unconscious, explicit.
That beauty is thus not a reflection of the rules of any nature. No order of things legislates
art. Indeed, it is even suggested that the observation of nature (at least from an aesthetic
standpoint) is ruled over by the all-too-human definition of beauty given here.484 It is not
far from that determination to the possibility that the micro-world of the work of art could
have ontologically innovative capabilities. But Schelling does not go the same path as
Hölderlin, who had developed a theory of tragedy to develop this cabability. Here, he
leaves this question pregnantly open—he will answer it in the third and final phase of his
organology.
Before I leave the StI behind, let me simply note that one of the more hermetic
strains in the text points us in the indicated direction. Schelling writes of the genius’s
activity as being under the mark of a dunkle Gewalt, a Schicksal. The verb zurückstrahlen
occurs several times.485 Recall Blumenberg’s tracing of the collapse of the phusis-techne
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Schelling, System, p. 467.
Hegel would systematize this point is his Lectures on Aesthetics.
485
e.g.: “Dieses Unbekannte aber, was hier die objective und die bewußte Thätigkeit in unerwartete
Harmonie setzt, ist nichts anders, als jenes Absolute, welches den allgemeinen Grund der prästabilirten
Harmonie zweischen dem Bewußten und dem Bewußtlosen enthält. Wird also jenes Absolute reflectirt aus
dem Product, so wird es der Intelligenz erscheinen, als Etwas, das über ihr ist, un was selbst entgegen der
Freiheit zu dem, was mit Bewußtseyn und Absicht begonnen war, das Absichtslose hinzubringt.
Dieses unveränderlich Identische, was zu keinem Bewußtseyn gelangen kann, und nur aus dem
Product widerstrahlt, ist für das Producirende eben das, was für das Handelnde das Schicksal ist, d.h. Eine
dunkle unbekannte Gewalt, die zu dem Stückwerk der Freyheit das Vollendete, oder
das Objective hinzubringt, und wie jene Macht, welche durch unser freyes Handeln ohne unser Wissen, und
484
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analogy. With reference to Kant—but here it looks like the hidden citation may be to
Schelling—Blumenberg writes that, when phusis-techne is finally swept aside:
Während der Mensch ganz dem hingegeben scheint, sich in der metaphysischen Tätigkeit
der Kunst seiner originären Potenz zu vergewissern, stellt sich unvermutet im
geschaffenen eine Ahnung des Immer-schon-da-Seienden ein, al ob es ein Produkt der
bloßen Natur sei.486

The presentiment (Ahnung) intimated here—the return of being in the advanced artificial
systems of techne and Kunst—points to Schelling (Potenz) but misses the mark. What
flows back phenomenally is not a being suspected of atavism, but the intuition of a whole
now greater than being, because in dialectical tension with an I with which it now forms
an organological (and literally beautiful) whole. In Blumenberg’s terms, we might call
that the totality of the lifeworld. For Schelling, it is the I in developmental agon with its
worlds. It is the flexible metaphysics that conflates the organon of metaphysics with a
multitude of developing organs. The constructed world’s possible non-fit with the
putative “real” world is no longer the point of this metaphysics, which passes from
construction into the technological metaphysics of alteration—intervention into reality in
its historical unfolding. The suggestion that we could make the world entirely anew using
philosophical tools was an invitation to find or, if necessary, invent those tools. The
attraction of that result of post-Kantian metaphysical efforts defined the task for
Schelling—as it did for his compatriots—as the discovery of an indifference-point
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selbst wider unsern Willen nichtvorgestellte Zwecke realisirt, Schicksal genannt wird, so wird
das Unbegreifliche, was ohne Zuthun der Freyheit, und gewissernmaaßen der Freyheit entgegen, in welcher
ewig sich flieht, was in jener Production vereinigt ist, zu dem Bewußten das Objective hinzubringt, mit dem
dunklen Begriff des Genies bezeichnet.” (Schelling, System, pp. 457-58, my emphases excepting Genie in
original)
486
Quoted from ed. Ralph Konersman, Kulturphilosophie (Hamburg: Meiner, 2009), p. 232. See also Hans
Blumenberg, “Nachahmung der Natur. Zur Vorgeschichte des schöpferischen Menschen” in Wirklichkeiten
in denen wir leben (Ditzingen: Phillip Reclam, 1986). The citation (italics, in original) is from Kant, KdU
I, 1, 2 §45, where the point is that the artwork’s integration of general and particular according to its idea
must make it look like a product of nature in order to be successful. Schelling’s point is, of course, the
opposite.
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between metaphysics and politics. Schelling came to the second part of that task only
years later, in Munich in 1809, and with Hegel’s recent betrayal a pressing concern.

The Romantic Metaphysics of Morals, or Schelling vs. Hegel, a View from
Organology

By the time Schelling had moved to Munich in 1806, a significant new discourse
of the organ had emerged. This was the so-called “organology” of Franz Joseph Gall,
popularly known (then as now) under the name phrenology. The famous break between
Schelling and Hegel, with Hegel’s charge in the Phenomenology of Spirit that Schelling’s
absolute (which had also been his own) was a “night in which all cows are black,” can be
profitably read in this discursive light. From the position the young friends had held
together (the absolute idealism of the “identity system”), and in common reaction to the
esotericization of Naturphilosophie, the bitter rivalry between the “negative” and
“positive” philosophies became a matter of the organ’s extensive applicability. And
where Hegel adumbrated his avoidance of organology (for which see chapter V of the
present study), Schelling articulated in the Freedom essay of 1809 a final organological
position that united the electric and ideal, particular and general organs of his earlier
career. I call his final organological synthesis the “Romantic metaphsyics of morals.”
Even as Schelling was producing his Naturphilosophie, however, Gall was
inventing phrenology.487 In 1798, he published a mission-statement of the program he
would exhibit and demonstrate across Europe (especially in Vienna and Paris) in the
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See Hagner, Homo cerebralis, p. 89/306 for a differentiation of Gall’s doctrine from the popular image
of phrenology. The term “phrenology” certainly occurs earlier than 1815, however, for example in the
Phenomenology of Spirit.
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coming decades. This writing was published in Wieland’s Neuer teutscher Merkur.488 In
a sense, Gall’s “organology”489 is everything but mythologizing—it is opposed to
Romantic scientific efforts in their very roots. It rejects all metaphysics in science, and
makes only apologetic efforts to respond to ethical concerns. If organs are the purely
material loci of various capacities (Fähigkeiten) and tendencies (Neigungen), then the
essay’s title makes clear its interest: Verrichtungen. But where Schelling and the forcesystem-theorists had been interested in Verrichtung as a quasi-philosophical term, Gall
employs it in a literal sense restricted to “execution.” As Hagner points out, it is no longer
the “soul” that has its seat in the brain—it is behavior. Organs are the material basis of
observable capacities and tendencies. In the attempt to reduce the problem of the organ to
brain-functions, Gall nevertheless has to pay conceptual tribute to the Aristotelian
complex. He writes that the eye does not see, the ear does not hear: the brain’s organs and
the brain as organ execute those functions:
Man irrt, wenn man glaubt, das Auge sieht, das Ohr hört u.s.w. Jedes äußerliche
Sinnenwerkzeug steht durch seine Nerven in Verbindung mit dem Hirn, wo beim Anfange
des Nerven eine angemessene Hirnmasse das eigentliche innerliche Organ dieser
Sinnesverrichtung ausmacht. Sey das Ohr das Auge selbst noch so gesund, sey sogar der
Sehnerve unverletzt; wenn dass innerliche Organ krank oder zerstöhrt ist, so nützen Auge
und Sehnerve nichts mehr. Folglich haben auch die äußerlichen Sinnenwerkzeuge ihre
Organ im Hirn, und diese äußern Werkzeuge sind nur das Mittel, wodurch ihre innerlichen
Organe mit den äußerlichen Gegenständen in Verbindung oder in Gegenwirkung gesetzt
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Franz Joseph Gall, Schreiben über seinen bereits geendigten Prodromus über die Verrichtungen des
Gehirns der Menschen und der Their, an Herrn Jos. Fr. Von Retzer Neuer teutscher Merkur 1798 (3), pp.
311-332.
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Hagner uses this term because Gall conceives of the brain (for the first time) as a complex series of
organs, thus anticipating both localization-theory and the “cerebralization” of the human: "Erst die
Verabschiedung des homme sensible in Galls Ansatz macht den Platz für eine Cerebralisierung frei. Die
Sinnesqualitäten spielen bei Gall nicht mehr die notwendigerweise dominierende Rolle bei der psychischen
Formierung des Menschen. Damit wird das wissenschaftliche Interesse an der Funktion der Sinnesorgane -ursprünglich durch den Sensualismus erheblich befördert -- zwar nicht eingeschränkt, erhält jedoch durch
den unabhängigen Blick auf das Gehirn ein Komplement, das als Vehikel für die Neuordnung des Wissen
vom Menschen dient. Das Gehirn ist jetzt zum ersten Mal nicht mehr bloß das Medium zwischen Seele und
Sinnesorganen, sondern ein Organ, das aus unterschiedlichen und gleichtwertigen Elementen besteht."
(Hagner, Homo cerebralis, pp. 93-94) Hagner’s implicit argument that Gall and the Romantic physiologists
were bitterly opposed to each other in method points to the difference between Gall’s organ-doctrine and
what I am calling Romantic organology.!
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werden.490

Organs, for the localization theory that leads to phrenology, are internal to the brain, itself
an organ. Werkzeug denotes a mere instrument—the eye, the ear, the vehicle of
transmission. The organs of the brain, as material as they are meant to be, must be
internal and separated from the mere instruments of phenomenal collection. They thus
perch in a sphere of potentiality, in true Aristotelian style, mediating between brute
perception (capacity) and behavior (tendency). Indeed, Fähigkeit and Neigung describe
just the potentialities the organs serve to communicate for any possible actuality. The
system is less materialized—though it certainly includes a material moment, as do the
other organological systems—than it is behavioralized, socialized.
The materialist moment of phrenology lay not in its organ-doctrine but in its
inference from brain’s organs to skull’s form.491 Organs might make up the potential
spheres of perception as of action, but the social program of Gall’s doctrine was not
mistaken in developing a social and criminological hermeneutics from the skull. The
identification of organs as possibilities of behavior does not imply, as Gall pleaded with
the public to understand, the necessity of those behaviors.492 Yet the doctrine of the
skull’s determination by the brain’s organs—the skull as expression—was, for Hegel as
for Schelling, philosophically unfounded. Their reactions to Gall—placed in the context
of their own mythologizing efforts and those of their contemporaries—present us with a
first separation of organology and experimental science. Gall’s silence on philosophy is
discursively different from the varying positions surrounding Kant on the conflict of the
faculties. Silence can emerge only from a position of power, in Gall’s case not the power
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Gall, Verrichtungen, pp. 320-21.
Gall, Verrichtungen, pp. 322-23.
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See Hagner, Homo cerebralis, pp. 99 ff.
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of institutional and ideological backing, but that of a sense of methodological superiority.
Organology and science began to miscommunicate when their premises are taken for
granted. Success would be the result, not the philosophical grounding, of this science.
Gall visited Munich in 1807 to give a lecture at the Bavarian Academy of the
Sciences.493 Schelling responded with a short article, “Einiges über die Schädellehre,”
where he questions the skull’s meaning as fixed: “Welche babylonische Verwirrung
könnte z.B. entstehn, wenn das Organ des Dichters zuerst an Alringer aufgefunden ware,
oder das Feldherrn-Organ bei General Mack, und dann etwa bei Schiller und Massena
darnach aufgesucht würde; da müsste man sich doch nach ganz andern Schädelhöhen
umsehen.”494 The objection is not ethical, but epistemological: the Babel of organs which
would result from their fixity would not merely contradict human freedom, but behaviors
and identities would either lose connection to the system, or the skull would have to
transform in real time with the vicissitudes of human behavior. By 1807, Schelling had
little even polemical ink to spill on the systems he took himself to have so thoroughly
refuted in the 1790s.
Not so Hegel. Hegel used the platform of the Phenomenology of Spirit (PhdG) to
attack and categorize systems of spirit-matter expression in his chapter on “observing
reason” (beobachtende Vernunft). Consciousness (Bewusstsein) has constituted objects,
and self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) has emerged through the famous lordshipbondage relation. Reason has emerged as the recursive immediacy of object- and selfconsciousnesses. Reason, for Hegel, will have to come to realize itself, but proceeds first
along a detour of re-determining objects in the social world of self-consciousnesses.
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Science exists only in this complex, does its observational work at a specific level of selfrealization of spirit, an uneven attempt to determine the world lawfully from the
standpoint of reason’s constitutive attempt to satisfy the foundational dissatisfaction of
self-consciousness. Could there be an organ of reason for Hegel?
Beobachtende Vernunft conceives of an organ which does not occur elsewhere in
the system. This organ is clearly borrowed from Gall, and yet Hegel contributes a
systematic determination of it that anticipates his later objections to organology (see
chapter V of this study, on Goethe and Hegel). Hegel considers two doctrines of
expression in the PhdG: Lavater’s physiognomy and Gall’s phrenology. Organ serves in
the latter system to name the mechanism which potentializes a sphere of behavior, but
Hegel correctly observes that organ should also be the term for the mechanism of
expression itself. That which makes the skull’s rises and valleys an expression of the
brain’s functions should be the organ. Hegel’s use, borrowed as it is from Gall, thus relies
textually on Romantic organology, using the latter to interrupt the flow of phrenological
argument. Organs are here taken not merely as mechanism—this would reintroduce the
Aristotelian problem which Gall already has—but are projections from the specific
standpoint of observing reason. Indeed, they are quasi-categorical—they are bastard
categories.
The mistakes of physiognomy are apparent. Hegel applies “organ” (from Gall and
Schelling) to Lavater’s discipline, but then strips its use from his discussion of
phrenology.495 “Expression” is the wrong category to determine the relation between the
material and the spiritual in both cases, but facial formation is potentially organ-based,
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“Der Schädelknochen ist kein Organ der Tätigkeit, noch auch eine sprechende Bewegung.” (G. F. W.
Hegel, Werke in 20 Bänden. Band 3. Die Phänomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1986). I
cite as: Hegel, PhdG, p. 251.)
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while phrenology emphasizes the dead thing, the “bone” identified with spirit. Hegel does
not reject “expression” because he adheres to a doctrine of pre-established harmony496
(“expression” is, after all, a version of the influxus-claim), but because the PhdG tracks
the self-constitution of spirit through stages of negativity. In the Introduction, Hegel
writes his version of the “stringent Criticism” of Fichte and Schelling: thought can be
taken as a medium or an instrument, but is correctly assessed to be in progressive mutual
constitution with its putative objects. The problem with “expression” is that it takes two
elements of representation and unifies them categorically, without including
categorialization (synthetic conceptual unification) as part of the process. It is certainly
possible to unite representations according to more or less rhetorically convincing
strategies, but that possibility is arbitrary. It is opposed to the true possibilities of the
concept as progressive synthetic constitution of objects.497 Indeed, “observing reason” is
the point in the narrative at which true categories begin to play a role:
Das unglückliche Selbstbewußtsein entäußerte sich seiner Selbständigkeit und rang sein
Fürsichsein zum Dinge heraus. Es kehrte dadurch aus dem Selbstbewußtsein in das
Bewußtsein zurück, d. h. in das Bewußtsein, für welches der Gegenstand ein Sein, ein
Ding ist; - aber dies, was Ding ist, ist das Selbstbewußtsein; es ist also die Einheit des Ich
und des Seins, die Kategorie. Indem der Gegenstand für das Bewußtsein so bestimmt ist,
hat es Vernunft. Das Bewußtsein sowie das Selbstbewußtsein ist an sich eigentlich
Vernunft, aber nur von dem Bewußtsein, dem der Gegenstand als die Kategorie sich
bestimmt hat, kann gesagt werden, daß es Vernunft habe; - hiervon aber ist noch das
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Although, in one sense, observing reason can properly be said to leave pre-established harmony as the
only option from its perspective: “Es bleibt, wenn denn die Beziehung doch stattfinden soll, eine begrifflose
freie prästabilierte Harmonie der entsprechenden Bestimmung beider Seiten übrig und notwendig; denn die
eine soll geistlose Wirklichkeit, bloßes Ding sein.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 252.)
497
“Wird aber die Möglichkeit nicht im Sinne der Möglichkeit des Vorstellens, sondern der inneren
Möglichkeit oder des Begriffs genommen, so ist der Gegenstand eine solche Wirklichkeit, welche reines
Ding und ohne dergleichen Bedeutung ist und sein soll und sie also nur in der Vorstellung haben kann.”
(Hegel, PhdG, p. 254.) Or, in a literary vein: “Man kann sich wohl auch bei einem Schädel, wie Hamlet bei
Yoricks, vielerlei einfallen lassen, aber der Schädelknochen für sich ist ein so gleichgültiges, unbefangenes
Ding, daß an ihm unmittelbar nichts anderes zu sehen und zu meinen ist als nur er selbst; er erinnert wohl
an das Gehirn und seine Bestimmtheit, an Schädel von anderer Formation, aber nicht an eine bewußte
Bewegung, indem er weder Miene und Gebär- de noch etwas an ihm eingedrückt hat, das [als] von einem
bewußten Tun herkommend sich ankündigte; denn er ist diejenige Wirklichkeit, welche an der
Individualität eine solche andere Seite darstellen sollte, die nicht mehr sich in sich reflektierendes Sein,
sondern rein unmittelbares Sein wäre.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 251.)
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Wissen, was Vernunft ist, unterschieden. - Die Kategorie, welche die unmittelbare
Einheit des Seins und des Seinen ist, muß beide Formen durchlaufen, und das
beobachtende Bewußtsein ist eben dieses, dem sie sich in der Form des Seins darstellt.498

The true goal of observing reason is itself as categorizing. This means that the true
(conceptual) object of reason’s observance is its activity—the object of this subject is the
categorizing subject iself.499 Category-work is synthetic in itself for Hegel, because it
discovers lawfulness in an assuredly conceptual sphere. In order to recognize that this
sphere is finally conceptual, the object will have to determine itself as category—as the
immediate self-differentiating synthesis of I and being (the concept)—for reason. In fact,
this is how reason will realize itself (in both senses). At the level of observation, the
representation remains categorically underdetermined. This underdetermination means
that observation grasps its objects—and in the case of physiognomy, itself as subject—as
being. This asserted being can be juxtaposed with other asserted beings, but judgments
that unify these beings remain arbitrarily possible. For conceptual possibility (real
possibility) to come into view, reason must realize itself as self-realizing. But to do this, it
will have to reach a nadir of self-objectifying assertion. It does this in phrenology.
The organ is that which makes the inner outer, the invisible visible, the für sich
the an sich. It is essentially activity:
Dies Äußere macht zuerst nur als Organ das Innere sichtbar oder überhaupt zu einem
Sein für Anderes; denn das Innere, insofern es in dem Organe ist, ist es die Tätigkeit
selbst. Der sprechende Mund, die arbeitende Hand, wenn man will auch noch die Beine
dazu, sind die verwirklichenden und vollbringenden Organe, welche das Tun als Tun
oder das Innere als solches an ihnen haben; die Äußerlichkeit aber, welche es durch sie
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Hegel, PhdG, p. 260; emphasis in original.!
“Die reine Kategorie, welche in der Form des Seins oder der Unmittelbarkeit für das Bewußtsein ist, ist
der noch unvermittelte, nur vorhandene Gegenstand, und das Bewußtsein ein ebenso unvermitteltes
Verhalten. Das Moment jenes unendlichen Urteils ist der Übergang der Unmittelbarkeit in die Vermittlung
oder Negativität. Der vorhandene Gegenstand ist daher als ein negativer bestimmt, das Bewußtsein aber als
Selbstbewußtsein gegen ihn, oder die Kategorie, welche die Form des Seins im Beobachten durchlaufen hat,
ist jetzt in der Form des Fürsichseins gesetzt; das Bewußtsein will sich nicht mehr unmittelbar finden,
sondern durch seine Tätigkeit sich selbst hervorbringen. Es selbst ist sich der Zweck seines Tuns, wie es
ihm im Beobachten nur um die Dinge zu tun war.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 261.)
498
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gewinnt, ist die Tat als eine von dem Individuum abgetrennte Wirklichkeit. Sprache und
Arbeit sind Äußerungen, worin das Individuum nicht mehr an ihm selbst sich behält und
besitzt, sondern das Innere ganz außer sich kommen läßt und dasselbe Anderem
preisgibt.500

The term organ falls away, therefore, as Hegel follows first the physiognomist and then
the phrenologist into a kind of navel-gazing observation. The activity suggested in the
quoted passage is, for Hegel, the first hint of self-materializing observation, of the grasp
of the inner in its passage to the outer, of the body possessed by reason. Thus, the term
disappears in Hegel for two reasons. First, as we descend from organic physiognomy to
the dead bone-matter of phrenology, observing reason stops uses “organic”
terminology.501 Second, even imported into physiognomy, the organ is literal for the
mind construing its own body, but operates for that very mind as a locus of materialized
reflection.502 Insofar as that organ is objectified subjective activity, it remains tinged with
the representational assertion Hegel is objecting to. This is why the term’s use dwindles
as the chapter progresses, and is not re-introduced later in the work.503
Phrenology lowers the already faulty conceptual content of physiognomy, judging
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Hegel, PhdG, p. p. 234.
The middle stage is suggested by physiology: “Das Nervensystem hingegen ist die unmittelbare Ruhe
des Organischen in seiner Bewegung. Die Nerven selbst sind zwar wieder die Organe des schon in seine
Richtung nach außen versenkten Bewußtseins; Gehirn und Rückenmark aber dürfen als die in sich
bleibende - die nicht gegenständliche, die auch nicht hinausgehende - unmittelbare Gegenwart des
Selbstbewußtseins betrachtet werden. Insofern das Moment des Seins, welches dies Organ hat, ein Sein für
Anderes, Dasein ist, ist es totes Sein, nicht mehr Gegenwart des Selbstbewußtseins.” ((Hegel, PhdG, p.
246.) This seems to me to be the only literal use of organ in the PhdG.
502
“Hier aber ist ein Organ verstanden, worin das selbstbewußte Individuum als Extrem gegen seine
eigene, ihm entgegengesetzte Wirklichkeit sich für sich erhält, nicht zugleich nach außen gekehrtes,
sondern in seiner Handlung reflektiertes, und woran die Seite des Seins nicht ein Sein für Anderes ist. In der
physiognomischen Beziehung wird das Organ zwar auch als in sich reflektiertes und das Tun
besprechendes Dasein betrachtet; aber dies Sein ist ein gegenständliches, und das Resultat der physiognomischen Beobachtung ist dieses, daß das Selbstbewußtsein gegen eben diese seine Wirklichkeit als
gegen etwas Gleichgültiges gegenübertritt.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 245.)
503
That is, in one sense, the goal: “Die Beobachtung ist damit dazu gekommen, es auszusprechen, was
unser Begriff von ihr war, daß nämlich die Gewißheit der Vernunft sich selbst als gegenständliche
Wirklichkeit sucht.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 259.) But this goal is meant to be surpassed, and when it is, “organ”
is simply no longer needed.
501
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spirit to be a bone.504 Hegel calls this judgment “infinite”—it is a pure unification of
opposites, and the most extreme form of judgment immanent to the perspective of
respresentation. It is the ultimate false categorial assertion, because it takes the two sides
of representational assertion (the subject and the object) and identifies them.505 It is a
pure, unreflected category. It forces reason to grasp its own activity as such, because it
points into categorial emptiness. For Hegel, the infinite judgment “spirit is a bone” is
simply nothing other than reason’s categorial assertion in itself. This is what makes it the
entry into reason’s self-realization506:
Die beobachtende Vernunft wendet sich also an diese, an den Geist, den als
Allgemeinheit existierenden Begriff oder als Zweck existierenden Zweck; und ihr eigenes
Wesen ist ihr nunmehr der Gegenstand.507

As observing reason prepares to become self-realizing reason, organ becomes a
terminological artifact of the disappearing stage.508 It was a terminological instrument of
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And it is here that Hegel brushes the organ finally aside: “Die Rückenwirbelsäule fällt also, wenn man
will, mit Recht hinweg; und es ist so gut als viele andere naturphilosophische Lehren konstruiert, daß der
Schädel allein zwar nicht die Organe des Geistes enthalte.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 247.)
505
“Der Begriff dieser Vorstellung ist, daß die Vernunft sich alle Dingheit, auch die rein gegenständliche,
selbst ist; sie ist aber dies im Begriffe, oder der Begriff nur ist ihre Wahrheit, und je reiner der Begriff selbst
ist, zu einer desto alberneren Vorstellung sinkt er herab, wenn sein Inhalt nicht als Begriff, sondern als
Vorstellung ist, - wenn das sich selbst aufhebende Urteil nicht mit dem Bewußtsein dieser seiner
Unendlichkeit genommen wird, sondern als ein bleibender Satz, und dessen Subjekt und Prädikat jedes für
sich gelten, das Selbst als Selbst, das Ding als Ding fixiert und doch eins das andere sein soll. - Die Vernunft, wesentlich der Begriff, ist unmittelbar in sich selbst und ihr Gegenteil entzweit, ein Gegensatz, der
eben darum ebenso unmittelbar aufgehoben ist.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 263.)
506
Hegel follows his usual dialectical logic, in which a lack leads to the emergence of a new form of selfconsciousness. He employs Biblical typology in an infantilizing gesture towards Judaism to make his point
by analogy: “Damit scheint aber auch die beobachtende Vernunft in der Tat ihre Spitze erreicht zu haben,
von welcher sie sich selbst verlassen und sich überschlagen muß; denn erst das ganz Schlechte hat die
unmittelbare Notwendigkeit an sich, sich zu verkehren. - Wie von dem jüdischen Volke gesagt werden
kann, daß es gerade darum, weil es unmittelbar vor der Pforte des Heils stehe, das verworfenste sei und
gewesen sei; was es an und für sich sein sollte, diese Selbstwesenheit ist es sich nicht, sondern verlegt sie
jenseits seiner; es macht sich durch diese Entäußerung ein höheres Dasein möglich, wenn es seinen
Gegenstand wieder in sich zurücknehmen könnte, als wenn es innerhalb der Unmittelbarkeit des Seins
stehengeblieben [wäre], weil der Geist um so größer ist, aus je größerem Gegensatze er in sich zurückkehrt;
diesen Gegensatz aber macht er sich in dem Aufheben seiner unmittelbaren Einheit und in der Entäußerung
seines Fürsichseins.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 257.)
507
Hegel, PhdG, p. 258.
508
For example: “Von dieser wandelbaren Sprache geht darum die Beobachtung endlich zum festen Sein
zurück und spricht ihrem Begriffe nach aus, daß die Äußerlichkeit nicht als Organ, auch nicht als Sprache
und Zeichen, sondern als totes Ding die äußere und unmittelbare Wirklichkeit des Geistes sei.” And even
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observing reason, and nothing more. Other than a dismissive—and intentionally vulgar—
joke, Hegel has no more use for organology, Gall’s or Schelling’s:
“Das Tiefe, das der Geist von innen heraus, aber nur bis in sein vorstellendes Bewußtsein
treibt und es in diesem stehenläßt, - und die Unwissenheit dieses Bewußtseins, was das
ist, was es sagt, ist dieselbe Verknüpfung des Hohen und Niedrigen, welche an dem
Lebendigen die Natur in der Verknüpfung des Organs seiner höchsten Vollendung, des
Organs der Zeugung, und des Organs des Pissens naiv ausdrückt. - Das unendliche Urteil
als unendliches wäre die Vollendung des sich selbst erfassenden Lebens; das in der
Vorstellung bleibende Bewußtsein desselben aber verhält sich als Pissen.509

Reason will realize itself in a play of immediacy and mediation that decreasingly requires
materializing terminology. Naturphilosophie is itself brushed aside here, as the
hermeneutics of spirit’s self-becoming. Infinite judgment has a pale reflection in the
contradictory coincidence of the organ of secretion and reproduction—nothing more.
If there is a critique of Romantic organology at work here, then it must dovetail
with Hegel’s critique of Schelling. That is a critique of the formerly-shared “identity
philosophy,” perhaps Schelling’s least organ-laced system.510 As I reconstruct Hegel’s
objection, it runs along parallel terminological and conceptual tracks. The terminological
track is retroactively irrelevant, given the Schellingian objection to Gall’s materialization
arguments. The transcendentalization of the term organ in Hölderlin as in Schelling
shows that organology does not limit itself to the use legitimated for observing but not
other reasons. If there is a conceptual objection, then it must be that Romantic organology
is itself an example of the categorial emptiness of observing reason. This in fact dovetails
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
more explicitly: “Es verbirgt sich vielmehr aus einem tiefer liegenden Selbstbewußtsein des Geistes, das
hier als eine natürliche Honettetät erscheint, die Schmählichkeit des begrifflosen nackten Gedankens, für
die Wirklichkeit des Selbstbewußtseins einen Knochen zu nehmen, und übertüncht ihn durch die
Gedankenlosigkeit selbst, mancherlei Verhältnisse von Ursache und Wirkung, von Zeichen, Organ usw.,
die hier keinen Sinn haben, einzumischen und durch Unterscheidungen, die von ihnen hergenommen sind,
das Grelle des Satzes zu verstecken.” (Hegel, PhdG, p. 259.)
509
Hegel, PhdG, p. 262.
510
I will come back to the identity philosophy at the beginning of chapter V of the present study, under the
rubric “mythological organology.” Exceptions to the lack of organs in the identity-system will be identified
there.
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nicely with Hegel’s basic critique of Schelling, to the effect that no principle of
differentiability effectively links the real absolute with its emanating particulars. It is my
contention that Schelling, if he is to have a response to this objection, will have had it
only in the 1809 Freedom essay, in a last but important formulation of organology that
unites organological Nature with organological I (the two poles of reason’s observation)
in what I call a “Romantic metaphysics of morals.”
The Freedom essay is notoriously difficult, and represents Schelling’s turn against
Hegel and towards a “positive philosophy” in which a theological, irrational kernel resists
the totalizing reason of his earlier systems. And yet, the essay explicitly unites
Naturphilosophie with idealism by way of a reading of Kant’s moral philosophy.
Organology’s final formulation in Schelling was tasked, from the beginning, with
responding to Hegel. And although Schelling reached deep into the Christian tradition,
orthodox as well as hermetic, to achieve his end, in a sense, theology becomes an organ
here, before the late Schelling would return philosophy to its ancillary position with
respect to theology. Because the problem was that of the activity of reason, it was natural
that the context for such reflection should have been Kant’s “practical reason,” reason
possessed of a rational will. Schelling adopted the project of Kant’s rationalization of the
will, but altered its source, making it a deed which, in the end, rationalized Nature too.
It is common to think of Kant as pursuing his incomplete marriage of concept and
intuition—and excluding “things in themselves”—in the name of “making room for
faith”511—rational faith. And yet his defense of rational “spontaneity” on the one hand,
and of reason’s reflexivity on the other (specifically, its self-restriction to application
always with respect to the understanding—or what Kant calls Kritik) also makes room for
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the intentionally flexible elements of his understanding of our knowledge. For example,
the break between the understanding’s and reason’s manner of judgment ensures that,
while the understanding can only produce validities through reference to the concreteness
of particular intuitions, our power to think is not merely representational. And as soon as
it is not, it is also practical—that is, our judgments leave the realm of evaluating
representational “matching” and enter into that of evaluation.512 It is on this transition to
evaluation with respect to action that Kant bases his constitutive metaphysics “of
morals,” based merely on the (for us) necessary “standpoint” of our own freedom. The
ability to represent rules for action to ourselves, and then to evaluate the relationship
between those rules (maxims) and possible actual actions, presumes, for Kant, the
standpoint of freedom. To be free is nothing other than to possess, in just this sense, a
“rational will.”
And yet, this evaluative comparison we perform remains empirical—Kant calls its
imperatives “hypothetical”—so long as there is no necessary relation between the deed
and the rule. This obtains whenever we act “pathologically”—out of external necessity or
drive. But we must believe, according to Kant, that we are rationally willful in order to
make these evaluations at all. Indeed, following the same procedure he had for the
metaphysics of nature—the analysis of a priori elements in everyday judgments of
truth—Kant here isolates an internally necessary belief in the possibility of rational will
which excludes the hypothetical and thereby the empirical. He thus calls his “categorical
imperative” “ein synthetisch-praktischer Satz a priori.”513 The evaluative judgment
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It is above all Susan Neiman who has emphasized this side of Kant in her The Unity of Reason:
Rereading Kant (Oxford: Oxford 1997).
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Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten in Immanuel Kant, Werke in zwölf Bänden.
Band 7 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 11-102, here p. 50. I cite as: GMS, p. 50.
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provides its own content—it both extends our reason and is necessary from the standpoint
of practical reason. The form of metaphysics is retained, but its content is shifted into
what he repeatedly calls “another order of things.” Out of the restrictions that allow for
validity in the sciences emerges the malleable kingdom of metaphysical morals,
grounding both a philosophy of freedom and a teleological approach to society’s progress
in social and political matters.
This depiction of Reason, of its desire and operation, was determinative. Yet Kant
restricted its use severely, calling its “pure” version a matter for “discipline.” Where no
measure of experience can aid us in separating true from false, no referential claims
should be made. That there is such a space, however, is a constant point of insistence in
Kant. We have entered, he writes in the Groundwork, the space where “die Beispiele uns
verlassen.”514
Lacking orientation in such a world of Reason, we must, minimally, be able to
determine ways of acting. Kant's line of thought begins with a phenomenal observation
about humans: we are the sort of beings that act in accordance with universal rules which
we represent to ourselves. For Kant, this is simply what it is to have a human will. The
capacity to represent rule-based reasons for action to oneself is, then, at the heart of
Kant's moral rationalism. The reasons we give ourselves for action are dubbed “maxims”
(internal determining grounds for action) and are contrasted to “pathological” (external,
playing on the Greek pathein, “to suffer”) determining grounds for action (like our
physical inclinations). To begin with, Kant brackets the metaphysical question of the
freedom of the will in favor of this phenomenal exploration. But the question of
metaphysics arises again when Kant sorts out types of imperatives to action.
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At the outset of the essay, Kant had defined metaphysics as “reine Philosophie...
auf bestimmte Gegenstände des Verstandes eingeschränkt...”515 In the realm of
theoretical philosophy, as we have seen, this limitation misfires: posited entities can
never be known to be like the positing we perform. In the realm of practical reason, this
restriction does not hold. This is because no external measure is needed in the case of
philosophical exploration of practical Reason (having to do with the will). Our intentions
and our actions, minimally, may be the determinate objects of our assertions without an
external measure of truth for such assertion: we know that we give and take Reasons, that
we represent rules for our own actions. Kant continues: where a hypothetical imperative
only gives us possible actions aimed at some determinate goal outside us, the categorical
imperative “würde der sein, welcher eine Handlung als für sich selbst, ohne Beziehung
auf einen andern Zweck, als objektiv-notwendig vorstellte.”516 The categorical
imperative—should one exist—is therefore universally valid for all creatures possessing
Reason, and indeed is based on an internal telos of practical Reason itself. The reason the
doctrine is called “metaphysical” begins to become clear: where the hypothetical
imperative falls out into the “possible” and “actual” intentions of an act, the categorical
imperative is an apodictic principle.517 If we gloss “apodictic” as a priori, we see what
Kant has in mind. He has written that the moral doctrine has as its source the “Idee, die
die Vernunft a priori von sittlicher Vollkommenheit entwirft.”518 Reason's “idea” of
moral perfection is itself a practical source of synthesis a priori. And indeed, while
imperatives having external ends cause intentions to be merely analytical (executions of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
515

GMS, pp. 11-12.
GMS, p. 43.!
517
GMS, p. 44.
518
GMS, p. 36.!
516

!

256!
!!
!
an entirely self-possessed concept of myself acting in the service of a conceptualized
goal), the truly moral imperative is a “synthetisch-praktischer Satz a priori…”519, and the
source of this synthesis does not stand under the restrictions of theoretical cognition's
rational discipline. This source, however, would appear mysterious to thinkers like
Schelling.
When Kant formulates the categorical imperative—“handle nur nach derjenigen
Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz
werde”520—he takes himself to have formulated a metaphysical principle. This is because
the imperative to universalizable intention does not follow from our representation of the
law, but furthers it. The affirmation is subjective, and its content is objectively universal,
binding for all. For our purposes, it suffices to understand that this convergence is 1)
synthetic (because the representation of the law does not contain this imperative in itself)
and 2) a priori (since no experience can teach us universal truth). Practically, this means
that we are neither coerced (non-affirming of the maxim) nor acting from a contingent
recognition (as would be the case with a hypothetical imperative). Our actions, should we
follow the categorical imperative, will be unexemplified yet metaphysical in nature.
Beyond example, we will draw from the source of metaphysico-practical truth made up
by morality itself, or what Kant will come to characterize as the “das Reich der
Zwecke.”521
And indeed, the latter formulation is not accidental. Ultimately, Kant finds in the
Groundwork that the only possible source for a metaphysics of morals is the concept of a
creature which contains an absolute measure of value in itself—the notion of an internal
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end. Thus the second formulation of the categorical imperative: “handle so, als ob die
Maxime deiner Handlung durch deinen Willen zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze werden
sollte.”522 The metaphysics defended here, then, is a regulative one (“als ob”) meant to
produce a future in free acts. The will of the individual is to become, through the
categorical imperative, the very possibility of a transformative metaphysics also of
nature—counterfactually, for the purpose of guiding our actions.
Paul Guyer writes that “... throughout his works of the 1790s... Kant now
emphasizes that we are sensuous as well as rational creatures, and therefore need
sensuous as well as rational presentation and confirmation of the conditions of the
possibility of morality.”523 The kernel of this transition—not without its difficulties, even
within Kant's works—was already given with the Grundlegung. The concept of
categorical, metaphysical (regulative) freedom is not visible, not exemplified in acts, but
(already) positively requires these acts for the fulfillment of its task. Thus, when
Schelling writes in the Freedom essay that idealism has only produced the “formal”
concept of freedom, and that Kant has failed precisely in not conferring “real” freedom
upon “things,” his claim must be read against the backdrop of Kant's all-too-practical
project of a this-worldly metaphysics of morals. Indeed, we shall see how Schelling
adopts this project and alters its source.524
The task of the Freedom essay consists in a revision of Kant which sounds very
much like the job of naturephilosophy:
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What the source is for Kant himself is not easy to determine. It seems to be Reason itself—but then the
Idealist/Romantic question about Reason’s ontological status becomes necessary. Schiller’s aesthetic
writings of the 1790s are probably the most pronounced attempt to answer this sort of question outside of
Kant’s writings—until, I am claiming, the FS. See especially letter 14 of Über die ästhetische Erziehung
des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen.
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Es wird aber immer merkwürdig bleiben, dass Kant, nachdem er zuerst Dinge an sich von
Erscheinungen nur negativ, durch die Unabhängigkeit von der Zeit, unterschieden,
nachher in den metaphysischen Erörterungen seiner Kritik der praktischen Vernunft
Unabhängigkeit von der Zeit und Freiheit wirklich als korrelate Begriffe behandelt hatte,
nicht zu dem Gedanken fortging, diesen einzig möglichen positiven Begriff des An-sich
auch auf die Dinge überzutragen, wodurch er sich unmittelbar zu einem höhern
Standpunkt der Betrachtung und über die Negativität erhoben hätte, die der Charakter
seiner theoretischen Philosophie ist.525

Andrew Bowie comments that “this is... actually another version of Naturphilosophie.”526
And indeed, the FS seems to take both projects into its purview: to raise things to
consciousness, now by conferring freedom upon them, and to objectify consciousness
itself, by knowing—and ultimately by acting—it.
Schelling follows the passage cited above with the remark that “mere idealism”
will not take him the step Kant did not go. In this context, however, it would be wrong to
think that Schelling means “idealism” in general; rather, he means Kant's specific
version, replete with its agnosticism about things-in-themselves and its (apparently
sourceless) notion of freedom. Schelling goes on to call this concept of freedom “merely
formal,” and tries to replace it with “real” freedom. As we have seen, Kant thinks himself
to be establishing a metaphysical doctrine of freedom based in morality—the synthetic
practical judgment a priori (the categorical imperative) is, for Kant, a constitutive
practical truth for us. Nothing supervenes the rule of this law, and the project of
“transition” consists largely in “creating the kingdom of ends,” as Christine Korsgaard
has put it.527 Key uncertainties remain within the Kantian model, especially what sort of
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role aesthetic, but crucially also ontology itself in the form of teleological judgments, can
play in “helping” us to act freely.528
The Freedom essay is notoriously hermetic in language, in outline, and in sources
(the mystical tradition and above all Jakob Böhme529). Yet it is governed by a single
figure—the relation between ground and consequent—interpreted according to the
special concept of Reason Schelling was developing.530 Indeed, the Freedom essay
begins with a re-interpretation of pantheism that proceeds by investigating this figure.
Schelling rejects the possibility that “sameness” is intended in the pantheistic doctrine
Deus sive Natura, defending his belief that judgments are characterized rather by active
and differentiating synthesis than simple identity. Although the Freedom essay quickly
moves into a defense of the “real” concept of freedom, we should not underestimate the
importance of this early distinction. Schelling here grounds his concept of the
“indifference” of Reason: we have insight into the process we carry out, and we thus act
and know simultaneously. Remarking on the dialectical movement between “A” and “A”
in the judgment “A=A,” Schelling writes that
Spinozas härtester Ausdruck ist wohl der: das einzelne Wesen sei die Substanz selbst, in
einer ihrer Modifikationen, d.h. Folgen, betrachtet. Setzen wir nun die unendliche
Substanz=A, dieselbe in einer ihrer Folgen betrachtet=A/a: so ist das Positive in A/a
allerdings A; aber es folgt nicht, dass deswegen A/a=A, d.h. dass die unendliche Substanz
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in ihrer Folge betrachtet mit der unendlichen Substanz betrachtet einerlei sei; oder, mit
anderen Worten, es folgt nicht dass A/a nicht eine eigne besondere Substanz (wenn gleich
Folge von A) ist... Wenn daher auch die Substanz in ihren andern Folgen A/b, A/c... nur
vorübergehend wohnte, so würde sie doch in jener Folge, der menschlichen Seele=a,
ewig wohnen, und daher als A/a auf eine ewige und unvergängliche Weise von sich
selbst als A geschieden sein.531

This declared borrowing from Spinoza forms the main implement of the Freedom essay,
the strategy of which is to combine this tool with a Kantian metaphysical framework to
generate a new Reason. Much of the above statement would, of course, not be accepted
by Spinoza.532 Nevertheless, Schelling is dealing with a genuinely “Spinozan” problem,
and it seems doubtful that, in the last account, this problem of predication was not also a
question for Spinozism.533 In any case, Herder had laid the ground for such a reading of
Spinoza by carefully raising the problem of different types of infinities in his Gott: einige
Gespräche.534 The second of the Gespräche is largely devoted to proving that Spinoza is
not a pantheist after all, and this takes the form of denying the strict, predicative identity
of things and God. Schelling's procedure is a different one: he re-interprets the sense of
the copula, leaving Spinoza's identification intact but altered.535 Nevertheless, as Manfred
Durner writes, Herder and Schelling “betonen die innere Einheit von Natur und
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The most obvious element is, of course, the privileged status of the human soul. This is attached, as I
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The problem is nevertheless active in the Ethics from the definitions of the first book on. Vaught writes
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Geschichte.”536 The particularity of the seemingly contingent historical flow of things is
tied, for both thinkers (and for both thinkers through Spinoza) to Nature itself. Rather
than hedging however slightly on this unity, Schelling re-casts the sense of unity as such
along Romantic organological lines.
We are now in a position to see Schelling’s unique adoption of the project of a
metaphysics of morals. The moral action, for Schelling, is metaphysical, not because it
meets requirements set up for another, constitutive metaphysics whose task it does not
fulfill, but because the act here binds and opens to cognition in itself. Outside of time, it
produces the ground of synthesis even as it occurs—and thus produces Reason. Reason is
thus situated constitutively in the dynamic moment poised to become the future. It is as
though Schelling’s romantic metaphysics of morals is simply Kant’s embodied—
constituting as it produces the temporal order it oversees. Freedom is simply the
necessary engagement with this moving metaphysical ground. And freedom means
making the self an organ.537
The most radical move of the Freedom essay is, without a doubt, the
identification of Will with Being (Ursein): the combination of Spinozism and idealism
literalizes and ontologizes the language of Handlung and Tat in Fichte and Hegel. The
process of elevation towards the real “system of reason” involved an ontological will tied
to and ultimately instrumentalizing the individual human will:
In dieser [Erhebung] (der Freiheit) wurde behauptet, finde sich der letzte potenzierende
Akt, wodurch sich die ganze Natur in Empfindung, in Intelligenz, endlich in Willen

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
536

Durner, “Naturphilosophie,” p. 84.
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verkläre.—Es gibt in der letzten und höchsten Instanz gar kein anderes Sein als Wollen.
Wollen ist Ursein, und auf dieses allein passen alle Prädikate desselben: Grundlosigkeit,
Ewigkeit, Unabhängigkeit von der Zeit, Selbstbejahung. Die ganze Philosophie strebt nur
dahin, diesen höchsten Ausdruck zu finden.538

What sort of doctrine results from the combination of the ground-consequent doctrine of
predication and the metaphysical determination, Will is Ursein?539
The passage is often read alongside Nietzsche, for obvious reasons. And yet,
Schelling does not equate being with Wille (Schopenhauer’s term, which Nietzsche
borrowed). Schelling instead tells us that Ursein is Wollen—desire, want, even intent.
And if we turn back to Kant’s GMS, we find the repeated formula (with respect to the
categorical imperative) “dieses Sollen ist ein Wollen.”540 Indeed, it is just this modal shift
that makes the imperative categorical, that makes up the metaphysics defended here. If
the Sollen were not fully internalized—and this means autonomously produced—it could
not be a priori. Its necessity comes from the will’s rationality.
Wollen ist Ursein—this metaphysics unites Idealism with Naturphilosophie,
making will the source of theoretical insight.541 But for idealism as a Schellingian project,
this sentence places a potentially rational will in the position of providing the source of
extension of reason, a “truly rational insight.” Just as Schelling ultimately rejected Kant’s
restriction of metaphysical knowledge to the regularities of conceptual reasoning, so in
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ethics he rejected Kant’s constitution of the experience of the act. The line between
“hypothetical” and “categorical” in Kant is simply too cleanly cut for Schelling. Where
Kant’s system restricts the rational Wollen to that which proceeds from the “standpoint”
of constitutively practical reason, Schelling imagines a will that can categorialize the
external or the merely hypothetical. This will cannot simply be “argued” for—it literally
gets its (necessarily historical) information from its actions. Schelling was proposing a
synthesis of deed with the possibility of moving intentionally but not arbitrarily into the
future.
The act, for Schelling, binds as the judgment does for Kant. The act thus fills the
copula, opening onto a future as yet undetermined but unfolding synthetically with our
attention and intention. Reason therefore is not the ground but stands in a privileged,
active relation to the ground, its movement being that of the ground in expression. We
can say that Reason does not constitute the ground but is privileged to be constituted by
it; and thus knowledge, paradigmatically of the act (since the ground is will) is conceived
in Spinozan terms as immediate insight (scientia intuitiva) into the ground of Reason—
knowledge of the cause literally through its effect (the vehicle of that knowledge itself).
We can call this epistemological pantheism and a dynamically constitutive metaphysics
of morals.542 The moment of Reason we call the “future”—the movement in which
synthesis occurs—is thus opened by Schelling in a plastic re-casting of the Christian
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metaphysical tradition, and a synthesis of Kantian and Spinozan elements. The history of
Reason, history qua Reason, serves as the torque to pry open this new dimension of
active predication, to extend Reason and extend its task. The interface between the
rational will and its non-rational ground makes a theological organ for a metaphysical
(organological) approach to politics. That interface tells us not how to act, but what an act
is.
That act is the very difference between self and world (including social world),
the point of indifference between intellectual intuition and Nature. Its organ—the agent in
the act, the person—makes the hypothetical into the categorical. Schelling founded the
possibility of introducing and transforming non-contingent norms into the garden-variety
judgments and actions. That legacy has more than antiquarian value: it suggests a
progressive constitution of the social (and natural) worlds with constant reference to the
not-yet-included. The Romantic Metaphysics of Morals remains, in this sense, to be
written. Schelling gave it a mere foundation: an organon. It is in this special sense that I
think Schelling contributed to the formation of organological metapolitics.543 Rather than
a positive program of political action, this ontology was meant to make good on the
promise of the organ’s dual capacity to grasp and to act. Not the body of positive law, the
canon of a particular politics, but the organon of a politics, its source. That source was
the mutual instrumentalization of general and individual will.
The above quotation makes clear that Schelling is attempting a different sort of
synthesis from his earlier attempts. The players remain the same: Kant's idealism (now
rather than just his criticism) is to be combined with Spinoza's view of Nature (his
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monism). For this purpose, Schelling chooses a profoundly non-Spinozan figure, the
Will, and grants it ontological status (a move Kant would reject out of hand). Yet his
reason for doing this may be twofold. On the one hand, the movement required by his
pantheistic understanding of the ground-consequent relation is one that cannot be
provided for by a static being. There must, then, be a primal movement (and not just
mover), which Schelling finds expression for in Böhme's sense of “craving.”544 The
ground can only insufficiently be described in its causation, for Schelling, by a Spinozan
potestas-figure.545 This is because “power” in itself must be moved, for Schelling—or
much more must be movement, be in the continuously undulating relation of ground to
consequent. Herder had tested the notion of Kraft to solve this problem; Schelling finds
that only the synthesizing will can suffice here. The rejection of the “individual’s power”
model of freedom leads to the second point, which is that, for Schelling, there must be a
“rational insight” (Vernunfteinsicht) into this process of movement itself. Schelling tells
us, even as he quotes Lessing's Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, that the system of
“true reason” would be “ein System, worin die Vernunft sich selbst wirklich erkannte,”546
but that this recognition would not be enough. Schelling's future consists of the ur-
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movement provided for by the ontologization of the will, and the theoretico-practical
indifference (the “indifference of Reason”) created by the a-temporal act.547 He writes
Nur in der Persönlichkeit ist Leben; und alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf einem dunklen
Grunde, der also allerdings auch Grund der Erkenntnis sein muss. Aber nur der Verstand
ist es, der das in diesem Grunde verborgene und bloss potentialiter enthaltene
herausbildet und zum Aktus erhebt.548

The twin concepts “life” and “personality” are thus re-worked by Schelling on the
basis of his new conception of pantheism. They are intentionally mythologized, and the
personality of the human, immersed in hermetic emanation of life, becomes the organ of
God.549 In the key passage about Lessing in the FS, Schelling points to the result of
transformation of revelation into Reason:
Wir im Gegenteil sind der Meinung, dass eben von den höchsten Begriffen eine klare
Vernunfteinsicht möglich sein muss, indem sie nur dadurch uns wirklich eigen, in uns
selbst aufgenommen und ewig gegründet werden können.550

To conceive of the result of this process as human ownership of the truth is also to see
that, for Schelling, Reason is capable of acting, is primarily actu, and as such, opens
continuously onto a new dimension. This makes the relationship between two wills—
general and individual—organological.
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Die allgemeine Möglichkeit des Bösen besteht, wie gezeigt, darin, daß der Mensch
seine Selbstheit, anstatt sie zur Basis, zum Organ zu machen, vielmehr zum
Herrschenden und zum Allwillen zu erheben, dagegen das Geistige in sich zum
Mittel zu machen streben kann.551

Human selfhood is the necessary root of possible evil, but can be instrumentalized—
made organ—not by God but by God’s reliance on the very selfhood in question. The
hermetic text is used to make the individual will the organ of the general, metaphysical
will. But this makes the hermetic text the organ of a metaphysics of freedom, a
metapolitical organology based on the progressive synthesis of practical judgments. It is
not that we proceed a posteriori, that we “have examples” in this system. It is that the
very acts that must serve as evidence for thought can be made exemplary. By following
Kant’s social rationalizing of the will, Schelling arrives at a metaphysical general will for
which the individual will acts as an organ even as the philosopher of freedom makes
theology his organ.
Activity is not reified, as Hegel had worried. The organs of will are not those of
mere self-objectifying representational projection, because they are—as is Being in the
Freedom essay—already self-differentiated. Reason grasps itself as will, as having started
to act. It must trace the line backwards to the origin of its act, only to realize that its
apparent essence relies always on its status as expressed. Its actuality is actual activity,
and organ is no longer the sign of an arbitrary hermeneutics of observing reason. It is,
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instead, a necessary term for the dynamic relations of subsumption and subordination in
the will to know. Organs are meant to be the practical categories of a radical metapolitics.
These organs are a synthesis of the early organological Naturphilosophie and the
transcendental organology of the StI. The electrical and ideal organs of those two systems
are combined into moral or metapolitical organs. These organs—the ur-will as the
conflictual source of insight and action—constitute both the source of insight into Nature
as infinite productivity, and root the ideal organs of the transcendental philosophy in a
source which is not foreign to them but not simply created by them.552 This is, in fact,
why the metapolitical part of organology is so important: it provides the possibility of
intervention in Nature and in history which is non-arbitrary but not pre-conceived. It tells
us—now for the first time—that there can be something like a technological metaphysics.
The metapolitics of organology offers the temptation of a systematic philosophy open to
the contingency of real phenomenal flow and yet always preparing to interrupt that
contingency with human categories, both theoretical and practical. That metapolitics thus
bases itself on a revised notion of techne, something like a speculative activity.

!
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Here I am re-valuing Eckart Förster’s recent negative judgment of this characteristic of Schelling’s
philosophy. Förster writes that “Soll die intellektuelle Anschauung als Methode der Naturanschauung
erhalten bleiben, dann geht das nur durch Depotenzierung (Ausschaltung) des anschauenden Subjekts. Es
ist aber die Frage, ob eine intellektuelle Anschauung, in der vom Anschauenden abstrahiert wird, mehr als
ein Spiel mit Worten ist… Soll dabei vom produzierenden Subjekt abstrahiert werden, dann müsste eine
Einheit von Sein und Denken bestehen können, ohne dass diese als Produkt des Subjekts erschiene.”
(Eckart Förster, Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 2011), pp. 250-51) While an
idealism that is not total in conception but offers the progressive possibility of ideal totalization is, for
Förster, logically distasteful, organology offers precisely the theoretical groundwork for real, systemic
categorial knowledge and alteration of the world and of history. It perspective is not that of representation
but of progressive and progressively human truth.
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Chapter IV: Universal Organs: Novalis’s Romantic Organology
“Alles kann zum Experiment – alles zum Organ werden.”553

Introduction
Where Hölderlin had inaugurated Romantic organology, introducing it as a new
metaphysics of judgment with an ethics of tragedy, Schelling had given it classical form,
retaining its physiological and logical provenances as he made natural science, aesthetics,
and theology the instruments of philosophy. It was Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg)
who would give the doctrine its name, as well as its most robust—and most deeply
political—form. He would do this through similar discursive matrices to those of his
predecessors. He would agree that there must be a new—as he put it—plastic
metaphysics, true to Kant’s Critical vision and capable of remaining open to the
contingency of phenomena and their history. He would insist, with his friend Friedrich
Schlegel, that this new metaphysics should be expressed in the form of a mythology, a
new totality of beautiful propositions that could wield political force. Thus organology
retained its dual mission: the progressive unification of the universal and the particular
(in judgment’s reflexive and open system) and the potential alteration of the world itself,
both as Nature and as history. Where Hölderlin had envisioned an ethical organ, and
Schelling a metaphysically moral organ, Novalis would be most insistent on a political
organ. His version of organology is, in this sense, more thoroughly expressive of its
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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I cite Novalis from the Historisch-kritische Ausgabe (Novalis Schriften: Die Werke Friedrich von
Hardenbergs), eds. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel (3rd ed.) (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960/1977 ff.),
in the form: HKA III, p. 391. I cite the Allgemeines Brouillon according to entry-numbers for generality, as:
AB 657.
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attachment to the post-revolutionary circumstance than those of his peers. Novalis agreed
with them and in some ways went further than they did on the point that a flexible
metaphysics was the logical outcome of Kant’s impulse to include analysis of the knower
in all analyses of the known. He also agreed that the result of that inclusion was the
possibility of organs of knowledge that coincided, partially and actively, with the known.
Metaphysics, in order to become modern after the Copernican and French revolutions,
had to become technological, had to gain efficacy in the epistemological and political
welter of the waning eighteenth century. For Novalis, this efficacy meant that organology
could not remain on the political sidelines. It would have to provide what he improbably
termed an “intellectual intuition of the political,” the very substantial link between
knowledge and action implied by the combined etymologies of “organ.”
The Early Romantic project of a “new mythology” insisted on the possibility of
radically new forms of cultural and political unity, forms that would be derived from the
content of reason. This project thus had to be culturally totalizing, and its production
would need to include revolutions in all aspects of that culture. For Novalis, working in
the Jena atmosphere of Schelling’s suggestions and Friedrich Schlegel’s aesthetic
revisionism, several sub-projects attached to the new mythology emerged in
organological terms. First, in dialogue with Friedrich Schleiermacher, a new cosmology
would have to be written. This cosmology makes the distance between Herder’s quasiorganology and the Romantic doctrine most clear: the continuous and self-sufficient
teleology of cosmological enjoyment (see chapter III above) proposed in the Ideen and
even more explicitly in Gott was replaced with a world now defined as incomplete.
Schleiermacher’s revisionist anthropological theology served as a basis for Novalis to
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introduce a kind of hole into the graph of the universe, a discontinuity built into any
attempt to spatialize knowledge of the world. Novalis often conceives of human
knowledge as mathematical—organs are sometimes described as both differentials and
integrals—or cartographic. These two types of spatialization of lawful cognition of the
world present a flat space that the subject observes from the other side. Talk of a “hole in
the graph” (my terminology—Schleiermacher speaks of a “hole” as a “negative
revelation of the universe”) serves to point to what Novalis conceives of as a constitutive
inclusion of that observation in the construction of the graph. Like a curve with a single
point missing, the universe is graphed or mapped by an included but really contradictory
moment—as we shall see, the Critical organ. Cognition thus both includes the subject in
the pictured world produced by that cognition, while marking that inclusion as
contradictory. The organ is what separates subject from object, even as it serves to
remind that there is a real interaction between them. That real interaction can only be
rendered incompletely, because its object (cognition as form and content) is itself
incomplete. From the pictured content of the world to its representation to the representer
there is is a discontinuity or a hole. That hole is the human organ, the total possibility of
human assimilation and alteration of nature. In keeping with the Aristotelian sense of
organon, that possibility had to remain a possibility for this quasi-cosmology to obtain.
The universe is interrupted by the human, and each functions as an incomplete cipher of
the other. The metaphysics of the organ is one of permanent theoretical incompletion
with paradoxically systematic pretensions.
That incomplete quality finds its philosophical home in Novalis’ organological
revision of the Critical project, which expresses the second sub-project of the
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mythological impulse. By replacing Kant’s term Vermögen (faculty) with organ, Novalis
provides the most explicit basis for a Criticism stripped of the finality of intuitions (what
I called “intuitionism” in chapter I above). This philosophy calls for a reflexive analysis
of the organs of knowledge, rather than “faculties,” in all cognitive endeavors. This
allows Novalis to claim lawful specificity and potential innovation in the Critical
investigation of any cognition, indeed any form of cognition. “Organ” thus comes to
designate both a cognitive act and its content (more strictly, its sphere of applicability).
The term serves to help Novalis follow a suggestion from Lessing and Hemsterhuis to the
effect that new organs could arise. These Critical organs—lawful specificities of
knowledge in development—became the basis for the twin sub-projects of the new
mythology for which Novalis is perhaps best known: Romantic encyclopedics and the
writing of a “new Bible.” In both these cases, Novalis is in dialogue with Der Streit der
Facultäten, insisting that these books will be organs of reconciliation between the
metaphysically isolated Kantian university faculties. These books were thus meant to be
organa of the new mythology, the human universe of metaphysical organs in
developmental revision of their self-critical cognitive production.
This multifarious project was deeply political. Drawing on a combination of
Fichte’s and Hemsterhuis’s moral writings, Novalis followed his peers in noting the
necessary ethical ramifications of organology. If metaphysics were re-established, it
would have to be tied to doctrines of norms and action, as it had always been. Novalis
insisted that this consequence could not remain innocent of an explicit politics. His
writings on the “moral organ” for the legitimation of the political thus most explicitly tie
organology to its social-historical context. Novalis was ostracized from the Jena group
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because of his controversial presentation of these views, but his vision of the politics of
organology is the most daring. It makes clear that both laws and institutions are organs,
and that their developmental status means, in a post-revolutionary world, that they must
be made to conform to the reason at the basis of the new mythology. The actual, for
Novalis, is organological. In this proposition, Novalis anticipates the Young Hegelian
interpretation of Hegel’s dictum that the “actual is the rational”—the actual must be made
to conform to the rational. Here we can see why it makes sense to call Romantic politics
“radical”: it insists on a change from the roots up. And yet organs are not only in the
roots—they are at every level of the world and its history. Novalis’s organology is, in this
sense, “German Ideology”: it makes critical demands on the present from the perspective
of an ideal future. And yet its very terms—its very organ—are a mythological expression
of the multi-temporal predicament of a “world” caught between imminent institutional
dissolution and the reifying syncopation of restorations. An organ thus infused with
productive energies is the basis of modern metaphysical ideological construction.

Mythological and Cosmological Organs, or: the Hole in the Graph of the Universe

To understand Novalis’ efforts, we will need an excursus on the new mythology
and new cosmology more generally. Schelling gave a definitive impulse for
mythologization to the Romantic physiologists. He had extrapolated in the StI from the
organs/organon complex to a possible cultural container for the program of organology.
This could not be philosophy in the old mode, nor could it be art without philosophy. It
had to be presented as a higher unity of the two, and this, Schelling argued, was the very
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concept of mythology, its traditional role in the history of humans. As we will see, this
impulse was to ground a series of cosmological physiologies.
For the Schelling of the StI, philosophy was born from poetry during the
childhood of science, and, since “ein System ist vollendet, wenn es in seinen
Anfangspunkt zurückgeführt ist,”554 the totality of the sciences now in their maturity
must, to fulfill the organological vision, flow back into the ocean of poetry (aesthetic
intuition as the organ of philosophy). The means for that return are historically evident:
Welches aber das Mittelglied der Rückkehr der Wissenschaft zur Poesie sein werde ist im
allgemeinen nicht schwer zu sagen, da ein solches Mittelglied in der Mythologie existier
hat, ehe diese, wie es jetzt scheint, unauflöscliche Trennung geschehen ist. Wie aber eine
neue Mythologie, welche nicht Erfindung des einzelnen Dichters, sondern eines neuen,
nur einen Dichter vorstellenden Geschlechts sein kann, selbst entstehen könne, dies ist
ein Problem, dessen Auflösung allein von den künftigen Schicksalen der Welt und dem
weiteren Verlauf der Geschichte zu erwarten ist.555

The mythological dimension of organology is necessarily tied to origin-myths about
science. As Schelling argues here, the unified cultural expression of a state of balance
between poetry, science, and philosophy, has always been mythology. The need for a
new unity arises from the apparently irresolvable separation of these disciplines (for that
is what they now are), and a national project—the unification of a nation as a single
poet—comes into view.556
Schelling’s efforts would bear discursive fruit among his contemporaries. A series
of Romantic attempts at scientific mythology emerged in the first decade of the 19th
century. I will single out two—those of Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert and Joseph von
Görres—because of their organological pretensions. In philosophical and scientific terms,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Schelling, StI, p. 300. That structure is famously the methodological principle of Hegel’s Logic.

!Schelling, StI, p. 300.!
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556

In this sense I agree emphatically with Manfred Frank’s determination that the “new mythology” exists
because of the institutional dissolution of feudalism presented by the American and French revolutions. His
example text—which he treats exemplarily—is das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. See
Manfred Frank, Der kommende Gott: Vorlesungen über die neue Mythologie (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
1982), pp. 153-88.
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these systems fall behind the conceptual and experimental finesse of Schelling and
Novalis. They take neither Kant nor Fichte methodologically seriously, and in
cosmologizing organs, they present a spatialized continuous universe lacking critical
negativity. Like Herder, they refuse the skeptical moment at the basis of transcendental
idealism. Their mythological elements nevertheless follow through on the totalizing
cultural impulse of this aspect of organology.
Schubert’s Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaft, a series of
lectures delivered in 1808, starts with the premise that only a full history of the human
relation to nature can complete the scientific picture. A primordial unity of man and
nature, an account of the split and the collateral epistemic effects of that split, and the
principled possibility of a re-unification are the necessary elements of that history.557
Schubert clarifies the original separation in a gloss on Kant’s “Copernican
revolution”:
Es hat in jenen Tagen nicht der Geist des Menschen den Gestirnen, sondern diese dem
Daseyn des Menschen Gesetze gegeben, wie den Bewegungen der Erde, und die
weistheit der alten Welt war: Alles und ganz zu thun, was ihr die Natur gelehrt.558

The Kantian revolution is literalized and inserted into a long evolution of human
cognitive control over nature, the history of which is psychological as much as
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Thus Schubert is interested in “pseudo-science” as the unconscious effects of the emergence of
consciousness, i.e. the very split between the conscious and the unconscious. That his intention was
nevertheless “rational” (in the Romantic sense) can be circumstantially supported by his benefactor
Windischmann’s letter to Hegel upon reading the Phenomenology: "Das Studium Ihres Syst[ems] d[er]
W[issenschaft] hat mich ueberzeugt, dass dieses Werk einst, wann die Zeit des Verstaendnisses kommt, als
das Elementarbuch der Befreiung des Menschen angesehen werden wird, als der Schluessel zu dem neuen
Evangelium, von dem Lessing weissagte." (Windischmann an Hegel, 27. April 1810; in Briefe von und an
Hegel, Band I: 1785-1812, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), p. 307, cited in John
Toews, Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980), p. 82.
558
Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert, Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaft (Dresden: Arnold,
1808), p. 4.
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cosmological. It is then cast in organological terms: humans and their societies are the
organs of nature and each other:
Auf einen schnellen Blick wird das alte Ideal der Könige in erhabenem Glanz gesehen,
wie sie, ein Vorbild des Göttlichen, Vermittler und Erhalter der alten Harmonie mit der
Natur gewesen. Das Gesetz der Natur und der höhere Einfluß, waren die ersten Herrscher
der Menschen, und als Stellvertreter sind diejenigen gewählt worden, welchen sich, als
den reinsten Organen, der höhere Einfluß am innigsten mitgetheilt. Nicht den Herren
sondern das getreue Organ der höheren Natur, hat jene Zeit in ihren Königen verehrt, und
wir sehen noch in der ältesten Geschichte einige Völker, den ehrwürdigen König selber,
als Priester dem Dienste der Natur vorstehen, sein graues Haupt auf hoher Sternwarte der
Kälte der Nacht Preis geben, und das geweihte Auge für sein schlummerndes Volk den
alten Bund des Menschen mit der Natur bewahren.559

The king is twice organ, first as the truest knower of nature, and second as the legislator
of human law in the image of this nature. The psycho-mythology of science’s night is the
story of the emergence of human cognitive royalty, the becoming-king or becomingorgan of each human in transition to democratic mutuality. The king becomes irrelevant
politically precisely as humans become organs and then legislators of nature.560
This psychological new mythology found an explicitly physiological complement
in the work of Joseph von Görres, especially in his 1805 Exposition der Physiologie. The
subtitle of that work—Organologie—is, to my knowledge, the only use of the term
“organology” in Romanticism outside of Novalis’s allgemeines Brouillon.
Görres, a Jacobin and dedicated Romantic physiologist,561 undertook to make
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie into what he called “Iatropoetik”—a poetics of medicine or
a physiological cosmology. He imagines a cosmos filled with organs as transmitters of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Schubert, Ansichten, pp. 4-5.
The apparent political radicalism here is matched by a slide back into the judaeo-christian version of the
phusis-techne analogy, which undermines the intended Kantian analogy: “Der Mensch ist im Anfang ein
untergeordnetes Organ der Natur gewesen. Nicht aber jenes Theils derselben, welcher nur die Basis der
eigentlichen höheren ist, sondern jenes ewigen und göttlichen Gesetzes, nach welchem der Mensch
ward.” Schubert, Ansichten, p. 8. This move makes clear why the new mythology is radical but
indifferently reactionary or progressive. If politics is a metaphysically grounded intervention in historicalsocietal formation, pessimistic diagnoses of the state of human culture could point toward the demand for a
royal organ to stabilize that society.
561
For an informative and unfortunately dismissive overview of the movement, see Karl Eduard
Rothschuh, Geschichte der Physiologie (Berlin: Springer, 1953), pp. 97 ff.
560
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forces between different orders (like Schelling’s Potenzen). The cosmos has a central
organ, which is analogized to a “Centralsonne des Microcosm’s”: the brain.562 Although
directly inspired by Schelling,563 the resulting cosmology is Herderian in quality. An
aether subtends the universe, and spreads itself out finely and thickly through the
organs—individuals as the referenda of the totality of the universe—according to their
composition.564 The Herderian picture (aether, organs as cosmic relations) is reinforced
by Görres’ reliance on analogy, which he licenses with his claim to be writing a scientific
or medical poetics. The rhetoric of the work is Schellingian, but the method is not that of
Romantic organology.565 Lacking the philosophical depth of the Frühromantiker, Görres
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“So sind wir denn bis zu dem Organe hin vorgedrungen, das die erste und die hoechste Stelle in der
Hierarchie der organischen Gewalten behauptet; die Centralsonne des Microcosm's...” (Joseph von Görres,
Exposition der Physiologie. Organologie (Koblenz: Lassaulz, 1805), pp. 160-61.) The introduction to the
work has an extended polemic against Gall’s doctrines, putting a point on the difference between Gall’s
organology and Romantic organology in method. See chapter III of the present study. Görres reasons thus:
“Das Primitive kann nur im Gehirne liegen, denn im Gehirne ist das Centrum, von dem der ganze tiefere
Organismus, wie ein Radius gegen das Erdencentrum hin ausstrahlt; im Gehirne, wo wesentlich das Leben
wohnt, muss es sich aus zuerst gezündet haben; unmittelbar aus den zeugenden Flüssigkeiten muss es
ursprünglich zusammengenommen seyn, und aus sich selbst heraus wird es dann ein auffassendes Organ
produciren, mit dem es in den mütterlichen Organism übergreift, und eben erst selbstgezeugt schon wieder
zeugend, die plastische Materie wiedergebährend als Organe sich anfügt.” (Görres, Exposition, pp. 144-45;
emphasis in original.) Hagner, Homo cerebralis, pp. 170-80, has a helpful exposition of the brain-science in
Görres’s system.
563
Görres even follows Schelling in the “triple” structure of the organ, see Exposition, pp. 150 ff.
564
"In jeder Individualität wird daher das höhere erzeugende Princip in ihrer ganzen Totalität sich spiegeln,
insofern jede einzelne Form das Streben ist, die eigenen Individualität im Selbstdenken objectiv
auszupraegen; insofern aber dies Streben im Concreten nothwendig mislingen muss, und nur in
fortlaufender Metamorphose durch eine zugleich successive und extensive Allgemeinheit erreicht werden
kann, insofern wird das Einzelne auch nur jene richtungen aus der vollkommenen Integritaet der denkenden
Subjectivität repraesentiren, die in ihm zur Objectivität gekommen sind. Vermöge des Ersten ist das
Einzelne göttlich, inwiefern es von ihm gebohren nach seinem Ebenbild geschaffen ist; vermöge des
Andern ist es endlich, insofern es nur in dem Ebenbilde ist, nur ein Organ der Ganzheit; es wird gleichsam
einen inneren Kern von Göttlichkeit besitzen, durch den es mit dem Höhern zusammenhängt; nach aussen
hin aber wird es ein eine Differenz ausschlagen, die seine Entwickelungsstufe und seinen spezifischen
Character bedingt." (Görres, Exposition, pp. 4-5; emphasis in original.)
565
For example, as applied to sexual difference: "Und wie nun zweygliedrig zunächst die Kettenreihe der
Organe ist, und die erste Folge die ganze Evolution der Einheit repräsentirt, insofern sie in das Leben
aufgenommen wurde, und die ganze Metamorphose der organischen Natur; die Andere hingegen die
Involution der Allheit in ihren Formen dargestellt uns zeigt, und die Manifestation der
organischen Intellectualitaet, so werden Beyde überhaupt wie Universum und Geisterwelt in ihrer äussern
Erscheinung sich verhalten; und wie die Centralmasse im Universum durch alle Potenzen hindurch in
entgegengesetzte Weltgeschlechter sich zersetzt, ein Aetherisches, mehr Leuchtendes, und ein Festes mehr
von der Schwere Durchdrungenes; so wird das Centralorgan eine gleiche sexuelle Differenz in die
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offers a dogmatic crystallization of organology.566 “Organ” is not the locus of
methodological struggle here, but the panacea covering the connections in the projected
mythological universe. Görres’ organology is firmly of the new mythological variety, but
represents a Romantic parallel to that of Gall: the premises do not need to be spoken, and
“organ” becomes literal, functional, and uncritical.
In his rather more famous editorial work on the Early Modern chapbooks, Görres
makes the mythological dimensions of his project explicit. The immediate expressions of
culture in the Volkssagen impress themselves upon the organ of the people.567 Then—
Görres analogizes to Homer for the Greeks—the Volk narrates its sense of self. This
narration—the very chapbooks Görres is publishing—becomes the organ of a
remembered second phase of nation-building, the mediated unity which can be
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untergeordeten Organe übertragen, die in ihm ausgebohren werden. Aber diese Differenz wird jedesmal in
einer tieferen, gemeisnschaftlich producirten Einheit sich aufzuheben streben, aber immer aus der
Neutralisierung von neuem, obgleich unter beschränktern Formen sich entwickeln, bis endlich die Unterste
ihren Gegensatz ausserhalf des Organism's sucht." (Görres, Exposition, pp. 163-64.)
566
The system’s mythological element also borders on the astrological: “Wie daher jene innere
Homogeneitaet die Wechselwirkung jeder Individualitaet gegen die höhere Universalitaet bedingt, so wird
sie auch den Zusammenhang der Physiologie mit den höhern pansophischen Constructionen setzen, und
von der totalitaet des Universums wird so viel sich im Organismus reflectiren und als einzelne Richtung
eingehen in die Bildung der Organe, als sein lebendiger Sinn umfassen mag. Dasselbe was die
Naturhistorie ihr Centrum in der Organologie des menschlichen Körpers finden laesst, constituirt auch
diese als integrirenden Theil der Geschichte des All's, und pflanzt, was die Abstraction gewaltsam aus dem
mütterlichen Boden gerissen hat, wieder in denselben ein, dass der welkende Zweig von Neuem grünt und
blüht, und der todte Leichnam der Anatonomie von der Naturkraft durchglüht, in einer höhern Synthesis
ersteht.” (Görres, Exposition, p. 5.)
567
“Diese Dichtungen sind die Volkssagen, die die Tradition von Geschlecht zu Geschlechte fortgepflanzt,
indem sie zugleich mit jenen Liedern, durch die Gesangweise die sich dem Organe eingeprägt, einmal
gebildet, vor dem Untergange sich bewahrten.” (Joseph Görres: Die teutschen Volksbücher, in: Joseph
Görres, Gesammelte Schriften, Band 3: Geistesgeschichtliche und literarische Schriften I (1803–1808), p.
179.) Compare from the Exposition: “Es ist daher nur eine peripherische Bildung, die aus der Gediegenheit
der jungen Natur zuerst hervorgetrieben wurde, damit die Welt den Funken anfachen koenne, den die
Zeugung gezündet hat; aber hoehere Geister herrschen über diesen Regionen, von denen jene
Elementarischen nur die vorangeschickten Boten sind, und diese Geister müssen ihr Organ, den Kern aller
lebendigen Bildung unmittelbar im Acte schon sich zugebildet haben, ehe jene secondaire [sic] Schoepfung
werden konnte, die von ihr ausgegangen, auch in allen Aeusserungen ihrer Thaetigkeit von ihr regul[är?]
erscheint.” (Görres, Exposition, pp. 143-44.)
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remembered for renewal.568
Görres’ editorial mythologizing presents the one side of organological aesthetic
theory. In one sense, this part of the project is not new mythology, but the recuperation of
old mythologies. Friedrich Schlegel presented organological aesthetics with a kind of
Kunstorgan, an artistic but also artificial organ. His was the proper aesthetics of
organology, mythological in pretension and metaphysical in conception. Where Novalis
speaks of an aesthetic organ, the conversation with his friend Schlegel is never distant.
Friedrich Schlegel’s version of the new mythology is perhaps the most political,
and the most aesthetic—it is certainly the most organological. In the Rede über die
Mythologie, part of Schlegel’s mixed-genre treatise Gespäch über die Poesie, Schlegel
calls for a total unification of the cultural efforts of romanticism. What he perceives
already happening, especially in “higher physics”569 and philosophy, needs, however, a
means for generic formation. As I pointed out in the Introduction to the present study,
Schlegel provides a kind of mission-statement of organology in this context:
Auch ich trage schon lange das Ideal eines solchen Realismus in mir, und wenn es bisher
nicht zur Mittheilung gekommen ist, so war es nur, weil ich das Organ noch dazu suche.
Doch weiß ich, daß ichs nur in der Poesie finden kann, denn in Gestalt der Philosophie
oder gar eines Systems wird der Realismus nie wieder auftreten können.570
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That organ loses, along with immediacy, poetic form, and becomes the prose of the nation: “Jene andern
Gesänge aber, ihrer Natur nach mehr ruhend, bestimmt, mehr an das Bild als an den Ton gebunden, und
daher Zauberspiegeln gleich, in denen das Volk sich und seine Vergangenheit, und seine Zukunft, und die
andere Welt, und sein innerstes geheimstes Gemüth, und Alles was es sich selbst nicht nennen kann,
deutlich und klar ausgesprochen vor sich stehen sieht; diese Gebilde mußten vorzüglich in jenem äußeren
Fixirenden ein glückliches Organ für ihre freie Entwicklung finden, weil sie ihrer Natur nach mehr im
Extensiven sind, und nun, indem die Schranken, die die enge Capacität des Gedächtnisses ihnen zog,
gefallen waren, sich frei nach allen Richtungen verbreiten konnten. So sind daher aus jenen Sagen die
meisten Volksbücher ausgegangen, indem man sie, aufgenommen aus dem mündlichen Verkehr in den
Schriftlichen, in sich selbst erweiterte und vollendete; nur Eines haben sie bei dieser Metamorphose
eingebüßt: die äußere poetische Form, die man als bloßes Hülfsmittel des Gedächtnisses jetzt unnütz
geworden wähnte, und daher mit der gemeinen Prosaischen verwechselte.” (Görres, Die teutschen
Volksbücher, pp. 179-80.)
569
“Die Spuren einer ähnlichen Tendenz könnt ihr schon jetzt fast überall wahrnehmen; besonders in der
Physik, der es an nichts mehr zu fehlen scheint, als an einer mythologischen Ansicht der Natur.”
570
Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe. Erste Abteilung: Kritische Neuausgabe, Band
2 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1967 ff.), p. 315. I cite as: KFSA II, p. 315.
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The means of mythological formation are named “organ,” and poetry must be that organ.
The shared goal of an “ideal realism” is tasked to poetic formation. Although Schlegel
insists here that a system cannot help, his repeated use of Spinoza as example571 suggests
that the poetry he intends as philosophical organ will have a good measure of systemic
unity. Indeed, the organ of philosophy572 here—we can now see—confers a higher
(organic) unity on a whole discourse, one particularized in organology as critical
metaphysics, and generalized in cultural and scientific projects (such as the creation of a
new (national) literature, a new “Bible,” and a new politics).573
The reason for a new mythology is contemporary poetry’s lack of a Mittelpunkt, a
“sensuous center.” The poetry of the ancients wove itself into a single large poem.574 The
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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From the Rede über die Mythologie: "Versucht es nur einmal die alte Mythologie voll vom Spinosa und
von jenen Ansichten, welche die jetzige Physik in jedem Nachdenden erregen muß, zu betrachten, wie
Euch alles in neuem Glanz und Leben erscheinen wird." (KFSA II, p. 319.) The justification of this role for
Spinoza is: "Wie die Wissenschaftslehre nach der Ansicht derer, welche die Unendlichkeit und die
unvergängliche Fülle des Idealismus nicht bemerkt haben, wenigstens eine vollendete Form bleibt, ein
allgemeines Schema für alle Wissenschaft: so ist auch Spinosa auf ähnliche Weise der allgemeine Grund
und Halt für jede individuelle Art von Mystizismus...” Spinoza, the arch-systematic philosopher, thus
becomes the formal predecessor of all transcendental poetry.
572
Schlegel’s uses of organ—many of which come early, in 1795 and 1796—display the intentional
conflation of organ and organon characteristic of Romantic organology. Perhaps most pregnantly: “Sehr
bedeutend ist der Griechische Nahme Dialektik. Die ächte Kunst, (nicht der Schein wie bey Kant), sondern
die Wahrheit mitzutheilen, zu reden, gemeinschaftlich die Wahrheit zu suchen, zu widerlegen und zu
erreichen (So bey Plato Gorgias – cfr. Aristoteles); ist ein Theil der Philosophie oder Logik und
notwendiges Organ der Philosophie.” (Schlegel, Philosophische Fragmente 1796, 50.) Here philosophy’s
organ is literally Aristotle’s organon.
573
I will address the Bible-project, also with reference to Schlegel, below.
574
Several early uses of “organ” occur in Schlegel’s essay Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie. The
basic notion—that imagination is the organ—is given: “Die Poesie ist eine universelle Kunst: denn ihr
Organ, die Phantasie ist schon ungleich näher mit der Freiheit verwandt, und unabhängiger von äußerm
Einfluß.” (KFSA I, p. 256.) But Schlegel is also searching for a new “legistlation” for modern poetry,
which, because it is subjective (or broadly “sentimental” in the terms given by Schiller), is interesting but
not objective. The term organ thus abounds here as a demand for the concrete laws of aesthetics which, in
the Rede, are broadened to include the totality of culture. So, for example: “Freilich ist aber der bloße gute
Wille nicht zureichend, so wenig wie die nackte Grundlage zur vollständigen Ausführung eines Gebäudes.
Eine entartete und mit sich selbst uneinige Kraft bedarf einer Kritik, einer Zensur, und diese setzt
eine Gesetzgebung voraus. Eine vollkommne ästhetische Gesetzgebung würde das erste Organ der
ästhetischen Revolution sein. Ihre Bestimmung wäre es, die blinde Kraft zu lenken, das Streitende in
Gleichgewicht zu setzen, das Gesetzlose zur Harmonie zu ordnen; der ästhetischen Bildung eine feste
Grundlage, eine sichre Richtung und eine gesetzmäßige Stimmung zu erteilen.” (KFSA I, p. 272.) Perhaps
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formation is automatically revolutionary: “Alle Wissenschaften und alle Künste wird die
große Revoluzion ergreifen.”575 The organ of imagination, as the aesthetic organ of a
general cultural revolution, allows the free movement of the poet between primordial
chaos and its formation.576 Artists themselves thus become the unifying factors in the
sensuous world, and their cultural-political activity is organological:
Durch die Künstler wird die Menschheit ein Individuum, indem sie Vorwelt und
Nachwelt in der Gegenwart verknüpfen. Sie sind das höhere Seelenorgan, wo die
Lebensgeister der ganzen äußern Menschheit zusammentreffen und in welchem die
innere zunächst wirkt.577

The collective soul needs the interface of inner and outer, and for this it needs an organ.
That organ is the artist in imaginative activity, and his task is to illuminate the present
from the perspective of the past and the future. The collective sensorium must range
imaginatively over the expanse of time in order to act in the present.
The aesthetico-mythological organ is thus the means by which to make an
arrangement of cultural disciplines real. On the one hand, there should be philosophy, the
self-positing of reason, in its moral/practical guise, but also as intellectual intuition578; on
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
most interesting in this organological revision of classicist aesthetic doctrine is that Schlegel implies that
new organs must be created by not imitating the local organs of individual Greeks, but instead their total
culture. The statement is clearly a re-working of the Winckelmannian dictum that to imitate the Greeks, the
Germans must become in inimitable: “Nicht dieser und jener, nicht ein einzelner Lieblings-Dichter, nicht
dielokale Form oder das individuelle Organ soll nachgeahmt werden: denn nie kann ein Individuum, »als
solches«, allgemeine Norm sein. Die sittliche Fülle, die freie Gesetzmäßigkeit, die liberale Humanität, das
schöne Ebenmaß, das zarte Gleichgewicht, die treffende Schicklichkeit, welche mehr oder weniger über die
ganze Masse zerstreut sind; den vollkommnen Stil des goldnen Zeitalters, die Ächtheit und Reinheit der
Griechischen Dichtarten, die Objektivität der Darstellung; kurz den Geist des Ganzen – die reine
Griechheit soll der moderne Dichter welcher nach echter schöner Kunst streben will, sich zueignen.”
(KFSA I, pp. 346-47; emphasis in original)
575
KFSA II, p. 314.
576
“Denn das ist der Anfang aller Poesie, den Gang und die Gesetze der vernünftig denkenden Vernunft
aufzuheben und uns wieder in die schöne Verwirrung der Fantasie, in das ursprüngliche Chaos der
menschlichen Natur zu versetzen, für das ich kein schöneres Symbol bis jetzt kenne, als das bunte
Gewimmel der alten Götter.” (KFSA II, p. 319.)
577
KFSA II, p. 262.
578
“Die intellectuale Anschauung ist der kategorische Imperativ der Theorie.”(KFSA II, p. 176.) The
formulation suggests just the idealism demanded in the Rede: the categorical imperative will be the
transcendental arbiter of not just content but also form, now in cognition and not just morals.
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the other hand, there is Poesie, which exists in the realm of “Chaos,” and works more
communicatively. It stands on the side of the “real,” of Realismus, because it operates in
the sensuous and creates therein. Religion stands between the two, the universal mediator
and the mediator to the universe (more on this in a moment).579
As Manfred Frank has argued, the new mythology presents us with an early
critique of bourgeois republicanism, not merely a defense of the new form of
government. For Frank, the dichotomy organic/mechanical is used to separate between
bourgeois laws (the laws of “mechanical,” “Enlightenment” reason) and a possible form
of organically synthesized community—a utopia.580 Frank’s point is both supported and
metaphorically altered by an investigation of Schlegel’s early essay (1796), Über den
Begriff des Republikanismus. Schlegel argues, in response to Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden,
that there should be a “deduction” of the republican form of government. Indeed, he
accuses Kant of insufficient Critical impulse with respect to government: institutions
should be characterized according to their sources in the faculties.581 And yet the talk of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
579

Summarized systemically as follows in the Ideen: “Die Philosophie ist eine Ellipse. Das ein Zentrum,
dem wir jetzt näher sind, ist das Selbstgesetz der Vernunft. Das andre ist die Idee des Universums, und in
diesem berührt sich die Philosophie mit der Religion.” (KFSA II, p. 267.) Schlegel would go on to
formalize this “system” (in spite of his remarks in the Rede) in his 1800 Vorlesungen über
Transcendentalphilosophie. NB: Schlegel continues to use organ in his mature years, but these fall outside
the scope of the present effort. For a reading of Schlegel that takes his philosophical efforts in the first
years of the 19th century, see Beiser, German Idealism, pp. 435-65.
580
See Frank, Der kommende Gott, pp. 176 ff.
581
Schlegel’s suggestion is that the constitution corresponds to reason, legislative power to the
understanding, judicial power to the power of judgment, and executive to sensibility. (KFSA VII, p. 15.)
This suggestion remains unelaborated, but the basic Romantic suggestion (that history should be included
as part of theoretical philosophy) is given in this thick but more basic objection: “Das, was diese Gewähr
leistet, ist nichts Geringeres, als die große Künstlerin, Natur,” sagt Kant... So geistreich die Ausführung
dieses trefflichen Gedankens ist, so will ich doch freimütig gestehn, was ich daran vermisse. Es ist nicht
genug, daß die Mittel der Möglichkeit, die äußern Veranlassungen des Schicksals zur wirklichen
allmählichen Herbeiführung des ewigen Friedens gezeigt werden. Man erwartet eine Antwort auf die
Frage: Ob die innere Entwicklung der Menschheit dahin führe? Die (gedachte) Zweckmäßigkeit der
Natur (so schön, ja notwendig diese Ansicht in andrer Beziehung sein mag) ist hier völlig gleichgültig: nur
die (wirklichen) notwendigen Gesetze der Erfahrung können für einen künftigen Erfolg Gewähr
leisten. Die Gesetze der politischen Geschichte, und die Prinzipien der politischen Bildung sind die
einzigen Data, aus denen sich erweisen läßt, “daß der ewige Friede keine leere Idee sei, sondern eine
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faculties is paralleled by talk of organs. Institutions of government can be organs
precisely because they are the material expression of faculties: senses of the common
body. For Schlegel, constitution and government differ as the permanent and alterable
elements of the republican form.582 The constitution, however, might include insurrection
(Schlegel clearly has the United States constitution in mind). A constitution which rejects
the possibility of revolution is simply blind, for Schlegel, since its power only extends as
far as it actually constitutes. One which maintained the permanent possibility of
insurrection, however, would “cancel itself” (sich selbst aufheben). And yet, the
provision that revolution should follow failure of the constitution to maintain the
republican ideal itself can be included:
Diejenige Insurrektion ist also rechtmäßig, deren Motiv die Vernichtung der
Konstitution, deren Regierung bloß provisorisches Organ, und deren Zweck die
Organisation des Republikanismus ist.583

Republican government—the only rational form of political constitution—may form for
itself a provisional organ of self-correction when, in the course of organic events, reason
fails to embody itself as constitution. Friedrich Schlegel’s new mythology includes a
voice that might be characterized as the Jeffersonian strain of Romantic organology.

A Hole in the Graph of the Universe: Cosmological Organs
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Aufgabe, die nach und nach aufgelöst, ihrem Ziel beständig näher kommt;” … nach denen sich die künftige
Wirklichkeit desselben, und sogar die Art der Annäherung, zwar nicht weissagen … – thetisch und nach
allen Umständen der Zeit und des Orts – aber doch vielleicht theoretisch (wenngleich nur hypothetisch) mit
Sicherheit vorher bestimmen lassen würde.” (KFSA VII, p. 23; emphasis in original.) And again: “Nur
aus den historischen Prinzipien der politischen Bildung, aus der Theorie der politischen Geschichte, läßt
sich ein befiedigendes Resultat über das Verhältnis der politischen Vernunft und der politischen
Erfahrung finden.” (KFSA VII, p. 24; emphasis in original.)
582
While representationalism is the organ. Thus, on the difference between direct democracy and the
republican form: “Daß aber die Volksmehrheit in Person politisch wirke, ist in vielen Fällen unmöglich,
und fast in allen äußerst nachteilig. Es kann auch sehr füglich durch Deputierte und Kommissarien
geschehen. Daher ist die politische Repräsentation allerdings ein unentbehrliches Organ des
Republikanismus.” (KFSA VII, p. 17; emphasis in original.)
583
KFSA VII, p. 25; emphasis in original.
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Schlegel’s new mythology was, in addition, just as theologically radical as
Jefferson’s bible. The religious feeling that links the subject to the universe, and poetry to
philosophy, is also rooted in the organ of the imagination, with explicit reference to
Friedrich Schleiermacher:
Der Verstand, sagt der Verfasser der Reden über die Religion, weiß nur vom Universum;
die Fantasie herrsche, so habt ihr einen Gott. Ganz recht, die Fantasie ist das Organ des
Menschen für die Gottheit.584

Schleiermacher—and especially his theologically radical Reden über die Religion für die
Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (1799)—is the model for Schlegel’s aesthetically
focused version of organological mythology. And where new organs of art, even
artificial organs (Kunstorgane) were brought into view by Schlegel, Schleiermacher
provided the theological organs for the “new religion” that would operate as part of the
new mythology. Novalis would bind all these factors together into the fullest statement of
Romantic organology.
For Schleiermacher, religion is a sense.585 The positive content of philosophy, the
sciences, and morals, is subtended by the total human who binds them together in a more
primitive, even more negative imaginative acitivity: the intuition of the universe.586 This
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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KFSA II, p. 257. Note that Schlegel here means “productive imagination,” of the ability to form objects
out of intuitions in the first place. Thus the organ, filtered through this Kantian doctrine and its centrality
for Fichte, becomes the divine ability of the human to make a world—as we have seen, a key Romantic
aesthetic doctrine.
585
Or infinite intuition: “Praxis ist Kunst, Spekulazion ist Wissenschaft, Religion ist Sinn und Geschmak
fuers Unendliche.” (Friedrich Schleiermacher, Über die Religion: Reden and die Gebildeten unter ihren
Verächtern (Hamburg: Meiner, 1958), p. 30; cited as Reden, p. 30.)
586
“Anschauen des Universums, ich bitte befreundet Euch mit diesem Begriff, er ist der Angel meiner
ganzen Rede, er ist die allgemeinste und höchste Formel der Religion, woraus Ihr jeden Ort in derselben
finden könnt, woraus sich ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen aufs genaueste bestimmen lassen. Alles Anschauen
gehet aus von einem Einfluß des Angeschaueten auf den Anschauenden, von einem ursprünglichen und
unabhängigen Handeln des ersteren, welches dann von dem letzteren seiner Natur gemäß aufgenommen,
zusammengefaßt und begriffen wird. Wenn die Ausflüsse des Lichtes nicht – was ganz ohne Euere
Veranstaltung geschieht – Euer Organ berührten, wenn die kleinsten Teile der Körper die Spitzen Eurer
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intuition, which makes up humanity’s humanity, becomes the principle of communication
between those of different religions, and indeed the basic principle of communication in
general. The play of the positive and the negative in the religious organ makes the basis
for a true communication between believers of different faiths.587 Since the introduction
to religious intuition is different for each person, mutual communication and yet
substantial (we could say organological) tolerance is possible:
… so würdet Ihr doch Demjenigen Achtung und Ehrfurcht nicht versagen können, dessen
Organe dem Universum geöffnet sind, und der, fern von jedem Streit und Kontrast,
erhaben über jedes Streben, von den Einwirkungen desselben durchdrungen und Eins mit
ihm geworden, wenn Ihr ihn in diesem köstlichen Moment des menschlichen Daseins
588
betrachtet, den himmlischen Strahl unverfälscht auf Euch zurückwirft.

This sense cannot be taught, just as art cannot, but its organ can be opened. And openness
is the essential desideratum and even definition of that organ’s activity.589 It produces the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Finger nicht mechanisch oder chemisch affizierten, wenn der Druck der Schwere Euch nicht einen
Widerstand und eine Grenze Eurer Kraft offenbarte, so würdet Ihr nichts anschauen und nichts
wahrnehmen, und was Ihr also anschaut und wahrnehmt, ist nicht die Natur der Dinge, sondern ihr Handeln
auf Euch. Was Ihr über jene wißt oder glaubt, liegt weit jenseits des Gebiets der Anschauung. So die
Religion; das Universum ist in einer ununterbrochenen Tätigkeit und offenbart sich uns jeden Augenblick.”
(Reden, pp. 31-32.)
587
The common element of the first revelation is the religious organ: “Betrachtet noch einmal den
erhabenen Augenblick in welchem der Mensch überhaupt zuerst in das Gebiet der Religion eintritt. Die
erste bestimmte religiöse Ansicht, die in sein Gemüt mit einer solchen Kraft eindringt, daß durch einen
einzigen Reiz sein Organ fürs Universum zum Leben gebracht und von nun an auf immer in Tätigkeit
gesetzt wird, bestimmt freilich seine Religion; sie ist und bleibt seine Fundamental-Anschauung in
Beziehung auf welche er Alles ansehen wird, und es ist im Voraus bestimmt, in welcher Gestalt ihm jedes
Element der Religion sobald er es wahrnimmt, erscheinen muß. Das ist die objektive Seite dieses Moments;
seht aber auch auf die subjektive: so wie durch ihn in jener Rücksicht seine Religion insofern bestimmt
wird, daß sie zu einem in Rücksicht des unendlichen Ganzen völlig geschloßnen Individuum gehört, aber
doch nur als ein unbestimmtes Bruchstück desselben, denn nur mit mehreren vereint kann es das Ganze
darstellen: so wird durch denselben Moment auch seine Religiosität in Rücksicht der unendlichen
religiösen Anlage der Menschheit als ein ganz eignes und neues Individuum zur Welt gebracht.” (Reden, p.
147.)
588
Reden, p. 131.
589
“Die Philosophie wohl strebt diejenigen, welche wissen wollen, unter ein gemeinschaftliches Wissen zu
bringen, wie Ihr das täglich sehet, die Religion aber nicht diejenigen welche glauben und fühlen, unter
Einen Glauben und Ein Gefühl. Sie strebt wohl denen, welche noch nicht fähig sind das Universum
anzuschauen, die Augen zu öffnen, denn jeder Sehende ist ein neuer Priester, ein neuer Mittler, ein neues
Organ; aber eben deswegen flieht sie mit Widerwillen die kahle Einförmigkeit, welche diesen göttlichen
Überfluß wieder zerstören würde. Die Systemsucht stößt freilich das Fremde ab, sei es auch noch so
denkbar und wahr, weil es die wohlgeschlossenen Reihen des Eigenen verderben, und den schönen
Zusammenhang stören könnte, indem es seinen Platz forderte; in ihr ist der Sitz der Widersprüche, sie muß
streiten und verfolgen; denn insofern das Einzelne wieder auf etwas Einzelnes und Endliches bezogen wird,
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religious sense in general and—because it is objective—the positive doctrine of particular
religions. And yet it also maintains a dialectic of positivity and negativity internal to its
operation. It is passive, general, negative: it opens onto the universe. Yet it is also
concrete, active, and positive: it is the substrate of the cosmos itself. Novalis would both
adopt both the term organ and elaborate its partly negative essence in debate with
Schlegel about a “new religion.”
Schleiermacher’s religious organology has surprising Kantian roots, and
surprising cosmological consequences—the latter will complete the picture of the
discursive context into which Novalis placed his organology. In his early Kurze
Darstellung (undated, but between 1793 and 1799), written after reading Jacobi’s
Spinoza-Büchlein, Schleiermacher calls into question Kant’s account of the infinite in the
KdrV. His line of critique is a refinement of the notion that the thing-in-itself is a problem
for Kant. Schleiermacher argues that the infinity within the faculties (which Kant locates
as the basic formal characteristic of reason) cannot be claimed to be immanent and
transcendent simultaneously: if it is in the faculties, Kant is a Spinozist; if not, he falls
into his own category of dogmatism.590 The result, for Schleiermacher as for the others in
the Jena circle, was that the question would have to be bracketed in favor of a continued
application of a critique of the various areas of human cognitive endeavors. And
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kann freilich Eins das Andere zerstören durch sein Dasein; im Unendlichen aber steht alles Endliche
ungestört nebeneinander, alles ist Eins und alles ist wahr.” (Reden, p. 36.) This separates religion from
metaphysics, which is the expression of one of two basic drives—consumptive and resignative—that make
up human nature for Schleiermacher. “Sie begehrt nicht das Universum seiner Natur nach zu bestimmen
und zu erklaeren wie die Metaphysik, sie begehrt nicht aus Kraft der Freiheit und der goettlichen Willkuehr
des Menschen es fortzubilden und fertig zu machen wie die Moral. Ihr Wesen ist weder Denken noch
Handeln, sondern Anschauung und Gefuehl. Anschauen will sie das Universum, in seinen eigenen
Darstellungen und Handlungen will sie es andaechtig belauschen, von seinen unmittelbaren Einfluessen
will sie sich in kindlicher Passivitaet ergreifen und erfuellen lassen.” (Reden, pp. 28-29.)
590
Schleiermacher makes this point especially clear in an early fragment inspired by Jacobi called the
Kurze Darstellung des spinozistischen Systems.
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Schleiermacher is thus led to religion as the object of a critical approach to the “infinite.”
This approach is characterized by the “essence” of religion: the interaction between the
faculties of intuition and feeling.
Schleiermacher glosses one of the basic doctrines of the KdrV (“Die
Anschauung sieht, aber sie ist leer; das Gefühl bezieht sich auf Realität, aber es
ist blind.591”) as follows:
Anschauung ohne Gefühl ist nichts und kann weder den rechten Ursprung noch die rechte
Kraft haben, Gefühl ohne Anschauung ist auch nichts: beide sind nur dann und deswegen
etwas, wenn und weil sie ursprünglich Eins und ungetrennt sind.592

Schleiermacher, in insisting that the organ of the infinite is the interaction of intuition and
feeling, may, however, be referring proximately to Fichte’s own revision of Kant in the
Wissenschaftslehre:
Die Anschauung sieht, aber sie ist leer; das Gefühl bezieht sich auf Realität, aber es
ist blind.593

Kant is simply stating the doctrine that all cognition takes the form of judgments. The
proposition of a given judgment is successful when it unites the content of some intuition
with the generality of some concept. Fichte’s take on this passage comes in the practical
philosophy of the Wissenschaftslehre. In striving infinitely to realize its true, absolute
nature, the Ich builds upwards from the apparent passivity of Empfindung. But in the
realm of feeling, there is only blank relation to “reality”—feeling is blind but connected.
Intuition, on the other hand, “sees.” Fichte appears to be contradicting Kant, but he is
really building in two directions simultaneously. Intuition sees because it is constructed
in a descending categorical activity on the part of the theoretical ego, and marks a kind of
threshold of conscious cognition as the practical ego emerges in the other direction. For
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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KdrV B75.!
592
593
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Reden, p. 41.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke. Band 1 (Berlin: Veit, 1845/1846), p. 319.!
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Schleiermacher, the source of cognition is feeling—it connects us to reality, as it does for
Fichte. Intuition, on the other hand, is not empty, but—as Novalis would say—plastic. If
the two are to become one, they must do so by way of the infinitization of intuition. The
name for that process, which underlies the religious “sense,” is “organ.”594
The religious organ is balanced between the consumptive and resignative drives:
it is the field of potential poised between action and passion. The peace and poise that
come with the operation of that organ are counterindicated by the speed and
industriousness (not to speak of industrialization) of the contemporary world.595 And yet
Geselligkeit proceeds precisely from this balance596: the play of the positive and the
negative in the critical religious organs forms the basis for a truly social society. This is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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That process goes a long way to explaining the Romantic interest in and specific reading of Spinoza. As
Herder before him, Schleiermacher prizes Spinoza’s “religious” sense: “Opfert mit mir ehrerbietig eine
Locke den Manen des heiligen verstoßenen Spinoza! Ihn durchdrang der hohe Weltgeist, das Unendliche
war sein Anfang und Ende, das Universum seine einzige und ewige Liebe, in heiliger Unschuld und tiefer
Demut spiegelte er sich in der ewigen Welt, und sah zu wie auch Er ihr liebenswürdigster Spiegel war;
voller Religion war Er und voll heiligen Geistes; und darum steht Er auch da, allein und unerreicht, Meister
in seiner Kunst, aber erhaben über die profane Zunft, ohne Jünger und ohne Bürgerrecht.” (Reden, p. 31)
Thus the prefiguration of intellectual intuition in the “third kind” of knowledge (scientia intuitiva) of Ethica
Book II, proposition 42 scholium, and the entirety of book V on amor intellectualis Dei, are taken to be
adventures not in dogmatic metaphysics, but in the expansion of the instruments of the broadly conceived
philosophical and religious senses.
595
“Um den Sinn einigermaßen gegen die Anmaßungen der andern Vermögen zu schützen, ist jedem
Menschen ein eigner Trieb eingepflanzt, bisweilen jede andere Tätigkeit ruhen zu lassen, und nur alle
Organe zu öffnen, um sich von allen Eindrücken durchdringen zu lassen; und durch eine geheime höchst
wohltätige Sympathie ist dieser Trieb gerade am stärksten, wenn sich das allgemeine Leben in der eignen
Brust und in der umgebenden Welt am vernehmlichsten offenbart: aber daß es ihnen nur nicht vergönnt
wäre, diesem Triebe in behaglicher untätiger Ruhe nachzuhängen; denn aus dem Standpunkt des
bürgerlichen Lebens ist dies Trägheit und Müßiggang. Absicht und Zweck muß in Allem sein, sie müssen
immer etwas verrichten, und wenn der Geist nicht mehr dienen kann, mögen sie den Leib üben; Arbeit und
Spiel, nur keine ruhige, hingegebene Beschauung, – Die Hauptsache aber ist die, daß sie Alles verstehen
sollen, und mit dem Verstehen werden sie völlig betrogen um ihren Sinn: denn so wie jenes betrieben wird,
ist es diesem schlechthin entgegengesetzt. Der Sinn sucht sich Objekte, er geht ihnen entgegen und bietet
sich ihren Umarmungen dar; sie sollen etwas an sich tragen, was sie als sein Eigentum, als sein Werk
charakterisiert, er will finden und sich finden lassen...” (Reden, p. 82)
596
“Ich hoffe Ihr seid aus dem vorigen mit mir einverstanden darüber daß in der wahren religiösen
Geselligkeit alle Mitteilung gegenseitig ist, das Prinzip, welches uns zur Äußerung des eigenen antreibt,
innig verwandt mit dem was uns zum Anschließen an das Fremde geneigt macht und so Wirkung und
Gegenwirkung aufs unzertrennlichste miteinander verbunden. Hier im Gegenteil findet Ihr gleich eine
durchaus andere Form: Alle wollen empfangen und nur einer ist da der geben soll; völlig passiv lassen sie
auf einerlei Art in sich einwirken durch alle Organe, und helfen höchstens dabei selbst von innen nach
soviel sie Gewalt über sich haben, ohne an eine Gegenwirkung auf Andere auch nur zu denken. Zeigt das
deutlich genug, daß auch das Prinzip ihrer Geselligkeit ein ganz andres sein muß?” (Reden, p. 107.)
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indeed, then, organology: the sense for the infinite turns into a theological social doctrine,
a kind of post-revolutionary metapolitics.597 But before I turn to Novalis’ reception of this
cocktail of mythology, religion, and aesthetics, I want to note the cosmological
revisionism of the Reden. This revision, which introduced a kind of incompleteness into
the cosmos, forms the entry-point into Novalis’ organology.
The full radicality of Schleiermacher’s vision emerges only when he defines the
relationship between God and the universe. A religion “without God” can be better than
one with, he writes controversially. God is, in one sense, simply the feeling, the manner
of intuition that comes with the proper relationship of the human to the universe.598 And
this higher intuition intimates that the universe is like a work of art, harmonious
internally, unified according to a law not expressed inside it, and therefore, in one sense,
partial.599 This partiality is reflected in our faculties as the divide between possible and
actual lawfulness. A possible relation, in this sense, is a “negative revelation”:
Und wenn Ihr Euch noch Verbindungen denken könnt, die Ihr nicht sehet, so ist auch
diese Lücke eine negative Offenbarung des Universum, eine Andeutung, daß in dem
geforderten Grade in der gegenwärtigen Temperatur der Welt diese Mischung nicht
möglich ist, und Eure Phantasie darüber ist eine Aussicht über die gegenwärtigen
Grenzen der Menschheit hinaus, eine wahre göttliche Eingebung, eine unwillkürliche und
unbewußte Weissagung über das was künftig sein wird.600

The universe is the totality of being and thought—it is complete, includes possibility.
This possibility, as we will see emphasized in Novalis, includes the future. The current
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It is also paradigmatically Romantic, following the rejection of Kant’s ungesellige Geselligkeit and all
doctrines based on self-interest in favor of a critically metaphysical doctrine of perfectibility.!!
598
“Gott ist nicht Alles in der Religion sondern Eins, und das Universum ist mehr.... Mitten in der
Endlichkeit Ein werden mit dem Unendlichen und ewig sein in einem Augenblick, das ist die
Unsterblichkeit der Religion.” (Reden, pp. 73-74.)
599
For example: “Wo Ihr eine erhabene Einheit, einen großgedachten Zusammenhang ahnden sollt, da muß
es neben der allgemeinen Tendenz zur Ordnung und Harmonie notwendig im Einzelnen Verhältnisse
geben, die sich aus ihm selbst nicht völlig verstehen lassen. Auch die Welt ist ein Werk, wovon Ihr nur
einen Teil überseht, und wenn dieser vollkommen in sich selbst geordnet und vollendet wäre, könntet Ihr
Euch von dem Ganzen keinen hohen Begriff machen.” (Reden, p. 47.) Again: “Das ist die Harmonie des
Universums, das ist die wunderbare und große Einheit in seinem ewigen Kunstwerk.” (Reden, p. 54.)
600
Reden, p. 52; my emphasis.
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“temperature” of the world, however, is another matter. The world is only the set of the
actual, only that part that is explored in the sense for the particular. Part of that actuality,
however, is the totality of the human and of humanity. And because the human is in the
world, but has a sense (a religious sense) for the universe, the world is incomplete. It is a
discrete totality, or a non-total entirety. The religious person is simply aware of this
condition, and her feelings and even thoughts emerge from the social and intuitional
organs of that negative space.601
The imagination, playing freely between the understanding and intuition, is made
constitutive not of the world, but of the relation between the non-whole of the world and
the universe: of God. Schleiermacher clarifies:
In der Religion wird das Universum angeschaut, es wird gesetzt als ursprünglich
handelnd auf den Menschen. Hängt nun Eure Phantasie an dem Bewußtsein Eurer
Freiheit so daß sie es nicht überwinden kann dasjenige was sie als ursprünglich wirkend
denken soll anders als in der Form eines freien Wesens zu denken; wohl, so wird sie den
Geist des Universums personifizieren und Ihr werdet einen Gott haben; hängt sie am
Verstande, so daß es Euch immer klar vor Augen steht, Freiheit habe nur Sinn im
Einzelnen und fürs Einzelne; wohl, so werdet Ihr eine Welt haben und keinen Gott. Ihr,
hoffe ich, werdet es für keine Lästerung halten, daß Glaube an Gott abhängt von der
Richtung der Phantasie; Ihr werdet wissen daß Phantasie das höchste und ursprünglichste
ist im Menschen, und außer ihr alles nur Reflexion über sie; Ihr werdet es wissen daß
Eure Phantasie es ist, welche für Euch die Welt erschafft, und daß Ihr keinen Gott haben
könnt ohne Welt.602

The human religious organ is dual, active and passive, positive and negative. It treats the
world, which is a precipitate of its interaction with the universe, as a holy but subordinate
construction. God is not in that world but is immanent to the religious sense for the
incompleteness of that world. God, intuition, the religious organ: these represent a hole in
the graph of the universe.
Novalis worked with this problem as he developed his cosmology and Bible!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
601

“… der magische Kreis herrschender Meinungen und epidemischer Gefühle umgibt und umspielt alles.”
(Reden, p. 54.)
602
Reden, pp. 71-72.
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project, both before and in dialogue with Schleiermacher. Fragment 1144 of the
allgemeines Brouillon (AB) claims that “das Denken is, wie die Blüthe,603 gewiß nichts,
als die feinste Evolution der plastischen Kräfte… Die Denkorgane sinde die
Weltzeugungs—die Natursgeschlechtsteile.”604,605 The universe is interrupted, for
Novalis as for Schleiermacher, by a constitutive partiality. Novalis more than
Schleiermacher articulates the part-object “world” as the precipitate of the organs of
thought606:
Diese höhere Bildung… benutzt die Welt, die eben deshalb Welt ist, weil sie sich nicht
vollständig und Total bestimmt—und also noch mannichfach anderwärts her bestimmbar
bleibt… Zur Welt gehört also alles, was sich nicht abs[olut] vollständig bestimmt… und
dadurch gestört und im Wesentlichen verändert wird.607

Bildung becomes mutual—yet constitutively incomplete—through its organs. Those
organs, in stark constrast to those of the Herderian system, are not placeholders for
enjoyment. They are not merely relata, but determining actors in the interrupted universe.
Where the Ideen had insisted on the complete teleological self-enjoyment of God’s
universe, the dialogue Gott. Einige Gespräche, was even more emphatic. In the final
discussion, the revised Spinozan universe is gathered into a series of laws. Organic
unities subsist and persist; they amalgamate themselves with similarities, and resist the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Because the next fragment goes on to claim that “D[ie] Blüthe ist das Symbol des Geheimnisses unsers
Geistes” (HKA III, p. 477), we should think of the only series of philosophical fragments Novalis published
during his lifetime, Blüthenstaub, as the plastic sediment of the Romantic brain.!
604
HKA III, p. 476.
605
Novalis’s reading of Fichte has one valence based on this very notion: “Fichtes Philosophie ist ein
Denkerzeugungsproceß oder Organisationsproc[eß] – ein Phaenomèn selbst, ode rein Factum.” (HKA III,
p. 477.) Jürgen Daiber has shown the extent to which Novalis treats the Fichtean complex as experiment—
and thus makes literature experimental. See Jürgen Daiber, “Experimentalphysik des Geistes” – Novalis
und das romantische Experiment (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).
606
In his most complete theoretical statement, the Logological Fragments and Poëticismen, Novalis writes
that the world is like “ein Niederschlag aus der Menschennatur… so ist die Götterwelt eine Sublimation—
Beyde geschehen uno actu—Kein plastisches Praecipitat, ohne geistiges Sublimat.” (HKA II, p. 531)
607
HKA II, p. 554. See also: “Gott und Welt ensteht zugleich”—the complex is contained in the singular
conjugation)—“durch eine Zersetzung der Menschennatur.” (HKA II, p. 554.) And: “Das Praecipitat des
Lebens ist ein Lebendiges… Das Produkt ist Leben” (HKA II, p. 556) And again: “Ein vollkommen
vernünftiges Weses kann nicht einmal gedacht werden—ohne um diesen Gedanken zu wissen und ihn mit
zu bestimmen. (Gott etc.)”
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dissimilar; and they “imprint” themselves internally and on other beings through a
process called “similarization” (Verähnlichung).608 As the rules unfold, the properties of
opposition are included in a plane of immanent organic unfolding. The plenum persists.
The universe is infinite, includes God and the self-naming animal (the human), and is
even temporal.609 But it suffers no break.
Kant had, in his inaugural dissertation of 1770, defined a world as the result of
synthesis:
In composito substantiali, quemadmodum analysis non terminator nisi parte quae non est
totum, h.e. SIMPLICI, ita synthesis nonnisi toto quod non est parts, i.e. MUNDO.610

Here we have another example of the de-specified Critical system. Novalis strips away
the specifics of the faculties, not to return to the noumenal metaphysics of the inaugural
dissertation, but in the service of a construction that maintains its organological status on
the edge of reality and ideality. It is literally in process, chiasmically extending to both
total object (world) and total subject (spirit), but based in the systemic attitude that
system is not representationally complete. It is only in such a system, for Novalis, that
efficacity can come to be.611 Subject and object are the result of a single mathematical
function.612 The organs of creation are holes in that graph.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The Leibnizian elements of this picture are not implicit: “Wie Leibnitz einen idealischen Einfluß der
Monaden auf einander annahm: so möchte ich diesen idealischen Einfluß zum geheimen Bande der
Schöpfung machen, das wir bei denkenden, bei handelnden Wesen unwidertreiblich und unzerstörbar
bemerken.” (Herder, Gott, p. 786.)
609
See Lovejoy, Great Chain. On the “infinity” of the universe, see Alexander Koyré, From the Closed
World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968). On the immanence of
the universe, see Hans Blumenberg, Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
1975).!!
610
AA II, p. 387.
611
Following Schlegel and Schleiermacher, here the efficacious organ is the imagination: “Theorie der
Fantasie. Sie ist das Vermögen des Plastisirens.” (HKA III, p. 401, emphasis in original). AB 327: “die
Einbildungskraft ist das würkende Princip.”
612
Fragment 900: Alles Object wird Reitz (und Formel einer neuen Objection… Es ist ein Geronnenes—
und das Subj[ect] ein Flüssiges, eine Atmosphäre. Es ist ein beständige Größe—das Subj[ect] eine
Veränderliche—Beyde in Einer Function (Ibid., emphasis in original) “Beyde Operationen sind
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The systemic incompleteness of the universe is reflected in the Romantic organ.
Novalis writes that organ into his fragments, generalizing the doctrine formally:
Werkzeuge armiren den Menschen. Man kann wohl sagen, der Mensch versteht eine Welt
hervorzubringen, es mangelt ihm nur am gehörigen Apparat, an der verhältnißmäßigen
Armatur seiner Sinneswerkzeuge. Der Anfang ist da. So liegt das Prinzip eines
Kriegsschiffes in der Idee des Schiffbaumeisters, der durch Menschenhaufen und
gehörige Werkzeuge und Materialien diesen Gedanken zu verkörpern vermag, indem er
durch alles dieses sich gleichsam zu einer ungeheuren Maschine macht. So erforderte die
Idee eines Augenblicks oft ungeheure Organe, ungeheure Massen von Materien, und der
613
Mensch ist also, wo nicht actu, doch potentia Schöpfer.

The martial organs of this anthropological textual shard include literal tools, the
senses, and the possibility of new organs (on which more below) out of the terrible
grandeur of material. The human is potentia creator, and as we shall see, this state of
potentia is anything but a mere adjective. The form of the fragment reflects the
organological program—the compact sentences filled with strained, hyperbolic
vocabulary, describe the doctrine of construction (the engineer’s ship). Just as
construction needs a principle that could make it more than the techne of machinebuilding, that could make it potentially active in the real metaphysical universe, so the
fragment needs an idea which is not stated in it. This fragment—like Hölderlin’s
Empedokles—is an invitation to construction, both of its historical and philosophical
content (what I am attempting in this chapter). The fragment is the formal consequence of
the Romantic revision of Kantian Criticism—that is, organology—because it concretizes
forms of cognition in a formal container open to revision at both the formal and contentlevels. It is the writing of the history of the a priori, of the organs of metaphysical and
ultimately political possibility.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
idealistisch. Wer sie beyde vollkommen in seiner Gewalt hat ist der magische Idealist.” (HKA 3: 301)
Letter of 27 February 1799 to Caroline Schlegel, at HKA 4: 281.
613
HKA II, pp. 452/53.
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The same view is expressed in cartographic terms by the third traveler in perhaps
the most organological of all aesthetic productions, Die Lehrlinge zu Saïs. Beginning
with an admiring plaint of an alienated apprentice in a hermetic school of nature, the
explicit goal of which is to “lift the veil of Isis,” the narrative becomes a welter of voices.
The second section, entitled laconically Die Natur, begins with a depiction of human
relations to nature, not unlike that of the Schubert’s Nachtseite lectures or
Schleiermacher’s myths about the origins of religion. This devolves into a discussion
between the apprentices on the uses of and attitudes towards nature, which is followed by
the arrival of a Gespiele who recounts the new mythological fairy-tale of Hyazinth and
Rosenblütchen. This tale repeats the structure of the entire narrative’s desire. It begins
with naïve original relation to love, continues with fascination and alienation with
another (intellectual development, presented by an old man who passes through their
hometown), and after long searching, finishes with the lifting of the veil of Isis to
reveal—Rosenblütchen. (In fragments, sometimes it is the self rather than Rosenblütchen
who is revealed.614) The apprentices leave the hall where they are gathered, and a
conversation between the forces of nature they have conjured ensues. The hall is then
occupied by a group of travelers, who carry on yet another conversation about the nature
of nature. They are then included in the group of apprentices for a final speech by the
master—yet another voice in the welter of nature-myths.
Nearly every voice in the fragment includes a consideration of instrumentality
(more on the other voices below). The third of the travelers points to the arbitrariness of
any “net” that is thrown into the sea of nature. The non-fit between system and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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For the relation of woman to the linguistic process of Bildung, see Friedrich Kittler, “"Heinrich von
Ofterdingen als Nachrichtenfluß", ed. Gerhard Schulz, Novalis. Wege der Forschung. (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986), pp. 480-508.
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experience is the condition for investigation. The voice of third traveler then switches to
the cartographic metaphor:
Glaubst du nicht, daß es gerade die gut ausgeführten Systeme sein werden, aus denen der
künftige Geograph der Natur die Data zu seiner großen Naturkarte nimmt? Sie wird er
vergleichen, und diese Vergleichung wird uns das sonderbare Land erst kennen lehren.
Die Erkenntnis der Natur wird aber noch himmelweit von ihrer Auslegung verschieden
sein. Der eigentliche Chiffrierer wird vielleicht dahin kommen, mehrere Naturkräfte
zugleich zu Hervorbringung herrlicher und nützlicher Erscheinungen in Bewegung zu
setzen, er wird auf der Natur, wie auf einem großen Instrument phantasieren können, und
doch wird er die Natur nicht verstehn.615

The experimental method makes nature an instrument, and recognition goes
systemically missing in its mapping endeavors. And yet the preparation of instrumental
data returns, in the second speech by the third traveler, in a more positive light. The map
becomes an artifact of the retrospectively real, ontological work of the cartographer.616
His work is rooted in that of the artist, whose perspective is that of the organologist:
Billig stellt der Künstler die Tätigkeit obenan, denn sein Wesen ist Tun und
Hervorbringen mit Wissen und Willen, und seine Kunst ist, sein Werkzeug zu allem
gebrauchen, die Welt auf seine Art nachbilden zu können, und darum wird das Prinzip
seiner Welt Tätigkeit, und seine Welt seine Kunst.617

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
615

HKA I, pp. 98-99.
“Sind sie mit dieser mühseligen Arbeit fertig, so ist auch unvermerkt ein höherer Geist über sie
gekommen, und es wird ihnen dann leicht, über die vorliegende Karte zu reden und jedem Suchenden
seinen Weg vorzuschreiben. Unermeßlicher Nutzen segnet ihre mühsame Arbeit, und der Grundriß ihrer
Karte wird auf eine überraschende Weise mit dem Systeme des Denkers übereinstimmen, und sie werden
diesem zum Trost gleichsam den lebendigen Beweis seiner abstrakten Sätze unwillkürlich geführt haben.”
(HKA I, p. 103.)
617
Here I cannot agree with Jocelyn Holland’s otherwise informative work on Novalis. When she claims
that “instrument” and “tool” are strictly divided from “organ” by the separation of organic and mechanical
models, she runs against Novalis’s own text. Holland writes: “Applicable in the most diverse contexts, the
instrument’s resiliency overcomes any possible tautology in the statement that it is nature, produces nature
and is also required for understanding nature.” This excellent result of her research is then extended in the
following way: “Just like the instrument which swung between the artist and the artwork, or which armed
humans to accomplish creations of immense proportions, the concept of the instrument in The Apprentices
redefines the threshold of man and nature in such a way as to complete the transition ongoing since the
Renaissance from man/microcosm to world/macroanthropos and beyond: from a definition of man based on
representation to one based on function.” (Holland, German Romanticism and Science, p. 109) In onse
sense, this is not incorrect, but it is precisely by missing the homology of Werkzeug and Organ (especially
in but not limited to the Lehrlinge), she reduces Novalis’s logic below the level of system. The point is not
that the logic of the instrument is unmechanical—or unimportant—but rather that the organ emcompasses
both sides of this logic. “Organ,” as we can see most clearly here, is not of organicist provenance, but
makes that metaphorics operate in the first place.
616
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The universe is a map, a graph, that functions and is known systematically to be
non-whole. This critical differentiation—the infinite yet discrete curve—is where the
organ finds its home. The nameless voice (the narrator) of the beginning of the second
part might be identified most strongly with the cosmology of this critical graphing. He
states, perhaps most authoritatively:
Noch früher findet man statt wissenschaftlicher Erklärungen, Märchen und Gedichte voll
merkwürdiger bildlicher Züge, Menschen, Götter und Tiere als gemeinschaftliche
Werkmeister, und hört auf die natürlichste Art die Entstehung der Welt beschreiben. Man
erfährt wenigstens die Gewißheit eines zufälligen, werkzeuglichen Ursprungs derselben,
und auch für den Verächter der regellosen Erzeugnisse der Einbildungskraft ist diese
Vorstellung bedeutend genug.618

The world comes to be as a tool. The origin is, then, the organ, real and ideal, that
makes this instrumentalization possible. To do that, the world and the subject must be
produced by an incompleteness in the universe. The cosmos is organological.
The Allgemeines Brouillon (AB) relates, under the heading “COSMOL[OGIE],”
that the organ is the integral and simultaneous differential of the opposed tendencies of
the inner and the outer. It homogenizes and separates, isolates and causes interaction. For
these two opposed techniques in constructing a graph of the cosmos, it is “ihre Function
überhaupt.”619 The organ thus makes a zero-point—its apparent unification is always
negative, because its essence is contradictory. “Mittelbarkeit,” writes Novalis, “verstärkt
die Unmittelbarkeit auf der anderen Seite… Indem sich die Organe berühren harmoniren
die Seelen620.” The organs of the universe’s incompleteness are also the organs of human
souls—in fact, the soul’s organ, as we will see, is the very contradictory function that
seeds the universe with incompleteness. It is the critical organ, the systemically necessary
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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HKA I, p. 85.
HKA III, p. 293, AB 295.
620
HKA III, p. 293. See below on the “moral organ” in the present chapter for more on the communication
of souls.
619
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split between knower and known. Novalis will not give up on this partially Kantian point,
but as we have just seen, he will literally construct disciplines from its negativity, turning
the canon of the understanding into the organ of a revised Criticism.
Much of Novalis’s writing can be understood from this vantage point. His
projects of a romantic encyclopedia and a new bible are—as we shall see—both
elaborations of this critical moment. Ultimately, the “moral organ” he borrowed and
developed from Hemsterhuis also rests on this basis, as do the political organs which
alienated him from the Jena circle. The encyclopedic project intersected with the biblical
project in just the moment of Novalis’ explicit rejection of the specific version of
Criticism that Kant had defended in the 1780s. In other words, the basis for Novalis’s
organology was a critical organ.

From the Senses to the Bible: Critical and Encyclopedic Organs

The narration—which is not ascribed to a single voice—of the beginning of the
second part of the Lehrlinge (“die Natur”) contains an anticipation of Schubert’s idea that
the observations of primordial humanity are an essential part of the history of nature
itself.621 Indeed, the organological origin of the world—its necessary production of tools
as its very nature—makes humans in turn the instruments of perception:
Wir können daher die Gedanken unsrer Altväter von den Dingen in der Welt als ein
notwendiges Erzeugnis, als eine Selbstabbildung des damaligen Zustandes der irdischen
Natur betrachten, und besonders an ihnen, als den schicklichsten Werkzeugen der
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This passage also makes clear how science and poetry share a common basis in the new mythology. Cf.,
from Blüthenstaub 110 (HKA II, p. 461): “Die Menschenwelt ist das gemeinschaftliche Organ der Götter.
Poesie vereinigt sie, wie uns.”!
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Beobachtung des Weltalls, das Hauptverhältnis desselben, das damalige Verhältnis zu
seinen Bewohnern, und seiner Bewohner zu ihm, bestimmt abnehmen.622

For Kant, our cognitive tools were too deeply hidden and ultimately incapable of
providing rational insight into the ground of cognition623; for Schelling, the “hidden”
organ was not too deep, but lay in the incomplete but complementary methods of
Naturphilosophie and transcendental idealism. Novalis targets not the hiddenness of the
organ but its capacity, its technical failure for Kant. The organs of those primordial
observers, themselves tools of observation, stand in for a technical capacity of the organ
which Novalis would develop in a vast discourse of the organ. This term runs throughout
his work, as we have already begun to see. In the last years of his life, it became the
explicit topic of conceptual and mythological concern—indeed, it demonstrates the link
between Novalis’ philosophical and cultural-technological projects. The hole in the
universe makes the critical-encyclopedic project possible, and makes its characterization
as a Bible necessary. Those projects are supported by a “Critique of organs” in which
organs are fungible, historical, new. The possibility of such organs—the possibility of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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HKA I, p. 83.!Cf. Blüthenstaub 78 (HKA II, pp. 448/49), which defends the same position while
adumbrating the metaphysical judgmentalism of organology: “In den ersten Zeiten der Entdeckung der
Urtheilskraft war jedes neue Urtheil ein Fund. Der Werth dieses Fundes stieg, je anwendbarer, je
fruchtbarer dieses Urtheil war. Zu Sentenzen, die uns jetzt sehr gemein vorkommen, gehörte damals noch
ein ungewöhnlicher Grad von Leben des Verstandes. Man mußte Genie und Scharfsinn aufbieten, um
mittelst des neuen Werkzeugs neue Verhältnisse zu finden. Die Anwendung desselben auf die
eigenthümlichsten, interessantesten und allgemeinsten Seiten der Menschheit mußte vorzügliche
Bewunderung erregen und die Aufmerksamkeit aller guten Köpfe auf sich ziehn. So entstanden die
gnomischen Massen, die man zu allen Zeiten und bey allen Völkern so hoch geschätzt hat. Es wäre leicht
möglich, daß unsere jetzigen genialischen Entdeckungen im Laufe der Zeiten ein ähnliches Schicksal träfe.
Es könnte leicht eine Zeit kommen, wo das alles so gemein wäre, wie jetzt Sittensprüche, und neue,
erhabenere Entdeckungen den rastlosen Geist der Menschen beschäftigten.”
623
“Ins Innere der Natur dringt Beobachtung und Zergliederung der Erscheinungen, und man kann nicht
wissen, wie weit dieses mit der Zeit gehen werde. Jene transzendentale Fragen aber, die ueber die Natur
hinausgehen, wuerden wir bei allem dem doch niemals beantworten koennen, wenn uns auch die ganze
Natur aufgedeckt waere, da es uns nicht einmal gegeben ist, unser eigenes Gemuet mit einer andern
Anschauung, als der unseres inneren Sinnes, zu beobachten. Denn in dem selben liegt das Geheimnis des
Ursprungs unserer Sinnlichkeit. Ihre Beziehung auf ein Objekt, und was der transzendentale Grund dieser
Einheit sei, liegt ohne Zweigel zu tief verborgen, als dass wir, die wir so gar uns selbst nur durch innern
Sinn, mithin als Erscheinung, kennen, ein so unschickliches Werkzeug unserer Nachforschung dazu
brauchen koennten, etwas anderes, als immer wiederum Erscheinungen, aufzufinden, deren nichtsinnliche
Ursache wir doch gern erforschen wollten.” (KdrV B334/A278.)
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possibility, as we will see—makes radical politics in an organological vein necessary.
The entirety of this project is sketched in a series of extraordinary letters between
Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel from the fall of 1798 to the spring of 1799 (see the
appendix to this chapter). The letters are the best surviving example of what the friends
called Symphilosophie. As such, they attest to the breadth of the project, which included
Schlegel’s novel Lucinde, Novalis’ encyclopedic and biblical efforts, Schlegel’s own
notion of a Bible—all on the basis of a new philosophy.
The central statement is Novalis’ response to Schlegel’s mention of a reiteration
in the footsteps of Muhammad and Luther, literature as Bible:
Du schreibst von Deinem Bibelproject und ich bin auf meinem Studium der Wissenschaft
überhaupt – und ihres Körpers, des Buchs – ebenfalls auf die Idee der Bibel gerathen –
der Bibel – des des Ideals jedweden Buchs. Die Theorie der Bibel entwickelt, giebt die
Theorie der Schriftstellerey oder der Wortbildnerey überhaupt – die zugleich die
symbolische, indirecte, Constructionslehre des schaffenden Geistes abgiebt. Du wirst aus
dem Brief an die Schwägerinn sehn, daß mich eine vielumfassende Arbeit beschäftigt –
die für diesen Winter meine ganze Thätigkeit absorbirt.
Dies soll nichts anders, als eine Kritik des Bibelprojects – ein Versuch einer
Universalmethode des Biblisirens – die Einleitung zu einer ächten Encyklopädistik
werden.
Ich denke hier Wahrheiten und Ideen im Großen – genialische Gedanken zu erzeugen –
ein lebendiges, wissenschaftliches Organon hervorzubringen – und durch diese
synkritische Politik der Intelligenz mir den Weg zur ächten Praxis – dem wahrhaften
Reunionsprozess – zu bahnen.624

The Book625 is a function, and Novalis wants to offer its Critique. The introduction or
propadeutic to the New Bible would be the creation of a universal method: an organon
that would offer—perhaps surprisingly—two only slightly distinct objects, an
encyclopedia and a Bible.626 The quoted passage demonstrates the compact presentation
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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HKA IV, pp. 262-63.!
625

Both encyclopedias and bibles can be placed in the superlative category. For the former, see the
excellent treatment by Chad Wellmon, ““Touching Books: Diderot, Novalis and the Encyclopedia of the
Future,” Representations (114:1), 2011, pp. 65-102. His focus on the materiality of the Book is an
important corrective to the idealizing tendencies in the historiography of the new mythology in general.
626
The obvious reference is to Kant’s claim that the Kritik is a universal method for philosophy, not that
philosophy itself. For the pre-history of the encyclopedic relation to the Bible in the Enlightenment, see
Jonathan Sheehan, “From Philology to Fossils: The Biblical Encyclopedia in Early Modern Europe,”
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of the entirety of the project. The proposed project moves extensively towards a new
religion, even as it seeks to deepen its approach on the basis of a doctrine of spiritual
construction tied to organological metaphysics.627 This project then becomes the basis for
a synkritische Politik der Intelligenz (which, in Novalis’ vocabulary, means both
“intelligentsia” and “intelligence”). The connection, in the context of the encyclopedia, to
syncretism is clear. “Syncriticism” would then be a collection of disciplines—this is how
Novalis imagines the encyclopedia—connecting concrete organs to metaphysics and
critique. He writes of this collective discipline as a “Bahn zur ächten Praxis…
Vervollkommnung der intellectualen Werckzeuge…”628 The Bible and encyclopedia
projects seems to run together, each containing a generalized Critique followed by
content. In each case, too, the content will be treated substantially from the perspective of
the Critical organ. This is why Novalis takes issue with the demotion of organon in the
Streit. For him, the critical container will be the Bible, indeed the Bible will be an organ
of Critique or an organon for metaphysics. Novalis takes direct aim at Kant:
Kants Streit der Facultaeten ist ein schönes Advocatenspecimen – ein Gewebe feiner
Chikanen. Kant wird jezt, wie ihr Leibnitz beschuldigt, juristisch – und es ist von Anfang
an, etwas gewesen. Die phil[osophische] Facultaet ist, wie der ärgste Sünder, am besten
zu vertheidigen. Die phil[osophische] Darstellung dieses Streits wäre die schönste
Defension der phil[osophischen] Facultaet gewesen. Kant ist, in Beziehung auf die Bibel,
nicht a la Hauteur.629

In the intention to build an encyclopedia, Novalis marks Kantian Discipline as his point
of reference. Kant misunderstands something about the Bible, he cuts through its
possibilities too quickly, indeed legalistically. Novalis goes so far as to accuse Kant’s
treatment of the university faculties as non-philosophical.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Journal of the History of Ideas (64: 1), 2003, pp. 41-60. For a more general treatment by the same author,
The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
627
On Novalis’’ notion and practice of construction, see Gaier, Krumme Regel.
628
HKA III, p. 432; AB 841. This passage has three genetives: der Werckzeuge, der Fernröhre, and der
Theorieen, demonstrating the generality of Novalis’s organology.
629
HKA IV, p. 264.
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The disagreement is actually fourfold. Novalis and Schlegel are both working
with Lessing’s Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, which had claimed that a new
“gospel of Reason” must be written. Indeed, Lessing had gone so far in that work as to
say that revelation was not rational, but that the revealed was given to humans in order to
be made rational. That formula of intentional secular reduction—preserving, as it does,
the now disputed content of dogma—is the precursor to Schleiermacher’s play of
negative and positive as much as of the New Bible project.630 Schlegel’s nostalgia for
Lessing—if only he were still alive, much of the project would not be necessary—makes
up the one axis of this complex. The other is Novalis’ engagement with Kant, which, in
spite of his uncharacteristically negative designations, is terminologically deep.
We have seen the development of disciplinary organs in Kant’s Streit der
Facultäten (in the context of the return of metaphysics in biological discourse in the
1790s, in chapter II of the present study). Novalis singles out the demotion not of the
theological faculty but of the organa of the faculties in general. Indeed, the accusation of
legalism is tied to just this terminological shift. Novalis’ dual project—encyclopedia and
Bible—is an organon in the sense Kant had abandoned in the 1770s. This designation is
not accidental—it is a reaction to a close reading of the Streit.
The specific conflict between the theological and the philosophical faculty—the
“legal” version of this conflict631—is that between Kirchenglaube and Vernunftglaube.632
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Schleiermacher is actually less optimistic about the written as a medium of religion: “Jede heilige
Schrift ist nur ein Mausoleum der Religion ein Denkmal, daß ein großer Geist da war, der nicht mehr da ist;
denn wenn er noch lebte und wirkte, wie würde er einen so großen Wert auf den toten Buchstaben legen,
der nur ein schwacher Abdruck von ihm sein kann? Nicht der hat Religion, der an eine heilige Schrift
glaubt, sondern der welcher keiner bedarf, und wohl selbst eine machen könnte.” (Reden, p. 68.)
631
Kant separates between “illegal” and “legal” forms of these conflicts. Those which are geseztwidrig are
based on the higher faculties attempting to usurp the truth-tribunal of the philosophical faculty, either
through pretension or through governmental manipulation. Those which are gesetzmäßig are arguments
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This division is in the Bible itself, according to Kant, but only in the way in which is read
by the different faculties. The philosophical reading, which insists on the rational kernel
of moral teachings, is the canon of religion in general. The higher faculty’s reading,
which is based on revelation, and focuses on the content of the stories, is the organon of
religion. The Streit had demoted organon to an “aid” or “help” for practice in each higher
faculty. The Bible is precisely this demoted tool, insofar as it is read by the higher
faculty. It is the source of dogma, which finds its disciplinary home in the pulpit. Kant
glosses organon with the even more deflationary Vehikel, which is repeated throughout
the text.633 The legalism that Novalis detects is not in the separation of the faculties, but
in the disciplinary rejection of their substantial and political disagreement. Novalis agreed
with Schleiermacher that substantial disagreement could be both politically and
religiously salutary.
Fragment 782 of the AB informs us that “Gegen Kants Streit d[er] Facult[äten] ist
sehr viel zu erinnern.” For Novalis, as a practitioner of the new mythology trying to
create a new Book, the restrictions the Streit terminologically placed on communication
between the faculties could not be normatively accepted. And in fact, the hermeneutic
and disciplinary problems presented in this debate went, for him, to the very heart of the
Critical project. With Schlegel and Schleiermacher in dialogue, Novalis specifies his
complaint against the Streit:
Religionslehre ist wissensch[aftliche] Poësie. Poësie ist unter d[en] Empfindungen – was
Phil[osophie] in Beziehung auf Gedanken ist.
(Selbstgedanke – Selbstempfindung.)

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
about truth’s social and technical application and its convenience to historical and governmental
circumstance.!!
632
The religion of reason was first fully articulated in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, and it
was the censoring of that book which prevented the Streit’s publication until 1798. See chapter II above.
633
The first gloss is at AA II, p. 37, and is followed at pp. 42, 44, 45 48, 51, and 53. Once the gloss has
occurred, Kant no longer uses organon.
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Religion ist Synth[esis] von Gefühl und Gedanke oder Wissen
Rel[igions]Lehre ist also eine Synthesis von
Poëtik und Philosophik.
Hier enstehn ächte Dogmata – ächte Erfahrungssätze, d.h. aus Vernunfts[ätzen] (Direct) –
Philosophemen – und Glaubenssätzen (indirect) – Poëmen – wahrhaft zusammengesezte
– nicht gegens[eitig] beschränkte, sonder vielmehr gegens[eitig] bestärkte und erweiterte
Sätze.
(Vernunft ist director Poët – direct produktive Imag[ination] –
Glauben ist indirecter Poët indirect prod[uktive] Imag[ination].)634

The poet writes dogma from the productive imagination of reason (which constitutes the
world) and the indirect production of belief. The “self-thought” of reason must remain in
contact with the “self-sensation” of feeling, in which religious feeling emerges. In one
sense, religion unites poetry in philosophy; in another, poetry is the container of actual
dogmata. Derived from dokein (“to seem (to one),” but also “to think”), Kant’s excluded
word becomes the temporary crystallization of experience, the expressive moment
between the self-reflexive systems of reason and of feeling. It seems that dogmata are
simply propositions that combine these two: in short, synthetic judgments a priori. The
metaphysics of everyday judgment is built into the heart of the new religion.
The producer of dogmata will turn out to be the organ, nestled in the definitional
core of the organon, Bible and encyclopedia. Novalis writes, just before the above
quotation:
Tödtet der Mystizism d[ie] Vernunft? – Kant meint den Dogmatism – Dogmatism ist
Verhältnißaufhebende etc. Thätigkeit oder Unthätigkeit.635

This unusual definition of dogmatism after Kant contains the whole vision of the organon
for metaphysics. The larger difference between Kant and Novalis on the score of
mysticism highlights the difference in their Bible teachings; the central adjective
“relation-canceling” the difference in their conceptions of Critique. What relation would
be cancelled in dogmatic thought?
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HKA III, pp. 420-21.
HKA III, p. 420.!
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As we have seen, Kant’s Bible is hermeneutically divided between faculties, and
their communication is a “legal” battle over political pragmatics. The Bible is a mere
ecclesiastical vehicle. It is, however, the document of the canon, too: it contains the truths
of reason and of reason’s belief, which the philosophical faculty must unearth. Novalis’
Bible is a function, and an object. It is a book, containing a record of real dogmata, a
history of organological Nature. It thus both contains the historical truth and is irrelevant
otherwise. Its own history, as Book, makes up its true worth. Not the content—not even
the rational kernel we might and should discover by reading the Bible—but the
collocation and cultural force of the Bible should interest, for Novalis. The Bible is
simply the total container of teachings—dogmata, results—and must therefore be
reproduced. The assumption is that ächte Dogmata, philosophy itself, will change over
time. The Bible must reflect the dual histories of self-sensation and self-thought.
If these histories are synthetic judgments a priori, why is “dogmatism”
characterized as “relation-cancelling”? (Note that Verhältnißaufhebende applies only to
Thätigkeit, thus making Unthätigkeit appositive to Dogmatism and a gloss on
Verhältnisaufhebende Thätigkeit.) What relation is meant? Dogmatism is, according to
Kant, the doctrines of reason without a previous critique of the faculties. The relation
cancelled in dogmatic thought is thus that between Critique and philosophy. Philosophy
by itself is the production of dogmata without the built-in assurance of their source and
location in the system of knowledge. Novalis’ reading of this problem agrees with the
basic gesture: activity that cancels the self-reflexive examination of cognition in its very
acts is actually not activity. Ächte Dogmata are those which are produced with critical
energy, with simultaneous attention to form (thought) and content (feeling, likely here by
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Schleiermacher’s lights)—or they are those teachings which are subjected retroactively to
such critique with sensitivity to the historical circumstance of both parts of cognition.
That is, the Bible is the totality of propositions produced by a certain doctrine of
judgment itself, a certain moment in the hylomorphy of human cognition. Their truth is in
their witnessing, as the Lehrlinge has it on my reading above, of the condition of the
constructed world, natural as well as social, at a certain time. The critique of the Bible is
thus an organon for reading itself—this is why it overlaps with the encyclopedic
project—or for the evaluation of judgments as producing the relation between selfknowledge and knowledge. If that relation also produces the non-whole world (and we
shall see that it does), then the Book is an organon for metaphysics.
The bearer of such historically critical dogmata cannot be the proposition, which,
by Kant’s own admission, is not in itself critical. The name for that bearer is organ.
Novalis transcribes from the KdrV in his Kant-Studien:
Dogmatism hingegen ist dogmatisches Verfahren der reinen Vern[unft] ohne
vorangehende Kritik ihres Organs.636

Either Novalis has here confused this with later passages,637 or “organ” simply makes
more sense to him as a characterization of the parts of intelligence. In any case, Kant had
actually written that “Dogmatismus ist also das dogmatische Verfahren der reinen
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HKA II, p. 388.
Specifically: “In der Ausführung also des Plans, den die Kritik vorschreibt, d. i. im künftigen System der
Metaphysik, müssen wir dereinst der strengen Methode des berühmten Wolf, des größten unter allen
dogmatischen Philosophen, folgen, der zuerst das Beispiel gab, (und durch dies Beispiel der Urheber des
bisher noch nicht erloschenen Geistes der Gründlichkeit in Deutschland wurde,) wie durch gesetzmäßige
Feststellung der Prinzipien, deutliche Bestimmung der Begriffe, versuchte Strenge der Beweise, Verhütung
kühner Sprünge in Folgerungen der sichere Gang einer Wissenschaft zu nehmen sei, der auch eben darum
eine solche, als Metaphysik ist, in diesen Stand zu versetzen vorzüglich geschickt war, wenn es ihm
beigefallen wäre, durch Kritik des Organs, nämlich der reinen Vernunft selbst, sich das Feld vorher zu
bereiten: ein Mangel, der nicht sowohl ihm, als vielmehr der dogmatischen Denkungsart seines Zeitalters
beizumessen ist, und darüber die Philosophen seiner sowohl, als aller vorigen Zeiten einander nichts
vorzuwerfen haben.” (KdrV B xxxvi-xxxvii; emphasis in original.)
637
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Vernunft, ohne vorangehende Kritik ihres eigenen Vermögens.”638 The shift from
Vermögen to Organ reflects the entire program of organology. It shows, for Novalis, how
Critique can be itself non-dogmatic (or non-“negatively dogmatic,” as Fichte had had it—
see chapter III above). By making Critique a question of organs, fundamentally in
development as judgmental combinations of the physical and the spiritual, Novalis insists
on the history of possibility, indeed on the possibility of possibility. He comments on his
transcription:
/Kritik ist Bildung für das Vernunftorgan, durch Lenkung der Aufmercksamkeit auf
dasselbe – man erwirbt sich durch die Kritik sichern Sinn für das Venrunftorgan, so daß
man es brauchen und seine Functionen von allen andern streng unterscheiden lernt./639

Critique is an experiment, and makes pure reason into an organ. Indeed, it involves itself
in the development of the actual organs, and in so doing, means to provide the substantial
link between the general (metaphysics) and the particular (the individual disciplines of
the encyclopedic efforts).640 Organ is no longer taken only as the physical sense-organ,
but in the breadth of its etymological possiblities. The Bible as organon of the
encyclopedia makes the relation between the general and the particular substantial. We
have, no longer disciplinary organs, but disciplines as organs. Critique, in order to avoid
dogmatism, must particularize its object. The faculties under Kant’s investigation become
the generalized organs under Novalis’. These organs can be literally anything (see the
epigraph). Thus, the organon of the encyclopedia, which is also the new Bible, is a
discipline Novalis dubs Organologie:
ORGANOLOGIE. Das Werckzeug, als solches, läßt sich nicht müßig denken. Ein Organ
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KdrV, B xxxv; emphasis in original. !
HKA II, p. 388.
640
That this is so is supported by the various entries on Encyclopaedistik in the AB. Those are AB passages
69, 90, 92, 176, 282, and 552. Together these passages emphasize that the instruments of the various
sciences are made instrumental first by the generality of the encyclopedic effort, which also makes the
various sciences themselves organs.
638
639
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ist, seinem Begriff nach, in Bewegung und mithin in Verbindung mit seinem Reitz theils
unmittelbar, theils mittelbar durch das Produkt. Der todte Körper todt gedacht wird uns
keine Aufschlüsse über die Kraft geben, und ihre Verbunding mit ihm. Beobachtet das
lebendige Organ und das bewegte Werkzeug.641

Werkzeug here is constrasted with Organ, but only to point out a higher concept of the
organ, which applies to both.642 That higher concept grounds Novalis’ replacement for
Kantian Critique, organology. Indeed, the concept of the organ here comes to replace the
metaphorically organic judgment I located in Kant’s doctrine of judgment in chapter I
above. Organs are the forms of judgment, and they make what Novalis calls “magical
idealism”—and what I will call “transcendental realism” to de-mystify the doctrine (see
below)—possible. They are both called organology because the organs, physical and
cognitive, that they attend to and eventually manipulate, cover the expanse of being in
general and in particular.
If organs are the forms of judgment, then we must ask, what is the difference
between an organ and a category? For Kant, the categories were unities of judgment
under which synthesis (of intuitions and concepts) occur. “Organ” for Novalis is a
designation of the form of that synthesis as it occurs. “Higher realism” is attention to the
categories that holds open the possibility of their own development. Novalis writes:
Höhere Physik, oder höhere Mathematik oder ein Gemisch von beyden wurde immer
unter Phil[osophie] bisher verstanden. Man suchte durch Phil[osophie] immer etwas
werckstellig zu machen – man suchte ein allvermögendes Organ in der Philosophie.
Magischer Idealism.643

This description of the historical search for an organon intentionally conflates that term
with the organs at issue in “magical idealism,” the distinctive doctrine that, over time,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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HKA III, p. 332; AB 453.
Ulrich Stadler has investigated the structure of the Werkzeug in great detail. I am in agreement with his
two fundamental points, that the tool makes both its user and its use also take on the character of mediation,
and that this mediation can, for Novalis, raise itself to a “higher” immediate mediation. See Ulrich Stadler,
Die theuren Dinge (Bern/Munich: Francke, 1980), pp. 150-83. See also HKA III, p. 391; AB 656-58, which
is Stadler’s most important text.
643
HKA III, p. 385; AB 642.
642
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humans should make their involuntary organs fully voluntary. Its classical statement is:
Der thätige Gebrauch der Organe ist nichts, als magisches, wunderthätiges Denken, oder
willkührlicher Gebrauch der Körperwelt—denn Willen ist nichts, als magisches, kräftiges
Denkvermög[en].644

“Magic” functions for Novalis as a way of talking about real interactions between
seemingly opposed entities, like body and soul.645 Novalis thus reads the history of
metaphysics as the search for an organ of intervention in the world, the first site of which
will be our own bodies. This is because they are the site of our specific, historical organs,
and the users of tools more generally. As he writes in Blüthenstaub:
Werkzeuge armiren den Menschen. Man kann wohl sagen, der Mensch versteht eine Welt
hervorzubringen, es mangelt ihm nur am gehörigen Apparat, an der verhältnißmäßigen
Armatur seiner Sinneswerkzeuge. Der Anfang ist da. So liegt das Prinzip eines
Kriegsschiffes in der Idee des Schiffbaumeisters, der durch Menschenhaufen und
gehörige Werkzeuge und Materialien diesen Gedanken zu verkörpern vermag, indem er
durch alles dieses sich gleichsam zu einer ungeheuren Maschine macht. So erforderte die
Idee eines Augenblicks oft ungeheure Organe, ungeheure Massen von Materien, und der
646
Mensch ist also, wo nicht actu, doch potentia Schöpfer.

The sense themselves become historical, their respective fields of potential a matter of
Potenzen or possibility.647 This solves a preliminary difficulty in considering organology
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HKA III, p. 466; AB 1075.!
645

See HKA III,pp. 266-67 and p. 297; AB 137 and 322. HKA III, p. 301; AB 338 makes clear that magical
idealism is tied to the outside world coming under rational control as well, and this under the heading
METAPHYSIK. For the latter to make sense, organology must be the base discipline. The best treatment of
this doctrine is still Manfred Frank, “Die Philosophie des sogenannten magischen Idealismus,” in Manfred
Frank, Auswege aus dem deutschen Idealismus (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2007), pp. 27-67.
646
HKA II, pp. 452/53. This is a base-text for Holland’s investigation, and undermines the strict separation
between Werkzeug and Organ. Although they are not identical, their relation is hardly one of analogy
across the divide of mechanism and “organicism.” Instead, instrumental capability is intimately linked to
having organs, which are in turn the precipitate of “higher organs.” It is the latter that must be realized and
changed in the course of philosophy. HKA III, pp. 401-03; AB 702 claims that nature is simply “more” after
it has passed through the philosophical organ. See pp. 295 ff. in the current chapter above for a formal
reading of this fragment.
647
As Daiber has pointed out, Novalis differs from his friend Ritter on the score of experimentation,
because Novalis does not think that mere experiment will answer transcendental questions (Daiber,
Experimentalphysik, pp. 99-115). Here we can see why: organs are not merely physical locations, nor are
they transcendent sources of truth. They are always split between their physical and spiritual
determinations—they are always the forms of possible judgment. Physiology and medicine are treated
always from this perspective, where organ is both the concrete and physical location of a sense, and the
potentially ideal historical condition of magical reality (possibility). See HKA III, pp. 307-08 (AB 370-72);
pp. 314-15 (AB 399); pp. 317-19 (AB 409); pp. 322-23 (AB 437); pp. 327-29 (AB 446); pp. 331-32 (AB
452); pp. 369-71 (AB 593).
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a revision of Critique. There can be no Kantian critique of organs—indeed, for Kant,
organs fall into the realm of physiology (thus the medical faculty) because they are
empirical. The KdrV often rejects the notion of a “physiology” of reason. Novalis
responds with magical idealism.
While the latter doctrine seems a good candidate for hermetic obscurantism, it is
based on a specific doctrine of the senses that frees them from the limitations of their
fields of potential. Novalis makes this move by identifying Sinn and Werkzeug:
Sinn ist ein Werkzeug – ein Mittel. Ein absoluter Sinn wäre Mittel und Zweck
zugleich.648

The sentence makes up the distance between magical idealism and transcendental
idealism, by making the field of possibility of any given sense into an instrument itself.
Novalis elsewhere calls this Organibilität.649 Between the specifics of supposedly
material and the generalities of the supposedly rational lies the previously experienced
mixture of the two through an open-ended formation called “organ.” The sense attached
to the organ is in turn the organ of philosophy itself. Fields of potential, precipitated out
of historical formations of this very site of the formation of categories,650 become
fungible. Their activity is the activity of the universe. They are the organs of
transcendental realism.
Transcendental realism is my name for this doctrine, the most robust form of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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HKA II, p. 550. Stadler understands this passage in terms of his “general mediation” thesis. I agree, but
there is more to the story.
649
HKA III, p. 665.
650
Historical development, which precipitates and sublimates organs from the primordially organological
cosmos, introduces intertia into their “lower” forms. So HKA II, pp. 450/51; Blüthenstaub 80: “Eine
allzugroße Dienstfertigkeit der Organe würde dem irdischen Daseyn gefährlich seyn. Der Geist in seinem
jetzigen Zustande würde eine zerstörende Anwendung davon machen. Eine gewisse Schwere des Organs
hindert ihn an allzuwillkührlicher Thätigkeit, und reizt ihn zu einer regelmäßigen Mitwirkung, wie sie sich
für die irdische Welt schickt. Es ist unvollkommener Zustand desselben, daß ihn diese Mitwirkung so
ausschließlich an diese Welt bindet. Daher ist sie ihrem Prinzip nach terminirt.” Similarly at HKA III, p.
281; AB 235, which describes organs as excrement.
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Romantic organology. I use this name because “magic” denotes the real for Novalis,
while idealism refers to the conditions of possibility that Kant calls “transcendental.”651
The organs of that philosophy, however, are in development. This means that they are not
merely developmental or evolutionary factors in biological mass, but instead mark the
history of possibility. Possibility is not, as Kant had had it, the formal coincidence of
categorical contribution on our part with time as a form of intuition. Instead, it is the very
hole in the graph of the universe. The divide between subject and object, which is also the
condition of possibility for their reunification in each judgment, takes on different forms
according to the whole complex of human natural, social, and indeed cultural-political
perception and action.652 The only word that could characterize that form in general was
organ.
Novalis shares the approach that Fichte had given to Schelling, that of
methodological stringency, the deferral of the question of the thing until the form-content
complexes of judgment began to respond to this question independently. Schelling
presented this approach in latency, always incomplete, always anticipatory; it is made a
complete program by Novalis. The statement of transcendental realism is that sense is
organ, where “organ” denotes both the physical locus of the sense and its
instrumentalization—Organibilität. The distance from the precipitate of the specific,
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Novalis suggests something similar to this in HKA III, p. 401; AB 694: “Schmerz muß Täuschung sein.
(Alle Erfahrung ist Magie – nur magisch erklärbar – Verminderung und Concentration d[er] Erfahrung.
Vermindung und Concentration der Speculation. Der Empirism endigt mit einer einzigen Idee, wie der
Rationalism mit einer einzigen Erfahrung anfängt. (Empirischer Idealism – und Realism. Rationeller
Realism und Idealism.)” And similarly at HKA III, p. 316; AB 402 (emphasis in original): “Der Idealism ist
nichts, als ächter Empirism.”
652
So HKA III, p. 333; AB 457: “PHIL[OSOPHIE]. Synth[etische] Urtheile sind genialische—nicht
antinomische, einseitige Urtheile – Eine Art von einseitigen Urtheilen begreift der Idealismus – die Andre
der Realismus. Die synth[etischen] Urtheile begreift der Kriticism. Methode des Synth[etischen]
Urtheilens—System der synth[etischen] Urtheile. Gemeiner—höherer Kriticismus. Angewandter
Kriticism.” Critique is thus, through the filter of the forms of judgment in development (organs, or the
possibility of experience as the possibility of possibility), the substantial link between Bible, encyclopedia,
and the individual disciplines.
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physical organ (which is defined literally and traditionally as the locus of a field of
possibility) to the organ as the use of the senses is the distance from transcendental
idealism (even in its stringent forms in Fichte and to an extent in Schelling) to
transcendental realism, which is magical idealism. By conceiving of the senses as loci of
possibility precipitated out of an instrumentally emergent “world,” Novalis literalizes
“organ” both as and across the divide of object and subject. The effect for metaphysics
and politics is that the world is then fully potentially constructible, but only in absolute
devotion to its precipitated form. Construction becomes the instrument of the invention of
what would be called categories.653 The categories as Kant speaks of them are the
universal subjective forms of the world. The Copernican revolution, traditionally
understood, is just this reversal: the world’s very ability to appear (Erscheinung) is
formally subsumed under the categories, while what appears is a matter of contingency
(from a categorial or conceptual standpoint). Rather than making what appears a
necessity, Novalis makes the form of its appearance (what Kant calls possible
experience) also “contingent.” But here, one should say possible. The Copernican
revolution made the lawfulness of Newton’s universe reflect in the lawfulness of the
subject, freeing the flow of phenomena from rational anticipation and the rational will
from empirical determination. Novalis responded by making the subject’s very
lawfulness a half-phenomenal flow—Bildung des Vernunftorgans. The phenomenal
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Novalis mentions the categories in AB 820, where he argues that Kriticism has provided a new way of
looking at the link between subject and object, as one of active appropriation and self-alienation. The
upshot is that “wir erblicken uns im System, als Glied.” Humans becomes organs, partial points of contact
between substances in the universe—nowhere is the link between metaphysics and politics more clearly
suggested. HKA III, p. 297; AB 321: “[MENSCH[EN]L[EHRE]. Der Mensch soll ein vollkommenes und
Totales S e l b s t w e r c k z e u g seyn.” Novalis often describes humans as organs, as Stadler rightly
insists. Examples are at HKA III, p. 292 (AB 291); and HKA III, pp. 410-11 (AB 737). For Novalis’s
anthropology, see Chad Wellmon, “Lyrical Feeling: Novalis' Anthropology of the Senses,” Studies in
Romanticism 47: 4 (2008), pp. 453-77; Holland, Procreative Poetics, pp. 85-113; and Florian Roder,
Menschwerdung des Menschen: der magische Idealismus im Werke des Novalis (Stuttgart: Mayer, 1997).
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freedom of the world in Kant is transferred to the transcendental subject, which is thereby
not simply reified but made real in Kant’s sense, in principle open to new discoveries,
new and higher and more rational unities. So far from trapping the world in the net of the
subject, this makes the world, for Novalis, first cognizable, first the property of cognition
with its palette of categories, intuitions, feelings, sensations. In short, perception imposes
an open framework on its resulting objects, but neither the object nor the subject
ultimately precedes that interaction. The program of systemic imposition thus has to
proceed by painstaking attention to the appearance qua organ. Thus Novalis’ method is in
a third position with respect to Kant and Fichte, whom he characterizes as “lower and
higher natural history.”654 Kant has removed the one-sidedness of scientific construction
according to a “single criterion” (the sun), and Fichte has uncovered the laws of the
multiple-criterion system. Fichte is thus the “Neuton” or “2te[r] Copernikus,” the
inventor of laws for the interior world-system.655 Novalis occupies a third position, which
is based on a dynamic relation between the pre-Kantian systems and the interior
constructions that follow on their critique. “Organ” designates the use—theoretical and
practical—of the changing interaction between the pre-Kantian and Fichtean positions.
As we will see below, for Novalis, Kant is the “lower organ” and Fichte the higher. In
this context, this means that the method proposed by the KdrV takes the position of a
concrete organ, the designator of a field of epistemological possibility crucial to the
contemporary intelligentsia. The goal, then, must be to use this “lower” organ to
influence the world in such a way that that organ itself is raised to a higher power.
Metaphysics must realize itself in a politics that alters the very constitution of that
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HKA III, p. 335; AB 460.
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metaphysics retroactively. Critique is transcendentally real: it makes up the historical
formation of cognition that leads to a better world, which will in turn change the organ of
its production. The constant is “organ” as the general term for that mutually instrumental
development. Novalis is a third Copernicus: following the construction of systems of law
for the cosmos and the subject across the Critical divide, Novalis allows contingent flow
to attach to both systems. The division between the two—their non-fit at the level of
representation—constitutes the subject, which thus becomes the locus of organological
capacity (the organ), or the possibility (as subject) of possibilities (of individual fields of
potential, or organs).
The name “organ” thus also denotes appearance’s subjective/objective
contingency or more precisely possibility, and thus demarcates the field of possibility of
all possibilities. It allows construction of not the world (which is incomplete, constructed
but present) but of the universe. That construction is no longer merely the pure creative
act of an intellectual intuition (whether Kant’s or Fichte’s), but instead the production of
possibilities. The organs of that production are necessarily mythological, biblical,
encyclopedic.656 Reason as organ is thus not free from empirical determination, but free
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Thus, HKA III, p. 359; AB 540 (emphasis in original): “Eine Kritik der menschl[ichen] Intelligenz (als
des höchstgradigen Meters, den wir haben) muß gleichsam die Propadeutik aller übrigen kritischen
Disciplinen seyn.
(Niederes sinnlich[es] – höheres Sinnlich[es] allg[emeines] Sinnlich[es] etc. Erkenntn[iß]
Verm[ögen].” And again, HKA III, p. 302; AB 343 (emphasis in original): “PHIL[OSOPHIE]. Jede
Wissensch[aft] ist vielleicht nur eine Variation der Philosophie. / Die Phil[osophie] ist gleichsam die
Substanz der W[issenschaft] – die überall gesucht wird – überall vorhanden ist, und nie dem Sucher
erscheint. Dennoch soll sie auch in concreter Gestalt erscheinen, wie der Stein der Weisen und dies ist das
höchste Problem.” Organ is at a minimum a designation for the desired concreteness. The connection
provided here is also then reflected in a famous fragment on the Mittler in religion (grist especially for
Stadler in Die theuren Dinge). Here, in HKA II, pp. 442/43; Blüthenstaub 74, Novalis writes that “Wahre
Religion ist, die jenen Mittler als Mittler annimmt, ihn gleichsam für das Organ der Gottheit hält, für ihre
sinnliche Erscheinung… Die wahre Religion scheint aber bei einer nähern Betrachtung abermals
antinomisch getheilt in Pantheismus und Monotheismus. Ich bediene mich hier einer Licenz, indem ich
Pantheism nicht im gewöhnlichen Sinn nehme, sondern darunter die Idee verstehe, daß alles Organ der
Gottheit, Mittler seyn könne, indem ich es dazu erhebe: so wie Monotheism im Gegentheil den Glauben
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to determine empirically. For that, it needs fields of possibility in the plural, and it must
have an active relation to them, i.e. they must become its instruments. The retroactive
constructions of natural history are thus metaphysically innovative. They leave the
physis-techne analogy behind, and they do so with the immediate task of revising the
moral, social, and political orders.

The Absolute Annihiliation of the Present: Moral, Social, and Political
Organs
I.

Moral Organs

The senses, for the magical idealist or transcendental realist, are historical
formations of possibility. The historical condtions of possibility called organs form the
possibility of that possibility because of their dialectical subject-object structure. For
Novalis, this means also that organs have a future. And that future is political. Organs are
tasked with the political: radical instauration of institutions from the theoretical
nothingness which its capacity to abstract has reduced them. That pure possibility is
subtended by attention to their nevertheless actual, contemporary forms. Thus a link is
created between system and history, and this philosophical gesture is at the basis of
German radicalism going forward into the 19th century.
Future organs had been a topic of discussion in at least two previous authors with
whom Novalis was familiar. In a fragment by Lessing entitled Daß mehr als fünf Sinne
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
bezeichnet, daß es nur Ein solches Organ in der Welt für uns gebe, das allein der Idee eines Mittlers
angemessen sey, und wodurch Gott allein sich vernehmen lasse, welches ich also zu wählen durch mich
selbst genöthigt werde: denn ohnedem würde der Monotheism nicht wahre Religion seyn.” Thus
Organibilität is the basis for panentheism, where hen kai pan is made into organology.
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für den Menschen sein können, the Enlightenment stalwart defines the senses as areas of
order and mass (Ordnung und Maß) within the realm of representations. Noting the gap
between these fields of possible perception and the totality of possibly perceived things
(Materie as the limits of individual senses), Lessing reasons that the discovery of other
senses is possible. The obvious candidates are electricity and magnetism, since we know
these phenomena indirectly—what in principle could prevent a direct means of
knowledge in these areas?657
As Fritz Mauthner showed long ago, Lessing may well have influenced Novalis’
beloved moral philosopher, Franz Hemsterhuis. The latter’s conception of a moral organ
was determinative for Novalis’ own larger cultural projects.658 Much has been written on
Novalis and his relationship to Hemsterhuis, and I do not intend to repeat that excellent
work here.659 Instead, I offer a short summary of the Novalis-Hemsterhuis relationship,
followed by a suggestion about the moral sense as organological conscience in the second
part of Heinrich von Ofterdingen. I then press on to the political organs.
The Dutch philosopher Franz Hemsterhuis wrote against sensualism and
materialism throughout his career. His project was, in fact, a new mythology in the most
literal sense. Works like Alexis ou l’âge d’or (1787) make clear that an organe morale is
meant to restore the classical paradise on earth. Stadler has suggested that this project
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Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Werke. Band 8 (Munich: Hanser, 1970 ff.), pp. 557-560.
Fritz Mauthner, Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Band 2 (Leipzig: Meiner, 1923), pp. 81-89. Mauthner
simply assumes the identity of Sinn in Lessing and organe in Hemsterhuis, and argues for a subtler protoorganology in Lessing. For this study, much depends upon the word organ.
659
Hans-Joachim Mähl argues that Hemsterhuis presents the “passive” side of mythological perception for
Novalis, while Fichte represents the “active.” See Hans-Joachim Mähl, Die Idee des goldenen Zeitalters im
Werke des Novalis: Studien zur Wesensbestimmung der frühromantischen Utopie und zu ihren
ideengeschichtlichen Voraussetungen (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1994 (1965)), pp. 266-87. Stadler, Die theuren
Dinge, has revised this thesis by calling attention to the ambivalence between passivity and activity in
Hemsterhuis’s own work. Agreement exists to the extent that Novalis’s “moral sense” is derived from his
reading of Hemsterhuis.
658
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was first taken to be a kind of guiding fiction, and then later became a poetic fact that
should be realized.660 Mähl has emphasized Hemsterhuis’ pessimistic attitude—
ultimately Pauline—towards organs: they exist as mediators because we are not face to
face with the beautiful world, and we are not in the fullness of time because we have
organs at all.661 In the Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports (1772), this ambivalent attitude
is built into the definition of the organ. The organs are literal for Hemsterhuis, and they
form the simultaneously separative and synthetic containers for the perception of objects.
Indeed, they are the locus where signs are separated from objects—where criteria of
recognition are abstracted from aggregates of material—and thus become the basis of the
semiotics of memory.662 “Organ” is defined as passive, but in this very gesture, also as
receptive of activity. Thus its stasis—the duration of its modification by an affecting
object—is its essence, but its ability to be moved is just as essential.663 This definition is
extended to a putative moral sense, which casts the very perception of the world in moral
terms.664 The central ambivalence is about the persistence of organs in the return of the
Golden Age. In one mood, Hemsterhuis imagines an umediated, pure moral perception.
In another, he says that this condition will make us “tout organe.”665
For Novalis, this condition of total organicity was not ambivalent. There is,
perhaps surprisingly, even in the moral sense which organology provides, no yearning for
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Stadler, Die theuren Dinge, pp. 157-64.
Mähl, Die Idee, pp. 278 ff. Novalis’s notes on this writing make clear that he is not simply adopting
passivity, but is thinking parallel to Hemsterhuis. See HKA II, pp. 362-63.
662
That is, the ability to remember an isolated sign is the ability to think of an object by linking that sign to
it. For a general study of semiotics in the (German) Enlightenment, see Welberry, Laocoon.
663
This summary is taken from Franz Hemsterhuis, Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports (Paris, 1772), pp. 9
ff., and especially p. 10.
664
This ability has a theoretical history which extends backwards to antiquity, and was particularly
intensely treated by medieval scholasticism under the heading synderesis. See Verplaetse, Localising the
Moral Sense, pp. 1-30, for the pre-19th century theories.
665
Frans Hemsterhuis: Oeuvres philosophiques, ed. L.S.P. Meyboom, print of the Leeuwarden edition
1846-50, Hildesheim, New York 1972, II, p. 138. Cited at Stadler, Die theuren Dinge, p. 164.
661
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the unmediated. Sehnsucht fulfills a function, but is not determinative. Instead, the
activity of the organ—its ability to potentialize the actual, make it an organ—provides the
basis for Novalis’ adoption of the moral organ from Hemsterhuis, because it provides a
theoretical basis on which to make “possible” the moral coloration of perception.666 The
epistemological question was set in the notes on Hemsterhuis:
/Keime künftiger Organe – Perfectibilitaet der Organe. Wie läßt sich etwas zu einem
Organ machen?667

The connection between the perceptive organs and the moral organ is thus not
trivial. The potentializing activity I have identified above must play a role in the creation
of a morally perceiving organ. The understanding and reason “drücken die Organe oder
Vermögen für Verhältnisse aus.”668 As we have seen, this means that the organological
faculties—crystallizations of cognition in development—are in Critical or substantial
relation to their putative content. If they are aufgehoben, we fall into dogmatism. They
can affect that content, all the way down to its moral coloring. This means that “Jedes
endliche Wesen ist ein Werckzeug…”669 Organology should allow the world to be rebuilt morally, relying on absolute abstraction on the one side, and absolute attention to
historical formations of knowledge and its constructed world on the other. In principle,
for Novalis, this realism about the historical conditions of possibility should make the
world alterable all the way down, through the ontological activity of poetry:
… und wenn die Philosophie durch Bildung des äußern Ganzen, oder durch die
Gesezgebung, die vollkommene Poësie möglich macht, so ist gleichsam die Poësie der
Zweck derselben, durch den sie erst Bedeutung und anmuthiges Leben erhält – den die
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Other than his extensive excerpting of various works by Hemsterhuis, Novalis mentions Hemsterhuis’s
Theorie des moralischen Sinns in HKA III, pp. 420-21; AB 782, where we started our investigation of
Novalis’s differences with Kant’s Streit. From that standpoint it becomes clear that what the moral organ
makes possible is the production of moral ächte Dogmata, experiential sentences that describe the moral
world or allow the experience of the world as moral.
667
HKA II, p. 368.
668
HKA II, p. 364.!!
669
HKA II, p. 370.
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Poësie bildet die schöne Gesellschaft, oder das innere Ganze – die Weltfamilie – die
schöne Haushaltung des Universi – Wie die Philosophie durch System und Staat die
Kräfte des Individuums mit den Kräften des Weltalls und der übrigen Menschheit paart,
und verstärckt – das Ganze zum Organ d[es] Individuums, und das Individuum zum
Organ des Ganzen macht – So die Poësie – in Rücksicht des Genusses – Das Ganze ist
der Gegenstand des individuellen Genusses, und das Individuum der Gegenstand des
Totalgenusses. Durch die Poësie wird die höchste Sympathie und Coactivitaet – die
innigste, herrlichste Gemeinschaft wircklich. /D[urch] d[ie] Philosophie – möglich.670

Philosophy is organology, the organification of the whole-part relation. It
establishes the mutuality—categorical community—at the basis of actual community,
which must be based on poetry’s ability to make organs the objects of enjoyment. This
enjoyment retains the form of the organological universe, however: it actualizes—both in
the sense of making actual and in the borrowed sense of making contemporary—what
philosophy has made possible. Philosophy after Kant is legislation (Gesezgebung), but its
potential syntheses are infinite. Where the human’s tools are unschicklich, Novalis writes,
philosophy’s task is to make them serve. Every finite being is caught in this potentially
endless circulation of ends and means. Philosophy makes the beautiful relation of whole
and part possible by making that relationship mutual; poetry makes it real by expressing
it as mutual enjoyment. The new mythology and its religion emerge from the negativity
of the organological universe into the positive historical realm of discourse and politics.
This structure is most clear in the second part of the novel-fragment Heinrich von
Ofterdingen. (The unfinished second section is ironically titled die Erfüllung.) Heinrich,
having finished his Bildungsreise, finds himself in a deserted landscape where he
encounters a monk named Sylvester, who once taught his father. The father’s recognition
and rejection of—but simultaneous nostalgia about—poetic fulfillment in the blue flower
had the tone of the novel as the paradigmatic Romantic epistemological space, split and
unified by the discursive distance from fulfillment and the bitter sweetness of desire for
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that completion. Heinrich wants to find what his father could not, and, as in Wilhelm
Meisters Lehrjahre, the apparent end of the apprenticeship with Klingsohr is
emphatically not the end. Heinrich asks Sylvester when the lack in the world will come to
an end. Sylvester responds: “Läßt sich Musik dem Tauben erklären?” Dismayed,
Heinrich responds: “Also wäre der Sinn ein Anteil an der neuen durch ihn eröffneten
Welt selbst? Man verstände die Sache nur, wenn man sie hätte?”671 The “only” force in
the world, according to Sylvester, is conscience (Gewissen), and it is connected to the
senses by structural analogy and by a substantial link:
Das Weltall zerfällt in unendliche, immer von größern Welten wieder befaßte Welten.
Alle Sinne sind am Ende Ein Sinn. Ein Sinn führt wie Eine Welt allmählich zu allen
Welten. Aber alles hat seine Zeit und seine Weise. Nur die Person des Weltalls vermag
das Verhältnis unsrer Welt einzusehn. Es ist schwer zu sagen, ob wir innerhalb der
sinnlichen Schranken unsers Körpers wirklich unsre Welt mit neuen Welten, unsre Sinne
mit neuen Sinnen vermehren können, oder ob jeder Zuwachs unsrer Erkenntnis, jede neue
erworbene Fähigkeit nur zur Ausbildung unsers gegenwärtigen Weltsinns zu rechnen
ist.672

Heinrich takes the organological challenge: how many worlds, how many senses?
Perhaps this is all the same, because the “fable” is, for Heinrich, “Gesamtwerkzeug
meiner gegenwärtigen Welt…”:
Selbst das Gewissen, diese Sinn und Welten erzeugende Macht, dieser Keim aller
Persönlichkeit, erscheint mir wie der Geist des Weltgedichts, wie der Zufall der ewigen
romantischen Zusammenkunft des unendlich veränderlichen Gesamtlebens.673

Alles kann zum Organ werden (see the epigraph to this chapter): the sense of this dictum
is ultimately a constitutive morality in the world, the historical ability to introduce,
slowly and in connection with the most concrete of appearances (critically), difference
into the categorical structure of things. Sylvester confirms the poetic, organological
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HKA I, p. 331.
HKA I, p. 331.!
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HKA I, p. 331.
672

!

320!
!!
!
innovation suggested by Heinrich,674 and Heinrich responds with the final word on the
new theology: for that doctrine to come forward as science, it will need the moral organ
that is conscience. That organ gathers the historical senses and makes their ultimate
possibility possible: the personalization of the world.675 Sylvester confirms: the general
Mittler is conscience itself,676 now conceived as the active sense, the sense par excellence
as organ. The novel “ends” with the promise of a politicization of organs in the
secularizing program of a new religion.
That program was explained to Schlegel as the “negativity of Christianity,” the
total annihilation of the present as the condition for the production of the past (antiquity)
and the genuinely new future (see the appendix to this chapter). This is an organological
expansion of the play of negativity and positivity in Schleiermacher. Organs bear the
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“Werter Pilger”, versetzte Sylvester, “das Gewissen erscheint in jeder ernsten Vollendung, in jeder
gebildeten Wahrheit. Jede durch Nachdenken zu einem Weltbild umgearbeitete Neigung und Fertigkeit
wird zu einer Erscheinung, zu einer Verwandlung des Gewissens. Alle Bildung führt zu dem, was man
nicht anders wie Freiheit nennen kann, ohnerachtet damit nicht ein bloßer Begriff, sondern der schaffende
Grund alles Daseins bezeichnet werden soll. Diese Freiheit ist Meisterschaft. Der Meister übt freie Gewalt
nach Absicht und in bestimmter und überdachter Folge aus. Die Gegenstände seiner Kunst sind sein, und
stehen in seinem Belieben, und er wird von ihnen nicht gefesselt oder gehemmt. Und gerade diese
allumfassende Freiheit, Meisterschaft oder Herrschaft ist das Wesen, der Trieb des Gewissens. In ihm
offenbart sich die heilige Eigentümlichkeit, das unmittelbare Schaffen der Persönlichkeit, und jede
Handlung des Meisters ist zugleich Kundwerdung der hohen, einfachen, unverwickelten Welt, – Gottes
Wort.” (HKA I, pp. 331-32.)
675
“Also ist auch das, was ehemals, wie mich deucht, Tugendlehre genannt wurde, nur die Religion, als
Wissenschaft, die sogenannte Theologie im eigentlichen Sinne? Nur eine Gesetzordnung, die sich zur
Gottesverehrung verhält, wie die Natur zu Gott? Ein Wortbau, eine Gedankenfolge, welche die Oberwelt
bezeichnet, vorstellt und sie auf einer gewissen Stufe der Bildung vertritt? Die Religion für das Vermögen
der Einsicht und des Urteils? der Richtspruch, das Gesetz der Auflösung und Bestimmung aller möglichen
Verhältnisse eines persönlichen Wesens?” (HKA I, p. 332.)
676
“Allerdings ist das Gewissen”, sagte Sylvester, “der eingeborne Mittler jedes Menschen. Es vertritt die
Stelle Gottes auf Erden, und ist daher so vielen das Höchste und Letzte. Aber wie entfernt war die bisherige
Wissenschaft, die man Tugend- oder Sittenlehre nannte, von der reinen Gestalt dieses erhabenen,
weitumfassenden persönlichen Gedankens. Das Gewissen ist der Menschen eigenstes Wesen in voller
Verklärung, der himmlische Urmensch. Es ist nicht dies und jenes, es gebietet nicht in allgemeinen
Sprüchen, es besteht nicht aus einzelnen Tugenden. Es gibt nur Eine Tugend, – den reinen, ernsten Willen,
der im Augenblick der Entscheidung unmittelbar sich entschließt und wählt. In lebendiger, eigentümlicher
Unteilbarkeit bewohnt es und beseelt es das zärtliche Sinnbild des menschlichen Körpers, und vermag alle
geistigen Gliedmaßen in die wahrhafteste Tätigkeit zu versetzen.” (HKA I, p. 332.)
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functional conceptual task of the reproduction of the world, and that task is not only
moral, but also political.677

II.

Social Organs

The political is, for Novalis, the critical joining of sense and will, and, as such, it
is derived from dialogue with Fichte.678 Among Novalis’ various opinions on Fichte,679
his adoption of and revision of Fichte’s doctrine of organs from the Grundlage des
Naturrechts (GdN—1796) is most political. The notion of connecting Sinn and Wille will
have been one of the primary tasks of the critical method, one primarily associated with
Fichte’s metaphysics.680 In this context, Novalis casts the incunabula of Criticism in
organological terms:
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Thus the “new Christianity” is paradoxically more secular than Kant’s Biblical organa. If we use
Blumenberg’s notion of secularization as the re-purposing of problems for different functions, we can see
that the moralization of belief (which re-directs content to a different function) finds an even more
secularizing tendency in the new mythology, which alters the function only by replacing its content. What
seems to be a new religion is a new set of tools for a function designated religious. But then, those tools do
not leave the function innocent: they make it an organ of political production. Again, the ambivalence of
this radicality between the reactionary and the progressive is subtended by the radical attitude itself.
678
The scholarship on Novalis and Fichte is broad but in flux. The old view that the Romantics were
Fichteans, which was laid aside during the 20th century’s editorial production and deepening of sourceinvestigation, has returned as the picture of Fichte as as subjective and totalizing idealist has been called
into question. See Bernard Loheide, Fichte und Novalis: transcendentalphilosophisches Denken im
romatnisierenden Diskurs (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000). See the excellent review article on this literature by
Dalia Nassar, “Interpreting Novalis’ Fichte-Studien,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte (84: 3), 2010, pp. 315-341. My disagreements within the
literature fall mostly with Manfred Frank, who insists on a “pre-reflexive” moment of self in Novalis. See
Manfred Frank, Unendliche Annäherung, but also and especially, Selbstgefühl (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
2002).
679
Most comprehensive on this is Frederick Beiser, German Idealism, pp. 407-35. In the course of the
1790s, Novalis became increasingly desirous of a figure who could present love in the universe, which
Fichte had done insufficiently. Candidates included Spinoza (in agreement with Schlegel), Hemsterhuis,
and above all, at the end of Novalis’s life, Plotinus, on which see Hans-Joachim Mähl, “Novalis und
Plotin,” in Schulz, Novalis, pp. 357-424. The basic attitude, including ambivalence, is sketched as follows:
“Es wäre wohl möglich, daß Fichte Erfinder einer ganz neuen Art zu denken wäre—für die die Sprache
noch keinen Namen hat. Der Erfinder ist vielleicht nicht der fertigste und sinnreichste Künstler auf seinem
Instrument… Es können wunderbare Kunstwercke [sic] hier entstehen…” (HKA II, p. 524.)
680
See HKA III, p. 445; AB 921.
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Fichte ist der Bearbeiter der Kantischen Kritik – der 2te Kant – das höhere Organ,
insofern Kant das niedre Organ ist… Er sezt die Leser da nieder, wo sie Kant
aufnimmt.681

Kant’s work is the basis of communication, the self-imposed passivity of the organ;
Fichte’s the active organ, and ultimately recognitive communication itself. Novalis takes
his terms here from Fichte’s GdN, an application of the WL to the political realm.682 This
work marks out what we might call the ethics of reason, the specific doctrine of action
(and ultimately law) that results from the WL’s determination of the capacities of reason.
The Ich sets itself as absolutely free, but can only do so in setting limitations for itself.
These limitations take the form of a fungible sensible world—the entirety of the parallel
deductions of the theoretical self and the practical self. For the rational being to inscribe
itself into a social order, however, it will have to have a conception of limitations that it
does not give itself, but which come from elsewhere. These are the so-called Anstoß, the
beginning of embodiment in the recognition of other rational beings.683 This relativizes
the notion of the individual, who can only exist as one among many. The legal relation
(das Rechtsverhältnis) is established by this mutual appearance of external limitation,
which is actually based on the recognition of others as rational beings (and thus an act).
In order to have this relation, the individual must posit himself as an embodied being.
Indeed, the central paradox is that, while the body itself falls under the constructive
freedom of the absolute Ich, the appearance of the restriction of freedom must occur,
without metaphysical restrictions thereby being placed (from where?) on the Ich. Fichte
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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HKA III, p. 335; AB 463.
The GdN is itself an excellent example of the reactionary/progressive ambivalence in radical
metaphysics of the period. For some fo the more reactionary moments, see Adrian Daub, Uncivil Unions:
The Metaphysics of Marriage in German Idealism and Romanticism (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2012), pp. 36-71, and further in that book for the Romantic appropriation. I will focus on the social
doctrines of recognition here.
683
Thus: “Der Mensch (so alle endliche Wesen überhaupt) wird nur unter Menschen ein Mensch…”
Fichtes sämmtliche Werke III, p. 39.
682
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thus posits two organs, a higher and a lower, a concrete organ of rational communication
and recognition, and a lower, bodily organ (sometimes the body itself, as complex).
Ultimately, these two organs are identical in the will, but they are separated through
recognition of others, so that other can influence the Ich not only in manipulation of the
body, but in communication with reason.684 The lower organs are those of the senses—
completely heteronomous with respect to the influence of others, but completely
autonomous with respect to the Ich itself. The higher organ is a sort of concrete schematic
capacity—its basic schema is the human face—within reason. It is thus completely
autonomous with respect to others, but is also what we might call heautonomous—
necessarily free with respect to itself. Two types of material correspond to these two
organs—zähe Materie and subtilere Materie. The subtle material is modified by the will
itself, and makes communication rational in the sense that it is both transmitted
concretely and leaves the higher organ under the power of the possessor’s will.685 This
entire structure must be attributed to another being for the individual to exist at all. Thus
there is a Wechselwirkung between both the higher and lower organs and between
individuals communicating through them. The form of that interaction is organic, its
perception intuitively understanding. Its science is called anthropology,686 its method is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“Offenbar eine doppelte Weise, die Articulation zu bestimmen, die man indess selbst eine doppelte
Articulation, oder ein doppeltes Organ nennen mag, die sich folgendermaassen zu einander verhalten: das
erstere, in welchem die Person die aufgehobene Bewegung hervorbringt, und das wir das höhere Organ
nennen wollen, kann modificirt werden durch den Willen, ohne dass es dadurch das andere, welches wir
das niedere Organ nennen wollen, werde. Höheres und niederes Organ sind insofern unterschieden. Aber
ferner: soll durch die Modification des höheren Organs das niedere nicht zugleich mit modificirt werden, so
muss die Person den Willen zurückhalten, dass es dadurch modificirt werden solle: also höheres und
niederes sind durch den Willen auch zu vereinigen, sind Ein und ebendasselbe Organ.” (GdN, p. 64.)
685
GdN, pp. 70 ff., esp. at p. 72: “Die Wechselwirkung vernünftiger Wesen, als solcher, geschieht sonach
stets vermittelst des höheren Sinnes; denn nur dieser ist ein solcher, auf welchen man nicht wirken kann,
ohne ihn vorauszusetzen; und so bleibt das obige Kriterium dieser Wechselwirkung richtig: es ist eine
solche, in welcher der Sinn des Objects der Wirkung vorausgesetzt wird.”
686
GdN, pp. 76 ff. At p. 78 Fichte divides between Naturprodukt (which is organ) and the Kunstprodukt,
which points quasi-organically to an external telos. This external goal demotes the Kunsprodukt from
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intuitive understanding, and the immediacy of that recognition makes its fundamental
principle that “Menschengestalt ist dem Menschen nothwendig heilig.”687
Thus, in spite of his limitations, Fichte presents Novalis with a higher organ of
rational human commonality—a social organ—that he himself defined.688 AB 452 uses
these organs to discuss the body-soul problem. Lower organ is Reiz, and higher is
reflection in the soul. The complex, clearly taken from Fichte, applies the logic of the
critique of organs to the historical conditions of cognition. The direct excitement of the
lower organ is indirectly (non-representationally) reflected in the higher organ. The result
is feeling, which is thus harmonious or non-harmonious. No element of this system offers
a real solution to the classical commercium-problem. This description lacks the activity of
real critique (the making-possible or making-organ), functioning rather to prepare the
imagination of social organs.
The surprising location of actual reception of the Fichtean doctrine is in the
conversation between the travelers in the Lehrlinge (see above in the current chapter). In
one sense, the whole novel-fragment seems to take place in the “subtle material” of
communicative reason, what the first traveler calls das elastische Medium.689 For this
traveler, the nature of attention and its complex social conditions must be investigated in
relation to the body before we can hope to penetrate into the depths of nature. The
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Organ to Werkzeug. The difference between animals and humans is then cast in partially traditional
anthropological terms (the lack-argument) as that between Bildung and infinite Bildsamkeit (pp. 79-80). By
attributing this Bildsamkeit as intuitive-organic form and content of (other) self to the other individual, the
invidivual first realizes her humanity as common humanity. Fichte goes on to discuss important organs
which have developed for humans, including the hand and the voice.
687
GdN, p. 85.
688
Violetta Waibel has called attention to Novalis’s interest in the organ in the GdN, but connects it to a
passage on the “inner” and “outer” organs in the Fichte-Studien. The two adjectival complexes are not
unrelated, of course, but at the least, Waibel has missed a larger philological context here. See the
nevertheless very informative ““Inneres, äußeres Organ”: Das Problem der Gemeinschaft von Seele und
Körper in den Fichte-Studien Friedrich von Hardenbergs,” Athenäum. Jahrbuch für Romantik 10 (2000),
pp. 159-81.
689
HKA I, p. 97.
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Forscher
glaubt es am höchsten gebracht zu haben, wenn er, ohne jenes Spiel zu stören, zugleich
die gewöhlichen Geschäfte der Sinne vornehmen, und empfinden und dneken zugleich
kann. Dadurch gewinnen beide Wahrnehmungen: die Außenwelt wird durchsichtig, und
die Innenwelt mannigfaltig690 und bedeutungsvoll, und so befindet sich der Mensch in
einem innig lebendigen Zustande zwischen zwei Welten in der vollkommensten Freiheit
und dem freudigsten Machtgefühl.691

This traveler, who, implicitly leading the group as the first voice, will be among the
community to receive the social-organological message of the master at the end of the
fragment, ties the higher and the lower organs to the phenomenology of form-content
connections which come to be called inner and outer organs.692 If the novel is the subtle
material of the higher organ, then its own higher organ is the voice of Fichte. One voice
among many, he sets the social framework in its simultaneously subjective and objective
traits. As the internal and higher organ of the constructivist novel, 693 he is thus the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This word is used repeatedly to describe nature, and is here transferred to the subject.
HKA I, p. 97.
692
Thus my fuller contextualization of Waibel’s attention to Novalis’s reading of Fichte. Novalis’s most
direct reflection of this doctrine is at HKA II, pp. 460/61; Blüthenstaub, 112: “Jede Menschengestalt belebt
einen individuellen Keim im Betrachtenden. Dadurch wird diese Anschauung unendlich, sie ist mit dem
Gefühl einer unerschöpflichen Kraft verbunden, und darum so absolut belebend. Indem wir uns selbst
betrachten, beleben wir uns selbst. Ohne diese sichtbare und fühlbare Unsterblichkeit würden wir nicht
wahrhaft denken können. Diese wahrnehmbare Unzulänglichkeit des irdischen Körpergebildes zum
Ausdruck und Organ des inwohnenden Geistes, ist der unbestimmte, treibende Gedanke, der die Basis aller
ächten Gedanken wird, der Anlaß zur Evoluzion der Intelligenz, dasjenige, was uns zur Annahme einer
intelligiblen Welt und einer unendlichen Reihe von Ausdrücken und Organen jedes Geistes, deren
Exponent oder Wurzel seine Individualität ist, nöthigt.”
693
If there is any doubt that this voice is Fichtean, this passage should quiet that doubt: “Um die Natur zu
begreifen, muß man die Natur innerlich in ihrer ganzen Folge entstehen lassen. Bei dieser Unternehmung
muß man sich bloß von der göttlichen Sehnsucht nach Wesen, die uns gleich sind, und den notwendigen
Bedingungen dieselben zu vernehmen, bestimmen lassen, denn wahrhaftig die ganze Natur ist nur als
Werkzeug und Medium des Einverständnisses vernünftiger Wesen begreiflich. Der denkende Mensch kehrt
zur ursprünglichen Funktion seines Daseins, zur schaffenden Betrachtung, zu jenem Punkte zurück, wo
Hervorbringen und Wissen in der wundervollsten Wechselverbindung standen, zu jenem schöpferischen
Moment des eigentlichen Genusses, des innern Selbstempfängnisses. Wenn er nun ganz in
die Beschauung dieser Urerscheinung versinkt, so entfaltet sich vor ihm in neu entstehenden Zeiten und
Räumen, wie ein unermeßliches Schauspiel, die Erzeugungsgeschichte der Natur, und jeder feste Punkt, der
sich in der unendlichen Flüssigkeit ansetzt, wird ihm eine neue Offenbarung des Genius der Liebe, ein
neues Band des Du und des Ich. Die sorgfältige Beschreibung dieser innern Weltgeschichte ist die wahre
Theorie der Natur; durch den Zusammenhang seiner Gedankenwelt in sich, und ihre Harmonie mit dem
Universum, bildet sich von selbst ein Gedankensystem zur getreuen Abbildung und Formel des
Universums. Aber die Kunst des ruhigen Beschauens, der schöpferischen Weltbetrachtung ist schwer,
unaufhörliches ernstes Nachdenken und strenge Nüchternheit fordert die Ausführung, und die Belohnung
691
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representative of social organology. Where Hemsterhuis had provided the basis on which
to think the world as subjectively but constitutively moral (through the conscience),
Fichte provided the basis on which to tie that moral world into a social sphere. The novel
makes the humans in that sphere organs, the sensitive antennae of a possibly rational
world. The concretization of that rationality is called politics.

III.

The Politics of Organs

In the context I have established, it is easy to see why Novalis would call
everything from a court to a church an organ.694 With that discourse, he anticipates the
social-political use of organ so familiar to our contemporary ears. What is less familiar—
even alienating—is his talk of a “christian monarchy,” of the love of the king and queen
as the basis of the organological state.695 The locale of these strange determinations—and
indeed, the reason I have put politics last—reveals that they are the results of the other
side of Novalis’ “German ideology,” the attempt to take the absolute abstractive drive
(which is a reflection of the institutional dissolution occurring on the other side of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
wird kein Beifall der mühescheuenden Zeitgenossen, sondern nur eine Freude des Wissens und Wachens,
eine innigere Berührung des Universums sein.” (HKA I, pp. 101-02.)
694
So HKA II, pp. 412/13; Blüthenstaub 3: “Der Weltstaat ist der Körper, den die schöne Welt, die
gesellige Welt, beseelt. Er ist ihr nothwendiges Organ.” And HKA II, pp. 436/37; Blüthenstaub 65:
“Gerichtshöfe, Theater, Hof, Kirche, Regierung, öffentliche Zusammenkünfte, Akademieen, Kollegien
u.s.w. sind gleichsam die speciellen, innern Organe des mystischen Staatsindividuums.” AB 398 has the
state itself as Mittler.
695
That is the message of his Glauben und Liebe, and is also communicated to Schlegel in the letters of
winter 1798-99. Terry Pinkard expresses what I take to be a common reaction to this discourse: “Whereas
Kant had been heavily influenced by Scottish writings on morals and politics and had explicitly argued for
a “liberal” political order, the early Romantics were far less influenced by any Scottish or English
conceptions. If anything, they tended in particular to hold English views in contempt as crude, philistine,
purely commer- cial, and blind therefore to the “higher” truths. Moreover, their own “revolutionary”
notions of the new social order were heavily colored by the existing “hometown” structures of
contemporary German life and by the idealized memories of Germany prior to its devastation in the century before. Thus, although they did not wish to restore the old society of orders, they nonetheless took
large elements of it as their model.” (Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy, 1760-1840: The Legacy of
Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 169.)
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Rhein and the Atlantic) and join it with the concrete forms of contemporary institutional
life. What Marx experienced as the international embarrassment of Germany, Novalis
tried to pry open conceptually using his new system, organology.
Not only do the institutions of the feudal government become organs; the organs
of metaphysics become political actors. Novalis articulated the final (and really only)
statement of organological politics in a speech delivered to the Jena group in 1799, Die
Christenheit oder Europa. The apparent mysticism and medieval nostalgia of the text
alienated him from perhaps the only audience that could have appreciated his message.696
After a vehement debate within the circle, Goethe was called in as an arbiter, and he saw
nothing more in it than the others had. The text was not published in Novalis’ lifetime.
Novalis’ basic insistence is on the unification of state and culture—on a
harmonious totality of society. And indeed, there is much that looks like nostalgia for
medieval Catholicism on these grounds, right down to a bizarre retroactive momentary
hope in the “secret society” par excellence, the Jesuits and their Inquisition. Novalis goes
so far as to claim that the Reformation had simply destroyed Christianity, that the latter
did not any longer exist after Luther’s separatist activities.697
The theoretical heart of the essay is, however, the following statement:
Nun wollen wir uns zu dem politischen Schauspiel unsrer Zeit wenden. Alte und neue
Welt sind in Kampf begriffen, die Mangelhaftigkeit und Bedürftigkeit der bisherigen
Staatseinrichtungen sind in furchtbaren Phänomenen offenbar geworden. Wie wenn auch
hier wie in den Wissenschaften eine nähere und mannigfaltigere Connexion und
Berührung der europäischen Staaten zunächst der historische Zweck des Krieges wäre,
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Schelling was most caustic in response, composing a satirical poem. It seemed to him that Novalis had
gone back on the elements of Enlightenment that were included in the Romantic program. See Richards,
Romantic Conception, pp. 103 ff., and Pinkard, German Philosophy, pp. 165 ff.
697
HKA III, p. 513: “Die Moderatisten behalten die Oberhand, und die Zeit nähert sich einer gänzlichen
Atonie der höhern Organe, der Periode des praktischen Unglaubens. Mit der Reformation wars um die
Christenheit gethan. Von nun an war keine mehr vorhanden.” Similarly at HKA III, p. 520: “Erst durch
genauere Kenntniß der Religion wird man jene fürchterlichen Erzeugnisse eines Religionsschlafs, jene
Träume und Deliria des heiligen Organs besser beurtheilen und dann erst die Wichtigkeit jenes Geschenks
recht einsehn lernen.”
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wenn eine neue Regung des bisher schlummernden Europa ins Spiel käme, wenn Europa
wieder erwachen wollte, wenn ein Staat der Staaten, eine politische Wissenschaftslehre,
uns bevorstände! Sollte etwa die Hierarchie diese symmetrische Grundfigur der Staaten,
das Prinzip des Staatenvereins als intellektuale Anschauung des politischen Ichs seyn?698

The present is the battle of the past and the future, and the state, now separated from its
cultural and religious institutions (however partially), has become incapable of guiding its
people through the passage of time. What is needed, then, is a political science of
knowledge, a Fichtean doctrine (not Fichte’s own) of political technology. The political
Ich must be reflected in its institutions—the link between metaphysics and politics must
become substantial. For that, it must be based on an intellectual intuition, the very
instrument of Romantic organology. A non-representational, innovative relation between
the rational metaphysics of instrumentality and political representation must be created.
This is a call to theoretical arms, or more precisely, tools. Novalis anticipates Hegel: the
state must be saturated with reason.699 But as philosophy could only capture its time in
reason for Hegel, so could the state for Novalis only capture reason in its historical
development. The state is a science of the possibly possible. Governance is organology.
Thus a profane connection between religion and the state must persist, at least
during the battle for the present: “Haben die Nationen Alles vom Menschen – nur nicht

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
698

HKA III, p. 522.
The first study to compare Novalis and Hegel was that of Theodor Haering, Novalis als Philosoph
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1954). The suggestive presence of Hegel in Novalis scholarship persists, up
through Stadler, Die theuren Dinge, and on to the present. In any case, Hegel’s negative comments on
Novalis in the Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik do capture part of Novalis’s program. Where Schlegel plays
lightly (ironically) over existence, and Schelling lacks negativity, Novalis’s thought is identified as
Vernichtungskunst. That characterization is at least half right. Novalis applies the thought—completing it
with the restorative connection between religion and state—to the historical battle for the present, HKA III,
p. 517: “Aus der Vernichtung alles Positiven hebt sie ihr glorreiches Haupt als neue Weltstifterin empor.
Wie von selbst steigt der Mensch gen Himmel auf, wenn ihn nichts mehr bindet, die höhern Organe treten
von selbst aus der allgemeinen gleichförmigen Mischung und vollständigen Auflösung aller menschlichen
Anlagen und Kräfte, als der Urkern der irdischen Gestaltung zuerst heraus. Der Geist Gottes schwebt über
den Wassern und ein himmlisches Eiland wird als Wohnstätte der neuen Menschen, als Stromgebiet des
ewigen Lebens zuerst sichtbar über den zurückströmenden Wogen.”
699
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sein Herz? – sein heiliges Organ?”700 It is the connection between religion, the Critique
of all knowledge in the Book, and the nation-state, that must take on the immediacy of
the intellectual intuition. Statescraft is the final theater for the breaking of the bonds
between physis and techne, and for its project, the actual tools of the present are needed.
Monarchs, persons, love: the discourse of feudalism is the found object that must be
judged in a single, immediate historical intuition dictating the form of a new, human
state. Novalis writes:
Der Schleier ist für die Jungfrau, was der Geist für den Leib ist, ihr unentbehrliches
Organ dessen Falten die Buchstaben ihrer süßen Verkündigung sind; das unendliche
Faltenspiel ist eine Chiffern-Musik, denn die Sprache ist der Jungfrau zu hölzern und zu
frech, nur zum Gesang öffnen sich ihre Lippen. 701

Note the reversal of terms: spirit is the organ of the body, and spirit’s analogical folds are
the infinite letters of a prophecy sung into the heart of the present. Organological politics
would be the construction of a political order out of the nothingness it intentionally
creates,702 but in constant dialogue with the persistence of the historically existing world.
This program remained a suggestion—Novalis died less than two years after his conflict
with the Jena group. And yet the suggestion is, in a way, powerful enough. Whatever else
the politics of organology should have been, it would always have been what I have
termed transcendental realism, persistently attendant to the historical conditions of
political possibility, even as it systematically negated them in the interest of of a
plasticization of instututionality. That utopianism was anything but a sentimental dream:
it united the abyss of alienated self-consciousness with the concrete ruination of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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HKA III, p. 523.
HKA III, p. 521.
702
Thus the (here) Hegelian Stadler is also half correct when he writes that “Die Vernichtung der
gegenständlichen Welt war eine Vernichtung von Nichtigem.” (Stadler, Die theuren Dinge, p. 183), but I
cannot agree in principle when he concludes that “jener Glaube [konnte] keine Berge versetzen, daß er
vollkommen außerstande war, die Welt zu verwandeln und eine Epoche allgemeiner Vermitteltheit in ein
Zeitalter neuer Unmittelbarkeit hinüberzuführen.” (Stadler, Die theuren Dinge, p. 184.)
701
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political order around it. To change the world, the Romantics thought, the modern subject
would have to tarry in the night of interpretation.
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Chapter V: Organs after Organology: Goethe, Hegel, and Technologies
of Nature and of History

In den Wäldern des Amazonenflusses wie auf dem Rücken der hohen Anden erkannte ich, wie von einem
Hauche beseelt von Pol zu Pol nur ein Leben ausgegossen ist in Steinen, Pflanzen und Tieren und in des
Menschen schwellender Brust. Überall ward ich von dem Gefühle durchdrungen, wie mächtig jene Jenaer
Verhältnisse auf mich gewirkt, wie ich, durch Goethes Naturansichten gehoben, gleichsam mit neuen
Organen ausgerüstet worden war.
Alexander von Humdoldt to Karoline von Wolzogen, 14 May 1806

Prologue: Eruption in the Academy

(Probably) 2nd August, 1830: Frédéric Soret hurries to Goethe’s residence in
Weimar, the news of the July Revolution in Paris fresh in his mind. Goethe responds to
the visit with apparent sympathetic immediacy: what does Soret think of this “volcanic
eruption,” with everything in flames, and closed doors opening to reveal the true
proceedings? Soret’s response is ambivalent yet excited: the events are “terrible”
[furchtbar], yet where else could the story have ended? The royal family had to be driven
out. But this guarded optimism, a sort of liberal kernel cloaked in a calculated,
conservative rhetoric, met with Goethe’s dismissal. The event of the time—the epochshift truly in the air—was not in the revolution at all, but instead in the open skirmish in
the Paris Academy of Sciences between the anatomist Cuvier and the zoologist Geoffroy
de St.-Hilaire. Soret reports “several minutes” of complete stasis in his thoughts as a
reaction to this strange, sudden shift in topic and enthusiasm.703
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Johann Peter Eckermann, Goethes Gespräche in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens, Montag den 2. [?]
August 1830, as WA (Anhang) 7, pp. 320-23, see note 708 infra for citational style. Also cited in Toby A.
Appel, The Cuvier-Geoffroy Debate: French Biology in the Decades Before Darwin (Oxford: Oxford,
1987), p. 1. Goethe’s involvement in the debate—this episode included—has been treated comprehensively
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If Soret seemed ready to waver on his political stance on the problem, Goethe’s
reply seems downright reactionary. Dismissing the news (which he clearly understood)
about the potential breakdown of the Metternich consensus, Goethe seems to play his
own Wagner here, withdrawing into the laboratory and away from life, idealistically
setting his hopes for a new epoch not in institutional change but in abstruse shifts in
zoological methodology in Paris.704 Indeed, as he makes clear in the subsequent
conversation (the minutes of Soret’s stupefaction), what is at stake is a triumph of “spirit”
[Geist] over matter in the sciences, a triumph which is German (that of Naturphilosophie)
in an increasingly French-dominated institution705; Geoffroy has heralded the entrance of
the “synthetic” method in the natural sciences into the leading institution of the day. This
seems a far cry from the libertine and cultural-revolutionary enthusiasms of the author of
Werther, let alone of Tasso or the Römische Elegien. If one thinks of the collectivist
spiritualism of the French radicals of the time, or the soon-to-emerge German
“Ideologists” in Berlin, Goethe strikes the figure of intellectual senility, missing the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
by Dorothea Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit. Studien über Goethes Kritik des französischen
Akademiestreites (Graz: Böhlau, 1967)—for this conversation, see pp. 56-8.
704
That Goethe was not “a-political” has been made clear by e.g. Theo Stammen, Goethe und die politische
Welt (Würzburg: Ergon, 1999)) and Ekkehart Krippendorf, Goethe: Politik gegen den Zeitgeist
(Frankfurt/Main: Insel, 1999). Both political scientists relate Goethe’s politics to his natural-scientific
observational methods, as does Astrida Orle Tantillo, The Will to Create: Goethe’s Philosophy of Nature
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2002). My claim is not that morphology is inherently democratic,
peaceful, or even “tender,” but that Goethe’s theoretical attitude makes possible a kind of historical
technology which is—perhaps pace Goethe himself—political.
705
See Appel, Debate, pp. 11 ff. for the rise of the French Academy in zoology. The perspective of the
French on Naturphilosophie was often reduced to a generality: “Across the Rhine, the leading anatomists
publicized a German style of transcendental anatomy, which, although it may have borrowed something
from the French—German anatomists such as Oken, Johann Friedrich Meckel, and Johann Baptist von
Spix had studied in Paris in the first decade of the nineteenth century—was also firmly rooted in an
independent German philosophical tradition, based upon the writings of Kant. While some German
anatomists—the so-called Gottingen school, in which Meckel can be placed—took a relatively empirical
approach, Oken and others of the school of romantic Naturphilosophie endowed transcendental anatomy
with a mystical form and cosmic dimensions that were entirely absent in the French counterpart. The
French, however, did not distinguish among the schools of German science, and friends and foes alike
linked Geoffroy with an undifferentiated "German philosophy of nature." (Appel, Debate, p. 106.) It is
important to note that, while Goethe saw an ally in Geoffroy, he actually removed himself from the fray to
point to the importance of philosophy in the natural sciences, as we shall see below.
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epoch-making mark of his last years in favor of personal obsessions making up the least
of his cultural legacy.706
None of these impressions holds water. By examining Goethe’s adoption and
adaptation of Romantic organology—his take on the technologia transcendentalis which
has been the topic of this study—I will show that this first ending to my terminological
history is one of philosophical synthesis with political possibilities. So far from isolating
himself in the a-political and the scientistic—a charge he has shouldered perhaps
singularly with his major dialogue-partner in the development of his version of
organology, Hegel707—Goethe sought, cautiously and painstakingly, to found a practice
of observation that could not only tenderly attend to the phenomena in their generality
and concreteness, but that could change this phenomenal world categorially, in short, to
found a system of experience capable of altering the world, a technological metaphysics.
Since he developed this transformative system in oblique dialogue with the mature Hegel,
and since this system seeks a rational agency in the historical world during its present
constitution, we may be justified in calling Goethe the first Young Hegelian—or in
saying that he anticipated the fundamental gesture of that radical movement he appeared
to foreclose on in August of 1830.

I. Goethe’s Organs
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Goethe’s insistence on the pride of place of his scientific works among his efforts, and the long-standing
dismissal of this claim in favor of his poetic works, is well-known. See, for example, Tantillo, Will, p. 1.
The scholarship which seeks not merely to recover Goethe’s “science” but to integrate it with our picture of
the cultural producer will be cited throughout in the following.
707
The mature relationship between Hegel and Goethe has been the topic of surprisingly little scholarly
discussion to date. Those studies which exist will be noted infra—yet this topic needs much more
consideration, especially after the wave of Goethe/Schelling scholarship which will be cited throughout.
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Perhaps the best-known words in Faust, which Goethe was still completing when
he turned his attentions to Paris, run:
Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,
Die eine will sich von der anderen trennen;
Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust,
Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen;
Die andere hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.708

Faust describes not his mind but his animal soul as so many lustful organs, clinging to
and keeping him in the world. This passage is mirrored in the essay “Polarity,” where
Goethe refers both to “zwei Seelen” and to the the distinction “Geist/Materie,” adding to
the polar pairs “zwei Körperhälften.” As Astrida Tantillo notes, the direction of the cut
across the body is ambiguous. Perhaps it is precisely between the rational head and the
sex-organs, thus further mirroring the distinction between souls across the spirit/matter
axis in the body itself.709 Organs, however, play a greater role in Goethe’s system than
this casual mention might lead us to believe. Indeed, the formal role occupied by the term
here is representative of a more general function I will examine in this chapter. In Faust’s
speculative-experiential monologue, the organs of the lower soul are the sexual organs as
such—yet then again, they are, in the soul, merely the desire of attachment to the world.
And then again they are both (lower) spirit and their functioning bodily counterparts,
polarized and unified across the spirit/matter divide. This emphatically dialectical
terminological gesture already points in the direction of Goethe’s revision of the
organological doctrine: uniting function and field across dual divisions—especially
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Goethes Werke, Weimarer Sophienausgabe (Weimar: Böhlau ,1887 ff.),
I. Abtheilung: 14. Band (1887), p. 57. Hereinafter as WA I: 14, p. 57.!I will cite the Weimar-edition
throughout for ease of reference, except where this hinders that ease. At those places, as throughout, I have
consulted the Frankfurt and Munich editions, and especially the Leopoldina-Ausgabe of Goethe’s scientific
works.
709
Tantillo, Will, pp. 18-19.
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spirit/matter—the organ becomes the organon of an intentionally quasi-philosophical
approach to experience and science which ultimately also serves as the foundation for the
alteration of the object addressed by that experience and that science: the world. Goethe’s
organology is a technological metaphysics.710

II. Canon and Organon: Hegel’s Critique of Kant

As we have seen above (Chapter I), Kant’s philosophical itinerary led him from
the brink of organology to a methodological revolution in metaphysics which foreclosed
the very possibility of that organology. Having accepted the challenge posed by the crisis
of metaphysics at the end of the 17th century, Kant explicitly sought a “Newtonian”-style
methodological revolution for his beloved discipline, seeking throughout the turbulent
decade of the 1760s a foundation for the new science. In keeping with the tradition, he
sometimes referred to that foundation as an “organon,” a specific or “special” logic that
could guide the discipline.711 Here he encountered a definitional difficulty: what specific
logic could apply to the science of the general itself? Where Aristotle had noted this
difficulty and optimistically affirmed a discursive “organon” (or a synthetic logic) that
methodologically underwrote the dual appearance of the “categories” in his Metaphysics
and in his logical treatise The Categories, Kant had to respond to skepticism on just this
count. The question that Kant slowly brought to bear—which he came to call, in its
critical form, “transcendental logic”—was itself the intentionally problematic foundation
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The paradox of a technology (usually associated with the voluntary, with Willkür) united with the
metaphysical (the object of which, as we have seen, is the necessary within being) is at the center of
Goethe’s thought, as I shall be arguing throughout.
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The history of these terms has been extensively explored by Tonelli, Kant’s Critique.
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for any possible metaphysics: how could our categories be genuinely informative about
the categories “out there”? What made a real interaction between thought and being
possible? For Kant, that interaction needed grounding in conditions of our thinking and
conditions of our apprehension, respectively. And ultimately, it was the marriage—or
actually procreation—of those two types of conditions that made up our particular kind of
rationality: the synthesis of the intuited “material of perception” interacted with the
synthesis of judgments (categories being the types of those syntheses) through the cipher
of the transcendental synthesis of apperception, the unity of consciousness itself. This
system allowed for a legitimate, rule-based manner of approaching the natural world and
our judgments about it. And in establishing that set of rules, Kant gave it the name
“canon”—a positive body of laws—rejecting now his earlier hopes for an “organon” of
reason.712 In one sense, the “synthesizing” reason which would have its base in this
organon was a gloss for the possibility of metaphysics, and its rejection a dismissal of any
reasoned insight into the ultimate link between thought and being.
As we have seen, finding a way back to the organological impulse in metaphysics
was a primary factor in philosophical Romanticism in Germany. Maintaining the critical
edge of Kant’s thought remained central713 even as the Romantics painstakingly removed
from the Critical philosophy what I have called Kant’s “intuitionism” (his reliance on a
“material” condition of possibility for the legitimate rules of reason). And while this
methodological intervention allowed for the “organon” of reason to ground this new
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The term “organon of reason” grew out of this objection to Aristotle and to Kant’s near-collaboration
and eventual rejection of Johann Heinrich Lambert’s Neues Organon (1764). The term “organon of reason”
was connected to the latter interaction, as Kant’s lectures on logic make clear (see chapter I).
713
This controversial thesis is based on the notion that the critical impulse is simply the rejection of
dogmatic judgment-formation, and is removable from the specific architectonic of faculties which Kant
came to defend. On the critical/architectonic relation to organology, see chapter I.
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metaphysics, the term was enriched by the legacy of that other term, “organ,” which
provided the field (dynamic, developmental nature) for the organon’s (rational) function.
The new metaphysics was, as Frederick Beiser has put it, rational and organicist
simultaneously.714 But in this etymological conflation, it was more: it was meant to be
interventionary, to make possible rational alteration of the world in a non-arbitrary
manner. It was technologia transcendentalis, an attempt not to describe the world but to
grasp it in its subject-implicating development. The task of grasping was only partially
representational, and its other part was oriented towards changing it. The broad course of
organology, into which Hegel and Goethe entered in conversation in the 1820s, was thus
neither a return to “content” nor a bland dialectical formalism,715 but instead a conception
of the very content of being as the very forms-in-development of the human organ(on)
itself, which thus, in keeping with the challenge first presented in these terms by
Hölderlin (see Chapter II) to unite practical and theoretical philosophy, was capable of
rational intervention in that content itself, the world in history.
Hegel’s entrance into this discursive field is marked not by his relationship to the
Romantics, but by his critiques of Kant and Goethe, respectively. Indeed, it was a sort of
oblique conversation between Goethe and Hegel that brought a first finishing episode to
the organological adventure. And that episode was always entangled in both men’s
relationships to Kant.
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See Frederick Beiser, German Idealism, esp. pp. 349-465. This depiction of “romantic” or “absolute”
idealism has received a more compact treatment from him in his The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of
Early German Romanticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 131-153.
715
Accusations made against Romanticism and Hegel, most often made against the one by the other. For a
modern version of Romanticism as methodological regression from the Enlightenment, see the (outdated)
thesis of Isaiah Berlin, for example, The Roots of Romanticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999). See also the important article by Robert E. Norton, "The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment,"
Journal of the History of Ideas, 68 (2007), pp. 635-658.
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Hegel everywhere critiques Kant. In his most famous—and most hostile—
assessment of Kant’s philosophy, he presents the Critical system as the obverse of vulgar
empiricism, which ignores the rational binding activity it uses for its putatively formally
innocents observations. Hegel cites Faust:
Encheiresin naturae nennts die Chemie,
Spottet ihrer selbst und weiß nicht wie.
Hat die Teile in ihrer Hand,
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.716

As elsewhere,717 Hegel uses Faust’s indictment of the ideology of empiricism to mark his
objection: that thoughtful analysis occurs in the allegedly naïve observation of the
empiria. The obverse of empiricism’s error, then, is overcommitment to analysis. And
indeed, Kant’s error is to cling too closely to the forms of thought (the categories) as
fixed forms. The categories are, as we have seen, tied to the empirical forms of spacetime intuition, but this is not Hegel’s objection.718 Nor, as it is easy to think, is Hegel’s
objection that Kant retains a “thing-in-itself” beyond thought.719 Or rather, it is not to the
“thing-in-itself” as such that Hegel objects, but rather to the way it emerges within Kant’s
thought. For Hegel, the critical impulse remains incomplete in Kant’s work, because an
obdurate “objectivity” remains external to the rational work the categories do, not outside
consciousness but within it. That is: Hegel is relatively unconcerned about the
problematic “thing” because he is already concerned with the establishment of
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G. F. W. Hegel, Werke in 20 Bänden. Bände 8-10. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1979 ff.). I cite as Enz. I, §38. Also quoted at WA I: 14, p. 91.
717
Enz. II, §246, Zusatz. More on this passage below.
718
In this regard, I agree with Sally Sedgwick. See her Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to
Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Our agreement is that Hegel’s primary line of objection
is not to the “restriction” thesis (that thought is restricted by the forms of intuition, and therefore ultimately
by a “thing in itself” tossed out into an unknowable void). While I agree with her assessment that Hegel
rejects Kant’s dual contingencies for us with respect to the material of perception, I do not think it
motivates Hegel’s objection, or that this is the optimal reading of Hegel.
719
This objection was famously made by Jacobi, who had written that with the thing-in-itself, he could not
get into the Critical system, without it, could not stay in it.!!
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internalities and externalities inside consciousness in Kant’s thought. The legitimate work
done by the canon is fixed in its form, not due to the “material” of perception (the
influence of which must remain technically problematic for Kant), but because the
positivity of its laws can express only one kind of objectivity, one Kant describes as
“constitutive,” and which conforms, ultimately, to the mechanical-quantitative worldimage of Newtonian physics and the qualitative-intensive scales of perception. The world
so constituted is not or not only prey to a final exterior, but (also, and more importantly)
to an internal splitting into an interior and an exterior, an impassive “material” element
(ultimately related by Kant to apprehension) and a therefore necessarily incompletely
constructive formal element (categorical synthesis).720 Where the empiricist ignores the
rational work he is unconsciously transporting into his observation, Kant misses the
“empirical” element in his supposedly transcendental analysis of the forms of judgment.
To repeat: it is not that Kant treats of genuine empiria in his analysis. Hegel’s reading is
subtler than that. The problem is that Kant maintains the problem of the empirical—its
essence—in the categorical system. In trying to analyze what we do when we synthesize
a priori (when we think non-arbitrarily but also informatively about the world), Kant
imports the contradiction of thought and being into thought itself. The characteristic of
being which does not allow of penetration by thought—does not allow of true
understanding—is simply reproduced as the “material” of that thought in the judgmental
form. The categories are fixed by a permanent contradiction, now not between thought
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On this internal split and its consequences, see John McDowell, Mind and World with a New
Introduction (Camridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). A similar thesis (cast in very different terms) is
defended by Slavoj Zizek in Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology
(Durham: Duke, 1993), pp. 18-22.
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and being, but between thought’s form and thought’s content. Hegel’s critical question is:
why should we regard this contradiction as permanent?721
Thus where the empiricist eternalizes the world (in contradiction with thought),
Kant eternalizes the forms of thought, in internal contradiction. Because of this
determination of thought’s form, only an analytical canon was possible. Hegel writes:
Dem Denken bleibt [...] auf seiner höchsten Spitze die Bestimmtheit etwas Äußerliches;
es bleibt nur schlechthin abstraktes Denken, welches hier immer Vernunft heißt. Diese,
ist hiermit das Resultat, liefert nichts als die formelle Einheit zur Vereinfachung und
Systematisierung der Erfahrungen, ist ein Kanon, nicht ein Organon der Wahrheit,
vermag nicht eine Doktrin des Unendlichen, sondern nur eine Kritik der Erkenntnis zu
liefern.722

A canon serves only to regulate and simplify judgments, not to extend them—in Hegel’s
terms, to establish valid abstract statements, but not to extend knowledge to an objective,
or truthful, form. That form, according to Hegel, could not be fixed, but would have to be
in movement. Neither the world nor its knowledge is in a fixed form: their interaction is
in constant revolution, mutual informing activity, or what is usually called the dialectical
relation.
Kant had divided the rationalists’ distinction between metaphysica generalis
(ontology) and metaphysica specialis (rational psychology, cosmology, and rational
theology) into a canon of the understanding and a “regulative” system. For the form of
judgment possible under the canon, the latter disciplines presented problems of a kind
that could not be synthesized constitutively, since propositions about the immortality of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Hegel drew attention to this difficulty in Kant’s thought as early as his Differenz-Schrift
(“Vorerinnerung”), where he writes: “Es bleibt außer den objektiven Bestimmungen durch die Kategorien
ein ungeheures empirisches Reich der Sinnlichkeit und Wahrnehmung, eine absolute Aposteriorität, für
welche keine Apriorität als nur eine subjektive Maxime der reflektierenden Urteilskraft aufgezeigt ist; d. h.
die Nichtidentität wird zum absoluten Grundsatz erhoben.” He had also begun his analysis of an alternative
in his earliest writing on Kant, Glauben und Wissen (1803), on which an extensive recent literature has
sprung up. See representatively John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and
Sellars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).
722
Enz. I, §52.
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the soul, the infinity of the world, or the omnipotence of God could not correspond to any
intuition.723 Hegel’s tack here is not to claim that we know those antinomic propositions
constitutively, but that our constitutive knowledge is also antinomical.724 The
contradiction in thought between its objectivity and its form is affirmed, but as a part and
foundation of thought’s dialectical development. The instrument of that antinomical
knowledge-process is the concept.
Perhaps the first (and certainly the most famous) articulation of this thought-inmovement is in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Here Hegel levels
critiques against earlier philosophers for working with a false notion of what thought
itself is. Wavering between the poles of “passive medium” and “tool,” philosophers have
missed the methodological point: thought certainly mediates, but in doing so is not
merely formal, but is the formal presentation of any possible content. Hegel’s point
here—at the beginning of an introduction to a book in turn intended as the introduction to
his system—is not that thought and being are dialectically mutually informative (this is
the result of the system), but that they appear within thought to be so.725 Taking a cue
from Kant’s anti-dogmatism, Hegel establishes a methodological baseline: what we know
is presented in the form of thought, for us there is no “outside” to this form of contentpresentation, and thus philosophy must take its impulse from this very form-content
admixture, including its internal contradiction. The beginning of philosophy is where we
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Metaphysica generalis is explicitly glossed as a “bloße Analytik des Verstandes” at A247/B303. For the
regulative doctrine of the “ideas,” see the opening passages of the “Dialektik der reinen Vernunft.”
724
“Die Hauptsache... ist, dass nicht nur in den vier besonderen, aus der Kosmologie genommenen
Gegenständen die Antinomie sich befindet, sondern vielmehr in allen Gegenständen aller Gattungen, in
allen Vorstellungen, Begriffen und Ideen... diese Eigenschaft macht das aus, was weiterhin sich als das
dialektische Moment des Logischen bestimmt.” (Enz. I, §48.)
725
PhdG, Einleitung.
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take note of the concrete forms of thought, what Hegel came to call Denkbestimmungen
(“thought-determinations”).
Note that Hegel rejects the vulgar organological notion of thought as a “tool.” We
should not be fooled into thinking that this leads him away from the more general
organological path, for the sketch of the dialectic of the concept that follows is named,
precisely in reaction to Kant, an “organon.” The concept—as representation and as
process—is the organon of metaphysics.726
This is not the place to explain the entirety of Hegel’s concept-logic, but the basic
procedure should be clear.727 A representation of any sort has two sides: on the one hand,
it is as itself a unit; on the other, it is related to something (to which it putatively refers),
its object. The object is the intended content of the representation, but the critical method
intervenes between intention and conclusion, and demands that we treat the object as
provisionally non-independent from its representational form. Thus Kant’s thoughtinternal contradiction reappears, but now without its finalistic determination. The
representation as unity is as representation a referring function, the object of which is
uncertain already for the representation—the uncertainty of the reference leads us to
imagine the object and the representation as external to each other. This process occurs,
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My interepretation here sides with those who think that Hegel is a defender of a robust metaphysics. The
recent debate about Hegel’s status as metaphysician or not is often presented as a conflict between those
who see relevance in Hegel (Brandom, McDowell, Pinkard) and those who treat him more historically
(Horstmann, Beiser). I think that Hegel was a metaphysician of a particular, post-Romantic stripe, and that
he is relevant for precisely this reason. See, for example, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, “Hegel's Phenomenology
of Spirit as an Argument for a Monistic Ontology”, Inquiry 49 (2006), pp. 103-118, and Frederick Beiser,
Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 51-80.
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Good summaries of the concept-dialectic can be found in Gunnar Hindrichs, “Die aufgeklärte
Aufklärung”, in: Kant and the Future of the European Enlightenment / Kant und die Zukunft der
europäischen Aufklärung, ed. Heiner F. Klemme (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), pp. 43-68, and
Rolf-Peter Horstmann, G. W. F. Hegel. Eine Einführung (zusammen mit D. Emundts) (Stuttgart: Phillip
Reclam, 2002). A “non-metaphysical” but formally clarifying analysis is in Klaus Hartmann, “Hegel: A
Non-Metaphysical View,” in Klaus Hartmann, Studies in Foundational Philosophy, (Amsterdam: Editions
Rodopi, 1988).
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however, conceptually: we produce the concept of the object and the concept of its
concept. This division is then seen as a “lack” in the representation, and drives us to
create a new unity: the concept must be corrected, and applied to a new, more appropriate
object. But this process of internal division is not limited by an external object: it is the
nature of conceptuality as such. To approach philosophy from the perspective of the
concept is to name this entire process “concept.”728
It now becomes possible to see why the concept can be a “synthetic organon” in
Kant’s sense. Because it works through the concrete interaction of form and matter
without ever treating the matter as permanently resistant or finally “external,”
conceptuality provides its own index of concreteness. The categorical function—
synthesis or the creation of types of unity out of given manifolds—is carried out by the
concept, which is not only an element in the process but the methodological basis (or
perspective) which allows the very analysis of that synthesis. Denkbestimmungen are
really the concrete aspect of thought itself.
This intervention can be cast in organological terms.729 The analysis of
conceptuality as process reveals that the “material” of judgment is concrete, not finally
resistant to but dialectically implied in that very process. The concept as “organ” (in the
Romantic sense) thus provides its own extensive field for its function, delimiting the
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This double name has led to many problems in Hegel interpretation. See Horstmann, Einführung, for a
treatment of the unity and plurality of the “concept” in Hegel.!!
729
Hegel usually uses these terms negatively, with reference to Kant, e.g.: “Es wird für einen Mißbrauch
erklärt, daß die Logik, die bloß ein Kanon der Beurteilung sein solle, als ein Organon zur
Hervorbringung objektiver Einsichten angesehen werde. Die Vernunftbegriffe, in denen man eine
höhere Kraft und tieferen Inhalt ahnen mußte, haben nichts Konstitutives mehr wie noch die Kategorien;
sie sind bloße Ideen; es soll ganz wohl erlaubt sein, sie zu gebrauchen, aber mit diesen intelligiblen Wesen,
in denen sich alle Wahrheit ganz aufschließen sollte, soll weiter nichts gemeint sein als Hypothesen, denen
eine Wahrheit an und für sich zuzuschreiben eine völlige Willkür und Tollkühnheit sein würde, da sie in
keiner Erfahrung vorkommen können.” (Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik II, “Vom Begriff im
Allgemeinen.”)
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extreme possibility of that field in concrete functional instances. Thus the concept is
“objective”: “logic becomes one with metaphysics, the science of things grasped in
thought, which in turn were meant to express the essentiality of the things.”730 The “tools”
themselves are de-neutralized, and their putative objects are leveled into their field’s
functionality. Content is included in the form of conceptuality, treated from the
perspective called the “concept,” which as this perspective is the organon of logic and
metaphysics simultaneously. The categories become the dynamic organs of the concrete,
the world as conceptual process.

III. Organs of Mediation: Hegel’s Critique of Goethe

Hegel accuses Goethe of doing science without instruments.731 The concreteness
of the concept, allowing for synthetic knowledge of the truth of objects in their mutuality
with the concept itself, is missing from Goethe method, even as his experience reveals the
schema of the truth:
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“Die Logik fällt daher mit der Metaphysik zusammen, der Wissenschaft der Dinge in Gedanken gefasst,
welche dafür galten, die Wesenheit der Dinge auszudrücken.“ (Enz I, §24.) Cf. the introduction to
Wissenschaft der Logik I.
731
Hegel and Goethe’s interactions generally fall into three periods. They were first introduced in Jena and
Weimar during Goethe’s intensive friendship with Schelling, which started in the last years of the 1790s.
During this time, they worked together on experiments in the botanical gardens. This has been documented
by Eckhart Förster, “Die Bedeutung von §§76, 77 der Kritik der Urteilskraft für die Entwicklung der
nachkantischen Philosophie. Teil 1” in ed. Jürgen Stolzenberg, Kant und der Frühidealismus (Hamburg:
Meiner, 2007), pp. 59-80. The second period of interaction (for which, see Frederick Burwick, The
Damnation of Newton: Goethe’s Color Theory and Romantic Perception (New York: de Gruyter, 1986),
pp. 58-79) occurred Hegel’s time in Nürnberg in 1816-17, when he aided in experiments, this time in the
later work on the theory of color, specifically on “entoptic” colors. This collaboration led Hegel to take
sides with Goethe in the color controversy, and ushered in what I will call the third period of their
interaction, from roughly 1821 until Hegel’s death. This period is marked by letters and a few visits in
Weimar, and is generally cordial and friendly but distant. The only analysis of this last period of which I
am aware is Karl Löwith’s short introductory study in his From Hegel to Nietzsche: Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century Thought, transl. David Green (New York: Anchor, 1967), pp. 2-29. This very general
introduction sketches the interaction admirably, but Hegel’s Christianity and Goethe’s philosophical
prowess have both been convincingly reevaluated since Löwith’s time.
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Bei der Erfahrung kommt es darauf an, mit welchem Sinn man an die Wirklichkeit geht.
Ein großer Sinn macht große Erfahrungen und erblickt in dem bunten Spiel der
Erscheinungen das, worauf es ankommt. Die Idee ist vorhanden und wirklich, nicht etwas
da drüben und hinten. Der große Sinn, wie z.B. der eines Goethe, der in die Natur oder in
die Geschichte blickt, macht große Erfahrungen, erblickt das Vernünftige und spricht es
aus. Das Fernere ist sodann, dass man das Wahre auch in der Reflexion erkennen kann
und es durch Verhältnisse des Gedankens bestimmt. Das Wahre an und für sich ist indes
in diesen beiden Weisen noch nicht in seiner eigentlichen Form vorhanden. Die
vollkommenste Weise des Erkennens ist die in der reinen Form des Denkens.732

Hegel dubs this type of rational recognition „sinnvolle Anschauung.“733 Playing on the
dual sense of the word Sinn, Hegel accuses Goethe of leaving the term in this conflated
state, where it deserves to be separated and re-joined to make up “das Allgemeine der
Sache.“ Goethe “sense“ divines this general truth but remains without an organ for the
determination of its insight.734 The conclusion of the Farbenlehre is correct [sic], but its
method is lacking: Goethe’s much-vaunted “intuitive” approach to nature lacks an
internally insightful organ that could make it a candidate for inclusion in the
metaphysical innovations of the early 19th century.
Hegel’s objection is to a lack of rational accounting for the conclusion of the
observation, a kind of meta-conceptual doubling (in his system, concept as representation
and as process). The lacking function was called “organ” by the Romantics, yet Hegel’s
accusation is ambivalent with respect to Goethe: only one step is missing in Goethe’s
method (where the Romantics, for Hegel, misstep from the very outset). In the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
732

Hegel, Enz. I, §24, Zusatz 3.
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I (VüdÄ I), Werke 13-15 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1986 ff.), p.
173.
734
“Von solcher Art ist die Goethesche Beschauung und Darlegung der inneren Vernünftigkeit der Natur
und ihrer Erscheinungen. Mit großem Sinne trat er naiverweise mit sinnlicher Betrachtung an die
Gegenstände heran und hatte zugleich die volle Ahnung ihres begriffsgemäßen Zusammenhangs.” (VüdÄ I,
p. 174; my emphasis.) Also: „Die innere Einheit bleibt innerlich, sie tritt für die Anschauung nicht in
konkret ideeller Form heraus, und die Betrachtung lässt es bei der Allgemeinheit eines notwendigen
beseelenden Zusammenhanges überhaupt bewenden. (VüdÄ I, p. 174; emphasis in original.)!
733
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Encyclopedia, the Romantics are accused of having the opposite of Goethe’s problem:
they have a “conceptless instrument”735 where Goethe is missing only the organ.
Goethe’s insistence on method in his own work speaks directly against Hegel’s
critique,736 and yet an anomaly in Hegel’s own presentation of Goethe may already point
us in the direction of Goethe’s response to this critique. As pointed out above, Hegel uses
Faust’s encheiresin naturae to reject empiricism’s claim to conceptual innocence.737 In
doing so, he implicitly recognizes that Goethe’s method is not empirically naïve: Goethe
sees “reason” (das Vernünftige) in nature. And yet Goethean methodology, while not
committing the error of Romantic Naturphilosophie, retains a naivety about just that
judgmental analytical division of nature. Further, the passage makes clear that Goethe
stands principally on the same side as Hegel in terms of the relationship of metaphysics
to physics. Physics unknowingly defends a metaphysics, projecting a “world” which is
ruled by a body of positive laws not visible but only calculable. The relation between
general and particular is, for Hegel as for Goethe, unsatisfactory. (Newtonian) physics
produces an unhappy parallel but not synthesis between the general-quantitative the
qualitative-particular, not truly obviating metaphysics but producing a metaphysical
image not grasped or graspable by experience.738 Hegel characterizes this as an
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Enz. II, §244 Zusatz: “[die Naturphilosophie] ist vielfältig, ja größtenteils in einen äußerlichen
Formalismus ver- wandelt und in ein begriffloses Instrument für die Oberflächlichkeit des Gedankens und
eine phantastische Einbildungskraft verkehrt worden.”
736
Most pointedly in a letter from 7 October 1820 to Hegel himself: “Es ist hier die Rede nicht von
einer durchzusetzenden Meinung, sondern von einer mitzutheilenden Methode, deren sich ein jeder, als
eines Werkzeugs, nach seiner Art, bedienen möge.” (WA 4: 33, p. 295. Cited by Löwith, From Hegel to
Nietzsche, p. 4.)
737
Enc. II, §246, Zusatz. See note 716 in the current chapter above.
738
This is Hegel’s articulation of a general complaint by Goethe against Newton, an objection that is
grounded in the method of mathematical abstraction that Newton called “analytical,” which searches for
generalities in visible effects, but does not construct causes of those effects which could be directly
demonstrated experimentally. For analysis of this objection, see my “Das Innere der Natur und ihr Organ:
von Albrecht von Haller zu Goethe“ (unpublished). For Hegel’s polemics against Newton, see Enc. II, §§
270, 318, 320. Goethe’s relationship to Newton is particularly sensitively handled by Tantillo, Will to
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overemphasis on unity: a formula is produced, but is exterior to any actual individual or
event in the physical world, and nature is split in two. An implicit metaphysics arises, a
split world parallel to the split thought-world of Kantian methodology.
What is missing is a categorical shift.739 In Goethe’s case, it seems, this would
simply be the activation of these categories for the constructive participation in the
conceptual world-process. With clear reference to Goethe, he writes:
Der philosophischen Allgemeinheit sind die Bestimmungen nicht gleichgültig; sie ist die
sich selbst erfüllende Allgemeinheit, die in ihrer diamantenen Identität zugleich den
Unterschied in sich enthält. Das wahrhaft Unendliche ist die Einheit seiner selbst und des
Endlichen; und das ist nun die Kategorie der Philosophie und daher auch der
Naturphilosophie. Wenn die Gattungen und Kräfte das Innere der Natur sind und gegen dies
Allgemeine das Äußere und Einzelne das Verschwindende ist, so fordert man noch als
dritte Stufe das Innere des Innern, welches nach dem Vorhergehenden die Einheit des
Allgemeinen und Besonderen wäre.740

Goethe’s method leaves a remnant of the division of inner and outer nature intact,
because the inner and the outer are not doubly reflected as the dialectical core of identity
and non-identity which is the concept, the true organ or category of (nature)philosophy.
Goethe observes but does not participate in the internal rationality of nature:
Der unbefangene Geist, wenn er lebendig die Natur anschaut, wie wir dies häufig bei
Goethe auf eine sinnige Weise geltend gemacht finden, so fühlt er das Leben und den
allgemeinen Zusammenhang in derselben: er ahnt das Universum als ein organisches
Ganzes und eine vernünftige Totalität, ebenso als er im einzelnen Lebendigen eine innige
Einheit in ihm selbst empfindet; bringen wir aber auch alle jene Ingredienzien der Blume
zusammen, so kommt doch keine Blume heraus. So hat man in der Naturphilosophie die
Anschauung zurückgerufen und sie über die Reflexion gesetzt; aber das ist ein Abweg,
denn aus der Anschauung kann man nicht philosophieren.741
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Create. Note that in a relatively temperate moment in the Farbenlehre (“historischer Teil”), Goethe affords
Newton an “organ”: “Newton war ein wohlorganisirter, gesunder, wohltemperirter Mann, ohne
Leidenschaft, ohne Begierden. Sein Geist war constructiver Natur und zwar im abstractesten Sinne; daher
war die höhere Mathematik ihm als das eigentliche Organ gegeben, durch das er seine innere Welt
aufzubauen und die äußere zu gewältigen suchte.” (WA: II 4, p. 97.)
739
Hegel puts its rather strongly here: “… Die Philosophie überhaupt hat als Philosophie andere Kategorien
als das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein; alle Bildung reduziert sich auf den Unterschied der Kategorien. Alle
Revolutionen, in den Wissenschaften nicht weniger als in der Weltgeschichte, kommen nur daher, daß der
Geist jetzt zum Verstehen und Vernehmen seiner, um sich zu besitzen, seine Kategorien geändert hat, sich
wahrhafter, tiefer, sich inniger und einiger mit sich erfassend.” (Enz. II, §246, Zusatz.)
740
Enz. II, §246, Zusatz. The phrase “das Innere des Inneren” is related to Goethe and Hegel’s parallel
treatments of the “inside of nature,” on which my “Das Innere der Natur.”
741
Enz. II, §246, Zusatz.!

!

348!
!!
!
This passage is immediately followed by a citation of Albrecht von Haller’s
famous words, “Ins Innere der Natur dringt kein erschaffener Geist / Glücklich,
dem sie nur die äußere Schale weist.” Rejecting this sentiment as an eternalization
of the pseudo-metaphysical split in nature, Hegel quotes Goethe’s rejection of
Haller’s poem, itself a poem entitled “Dem Physiker” (Newton):
»Ins Innre der Natur -«
O du Philister! »Dringt kein erschaffner Geist.«
Mich und Geschwister
Mögt ihr an solches Wort
Nur nicht erinnern: Wir denken:
Ort für Ort Sind wir im Innern.
»Glückselig, wem sie nur
Die äußre Schale weist!«
[…]
Natur hat weder Kern Noch Schale,
Alles ist sie mit einem Male.
Dich prüfe du nur allermeist,
Ob du Kern oder Schale seist.742

Goethe thus also polemicizes against a putatively “exterior” nature and its impenetrability
by reason. Hegel concludes his section on Naturphilosophie with the correct version of
the generalizing (or “theoretical”) and particularizing (or “practical”) attitudes towards
the reflective negation of nature in observation. He thus leaves an ambiguous challenge to
Goethe. Goethe’s words have stood in for the (correct) critique of empiricism (twice), a
one-sided approach to nature’s true Reason, and the norm to which that Reason should
tend in correct naturephilosophical methodology. Even in Hegel’s ambivalent
assessment, we begin to suspect that Goethe may have a response, an “organ” with which
to go about his thought-work.

IV. From Organs to Categories: Goethe’s Quasi-Philosophy
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WA I: 3, p. 105.
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a) Taxonomy and Idealism

Goethe is not a philosopher. And yet he performs thought-work in collaboration
with philosophy. This relationship is oblique, yet essential: Goethe’s work forms a direct
contribution to the family of philosophies I have been treating in this study, an alternate
or response to the Romantic743 organological project. That contribution emerges slowly
and piecemeal in Goethe’s works, forming less a “doctrine” than a conceptual attitude,
and as such a robust response to Hegel’s ambivalent organological critique.
Goethe sometimes addresses his relationship to philosophy directly, especially in
his scientific works. 744 Yet his characteristic attitude in this regard is—I think—found in
a literary text, the epistolary “novel”/aesthetic treatise Der Sammler und die Seinigen,
published in 1799 in the Propyläen, a periodical meant to contain the heart of the
classicist Weimar program. The collector himself (and it is hard not to see Goethe’s
primary identification with this figure745) delegates the taxonomic efforts to Julie746 and
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As Robert Richards has pointed out, the usual citation of Goethe’s antipathy towards Romanticism was
taken from late conversations dealing with French Romanticism in the 1820s. On 21 March 1830 he went
so far as to claim to Eckermann that Schiller had shown he that he (Goethe) was a Romantic, and that the
Schlegels had borrowed the term from them. See Richards, Romantic Conception, pp. 430-1.
744
So in his scientific magnum opus, he points to possible collaboration yet difference with philosophers:
“Vom Philosophen glauben wir Dank zu verdienen, daß wir gesucht die Phänomene bis zu ihren Urquellen
zu verfolgen, bis dorthin, wo sie bloß erscheinen und sind und wo sich nichts weiter an ihnen erklären läßt.
Ferner wird ihm willkommen sein, daß wir die Erscheinungen in eine leicht übersehbare Ordnung gestellt,
wenn er diese Ordnung selbst auch nicht ganz billigen sollte.” (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Berliner
Ausgabe. Kunsttheoretische Schriften und Übersetzungen. Band 19, (Berlin: Aufbau, 1960 ff.), p. 24.) The
scholarship I will be citing here is generally part of a recent wave of interest in Goethe and philosophy,
after a period of neglect. Especially the studies by Astrida Tantillo, Wolf Engelhardt, Eckhart Förster, and
the articles in the 2011 edition of the Goethe-Yearbook have reignited debate about “Goethe and Idealism.”
745
Johannes Grave has warned against identification-games in criticism of the novel. See Der “ideale
Kunskörper”: Johann Wolfgang Goethe als Sammler von Druckgraphiken und Zeichnungen (Göttingen:
Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 2006), p. 168. As always, narrow attempts at identification limit our criticalaesthetic assessment of the novel. And yet this particular work—part treatise, part epistolary novel, with
explicit reference to the extradiegetic Propyläen in which it was published—does not suffer, I think, from
more expansive dialogue about which intellectual figures play a role in its pages. See also his “Ideal and
History. Johann Wolfgang Goethe's Collection of Prints and Drawings,” Artibus et Historiae, 27: 53
(2006), pp. 175-186.
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maintains a distance from the abstract brilliance of the “philosopher” in the group,
insisting on a sort of cognitive innocence and tradition (his collection was started by his
grandfather) in his relation to art. And yet, the novel narrates his reconciliation to the
necessity of human cognitive intervention in both the production and the judgment of art.
This reconciliation is clearly signified by the central debate between the philosopher and
the Gast. The stranger presents the reader with an explicit ideology of the attitudinal
innocence of the collector: he constantly brushes aside the “metaphysical,” foundationsearching thought-style of the philosopher, and maintains that classical art had room for
the ugly and the monstrous. It is at this crucial moment that a Romantically ironic note is
sounded with a reflexive reference to the very organ (the Propyläen) in which the novel
has been published.747 Before withdrawing from the conversation and giving the pen to
the philosopher (!), the collector attempts to convince his interlocutor with an example he
cannot disagree with: the Laoköon statues, and the tradition of their classicist
interpretation. Both Lessing and Winckelmann are cited: surely no raw ugliness or
Entsetzliches is included in this kind of art, but only that which is recuperated by a
greater formal beauty.748 The collector’s horror at the Gast’s response (“no”) is then
turned into a genuine affection for the philosopher, who steps in to defend reason and
its—organological, as we shall see—role in the production and judgment of art. The
novel thus doubles back on to Goethe’s own history: having struggled with philosophy
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Whose presence and centrality at least partially undermine the otherwise outright sexism of Goethe’s
and Schiller’s writings on “dilettantism” from these years. See Hans Rudolf Vaget, Dilettantismus und
Meisterschaft. Zum Problem des Dilettantismus bei Goethe: Praxis, Theorie, Zeitkritik (Munich: Winkler,
1971), and also Elisabeth Krimmer, “German Women Writers and Classicism,” in ed. Simon Richter, The
Literature of Weimar Classicism (Rochester: Camden House, 2005), pp. 237-265.
747
WA I: 47, p. 162. Earlier mentions of the periodical are at pp. 146 and 152.
748
On the tradition of this interpretation, see Simon Richter, Laocoon's body and the aesthetics of pain:
Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, Moritz, Goethe (Detroit: Wayne State, 1992), and also his very helpful
“Introduction” in ed. ipsus, Literature of Weimar Classicism, pp. 3-45.
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and its deductive stylings, he had, in 1798, begun a serious study of and with Schelling
(on which more below). He had not and would not aspire to write philosophy: he left the
defense of reason to the “philosophers.” Yet he included reason, and its discipline
(metaphysics) in his intellectual itinerary. This inclusion was not incidental: his oblique
contribution to organology, as we shall see, was indeed about progressive inclusions of
the intuited and developing world. Resigning the ideological pen to the philosopher,
Goethe diagonally supported, included and engaged in philosophy’s characteristic task.
From this engagement emerged a quasi-philosophical episode in the organological
adventure.
Goethe’s first significant use of the term organ (in his metamorphosis-writings)749
and the first dislocation of that use into his aesthetic writings in the late 1790s seem to
fall easily prey to Hegel’s accusation that Goethe shows us “reason’s exterior” without its
internal “organ.”
The Metamorphosis of Plants (1790) contains two central doctrinal points in his
natural-scientific thought. The first is “type-theory”750: the notion that development
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Christopher Young and Thomas Gloning, A History of the German Language Through Texts (London:
Routledge, 2004), pp. 248-9, suggest that the term would still have appeared to the German reading public
as a Lehnwort, not as German, in 1790. See note 74 in chapter 1 above.!
750
The presence of a true type-theory in the Metamorphose is somewhat controversial, but its relation to
Goethe’s famous aperçu from 1787 is not. The passage from the letter to Herder from Italy reads: “Die
Urpflanze wird das wunderlichste Geschöpf von der Welt, um welches mich die Natur selbst beneiden soll.
Mit diesem Modell und dem Schlüssel dazu kann man alsdann noch Pflanzen in's Unendliche
erfinden, die consequent sein müssen, das heißt: die, wenn sie auch nicht existiren, doch existiren könnten
und nicht etwa mahlerische oder dichterische Schatten und Scheine sind, sondern eine innerliche Wahrheit
und Nothwendigkeit haben. Dasselbe Gesetz wird sich auf alles übrige Lebendige anwenden lassen…
So viel aber sei hier, ferneres Verständniß vorzubereiten, kürzlich ausgesprochen: Es war mir
nämlich aufgegangen, daß in demjenigen Organ der Pflanze, welches wir als Blatt gewöhnlich
anzusprechen pflegen, der wahre Proteus verborgen liege, der sich in allen Gestaltungen verstecken
und offenbaren könne. Vorwärts und rückwärts ist die Pflanze immer nur Blatt, mit dem künftigen Keime
so unzertrennlich vereint, daß man eins ohne das andere nicht denken darf. Einen solchen Begriff zu fassen,
zu ertragen, ihn in der Natur aufzufinden ist eine Aufgabe, die uns in einen peinlich süßen Zustand
versetzt.” (To Herder, 17 May 1787, Naples; WA I 32, p. 44; my emphasis.) Note that Goethe’s excitement
comes from the subjective side of the discovery, both its “concept” and the “painfully sweet” state of
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occurs according to a specific underlying form, one divinable from a correct perception
of nature’s individuals. An underlying form metamorphizes into the various parts of the
plant. Rooted in the same teaching is the second point: the name for this form is “organ,”
the part expressing both its own function and its relation to the whole. Because this more
general name is given to each separate form, the second doctrine is what Goethe named
as a discipline: morphology. Development occurs through processes of concentration and
expansion, forming “new” organs out of the functions of old. The two doctrines are
related but not identical, and even seem to beg a question about form: what is the “organ”
which, generating the model, schema, plan for the organic individual, is also encapsulated
terminologically and ontologically in each “part”? That tension is at the heart of Herder’s
proto-organology, and it was from a Herderian setting that Goethe seems to have taken
the term.751
Recall that the terms of Herder’s abortive “organology” were the following: an
organically developing Being qua force which, as God/World stood in mutual, expressive
interaction with all of its parts, thought, material, or otherwise. Those “parts” were called
“organs”: functions with internal teloi expressing the necessary course of nature and
culminating in humanity (Menschheit) itself, the ultimate organ. Although this doctrine
probably created the strongest textual or terminological basis for organology, the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
activity into which it puts him. This is portentous of his increasing commitment to idealism, as is the
constructive notion of “inventing plants to infinity” which might lack existence but not necessity.
751
For an exploration of Goethe’s relationship to “type-theory” and its origins in his collaborations with
Herder, see H. B. Nisbet, “Herder, Goethe, and the Natural Type,” p. 105: “But we find little reference to
[the singular “type-theory”] in his completed botanical writings; he gradually lost interest in it after he had
worked out in detail his theory of the ideal leaf or type organ of the higher plants in 1790.” As Kuhn,
Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, has shown, however, Goethe did return to this theory, especially in the
context of the Akademiestreit. Robert Richards, Romantic Conception, p. 416, points out that this overlap
between form and development puts Goethe between preformationism and epigeneticism in biology, with
the “transcendental leaf” open to epigenetic developments, but forming the encapsulation common in
preformationist theories.
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Romantic metaphysical project—its technologia transcendentalis—was
methodologically based on Kant’s philosophy, with its wavering on the question of an
organon. This admixture—a textual alternative to Frederick Beiser’s “Fichte plus
Spinoza” thesis752—was contradictory, and the stakes were that of the transition between
the organic and the ideal organ. As we have seen above, this transition was included in
Herder’s thought (indeed, he calls thought the “force of all forces”), and yet not
defended. With Schelling, the term’s history took on a new profile as a norm, an
intellectual tool for intervention in its field. Effectively, the next generation asked of
Herder what Herder had asked of Spinoza: what entitles us to conceive of Being in this
way? And this question became relevant in terms of content and not just methodology—
what organ could justify itself in the actual world for knowledge of that world? Kant’s
question was cast in Herder’s terms. Herder’s pullulating organs seemed, from the
organological perspective, a single plane, a mere extension, an exterior of teleological
entities with no basis in reason. The methodology he had defended was based only in
analogy, in structural similarities between various organs proliferating in the organic
unity of an undulating “Being.”753
It is easy to place Goethe’s early use of the term “organ” in this Herderian
context. Take the more significant of those uses in the Metamorphose itself:
Wenn wir nun bemerken, daß es auf diese Weise der Pflanze möglich ist, einen Schritt
rückwärts zu tun, und die Ordnung des Wachstums umzukehren; so werden wir auf den
regelmäßigen Weg der Natur desto aufmerksamer gemacht, und wir lernen die Gesetze
der Umwandlung kennen, nach welchen sie Einen Teil durch den andern hervorbringt,
und die verschiedensten Gestalten durch Modifikation eines einzigen Organs darstellt.
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See Beiser, Romantic Imperative, pp. 131-53.!!
Peter Hanns Reill has related this methodology to Goethe’s general procedure. See his “Bildung, Urtyp
and Polarity: Goethe and Eighteenth-Century Physiology” in: Goethe Yearbook, 3 (1986), pp. 139-148.
While this methodology certainly existed (see ipsus, Vitalizing Nature), I think that it represents only the
earliest of Goethe’s Ansichten der Natur.
752
753
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Die geheime Verwandtschaft der verschiedenen äußern Pflanzenteile, als der Blätter, des
Kelchs, der Krone, der Staubfäden, welche sich nach einander und gleichsam aus
einander entwickeln, ist von den Forschern im allgemeinen Längst erkannt, ja auch
besonders bearbeitet worden, und man hat die Wirkung, wodurch ein und
dasselbe Organ sich uns mannigfaltig verändert sehen läßt, die Metamorphose der
Pflanzen genannt.754
Und so wären wir der Natur auf ihren Schritten so bedachtsam als möglich gefolgt; wir
hätten die äußere Gestalt der Pflanze in allen ihren Umwandlungen, von ihrer
Entwickelung aus dem Samenkorn bis zur neuen Bildung desselben begleitet, und ohne
Anmaßung, die ersten Triebfedern der Naturwirkungen entdecken zu wollen, auf
Äußerung der Kräfte, durch welche die Pflanze ein und eben dasselbe Organ nach und
nach umbildet, unsre Aufmerksamkeit gerichtet.755

We note here, in paragraphs that open and close Goethe’s reflections, that terms for
“exterior” occur multiple times, that “exteriorization” or “expression (Äußerung) is
central, and that organic forces are everywhere at play. Goethe has successfully applied
the Herderian monistic matrix to natural-scientific observation, leaving the “concept” of
the plant announced in his 1787 letter to Herder somewhere in the methodology itself,
allowing it to emerge in the narrative flow of his written observations. A failed
organological metaphysics became the methodology of successful empirical observation.
I would like to suggest here, however, that the philosophical impact of that methodology
did not truly emerge until the inclusion of this writing in the Morphologische Hefte in the
second decade of the 19th century, when it in fact became included in the history of
organology.
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WA II 6, pp. 25-6.
WA II 6, p. 71. Other significant uses occur where Goethe speaks of concentration and expansion of
organs: “Es mag nun die Pflanze sprossen, blühen oder Früchte bringen, so sind es doch nur
immer dieselbigen Organe, welche, in vielfältigen Bestimmungen und unter oft veränderten Gestalten, die
Vorschrift der Natur erfüllen. Dasselbe Organ, welches am Stengel als Blatt sich ausgedehnt und eine
höchst mannigfaltige Gestalt angenommen hat, zieht sich nun im Kelche zusammen, dehnt sich im
Blumenblatte wieder aus, zieht sich in den Geschlechtswerkzeugen zusammen, um sich als Frucht zum
letztenmal auszudehnen.
Diese Wirkung der Natur ist zugleich mit einer andern verbunden, mit der Versammlung
verschiedener Organe um ein Zentrum nach gewissen Zahlen und Maßen, welche jedoch bei manchen
Blumen oft unter gewissen Umständen weit überschritten und vielfach verändert werden.” (WA II 6, p. 91;
emphasis in original.)
755
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The migration of the term from the Herderian context to that of the late 1790s,
from biology to aesthetics and beyond, is marked by Goethe’s engagement with Karl
Phillip Moritz, who uses the term in the same framework, but for aesthetic purposes:
Daher ergreift jede höhere Organisation, ihrer Natur nach, die ihr untergeordnete und
trägt sie in ihr Wesen über. Die Pflanze den unorganisirten Stoff durch bloßes Werden
und Wachsen; das Thier die Pflanzen durch Werden, Wachsen und Genuß; der Mensch
verwandelt nicht nur Thier und Pflanze durch Werden, Wachsen und Genuß in sein
innres Wesen, sondern faßt zugleich alles, was seiner Organisation sich unterordnet,
durch die unter allen am hellsten geschliffne, spiegelnde Oberfläche seines Wesens, in
den Umfang seines Daseins auf und stellt es, wenn sein Organ sich bildend in sich selbst
vollendet, verschönert außer sich wieder dar.756

Goethe’s reflections on Moritz’s essay Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen
come from conversations between the two men during Goethe’s Italian journey, less than
a year after his famous letter to Herder. The text slides analogically from one form and its
organs to the next, and the creativity of the artist is attributed to the distinctively
“formative” aspect of the human “organ.” “Webs of organization” (Gewebe der
Organisation) intertwine in a “thätige Kraft” (which is greater than but related to
“Denkkraft”—Herder’s term in Gott). And two epigenetic forces—formative
(Bildungskraft or –trieb) and sensible (Empfindungskraft)—mirror (abspiegeln) the
whole in its organization. The former, organic/ontological forms a perfect microcosmos,
but the latter has a “single point” in the whole missing. The organic genius is thus again
mirrored by the faculty of taste; a sense for the beautiful does not require genius. This
relation is that of man to woman as well.757 Thus the organs of the plant (e.g.) become
those of the imitator of nature: ideal organs, as in Herder, are attributed to the figure of
the genius. These organs confer on him the ability to extend the ontological hall of
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Transcribed in WA I 32, pp. 314-15.
See note 746 in the current chapter above. See also Simon Richter, Laocöon’s Body.
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organic mirroring into the human world. Being is one and differentiated, in art as in
nature.
This type of mimesis changes the frame of reference for the term, but makes no
change to Herder’s externalist “organology.” At best, this system differentiates Denkkraft
into a finer taxonomy. From a Hegelian perspective, however, it is just that: an extended
taxonomy. If Goethe was going to defend a kind of mimesis, it was going to be a
different one.
In the 1790s, Goethe started to use the term “organ” with some frequency again,
but now with a generic difference. This difference is, I think, the first clue to the
emergence of a particularly Goethean idealism, and the harbinger of his mature
organology.
Goethe’s theoretical writings of the late 1790s are marked precisely by a strong
taxonomic bent. Thus the essay einfache Nachahmung der Natur divides between
“manner” and “style” beyond “simple” imitation, and Der Sammler und die Seinigen
ends with a counting-up of artistic “styles,” numbering not less than 6, not counting
subdivisions by emphasis and area of focus.758 This apparently external descriptive
enterprise is undercut, however, by some uses of the term “organ” that indicate Goethe’s
increasing commitment to idealist trends in philosophy at this time.
In the introduction to the mission-statement of the classicist project, the
introduction to its organ, the Propyläen, Goethe divides again between artistic
“treatments” of the object to be constructed, naming the “spiritual” (which works through
the internal conjunction (Zusammenhang) of the object), the “sensible” (which presents
exciting, mild, and pleasant sense-impressions), and finally:
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The spectacular breakdown is given in the “Tabelle,” for which see WA I 47, p. 338.
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Die mechanische zuletzt wäre diejenige, die durch irgenein körperliches Organ auf
bestimmte Stoffe wirkt und so der Arbeit ihr Dasein, ihre Wirklichkeit verschafft.759

Taxonomy mixes here with definition: the “organ,” meant quite literally, prepares
determinate materials for “work,” giving the cipher through which the constructive
activity can alone operate. This “organ” is close to the type of interventionary work
admitted by Goethe in his reflections in einfache Nachahmung, where the “simple”
imitation (which Goethe calls the “courtyard” of style) is mediated by “manner” (which
binds the constructible-imaginary individual together in the manner of the artist’s Geist).
Finally, “style” performs a complete mediation of nature and spirit:
Wie die einfache Nachahmung auf dem ruhigen Dasein und einer liebevollen Gegenwart
beruht, die Manier eine Erscheinung mit einem leichten fähigen Gemüt ergreift, so ruht
der Stil auf den tiefsten Grundfesten der Erkenntnis, auf dem Wesen der Dinge, insofern
uns erlaubt ist, es in sichtbaren und greiflichen Gestalten zu erkennen.760

This earlier writing—summarizing the experience in Italy in 1789—shows us the
direction Goethe is taking: the mediation of the more abstract cognitive apparatus with
the concreteness of intuition and feeling.761 By presenting art in this holistic manner,
Goethe’s writing also trends towards the naturephilosophical point he would come to
embrace: ultimately, reason’s framework must come to be identical with that of nature.
The metaphysical point—that reflective knowledge must be included in nature, or that
knowledge must include its own justification—begins to emerge, parallel to a new use of
the term “organ.” Thus simple imitation of nature—vulgar mimesis—first gives way to
mimetic ordering (or proliferating Herderian-Moritzian organs, encapsulated one within
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WA I 47, p. 19.!!
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WA I 47, p. 80.
Thus again in the Einleitung to the Propyläen: “Der Blick auf die Oberfläche eines lebendigen Wesens
verwirrt den Beobachter, und man darf wohl hier, wie in anderen Fällen, den wahren Spruch anbringen:
Was man weiß, sieht man erst! Denn wie derjenige, de ein kurzes Gesicht hat, einen Gegenstand besser
sieht, von deme r sich wieder entfernt, als einen, dem er sich erst nähert, weil ihm das geistige Gesicht
nunmehr zu Hülfe kommt, so liegt eigentlich in der Kenntnis die Vollendung des Anschauens.” (WA I 47,
p. 13.)
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the other in Being) and then opens to the demand for a metaphysical attitude in artistic
and scientific encounters with nature. The demand presented by Goethe’s work around
the time he befriended Schelling is for a mimesis of the subject-object relation itself, the
concrete inclusion of reason in nature or nature in reason. And this was the stated task of
the Romantic organ.
But if this demand existed, and if Goethe’s work was only just coming into its
oblique yet essential relationship to Idealism, a direct anticipation of his mature
“doctrine” nevertheless occurred in 1798, precisely in Der Sammler und die Seinigen. In
the debate between the philistine stranger and the philosopher—who is speaking in the
name of Vernunft—there is a clear tip of the hat to foundational, abstract thinking. As the
caricatured Gast speaks out heretically against classicism, the philosopher steps in,
responding to admonitions about his metaphysicizing with more metaphysics. The Gast is
satisfied with that artist who can pick out actual characteristics, simplify them, and
produce a presentation of his concept. The philosopher objects, saying there is more to
the story, and the collector states pregnantly: “Zum Versuche gehe ich mit.”762 The
philosopher describes what is lacking:
Durch jene Operation möchte allenfalls ein Kanon entstanden sein, musterhaft,
wissenschaftlich schätzbar; aber nicht befriedigend fürs Gemüt.763

Here the collector breaks in again, strongly agreeing with this restriction: only a canon (a
positive body of laws) can emerge from the abstract species-production that occurs
through the representation of a concept. What is needed is “more” than this, and when the
collector demurs, the philosopher picks up the thread: a full individual must be
established, a circle of representation must be closed in the process, and this process must
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
762
763

!

WA I 47, p. 171.
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itself be that of reason, the only process satisfying das Gemüt. The Gast loses his cool at
this point, accusing the philosopher of speaking obscurely. The philosophers avers that
none of this is philosophy, merely “lauter Erfahrungssachen,” and the discussion
continues:
Gast: Das nennen Sie Erfahrung, wovon ein anderer nichts begreifen kann!
Ich: Zu jeder Erfahrung gehört ein Organ.
Gast: Wohl ein besonderes?
Ich: Kein besonderes, aber eine gewisse Eigenschaft muß es haben.
Gast: Und die wäre?
Ich: Es muß produzieren können.
Gast: Was produzieren?
Ich: Die Erfahrung! Es gibt keine Erfahrung, die nicht produziert, hervorgebracht,
erschaffen wird.764

The philosopher—who is not Goethe, but whose voice is now fully presented by the
extradiegetical Goethe—anticipates Goethe’s mature organological attitude. Experience
itself is organological, a matter of organs and their plastic production, fully mediated by
reason and only grasped in its essence through that process. Mimesis is self-reflexive and,
in a sense we shall explore shortly, technological. The artist as the scientist must take
account of philosophy, or at least of its subject, reason, the mediator of which cannot be
excluded, but must itself produce and include by that production experience itself. And
this production cannot occur abstractly, but instead by means of a concrete instrument or
an organ.765
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WA I 47, p. 174.
This passage is, in my estimation, circumstantial evidence that the philosopher should at least partly be
identified with Schelling. Schelling’s Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1798, precisely) closes with
the words “Was ist denn nun jenes geheime Band, das unsern Geist mit der Natur verknüpft, oder jenes
verborgenen Organ, durch welches die Natur zu unserem Geiste, oder unser Geist zur Natur spricht”…
Goethe studied this writing with enthusiasm, and subsequently managed to get Schelling appointed to the
university at Jena. (See von Engelhardt, Goethes Weltansichten, pp. 217 ff., which also deals with Goethe’s
increasingly personal relationship with Schelling, and his study of the “new philosophy” regularly with
Niethammer.) For an interpretation of the poems collected as Gott und Welt in Schellingian perspective, see
Jeremy Adler, “The Aesthetics of Magnetism: Science, Philosophy, and Poetry in the Dialogue Between
Goethe and Schelling” in ed. Elinor S. Schaffer, The Third Culture: Literature and Science (New York: de
Gruyter, 1998), pp. 66-103.
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b) The Categories of Organs, or the Representation of Representation

Goethe had used the term organ in his essay Metamorphose der Pflanzen (1790)
to denote the functional organic part, underlying both the type (unity) and development
(becoming) of the plant.766 The sense of the term, however, was altered by the essay’s
inclusion in the Morphologische Hefte,767 which contain the beginnings of Goethe's
broader organological thought, a conception of mimesis as the reproduction of
representation itself. For Goethe, mimetic activity, scientific or poetic, is a doubling of
representation's (already double) split between representing subject and represented
object. The inclusion of the observer in the realm of observed—and of the represented in
the realm of the representing—is recognizably Idealist in conception.
Goethe developed this line of argument further in his final biological efforts,
especially his review of the Akademiestreit between Cuvier and Geoffroy de St.-Hilaire
and a late series of fragments engaged with Galen and Aristotle. This latter discourse puts
the emphasis on the reproduction of the mimetic enterprise. It thus points to Goethe's
organology as a social-scientific program for altering the world itself in collective
reproduction of representation. Goethe's late biological classicism mixes with his long
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This tension between unity and development is clear in the rhetoric of the essay: “Wenn wir nun
bemerken, daß es auf diese Weise der Pflanze möglich ist, einen Schritt rückwärts zu tun, und die Ordnung
des Wachstums umzukehren; so werden wir auf den regelmäßigen Weg der Natur desto aufmerksamer
gemacht, und wir lernen die Gesetze der Umwandlung kennen, nach welchen sie Einen Teil durch den
andern hervorbringt, und die verschiedensten Gestalten durch Modifikation eines einzigen Organs darstellt.
Die geheime Verwandtschaft der verschiedenen äußern Pflanzenteile, als der Blätter, des Kelchs, der
Krone, der Staubfäden, welche sich nach einander und gleichsam aus einander entwickeln, ist von den
Forschern im allgemeinen Längst erkannt, ja auch besonders bearbeitet worden, und man hat die Wirkung,
wodurch ein und dasselbe Organ sich uns mannigfaltig verändert sehen läßt, die Metamorphose der
Pflanzen genannt.” (WA II 6, pp. 25-6.)
767
Which he began to gather late in the second decade of the 19th century, and published starting in 1820.
See Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, pp. 42 ff.
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engagement with Idealism to produce a response to Romantic metaphysics, seeking to
bind the latter’s speculative enterprise to emergent disciplinary scientific institutions,
mediating between comparative anatomy in Paris and Hegelian metaphysics in Berlin.
Goethe thus insists that science should be what it in fact is: a determiner of a collective
worldview inclusive of the citizens of that world. To participate in that determination is
to inherit and form new organs of transcendental perception, to re-make the world
categorially in scientific concert.
With the name “morphology” came a cluster of theoretical writings, poetic and
expository, which shifted the sense of “sorgan” in the Metamorphose retroactively,
grafting the structural-developmental organ onto its philosophical counterpart. What
emerged was a version of organology, and a response to Hegel’s charge that Goethe’s
methods were without a self-reflexive instrument which could ensure their truth.768
Goethe’s perspective on mimesis itself, on the scientific or aesthetic
representation of objects, had gained in just that reflexivity by the time of the Hefte. He
writes:
Alles im Object was im Subject + X
Alles im Subject was im Object + X Verlohren .....
Dem Object die Macht zugestehen
auf .... + zu verzichten
Das Subject mit seinen + zu erhöhen und jenes + nicht anerkennen.
Alles was im Subject ist, ist im Object und noch etwas mehr.
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For representative example, the Encyclopedia’s charge: “Bei der Erfahrung kommt es darauf an, mit
welchem Sinn man an die Wirklichkeit geht. Ein großer Sinn macht große Erfahrungen und erblickt in dem
bunten Spiel der Erscheinungen das, worauf es ankommt. Die Idee ist vorhanden und wirklich, nicht etwas
da drüben und hinten. Der große Sinn, wie z.B. der eines Goethe, der in die Natur oder in die Geschichte
blickt, macht große Erfahrungen, erblickt das Vernünftige und spricht es aus. Das Fernere ist sodann, dass
man das Wahre auch in der Reflexion erkennen kann und es durch Verhältnisse des Gedankens bestimmt.
Das Wahre an und für sich ist indes in diesen beiden Weisen noch nicht in seiner eigentlichen Form
vorhanden. Die vollkommenste Weise des Erkennens ist die in der reinen Form des Denkens.“ (Hegel, Enz.
I, §24, Zusatz 3.) Hegel’s charge against Kant had been that the “canon of the understanding” should be
expanded into an organon for synthetic knowledge a priori, i.e. metaphysics; his charge against Goethe is
that his natural-scientific work remains external to its correctly observed object, which—lacking precisely
that instrument—is not grasped (begriffen). !
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Alles was im Object ist, ist im Subject und noch etwas mehr.
Wir sind auf doppelte Weise verlohren oder geborgen.
Gestehen wir dem Object sein Mehr zu und gehen auf unser Subject Mehr zu...
Pochen wir auf unser Subject. (WA II: 11 349)

Epistemologically, the situation is one of mutual excess. The identity of subject and
object is complemented by the difference between them, and this dialectical formulation
characterizes representation as a re-production of that dialectical identity itself.
Representation—on both sides of the subject-object divide—always represents that
divide even as it produces the represented content. Mimesis is a “double infinite” built on
the apparently simple mutual influence of subject and object. Self-reflexivity is built into
representational knowledge, and Hegel’s charge is answered. This is not only the
proliferating organ-world of being and becoming on Herder’s model (which would be
open to the charge of external observation), but the intertwining relationships of both:
Kaum überzeugt er sich von diesem wechselseitigen Einfluß [des Objekts und Subjekts],
so wird er ein doppelt Unendliches gewahr, an den Gegenständen die Mannichfaltigkeit
des Seins und Werdens und der sich lebendig durchkreuzenden Verhältnisse, an sich
selbst aber die Möglichkeit einer unendlichen Ausbildung, indem er seine
Empfänglichkeit sowohl als sein Urteil immer zu neuen Formen des Aufnehmens und
Gegenwirkens geschickt macht…769

The subject’s capacity to receive—just like its judgment—can experience on this basis
infinite “training” or literally “outformation” (Ausbildung). On the one hand, receptivity
is essential—Goethe is not an idealist in the sense that everything is meant to be inside
representation.770 And yet, even as a part of any possible object remains yet to be
received, its inclusion in the crosshairs of dialectical self-representation shows that
Goethe’s progressive stance towards knowledge is developmentally Idealist: the circle of
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WA II: 6, p. 5.
But then, neither is anyone else in the younger generation. I do not see the point of insistences on
Goethe’s self-assessment as a “hartnäckiger Realist,” given the overwhelming evidence pointing in a more
subtle direction, as in the quotation here. See, for example, Robert Richards, “Nature Is the Poetry of Mind,
or How Schelling Solved Goethe’s Kantian Problems,” in Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann, The
Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science (Cambridge: MIT, 2006), pp. 27-51.
770
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knowledge might find mediated and temporary completion in reason’s organ. And that
organ will have passed a Hegelian test, because it produces reflexive mimetic
knowledge—the representation of representation itself. Indeed, the first passage above,
found on the verso of a folio of the Hefte, might be taken to be playing with Kant’s
“transcendental object=X,” the constituted form of any object for us.771 If this is the case,
then Goethe’s point is that that which we constitute is nevertheless an apparent excess,
not in principle in some “beyond” but not necessarily in our organ already. The world is
able to be included. The inclusion of more world is not contingent but appears so, and
this parallax is essential. Our “tender empiricism”772 insists—pocht—on the subject.
Goethe gives this representational apparatus the name organ, writing
programmatically that: “[z]um Ergreifen der Wahrheit braucht es eines höheren Organs
als zur Vertheidigung des Irrthums.”773 This organ for “higher” knowledge responds both
to his own demand for an articulated method for naturalist observation,774 and also to
Hegel’s critique. And yet organ is of different provenance from organon.
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This doctrine is one of the broadest results of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KdrV): we contribute the
basic form of any object for us (its unity and consistency over repeated instances of representation), but not
its content, which we gain in empirical viewings of phenomena. See e.g. KdrV A 104.
772
Even this famous Goethean topos, so often used to show a non-interventionary observer in Goethean
science, is based on the identity of subject and object and the possibility of their mutual influence: “Es gibt
eine zarte Empirie, die sich mit dem Gegenstand innigst identisch macht, und dadurch zur eigentlichen
Theorie wird. Diese Steigerung des geistigen Vermögens aber gehört einer hochgebildeten Zeit an.” (WA
II: XI 128-29) Note that “geistiges Vermögen” might be of Kantian derivation, while what it describes is
the organ this study has treated. Goethe ultimately preferred the Romantic terminology.
773
WA II 11, p. 162. NB: “Vertheidigung des Irrtums” is very close to the opposite of the definition of
logic according to Kant (KdrV B16/A10). The organ is thus meant to include truth rather than exclude
falsehood, and thus joins the terms organ and organon in Goethe’s terminology, following precisely on the
Romantic conflation of functional part and instrument. The implied “lower organ” is possessed by Newton:
“Newton war ein wohlorganisirter, gesunder, wohltemperirter Mann, ohne Leidenschaft, ohne Begierden.
Sein Geist war constructiver Natur und zwar im abstractesten Sinne; daher war die höhere Mathematik ihm
als das eigentliche Organ gegeben, durch das er seine innere Welt aufzubauen und die äußere zu gewältigen
suchte.” (WA II, 4, p. 97.) The Maximen und Reflexionen clarify, objecting simultaneously to Hegel, that
“Die Mathetmatik ist wie die Dialektik, ein Organ des inneren höheren Sinnes… Für Beide hat nichts Wert
als die Form, der Inhalt ist ihnen gleichgültig…” (MA 17, p. 829).
774
Locus classicus for talk of “higher experience” is Goethe’s controversial essay, Der Versuch als
Vermittler zwischen Subjekt und Objekt, composed in 1792 and then also included in the Morphologische
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The classical commentary on the definitional problem of the “organ” is Aristotle’s
De Anima. The philosopher uses organon in that work to specify that part (morion775)
which is possible where its object is actual.776 The instrument works in a determinate
field, and so must be suited to that field. Thus, for Aristotle, the senses are fields of
possibility for their respective objects. The sense of touch is already suited to the
touched—otherwise touching would not occur through this sense (i.e. it would not be this
sense).777 With the help of an organ as the seat of possibility, the sense must deliver the
formal element of perception to the understanding, without involving the material
element. We see through the eye without having the seen in our eye; we represent wood
without having corneal splinters. The organ separates the formal from the material but
also unites both as a single object of perception. The “object” of the organ is subdivided
into the representation and its being qua object. This is the most abstract determination of
the process of knowing. The possibly known (in this passage in the De anima, the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Hefte. For a Kantian reading, see von Wolf Engelhardt, Goethes Weltansichten: auch eine Biographie
(Weimar: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 2007), pp. 167-87. This essay does not use the term organ, but
demands a qualitative approach to reason’s mediation of the observed, thus focusing on the manner of
knowing as process, and articulating an area of methodological interest which the organ would come to
name.
775
On the terminological shift in antiquity from “part” (meros, diminutive morion—so Aristotle’s Parts of
Animals: Peri zoion morion) to “functional/instrumental part” or “organon,” see Wolf, Der Begriff, and
Löw, Philosophie des Lebendigen.
776
Note that this use differs from the sense of organon given as title to the logical works by the earliest
collaters of the Aristotelian corpus. The organon in Aristotle’s own usage is “that part which is potentially
such as its object is actually” [Hoste to poiouv hoion auto energiai, toioutovn ekeino poiei dunamei on]—
the organ is the “mean” between two opposites making up the field of perception: “What is “in the middle”
is fitted to discern; relatively to either extreme it can put itself in the place of the other.” (De anima
423b/424a.) I will cite the Bekker numbers for convenience. Translations are from The Basic Works of
Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 535-607. Transliterations mine.
777
On the sense-organ in particular Aristotle writes: “By a “sense” is meant what has the power of
receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking
place in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of signet-ring without the iron or gold... but it
is indifferent what in each case the substance is; what alone matters is what quality it has, i.e. in what ratio
its constituents are combined... By an “organ of sense” [really aestheterion, seat of perception] is meant
that in which ultimately such a power is seated.” [Katholou de peri pases aistheseos die labein hoti he men
aisthesis esti to dektikon ton aisthetow eidown aneu tes hules, hoion ho keros tou daktuliou aneu tou
siderou kai tou chrusou dechetai to semeion, lambanei de to chrusouv e to chalkouv semeion, all’ ouch hei
chrusos e chalkos... aistheterion de proton en joi he toiaute dunamis.] (De anima 424a-b) That Goethe was
familiar with this work is clear from the section on Aristotle in the “historischer Teil“ of the Farbenlehre.
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sensible possibility) is transformed into the actuality of experience. The realm of the
possible is delimited by the function of knowing, the organon itself.
Here Aristotle draws attention to a problem: where the sense-organs determine the
specific laws of their fields of perception and thus delimit the areas of possible perception
for themselves, this cannot possibly be the procedure for reason itself. For if thought
itself had an organon, then it could only offer our knowledge those specificities suitable
to the possibility of that tool. Knowledge would limit its field to the specifics of its
instrument’s function. We would be severely cognitively limited.778
Goethe was aware of the problem of the particularities of any organ, and thus
tried to root knowledge in not “an” organ but organs as numerous as the objects they are
meant to apprehend:
Jeder neue Gegenstand, wohl beschaut, schließt ein neues Organ in uns auf.779

Aristotle himself had come to the conclusion that the understanding always is the object
thought by that understanding.780 The generality of thought demanded by metaphysics
implies that there can be no particular and separating mediator—no actualizing means or
instrument—between thought and its object. Yet thought does cover a field of possibility,
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“Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to
dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its
nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own,
other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that
whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot
reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold,
or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none.” [ananke ara, epei panta noei, amige
einai, hosper phesin Anaxagoras, hina krate, touto d’ estin hina gnorizei: paremphainomenon gar koluei to
allotrion kai antiphrattei, hoste med’ autou einai phusin medemian all’ e tauten, hoti dunatov. Ho ara
kaloumenos tes psyches mous (lego de noun hoi danoeitai kai hupolambanei he psyche) ouden estin
energeiai town onton prin noein. Dio oude memichthai eulogon auton toi somati: poios tis gar an vivnoito,
psuchros e thermos, e kan organon ti eie, hosper toi aesthetikoi; nun d’ outhen estin.] (De anima 429a/19)
779
WA II 11, p. 59.
780
“In every case the mind which is actively thinking is the objects which it thinks.” [holos de ho nous estin
ho kat’ energeian ta pragmata noon] (De anima 431b).
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one greater than any possible organ. That field of possibility is principally unlimited:
cognition in general functions without mediator, and is thus noumenal, unmediated.
Goethe reflects both sides of this difficulty. He writes first of an organ, the eye,
which he develops towards organological freedom on the basis of Aristotle’s model. But
he also talks of higher organs—categories, as we shall see—in dynamic cognitive
development. Organology covers the spectrum of human cognition.
Perhaps the Farbenlehre’s most famous passage tells us that the deeds of
phenomena, not their essences, are to be observed and described, and continues:
Die Farben sind Thaten des Lichts, Thaten und Leiden. In diesem Sinne können wir von
denselben Aufschlüsse über das Licht erwarten. Farben und Licht stehen zwar unter
einander in dem genausten Verhältniß, aber wir müssen uns beide als der ganzen Natur
angehörig denken: denn sie ist es ganz, die sich dadurch dem Sinne des Auges besonders
offenbaren will.781

The unity of the phenomenon must be established for scientific observation to have
validity. The derivation of color will not do.782 We need instead to place color in the
whole (das Ganze) of nature, because only this inclusion can demonstrate the desired
unity. Nature, however, reveals itself particularly through the sense belonging to the eye,
and does so completely. An earlier redaction of this passage had phrased it:
Die Farben sind die ganze Natur dem Organ des Auges offenbart und recht sehen heißt
recht seyn.783!

!
This more compact version of the sentence shows that nature’s holism can be divided by
organs and nevertheless remain complete.784 Indeed, the sentence is a sort of précis of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
781

WA II I, pp. ix-x.
For Goethe’s systematic position against Newton in this regard see Hartmut R. Schönherr, Einheit und
Werden: Goethes Newton-Polemik als systematische Konsequenz seiner Naturkonzeption (Würzburg:
Königshausen und Neumann, 1993). See also Burwick, Damnation, for the broader consequences of
Goethe’s polemic.
783
WA II: I, p. 384.
784
Spinoza’s notion of “attributes”—as infinite in their kind—which do not divide natura (which is
absolutely infinite) might be the source or model of this type of division. See Ethics I, Defs. IV and VI, also
Prop. X. Goethe’s engagements with Spinoza are well-documented. His reading of the Ethics will have
782
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whole work: colors are nature itself, whole and revealed in a single organ. The possibility
of error in perception parallels that of moral degeneration, and their simultaneous
correction foregrounds the section on the “aesthetic-moral” effects of colors. Nature’s
totality is given under one aspect to the eye’s organ. The term can be taken here as the
physical eye (appositive genetive) or as a distinct capacity—on Aristotelian lines—for
the realization of the eye’s polarized field of possibility (possessive genetive). Goethe
must at least include the latter sense in the former, for the organ’s capacities develop just
this Aristotelian model towards “freedom.”
Goethe makes good on this promise of an organology of color in the section on
Totality and Harmony. The eye—as in Aristotle, suspended between two poles in a field
(of vision)—takes the single impulse it receives from one end of that spectrum and
complements it, running from one pole to the other, revealing the totality of color.785 But
this is only the first step: the organ goes on to harmonize the phenomena—some of which
it has just produced—and thereby makes itself free.786 Goethe ascribes spontaneity to an
organ both physical and metaphysical. The specificity of that organ (its field of
possibility) is thus complemented by a function which, going immediately to totality,
frees up perception for error and for truth. The organ is formed and forms towards
freedom, a freedom which attaches also to the organs of knowledge. Organology inserts
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
been during the “Spinoza summit” in 1783-4 in Weimar, together with Karl Phillip Moritz and Herder. See
Engelhardt, Goethes Weltansichten, pp. 157-67, and David Bell, Spinoza in Germany from 1670 to the Age
of Goethe (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, 1984).
785
This is most obviously seen, as Goethe confirmed, in the after-image on a white surface, which produces
the contrary color in the wheel.
786
“Wurden wir vorher bei dem Beschauen einzerner Farben gewissermaßen pathologisch afficirt, indem
wir zu einzelnen Empfindungen fortgerissen, uns bald lebhaft und strebend, bald weich und sehnend, bald
zum Edlen emporgehoben, bald zum Gemeinen herabgezogen fühlten; so führt uns das Bedürfniß nach
Totalität, welches unserm Organ eingeboren ist, aus dieser Beschränkung heraus; es setzt sich selbst in
Freiheit, indem es den Gegensatz des ihm aufgedrungenen Einzelnen und somit eine befriedigende
Ganzheit hervorbringt.” (WA II 1, pp. 323-24; my emphasis.)
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itself between science’s objects and philosophy’s subjects, and extends its terminology
into both. The organs of plants become the free organs of sense—and these pass into the
Organ(e) des Wissens.
All of nature flows formally in through the eye, which totalizes and harmonizes
nature, freeing itself technically from mere receptivity. This eye, and the scientist
possessing it, must have some means of making sense out of this colorful nature. In the
Hefte, then, Goethe names that means “intuitive judgment” (anschauende Urteilkraft),787
a term derived from Kant788 but deviating from the letter of the Critical system.789
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This is not explicit, but the centrality of this doctrine to his methodology, and his stated intention to
create “higher organs” for knowledge justifies my interpretive gesture. See Eckhart Förster, “Die
Bedeutung von 76, 77 der Kritik der Urteilskraft für die Entwicklung der nachkantischen Philosophie. Teil
1” in ed. Jürgen Stolzenberg, Kant und der Frühidealismus (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 59-80, and ipsus,
“Goethe and the “Auge des Geistes”,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und
Geistesgeschichte, 75: 1 (2001), pp. 87-101, with an explicit comparison to Hegel’s “idea” at p. 98. The
notion that “new sense organs” will develop as a result of this doctrine (p. 98) is, I hope, bolstered by my
analysis here.
788
“Zwar scheint der Verfasser hier auf einen göttlichen Verstand zu deuten, allein wenn wir ha im
Sittlichen, durch Glauben an Gott, Tugend und Unsterblichkeit uns in eine obere Region erheben und an
das erste Wesen annähern sollen; so dürft’s es wohl im Intellectuellen derselbe Fall sein, dass wir uns, das
das Anschauen einer immer schaffenden Natur, zur geistigen Teilnahme an ihren Produktionen würdig
machten. Hatte ich doch unbewußt und aus innerem Trieb auf jenes Urbildliche, Typische rastlos
gedrungen, war es mir sogar geglückt, eine naturgemäße Darstellung aufzubauen, so konnte mich nunmehr
nicht weiter verhindern, das Abenteuer der Vernunft, wie es der Alte vom Könighsberge selbst nennt, mutig
zu bestehen.” (MA XIII, pp. 30-31) Robert Richards reads this passage as a reference to gradualist
evolutionism: "Goethe was thus ready, as he concluded, boldly to undertake that adventure of reason
rejected by Kant, namely, that of evolution." (Romantic Conception, p. 491) To be sure, Kant’s own use of
the phrase (at AA 5 419) is probably written with Herder’s teleology in mind. But the problem with
gradualism is its status as idea without possible corresponding intuition, which is the defining problem of
(special) metaphysics in the KdrV. Thus, Richards points to a sub-problem included in the more general
metaphysical crux. Goethe’s essay, however, is about modes of knowing, and his reference stays at this
more general level. Kurz und gut, the passage is a confession of adherence to post-Kantian metaphysics.
789
Among Goethe’s many positive statements on the “new philosophy,” the best known is perhaps the
essay in the Hefte called “Einwirkung der neueren Philosophie,” where he describes his conversion (which
I place about 1798). But a lesser-known and very sensitive assessment is reported by Victor Cousin from a
conversation of 20 October 1817, in which Goethe reported: “J'ai tout vu en Allemagne, depuis la raison
jusqu'au mysticisme. J'ai assisté à toutes les révolutions. Il y a quelques mois, je me suis mis à relire Kant;
rien n'est si clair depuis que l'on a tiré toutes les conséquences de tous ses principes. Le système de Kant
n'est pas détruit. Ce systéme, ou plutôt cette méthode, consiste à distinguer le sujet de l'objet, le moi qui
juge de la chose jugée avec cette réflexion que c'est toujours moi qui juge. Ainsi les sujets ou principes du
jugement étant différents, il est tout simple que les jugements le soient. La méthode de Kant est un principe
d'humanité et de tolérance. --- La philosophie allemande,” me dit-il encore, “c'est la manifestation des
diverses qualités de l'esprit. Nous avons vu paraître tour à tour la raison, l'imagination, le sentiment,
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Intuition for Kant is the representation of particulars without anything “general.” It is
therefore always of the senses, because the general can only be contributed to knowledge
by the concept. On this basis, Kant polemicizes against any possible “intellectual
intuition,”790 that is, representation of noumena. But, as we have seen, Kant makes a
famous regulative exception in the name of biology in KdU §§76 und 77.791 As I detailed
in chapter II of the present study,792 the notion of intuitive understanding in that passage
stands in stark contrast to the subsumptive judgments of the constitutive function of the
understanding. Where the latter proceeds to construct the relation between concept and
intuition, between part and whole analytically, the former conceives of the relation
holistically or synthetically. For the constitutive understanding, wholes are aggregates;
for the intuitive understanding, wholes are determinative moments in the development of
a complex being characterized, finally, by its possession of organs.
Goethe calls his variant of this knowledge not “understanding,” but “power of
judgment” (Urteilskraft). The understanding, for Kant, is the faculty of concepts, and
Goethe replaces its terminologically with the faculty for unifying representations.793 The
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
l'enthousiasme.”” (WA (Anhang) 3, pp. 290-1) The attention to jugement links to his terminological shift
from Verstand to Urteilskraft.
790
Locus classicus: KdrV B176/A137-B187/A147.
791
The results of this engagement are treated thoroughly by Eckhart Förster, “Die Bedeutung von 76, 77
der Kritik der Urteilskraft für die Entwicklung der nachkantischen Philosophie. Teil 1” in ed. Jürgen
Stolzenberg, Kant und der Frühidealismus (Hamburg: Meiner 2007), pp. 59-80. Förster claims that Goethe
doesn’t defend “intellectual intuition” but “intuitive understanding.” Although I think Förster is right that
Goethe and his contemporaries were not pushing for the conceptual creation of objects in intellectual
intuition, we will see below that Goethe nevertheless did mean to introduce a kind of conceptual
intervention in the object-world through this line of thinking.
792
See pp. 146 ff. in chapter II above.
793
Kant explains that concepts of the understanding rely on “functions” of unification in judgment, and
continues: “Alle Urteile […] sind Funktionen der Einheit unter unsern Vorstellungen, da nämlich statt einer
unmittelbaren Vorstellung eine höhere, die diese und mehrere unter sich begreift, zur Erkenntnis des
Gegenstandes gebraucht, und viel mögliche Erkenntnisse dadurch in einer zusammengezogen werden. Wir
können aber alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urteile zurückführen, so daß der Verstand überhaupt als
ein Vermögen zu urteilen vorgestellt werden kann… Die Funktionen des Verstandes können also insgesamt
gefunden werde, wenn man die Funktionen der Einheit in den Urteilen vollständig darstellen kann.” (KdrV,

!

370!
!!
!
understanding is the unity of consciousness in the concept, while the power of judgment
is that which unifies whatever representations—intuitions or concepts—are produced in
that consciousness. The Power of judgment is thus the practical element of the ideal, the
activity of spirit itself.794 Its forms determine the quality of knowledge and its content.
And yet, for Kant, judgment’s operation is second-order, working only on
consciousness’s representations, while the latter possess a possible (and always
problematic) relation to an “outside.”795
Because the unifying functions of judgments (the most general form of which
Kant calls “categories”) do not have an effect on any “exterior” or “material,” for Goethe
they can therefore become kinds of synthetic thought. This intellectual-historical
conjuncture thus recommends that the doctrine of the categories in Kant be brought into
conversation with the Aristotelian teaching on “organs.” This is because the categories do
the work of the organ: they divide the content of the represented from its form and
determine knowledge as possible forms of whatever is represented. These forms are thus
unities of the represented, and as forms they determine this content, the knowledge of
which consists only in these forms.796 For Kant they only determine this content formally,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
B92/A67 ff.) This leads directly to the table of the functions of judgment, which leads to the table of
categories.
794
A number of readings of Goethe’s speculative work emphasize this practical element. See, for example,
Eckhart Förster, “Die Bedeutung,” Gunnar Hindrichs, “Goethe’s Notion of an Intuitive Power of
Judgment” in Goethe Yearbook XVIII (2011), pp. 51-67, and Chad Wellmon, “Goethe’s Morphology of
Knowledge, or the Overgrowth of Nomenclature,” Goethe Yearbook 17 (2010), pp. 153-177. These
readings emphasize that Goethe’s philosophical work is practice-oriented, indeed suggest that he introduces
a focus on operation into idealism. While I agree that this is one ramification of Goethe’s use of organ too,
the term’s use also illustrates an instrumental metaphysics in keeping with Romantic organology more
broadly. In other words, Goethe presents us with something like a practice of speculation. !
795
“Das Urteil ist also die mittelbare Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes, mithin die Vorstellung einer
Vorstellung desselben. In jedem Urteil ist ein Begriff, der für viele gilt, und unter diesem Vielen auch eine
gegebene Vorstellung begreift, welche letztere den auf den Gegenstand unmittelbar bezogen wird.” (KdrV,
B93/A68)
796
This is my gloss on Kant’s thesis that the “I think” must be able to complement any thought content.
The “I think” establishes “analytic unity”—that the whole of my perception is included under the mark of
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and the Critical question remains: whether we can have legitimate knowledge of the
coincidence of these forms with any possible content. But for Goethe the content in the
form is not external: a category becomes an organ in just that moment where the formal
element of cognition itself becomes a synthesis of content and form. For Goethe, the
judgment is the mediator that offers us the unities of nature we investigate in science and
reproduce in art. We intuit nature not in the concept, but in the unities of the forms of
judgment. The organs of these judgments are these forms themselves, which
progressively transform themselves according to and in symbiosis with the “content” they
treat. These forms—actually formations of organs—result from the process of science.
Science is not merely the constitution of a world made image and law,797 but also the
production of knowledge itself, the production of the meaning of the represented world
and thus of that world itself. Science and culture are united socially in this judgment: we
must, because we in fact do, formulate the world. Our constructive activity is a kind of
creative imagination, and it literally creates experience, not in isolation from “objects”
but in progressive mimetic reproduction of our very representation of them.
In progressive, investigatory reason qua organ, we continuously form new organs
according to the syntheses demanded by the process of judgment. Goethe’s famous
“tender empiricism” is thus meant to remind the judging consciousness of its own
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
that apperceptive judgment—while the intuited matter presents a “synthetic” unity, unified amongst itself
and genuinely informative for the apperceptive being (I). As Paul Guyer puts it ("The Arguments of the
Critique" ed. Paul Guyer,, The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 140: “He then argues that the “I think” of pure apperception “must
be able to accompany all my representations,” and that it too must be the product of an “act of spontaneity,”
or more speciﬁcally express not merely an analytic unity among my representations – that is, that they each
severally belong to me – but a synthetic unity among them, that they each belong to me because of some
substantive connection among all of them, which is itself the product of an act of synthesis on the part of
my understanding (§16, B 131–3).”
797
A critique that cuts against both Kant and Newton, since it rejects the externality of general formulae to
particulars and the removal of that lawfulness to the process of representing nature.!!
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formation (and mutual formulation) in being. The judgment unites intuitions and concepts
into an order (Ordnung) called the “idea.”798 It then allows this order to be continuously
transformed judgmentally according to intuitions that are parts of that judgment’s unity.
This mutuality allows in turn for a kind of intervention into nature. What is “tender” is
the categorial transformation we undertake.799
We can now return to the Metamorphose, with its overtones overturned in its new,
organological, context, and see its retroactively Idealist organ as a response to Hegel.
Hegel’s notion of the concept is the name for both the representational element of the
cognitive process and the name for that process itself.800 The concept’s double
appearance in Hegel’s taxonomy gives it the quality of the Romantic organ: it serves as
the demarcator of the field of cognition even as it assigns rules to that field or provides
the function in the process. It is thus the most general name for a “category”—it unites
cognition in judgment. But it is also the object of that cognition, and so is also a category
in the Aristotelian sense, ontological and formal-ideal simultaneously. The specifically
Critical edge to this thought is its inclusion of the “material” of thought in the analysis of
that thought, the treatment of content as formally implicated. The name for the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“Begriff ist Summe, Idee Resultat der Erfahrung; jene zu ziehen wird Verstand, dieses zu erfassen,
Vernunft erfordert.” (WA II 11, p. 158) This division between two faculties, clearly of Kantian mint, is
rarely accounted for in the scholarship. But Goethe’s notion of order differs from Kant’s, coming far
closer—precisely in its relation to order and ordering in being and representation—to Hegel’s.
799
See on this issue Hindrichs, “Goethe’s Notion,” p. 62: “In such a mimesis of nature, the subjective
domination of objects is suspended in favor of faithful presentation of individuals.” As true as this is, my
claim is that the Goethean “organ” (as “intuitive judgment”) is also—if not tyrannically in this sense—
influential in nature.
800
Actually, the concept is only the representational part from the perspective of the process-concept, and
then only momentarily: the concept is both part and structural unity, a synthetic organon of metaphysical
knowledge. See note 727 above.
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unification of the form/content split, and the name for that split itself, is concept, and that
concept is the “organon of truth.”801
This dual role is precisely that played by the organ in the Metamorphose, read in
the context of the theoretical apparatus of the Morphologische Hefte. Morphology alters
the sense of metamorphosis. “Organ” comes to play the categorical role of Hegel’s
concept, neither only the functional part of an organic universe, nor merely that part
reflected seamlessly into the ideal, a “force” underlying genius—as it had been for
Herder and Moritz. There is a seam, precisely where the two organs meet. The subjectobject split is reproduced, and thus becomes identity including difference.802 Goethe’s
science is a mimesis of the order of representation itself. Goethe is strikingly close to
Hegel in this conception, but his instruments of cognition are other than Hegel’s.
If we accept that the insertion of this essay into the Morphologische Hefte alters
the sense of its science—literally the manner of our knowledge of the phenomenon—then
the organ comes to play the categorical role of Hegel’s concept. The “organ” is not only
the functional part of an organic universe. Nor, however, is it merely that part reflected
seamlessly into the ideal, a “force” underlying genius. There is a seam, precisely where
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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For Brady Bowman, following Rolf-Peter Horstmann, this doubling over forms a requirement for
“subjectivity“ in Hegel, which is found only where a relation between two forms mirroring each other, thus
forming an identity which is the identity of each with itself and of the other simultaneously. See Brady
Bowman, “Goethean Morphology, Hegelian Science: Affinities and Transformations,” in: Goethe
Yearbook XVIII (2011), pp. 159-183, here pp. 166-7. This otherwise excellent essay errs in accepting too
much of Hegel’s critique of Goethe.
802
This is where Bowman misses the Goethean point, in accepting Hegel’s (paraphrased) charge that
“Goethe neglects explicit reflection on the fact that identity is given only in and through the difference of
subject and object”. See Bowman, “Goethean Morphology, Hegelian Science,“ p. 165. NB Goethe’s
statement: “So bald aber jener Streit [über “die alte Hauptfrage, wie viel unser Selbst und wie viel die
Außenwelt zu unserm geistigen Dasein beitrage”] zur Sprache kam, mochte ich mich gern auf diejenige
Seite stellen welche dem Menschen am meisten Ehre macht, und gab allen Freunden vollkommen Beifall,
die mit Kant behaupteten: wenn gleich alle unsere Erkenntniß mit der Erfahrung angehe, so entspringe sie
darum doch nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung.“ (WA II 11, p. 49), with reference to KdrV, B 1: “Wenn
aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben alle
aus der Erfahrung.” !
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the two organs—recall the passage from Faust—meet. There is literally a subject-object
split, and this split itself is mirrored as identity and difference in one. Goethe’s science is
a mimesis of the order of representation itself. If we look to the conclusion of Hegel’s
treatment of Naturphilosophie in the Encyklopädie, we see the true but limited parallel to
Goethe’s work, and thus resolve the ambivalence in Hegel’s assessment’s of Goethe:
Indem das Innere der Natur nichts anderes als das Allgemeine ist, so sind wir, wenn wir
Gedanken haben, in diesem Innern der Natur bei uns selbst. Wenn die Wahrheit im
subjektiven Sinn die Übereinstimmung der Vorstellung mit dem Gegenstande ist, so heißt
das Wahre im objektiven Sinne die Übereinstimmung des Objekts, der Sache mit sich
selbst, daß ihre Realität ihrem Begriffe angemessen ist.803

Hegel’s point is that, because of the reflexive yet ontological process of the
concept in which we participate, there is a normative way of looking at real difference.
Where the proliferation of organs obliterated that difference by including all organs in a
single generic order,804 Hegel asserts it as real and conceptual simultaneously. Difference
made contradiction is real, and this reality’s contradictory nature allows for normative
grasping of that reality. Goethe, it turned out, shared this viewpoint. Hegel’s citational
sense of Goethe was better than his stated opinion.
This real normativity in subject-object mimesis is the metaphysics of judgment,
and without it, science—and history—lose their metaphysical quality. “Truth” is neither
merely object-thought correspondence, nor the correspondence of elements of our
cognition with each other according to a “canon”: it is the conformity of the object to its
reflection in reason, or, in his terms, to “itself.” I have shown that Goethe is strikingly

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Enz. II, § 246.
This objection is not insignificantly precisely the one Hegel makes against Spinoza in the Lectures on
the History of Philosophy. Because Spinoza’s absolute does not develop, however, he is guilty of worse
than “exteriorism”: he obliterates the world itself—and thus precipitates modern, subject-oriented
philosophy.
804
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close to this conception,805 although his means for that transformation-based truth are
other than Hegel’s. And thus it is this difference in means—the line between two
reactions to Romantic organology—that makes up the distance between the two thinkers.
The response to Hegel first answers to reason’s demand for mediation of all
known material, then goes a step further. For the organ, according to the character “der
Philosoph” in Der Sammler und die Seinigen, must also produce experience:
Ich: Zu jeder Erfahrung gehört ein Organ.
Gast: Wohl ein besonderes?
Ich: Kein besonderes, aber eine gewisse Eigenschaft muß es haben.
Gast: Und die wäre?
Ich: Es muß produzieren können.
Gast: Was produzieren?
Ich: Die Erfahrung! Es gibt keine Erfahrung, die nicht produziert, hervorgebracht,
erschaffen wird.806

Here Goethe’s Idealism foreshadows his late turn in an ideal technology. The
possibilities of conceptual intervention in and receptive inclusion of the world in
development extend both to our speculative capacity and to our natural-scientific method.
Scientific practice exceeds the bounds of contemporary disciplinary science; Idealism
turns from representation to the reproduction of representation itself, and in so doing,
aims to make intervention not only into nature but also into (nature’s) history possible.

b) Reason’s Hand: The Organ of Organs and Ideal Technology

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
805

Here we can see why Hans Blumenberg’s assessment of Goethe in the Paradigmen zu einer
Metaphorologie is wrong. As we saw in Chapter I, a conceptually tinged version of his methodology is
helpful for analyzing the emergence of organology. And yet, as indicated above, he is missing a significant
point about the constructive family of philosophies I have tried to outline in this study. With respect to
Goethe in particular, his approach leads him to claim that the Weimar Sage looked backwards to truthterms based in Aristotelian being and the surety that metaphysical sensibility could bring. I hope to have
shown the opposite here, and to have included Goethe in the high-stakes game of an only partially
metaphorical disciplinary emergence: Romantic organology.
806
WA I 47, p. 174.
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In his last years, Goethe was both close enough to the mature Hegel and sure
enough of his own quasi-philosophical approach to nature and history to level critiques
back at Hegel, privately but with assurance that they would reach Hegel’s ears.807 Thus
on the 28th of August, 1827, he received the Hegelian jurist Eduard Gans in Weimar. The
conversation focused on Berlin’s university, and Hegel’s rise to dominance. Goethe was
concerned to see that the philosophy current in Berlin did not exclude productive
engagement with empiricists, repeating his critique of Hegel, asking if philosophy’s
categories did not need to change as history and science advanced.808 Gans responded,
with specific reference to the Hegelian organ Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik (to
which Goethe had been invited to contribute), with the Hegelian dictum that philosophy
is not an attempt to step out of time but to present its time in thought, to transform with
that time. This, according to Gans’s report, appeared to please Goethe. The conversation
turned to specific examples in the periodical.809
Goethe’s concern stemmed from his administrative sense for balance. Hegel’s
prowess notwithstanding, it was exceedingly rare to find one person with both synthetic
and analytical genius. This was demonstrated, for Goethe, by the increasing tension
between a synthesizer and an analyzer in Paris: Geoffroy de St.-Hilaire and Cuvier.810 By
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Goethe had critiqued Hegel, more and less convincingly, since their first work together in Jena. But until
this period there is no evidence that he did so with the intention of his remarks reaching Hegel.
808
The conversation demonstrates the consistency of the issues in the dialogue between Goethe and Hegel:
the categorical, nature, and history. “Er traue Hegel zwar sehr viele Kenntnisse in der Natur wie in der
Geschichte zu, ob aber seine philosophischen Gedanken sich nicht immer nach den neuen
Entdeckungen, die man doch stets machen würde, modificiren müßten, und dadurch selber ihr
Kategorisches verlören, könne er zu fragen doch nicht unterlassen.” (WA (Anhang) 6, pp. 180-1; my
emphasis.)
809
The conversation’s entirety may be found at WA (Anhang) 6, pp. 179-181.
810
See WA (Anhang) 6, p. 180.!!
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referring to an example weighing ever more heavily on his mind, Goethe (perhaps
unintentionally) brought his organological conversation with Goethe into the final
register he would give it: the instrumental or technological side of its etymology. And
here, for reasons I will explore below, his conversation left its Hegelian key and entered
into more present and ancient dialogues, with Paris on the one hand and Aristotle and
Galen on the other.
On 11 May 1828 Goethe had written to Soret to be reminded of the title of a work
they had discussed: August Pyramus de Candolle’s Organographie végétale, which he
then procured.811 This work, expansive and dedicated to a functional but empiricist
approach to the organs of plants, served Goethe as a sort of dictionary of French scientific
usage at the time.812 And Goethe himself was mentioned in the preface to the work:
Plusieurs naturalistes allemands, en tête desquels il faut citer dans les temps anciens le
botaniste Jungius, et, parmi les modernes, l’illustre poète Goethe, ont appelé l’attention
sur la symétrie de la composition des plantes … L’Organographie est le développement
de ce qui tient à la symétrie des organs partiels, et le Prodromus est destiné à indiquer le
résumé de l’état actuel de nos connaissances sur les rapports d’ensemble qui constituent
les familles naturelles.813

Generally sympathetic to de Candolle’s attempt to balance functional comparisons of
organs with type-comparisons across species and genera, Goethe thought that balance
needed a philosophical means. He thus sought to connect Berlin and Paris through an
organ. Even in de Candolle’s praise, he found cause for terminological concern:
Composition, ein gleichfalls unglücklickes Wort, mechanisch mit dem vorigen
mechanischen verwandt… Eben so wie in der Kunst, ist, wenn von der Natur gesprochen
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WA IV 44, p. 88.
See Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, p. 48. Goethe’s assessment was that: “Da macht es sich
denn dießmal gar hübsch: Herr De Candolle, welcher vom Besondern in's Allgemeine geht, behandelt uns
andere, die wir vom Allgemeinen in's Besondere trachten, nicht unfreundlich, und gar viele der
beiderseitigen Enuntiationen, wie sie sich begegnen, sind gleichlautend; an wenig Stellen erscheint ein
Widerstreit, welcher keiner Auflösung bedarf; es sind nur zwey verschiedene Sprachen, und man versteht
sich wohl.” WA IV: 44 (146). Goethe here positions himself on the naturphilosophisch end of the
spectrum, while leaving room for the differences between Geoffroy and himself/his compatriots.
813
August de Candolle, Organographie végétale (Paris: Deterville, 1827), pp. vii-viii; my emphasis.!
812
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wird, dieser Ausdruck herabwürdigend. Die Organe komponieren sich nicht als vorher
fertig, sie entwickeln sich aus- und aneinander zu einem notwendigen ins Ganze
greifenden Dasein.814

Organology thus perches inside evolutionary biology,815 intervening in the debate
between anatomical comparison (Cuvier) and physiological teleology (based, in
Geoffroy’s case, on a material monism).816 Goethe’s conceptualization of organs,
however, is not merely an insistence on holism and organicism. Instead, it is based in a
practical treatment of cognition’s own power to represent and reproduce, both
metaphysical and active. In a sense, even the organs of knowledge expand and contract,
forming a necessary whole which—representing and reproducing itself as the order of
being and of thought—intervenes in its own development.
Goethe thus enters a debate here on the brink of shifting dramatically. The role of
the part’s development in the formation of the animal, so centrally debated in the 18th
century (see Chapter I above), would, in the next decades, come to a head in Britain with
the advent of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. As Robert Richards has argued,
Goethe was closer than previously realized to Darwin’s evolutionary concept, precisely
because he allowed for external circumstances to influence formation. Here we see this
played out at the level of the part and its function rather than at the level of organism.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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MA 18 2, p. 534. The term composition was key in the larger debate, but Goethe is likely not
disagreeing with the sense given in Geoffroy’s unité de composition, since this is meant to point to the
philosophical underpinnings of zoology in analogy, a point Goethe agrees with. It is a more general use of
composition—and indeed the very term’s non-synthetic connotation—which Goethe rejects.
815
As Robert Richards has argued, Goethe was closer than previously realized to Darwin’s evolutionary
concept, precisely because he allowed for external circumstances to influence formation See Richards,
Romantic Conception, p. 486: “... there can be little doubt that Goethe believed in a gradual transmutation
of species over long periods of time and that he thought such change occurred by thoroughly natural
processes.”
816
Goethe also draws attention to the conceptual problems of unity, type, and taxonomy, in each case
objecting to mechanicism in the term’s use. For Goethe’s more general final efforts in biology, see Kuhn,
Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, pp. 48-63.
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The passage on Naturphilosophie in Hegel’s Encyklopädie—which also included
his critique of Goethe—rejects the possibility of natural selection.817 Because essence is
both concept and reality for Hegel, its development is not “mechanical,” an external reordering of parts. The conceptual side of reality by its very nature demands that leaps in
quality occur for essences to change. No extensive infinite is allowed, and gradualistic
development is therefore rejected. A new species is another essence, conceptually and
thus ontologically distinct from what went before. This applies all the way down to the
smallest functional part, the organ.
If Goethe’s response to Hegel was such that the constitutional overlap between
thought and being made intervention (das Eingreifen) possible, this meant that he could
allow for gradual progress in the organ-based observational process. The organ, which
spreads out to “intervene” in the whole as it enters into being, is mirrored in a doublemimesis by the human organ, the evolution of which is up to us. The broadest sense of
organ relates to its Indo-European (*uerg) and Greek (ergon) roots: the organ is
metaphysical efficacity. Organology is transcendental technology, because it conditions
all technological possibility.818
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Hegel’s language leaves no doubt that Goethe is included in his critique: “Auch bei der Vorstellung der
Metamorphose wird eine Idee zugrunde gelegt, welche in allen verschiedenen Gattungen, ebenso in den
einzelnen Organen beharre, so daß sie nur Umbildungen der Form des einen und desselben Typus sind. So
spricht man auch von der Metamorphose eines Insekts, indem z. B. Raupe, Puppe und Schmetterling ein
und dasselbe Individuum sind; bei den Individuen freilich ist die Entwicklung eine zeitliche, aber bei der
Gattung ist dies anders. Wenn die Gattung auf besondere Weise existiert, so sind zugleich die anderen
Weisen der Existenz gesetzt; insofern Wasser ist, ist zugleich auch Luft, Feuer usw. gesetzt. Die Identität
festzuhalten ist wichtig, das andere ist aber, den Unterschied [festzuhalten]: dieser ist zurückgestellt, wenn
nur von quantitativer Veränderung die Rede ist; und das macht die bloße Vorstellung der Metamorphose
ungenügend.” (Enz. II §249.)
818
My claim about this “ideal technology” thus runs parallel to Jonathan Crary’s placement of Goethe’s
attention to the subject in his Farbenlehre at the beginning of a history of manipulation of the senses. See
Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: MIT,s
1992), pp. 97-100. Crary claims that “once vision became relocated in the subjectivity of the observer, two
interwined paths opened up. One led out toward all the multiple affimations of the sovereighnty and
autonomy of vision derived from this newly empowered body… The other path was toward the increasing
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Intervening in the debate between anatomical description and physiological
teleology (based, in Geoffroy’s case, on a material monism), Goethe drew attention,
focusing on the French of the matter, to the problems of unity, type, and taxonomy. In
this last effort to approach this area,819 He unified the discourse around the classical
problem of function in the term “organ.” Pushing his classical taxonomy
characteristically into philosophical territory was Goethe’s last scientific effort.
The problem is classical in two senses. First, it is indebted to the tradition of the
ancients in biology, the “classics” (primarily Aristotle, Galen, and Hippocrates), whom
Goethe now read one final time. But the problem is also related to his own “classicism,”
his aesthetic and scientific methodology, covering both external taxonomy and idealistic
organological technique.820 And this classical problem is therefore treated through the
organological detour, adding in this way a new factor to Goethe’s quasi-philosophy: a
technology of sorts.
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standardization and regulation of the observer that issued from knowledge of visionary body, toward forms
of power that depended on the abstraction and formalization of vision.” (Crary, Techniques, p. 150) I will
come closer to this line of thought in my final chapter, on Marxist organology. Here, suffice to say that
Goethe’s participation in the material history of observation is complemented by his participation in
another kind of technology. For Goethe’s general attitudes towards the technological, see Hartmut Boehme,
“The Metaphysics of Phenomena: Telescope and Microsope in the Works of Goethe, Leeuwenhoek and
Hooke,” in Collection, Laboratory, Theater: Scenes of Knowledge in the 17th Century (Berlin: de Gruyter,
2005), pp. 355-394.
819
For Goethe’s more general final efforts in biology, see Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, pp.
48-63.
820
A similar point is made by Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, p. 155: “Offenbar umfaßt in
diesem letzten Augenblick der Steigerung Goethes “Klassik” das Romantische bis zu einer Grenze, an der
sie nicht mehr klassisch wäre, -- wenn der Dicther sich auf das romantische Lebensgefühl und das
Denkschema des deutschen Idealismus eingelassen hätte. Aber eine Systematik des Denkens, eine Theorie
des Erkennens bietet er ebensowenig, wie er aus dem klassisch umgrenzten Menschsein aufbricht zu
transzendenten Bereichen des Unendlichen, welches ihm gestaltlos, oder des Religiösen, das ihm
dogmatisiert vorkommen mußte. Er hält sich bei der Betrachtung und Erforschung der Natur auf, verschafft
sich Zugang durch sein gegenständliches Denken mit den Mitteln zarter Empirie und der Idee des
wandlungsfähigen Typus.” Agreeing with Richards’s point about externalities and deformities in the
evolutionary picture is Astrida Tantillo, “Goethe’s “Classical” Science,” in ed. Richter, Literature, pp. 32347. Tantillo’s argument for “another” classicism focused on the deformation process and its evolutionary
possibilities is, however, complemented in Goethe’s work by a complex engagement in the “first”
classicism, as we shall now see.
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Five days before his death, Goethe wrote to Wilhelm von Humboldt:
Die Tiere werden durch ihre Organe belehrt, sagten die Alten, ich setze hinzu: die
Menschen gleichfalls, sie haben jedoch den Vorzug ihre Organe dagegen wieder zu
belehren.821

This dictum guides the central historical section of the Rezension des
Akademiestreits, and appears on a folio’s verso,822 transcribed from the Maximen und
Reflexionen823 and dated to September 1830. The presence of the cluster of Maximen on
the paper on which the review was written, and its conceptually guiding role in the
historical unfolding of the debate in the Academy, makes clear its centrality to Goethe’s
final theoretical efforts. The organ, in short, which distinguishes humanity is one in
evolution (Bildung) of another sort: encompassing the “lower” soul and the physical
organs, the higher operations of reason and judgment in their categories, it is a
pedagogical or even technological organ, an organ for the formation of humanity and
indeed human history.
Indeed, this line of thinking, brought to bear on the “volcanic eruption” of the
Academy in 1830, is classicist in its source and its scope.824 The Aristotelian treatises to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Goethe to W. von Humboldt, (FA 11, p. 549.) This notion had been introduced into the academy-debate
by Geoffroy himself, who asked in his own Principes de philosophie zoologique if human and animal
organs could not be compared: is the human hand not the form from which the degradations of the paw and
so forth derive? (See Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, pp. 97-8.) Goethe, however, drawing on
the ancients, levels the hierarchy and replaces it with a techno-rational divide.
822
WA II 13, p. 114.
823
“1190: Das Tier wird durch seine Organe belehrt, der Mensch belehrt die seinigen und beherrscht sie.”
(September 1830–dating of Maximen at MA 17, p. 1245), (MA 17, p. 917).
824
The problem is thus classical in two senses. First, it is indebted to the tradition of the ancients in
biology, the “classics” (primarily Aristotle, Galen, and Hippocrates), whom Goethe now read one final
time. But the problem is also related to his own “classicism,” his aesthetic and scientific methodology,
covering both external taxonomy and idealistic organological technique. A similar point is made by Kuhn,
Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, p. 155: “Offenbar umfaßt in diesem letzten Augenblick der Steigerung
Goethes “Klassik” das Romantische bis zu einer Grenze, an der sie nicht mehr klassisch wäre, -- wenn der
Dicther sich auf das romantische Lebensgefühl und das Denkschema des deutschen Idealismus eingelassen
hätte. Aber eine Systematik des Denkens, eine Theorie des Erkennens bietet er ebensowenig, wie er aus
dem klassisch umgrenzten Menschsein aufbricht zu transzendenten Bereichen des Unendlichen, welches
ihm gestaltlos, oder des Religiösen, das ihm dogmatisiert vorkommen mußte. Er hält sich bei der
Betrachtung und Erforschung der Natur auf, verschafft sich Zugang durch sein gegenständliches Denken
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which Goethe returned were those on the Animalia (especially De historia animalium, De
partibus animalium, and the De anima), treating of the physical, functional, and formal
developments of animals in general. Aristotle’s treatises therefore cover organ-formation
in three distinct senses,825 senses Goethe adopted and adapted to his doctrine.826 For even
as he read the hylomorphic accounts of organ-formation in the organic sphere, Goethe
focused on the problem of the hand in this literature and re-formulated the text he found,
pushing his German into the realm of the technological.
Maxime 1192 (also on the verso of the Rezension) reads:
Die Alten vergleichen die Hand der Vernunft.827

Galen, basing himself largely on Aristotle,828 was the source of this speculative
comparison. Goethe had read in the De usu partium, in a passage meditating on the
anthropological lack of specific organs in favor of the generality or versatility of the
hand, that:
Indeed, Aristotle was right when he said that the hand is, as it were, an instrument for
instruments, and we might rightly say in imitation of him that reason is, as it were, an art
for arts. For though the hand is no one particular instrument, it is the instrument for all
instruments because it is formed by Nature to receive them all, and similarly, although
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mit den Mitteln zarter Empirie und der Idee des wandlungsfähigen Typus.” Agreeing with Richards’s point
about externalities and deformities in the evolutionary picture is Astrida Tantillo, “Goethe’s “Classical”
Science,” in ed. Simon Richter, The Literature of Weimar Classicism (Rochester: Camden House, 2005),
pp. 323-47. Tantillo’s argument for “another” classicism focused on the deformation process and its
evolutionary possibilities is, however, complemented in Goethe’s work by a late complex engagement with
the “first” classicism, as we shall now see.
825
See A. L. Peck, “Introduction” in Aristotle, The Parts of Animals, ed. A.L. Peck; The Movement of
Animals and the Progression of Animals, ed. E.S. Forster (London: Heinemann, 1937), pp. 9 ff.
826
Karl Schlechta’s Goethe in seinem Verhältnisse zu Aristoteles: Ein Versuch (Frankfurt/Main.:
Klostermann, 1938) deals comprehensively with Goethe’s readings in Aristotle. He mentions this episode
at pp. 81-2 as an example of Goethe’s agreement with Aristotle on the “law of compensation” or the
“balance of organs” in the organism. Schlechta’s only notice of Goethe’s having read the De anima comes
at p. 28, with reference to the historical part of the Farbenlehre. My suggestion that there is a closer
reading and philological relationship to this text below will also show that Goethe’s “agreement” with
Aristotle extends beyond fascination with the same “problems.” For Goethe’s engagement in 1827/8 with
the Aristotelian “probemata,” see pp. 53-62.
827
WA II 13, p. 114. Undated according to the MA.
828
Goethe opens his consideration of the central functional organ (the hand in the human, the forearm in
other mammals) in the Rezension with “Ohne gelehrt scheinen zu wollen, beginnen wir von Aristoteles,
Hippokrates und Galen, nach dem Bericht des letzteren.” (MA 18 2, p. 529.)
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reason is no one of the arts in particular, it would be an art for the arts because it is
naturally disposed to take them all unto itself. Hence man, the only one of all the animals
having an art for arts in his soul, should logically have an instrument for instruments in
his body.829
[kalos men ouv kai Aristoteles oion organon ti pro organon epasken einai ten cheirai:
kalos d’ an tis kai hemon, ekeinon mimesumenos, oion texnen tina pro texnon pheseien
einvai ton logon. Hos har he cheir, ouden ousa ton kaka meros organon, hoti panta kalos
pephuke dechesthai, pro panton estiv organon, houtos ho logos, oudemias men ton kata
meros hupurchon technon, hapasas d’ eis heauton dechesthai pephukos, techne tis an sin
pro technon. Anthropos ouv monas hepanton zoon, technen echon pro technon en psuche,
kuta logon en toi somati pro organon organon echtesato.830]

The ancients, engaged in a debate about the human from the perspective of its parts,831
draw an analogy from the versatility of the hand (its general capacity to instrumentalize
nature) to the generality of reason’s grasp of all things. And so Goethe finished his cluster
of Maximen with a translation of the climactic sentence from this passage from Galen:
Die Vernunft ist die Kunst der Künste, die Hand die Technik alles Handwerks.832

Goethe has, at the very least, reduced the complex syntax in Galen to the pith of
complementarity. But he has also done more than this, taking the key repeated phrase,
techne pro technon (for reason), and rendering it in the antiquated sense of “art” in its
root in artificialis/künstlich. Reason (logos) is constructive, even technological, an
artifice which builds not arbitrarily (by composition) but necessarily, progressively
including more nature in its constructive apparatus and literally giving it new form,
creating new categories within it. That would be a technological metaphysics, mixture of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Galen, On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body , trans. Margaret Tallmadge May (Ithaca: Cornell,
1968), p. 71. The passage from the De partibus is at IV, 10, 687a20-21, organon ti pro organon. See May’s
commentary on the translation tradition at the same location.
830
Claudii Galeni, Opera Omnia, Tomus III, ed. Carolus Gottlob Kühn (1822), pp. 8-9. My transcription
and transliteration from the edition Goethe used.
831
The local debate from Aristotle on is with Anaxagoras, who had claimed that the hand had made the
human intelligent. For Aristotle as for Galen, the reverse is true: the hand is a suitable instrument for the
animal possessing reason. Note how Galen plays in the last quoted sentence on the beginning of Aristotle’s
politics: anthropos zoon exon logon… Similarly, Goethe uses the debate in the academy to address
scientific issues at the same time as he addresses the methodological. This generic parallel to Aristotle (and
to Galen) is a sort of genre-classicism, the content behind the form of which is the organological debate
with Hegel. Both Wolf, Der Begriff, and Löw, Philosophie des Lebendigen, suggest that Galen’s
teleological thinking is a flattening of a more sensitive model in Aristotle.
832
WA II 13, p. 114; MA 18 2, p. 529; April 1829. I am not aware of a previous mention of this
philological connection to Galen in the literature. !
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making and necessity. The hand then becomes “technology” too, and the translation of
organ into Technik makes finally clear that Goethe goes beyond Hegel’s framework.
Beyond the instrument for truth is the instrument for making truth. Organ is the
instrument of instruments, a reflexive technology spanning the spectrum of human being,
which turns out to be human making. The mirroring of the organ from reason’s capacity
to intervene in nature into the technology of the versatile hand is not merely analogical.833
The generality and productivity of each is isomorphic with that of the other—they
interact in what the Romantics would have called “higher realism.” If Goethe has an
“anthropology,” it is technologia transcendentalis, or organology. Reason’s organ is not
a specific logic, not merely an organon. Or rather, it is precisely that organon for
metaphysics834 that Kant had once called for. And yet it is more than that. Redoubling
mimesis and creating a dialectical and constructive relationship between thought and
being, it also trends towards the practical. And we should not think of “practical” in a
vulgar empiricist sense here, but instead as the ideal interaction in reality which Goethe’s
organ is meant to make possible. For Goethe, the possibility of the “externality” of agents
of change in the evolutionary process is maintained permanently as a possibility,
precisely because the organ of reason is prepared to learn something principally new and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Goethe’s is thus neither Herder’s nor Geoffroy’s organ, strictly speaking.
Kuhn writes that “Hier erschließen sich ihm die Bereiche der Wirklichkeit, die wir als empirische und
ideele nachzuzeichnen versuchten; der empirische, der die Realität umgreift, der ideelle, der sich öffnet zu
Typus, Gestalt und Gesetz, ohne zu transzendieren zu einem Reich reiner Ideen. Innerhalb dieser
Wirklichkeit liegt für Goethe das Erkennbare, das er in der Betrachtung der Wirkung, Funktion und Form,
nicht in einer unmittelbaren Betrachtung des Wesens der Dinge sucht. Aber der aufmerksame Blick in die
Wirklichkeit und das vorgreifende Aperçu treiben das Unerforschliche in die Enge. Es bleibt ein Rest,
ein verborgenes, im Unendlichen liegendes Ziel, dem man sich nur nähern, das man nicht erreichen kann.”
Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit, p. 155. I add the emphasis to indicate her claims’ rejection of
Wilhelm Dilthey’s thesis that Goethe is “non-metaphysical” (a charge that here seems to amount to “nonHegelian”) because of a “Kern der Unerforschlichkeit” that remains in his thought. See Wilhelm Dilthey,
Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation (Gesammelte Schriften II),
ed. Georg Misch (Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1991), pp. 391-416. Kuhn’s sense that Goethe’s
attitude is parallel to that of the Romantics on this issue is, as I have been arguing, correct.
834
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then alter that newness in its reproduction of representation. Mimesis—as the
reproduction of representation itself—holds the possibility of a shift in the represented in
reserve.835
Perhaps Goethe was not merely translating that passage in Galen, but proposing
terms for a transfer of the whole discourse of the ancients on the hand as technology (“die
Alten sagten….”) Aristotle, on whom Galen is clearly drawing, had written in the De
anima:
It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the
mind is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.836
hoste he psyche hosper he cheir estin: kai gar he cheir organon estin organon, kai ho
nous eidos eidon kai he aisthesis eidos aestheton.

“Tender empiricism” brushes the world with new organs, new categories, painstakingly
reproducing its split between subject and object, and changing the form—eidos—(and
thus content) of that split through reproduction. The hand, the sense, and Reason itself
thus describe an organological human with dialectical ability, one who can progressively
include and alter the world in development. This organology thus reproduces the order of
representation and becomes productive within it—physis and techne are underpinned not
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This can help to solve the scholarly problem about what genre Goethe’s natural-scientific writings fall
into. So, for example, Dietrich von Engelhardt describes Goethe’s writing as an amalgamation of
aesthetics, philosophy, science, and biography: “Die Frage nach der Stellung und Eigenart der
Naturbetrachtung Goethes im Spektrum der verschiedenen naturphilosophischen und
naturwissenschaftlichen Positionen um 1800 verlangt noch viele weitere Untersuchungen. Es wird hierbei
weniger um Verteidigung oder Ablehnung Goethes als eines empirischen Naturforscher gehen als vielmehr
um Beschreibung und Analyse seiner Art der Naturbetrachtung al seiner spezifischen Verbindung von
Ästhetik, Philosophie, Wissenschaft und Biographie.” Dietrich von Engelhardt, “Natur und Geist,
Evolution und Geschichte. Goethe in seiner Beziehung zur romantischen Naturforschung und
metaphysischen Naturphilosophie,” in: Peter Matussek (ed.), Goethe und die Verzeitlichung der Natur
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), pp. 73-4. And as Dorothea Kuhn has noted about the Rezension in particular,
Goethe is not writing epistemology, anthropology, or anything else specific to a discipline, but progressing
in each of them: “Da er in diesem Essay zwar keine Naturwissenschaft, keine Erkenntniskritik, keine
Anthropologie im fachlich spezialisierten Sinne bot, aber in jeder von diesen drei Richtungen vorwärtsging
[sic], konnte die Interpretation auf drei entsprechenden Stufen ansetzen.” Kuhn, Empirische und ideelle
Wirklichkeit, p. 153. That would be the genre of Goethe’s organology: meaningful progression in the
development of plastic categories extending from “pure” cognition to the specific sciences—a quasiphilosophy meant to make the world quite literally meaningful.
836
De anima 432a.
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by Galen’s logos but by Aristotle’s self-knowing nous. Goethe’s “translation” of this
discourse pushes self-knowledge (in Hegelese: das Selbstwissen des Geistes) into
production: the encapsulated organs of form confront the genuinely gradual
developments of a processual world. Taxonomy treats the proliferation of forms in
development, but is complemented and harmonized by an Idealism founded in Reason’s
categorial organs. Organology thus offers the vision of a technological freedom. Nature is
delicately forced to mean something, and our human organs match the forward march of
technological and disciplinary isolation with a thus meaningful resistance. !

Epilogue: De vino et historia.
Frage sich doch jeder, mit welchem Organ er allenfalls in seine Zeit einwirken kann und
wird! –Maximen und Reflexionen

Young Hegelians have three characteristics. First, they are inspired by
fundamental dialogue with Hegel. Second, they have some disagreement with Hegel.
Third, the second amounts to a disagreement about the relationship of philosophy to
history. Leszek Kolakowski calls this disagreement a “Fichteanization” of Hegel broadly,
since the Hegelian Left reintroduced (political) striving into a generally Hegelian
analytical framework. It can also be noted that the Hegelians in the first generation after
the death of the master tended to emphasize the future as Hegel had not.837 If we put this
development in Hegelianism in Hegelian terms, however, we can see that the shared
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“The Young Hegelians, especially in their later phase (1840-3), were to “Fichteanize” Hegel, if I may so
put it, by reintroducing the aspect of obligation (Sollen) in their approach to history.” Leszek Kolakowski,
Main Currents of Marxism, trans. P. S. Falla (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005/1978), p. 70. For the latter
claim, see Horst Stuke, Philosophie der Tat: Studien zur Verwirklichung der Philosophie bei den
Junghegelianern und den Wahren Sozialisten (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1963). See also the comprehensive
study by John Toews, John Toews, Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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intellectual gesture is the conflation of objective spirit and absolute spirit. The famous
dictum that “the owl of Minerva only flies at dusk” is meant to intimate, for Hegel, that
the philosophical history of the development of institutions—the objectification of
spirit—is a thing of the past. Objective spirit has placed the necessities in front of us for
the absolute spirit to take its final form: that of philosophy, or the self-mediation of spirit
in its concept. Philosophy tells us the truth about institutions, but it is not meant to
intervene in them.838 As we shall see more clearly in the epilogue of this study, it is this
exclusive relationship between two forms of spirit which the Young generation rejected.
From Bauer to Feuerbach to especially Czieskowski and Marx, a clarion call for
philosophical intervention in history’s events, and especially in politics, was sounded.
Objective spirit was not through evolving, and only absolute spirit’s mediation could help
it do so correctly.
When Goethe named the wrong event of the epoch to Soret, then, he seemed a
good distance from 3), although—as we have seen—he admirably fulfills conditions 1)
and 2). But a curious incident in the interactions between the two men illustrates that
Goethe anticipated at least the philosophical conditions—if not the political
commitments—for being a Young Hegelian.
On 13 April 1821, Goethe, celebrating his Farbenlehre’s favorable treatment in
the Encyklopädie, sent Hegel a letter. The letter was attended by a glass, colored yellow
and with a piece of black silk inside, making the glass appear blue.839 For Goethe, this bit
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This rather flat interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy is not necessarily one I want to defend here. It is,
however, a necessity for understanding the gestures of the Young Hegelians. For recent readings that see
Hegel as more future-oriented, see Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005),
but also John Burbidge, Hegel on Logic and Religion: The Reasonableness of Christianity (Albany: SUNY,
1992).
839
Descriptions of the glass (along with the letters) can be found in ed. Karl Hegel, Briefe von und an
Hegel II (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1887), p. 47, and Arnold Genthe, “Acht Briefe Hegels an
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of black demonstrated that the spectrum was generated by the admixture of light and
dark. Hegel responded cordially, musing on the help that wine could give philosophy.
This line of thought ran quickly into the debate raging between Voss and Creuzer on
mythology. Mirroring the terms of the classicist debate more generally, Creuzer was on
his way to a demolishing critique of the genteel theories of Voss: mythology emerged
from a violent symbolic darkness, one that had to be taken account of in the emergent
folkloric and mythological disciplines. Hegel invoked Bacchus. What better than this
God-symbol to show that wine is the proof that nature and spirit are one?840 Relations
between the giants were established as friendly, and several visits from Berlin to Weimar
(as well as visits by disciples, as noted above) kept diplomacy online until their
respective deaths at the beginning of the next decade.
This episode, seemingly innocent of the deeper dialogue between the two men,
was in fact fraught. As Hegel began to lecture on aesthetics in Berlin, he incorporated
Creuzer’s work into his. The lowest level of absolute spirit’s mediation of itself—in the
sensible—art began with a quasi-mythological phase Hegel dubbed “symbolic,” in which
spirit, not grasping its own essence, strove to be represented in difference from itself
(indeed, from its own misunderstanding of itself). This phase would give way to the
“classical” (typified by the balance of the Greek representation of the human form), and
then to the form in which spirit grasps itself and comes to mourn its unrepresentability in
the sensible, the Romantic. Creuzer had allowed Hegel to formulate a dialectical history
of art, ending in a lack that gave way to absolute spirit’s next form of self-mediation (im
Gemüt): religion.
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Goethe,” Mittheilungen aus dem Goethe- und Schiller-Archiv Neue Mittheilungen Goethe-Jahrbuch 16,
pp. 56 – 79, here p. 76.
840
Hegel, Briefe, p. 61 ff.!!
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And yet, as we have seen, the Aesthetics Lectures also contain a critique of
Goethe’s view of nature. And they contain what may have been the even more peculiar
result of the peculiar epistolary exchange above.
We note that Hegel’s critique was not only of natural-scientific observation:
Bei der Erfahrung kommt es darauf an, mit welchem Sinn man an die Wirklichkeit geht.
Ein großer Sinn macht große Erfahrungen und erblickt in dem bunten Spiel der
Erscheinungen das, worauf es ankommt. Die Idee ist vorhanden und wirklich, nicht etwas
da drüben und hinten. Der große Sinn, wie z.B. der eines Goethe, der in die Natur oder
in die Geschichte blickt, macht große Erfahrungen, erblickt das Vernünftige und spricht
es aus.841

Hegel himself had developed the sense that Goethe’s thought was not only aimed at
nature, but also history. Thus, in the Aesthetics Lectures:
Von solcher Art ist die Goethesche Beschauung und Darlegung der inneren
Vernünftigkeit der Natur und ihrer Erscheinungen. Mit großem Sinne trat er naiverweise
mit sinnlicher Betrachtung an die Gegenstände heran und hatte zugleich die volle Ahnung
ihres begriffsgemäßen Zusammenhangs. Auch die Geschichte kann so erfasst und
erzählt werden, dass durch die einzelnen Begebenheiten und Individuen ihre
wesentliche Bedeutung und ihr notwendiger Zusammenhang heimlich
hindurchleuchtet.842

What seems a slight digression on “history” hangs closely together with Hegel’s sense of
Goethe’s project. When he returns to Goethe, Hegel is rejecting the possibility of
contemporary epic. The conditions for the true epic—the “world condition”
(Weltzustand) of exposure to nature in an underinstitutionalized society—have
disappeared. We need not read between too many lines to see that Hegel means that the
progress of objective spirit has made the heroic epic, with its exposure of its hero directly
to nature, the wrath of others, and the destinal wrath of the Gods themselves, irrelevant.
As he puts it, this condition has given way to a “private” condition based in the home
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Hegel, Enz. I, p. 87.
Hegel, VÄ I, pp. 173-4.
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(häuslich).843 Thus, when a heroic condition returned—in the Revolution of 1789 and the
disintegration of the protective measure established by institutional life—the epic could
return, too, but in a different form. Not the questioning of destiny and the hero’s journey,
as Büchner would depict Danton, but instead, an unmediated connection between the
private, homey condition of those living pastoral lives and the breaking down of order at
the highest level. Hegel called this new genre an “idyllic epic,” and used, as his primary
example, Goethe’s Hermann und Dorothea.844
Goethe’s hexameter epic about the pursuit of love in the refugee conditions
established by the Wars of Revolution was published in 1798. For Hegel, it returned,
within the strictures of the objectively supported absolute spirit, to certain key elements
of the epic. The “general world condition” implies that the hero has an unmediated
relationship to many of the objects in his surroundings.845 Even the marriage-bed of
Odysseus is of the hero’s own making.846 But the “idyllic” conditions of the home in the
contemporary world are such that even the apparently self-contained enjoyment of drink
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“Die Entwicklung des Geistes ist, daß er… II. in der Form der Realität als einer von ihm
hervorzubringenden und hervorgebrachten Welt [ist], in welcher die Freiheit als vor- handene
Notwendigkeit ist, - objektiver Geist…” (Enz. III §385)
844
Hegel, VÄ III, pp. 414-15: “Hier wird uns zwar der Blick auf den Hintergrund der in unserer Zeit
größten Weltbegebenheit eröffnet, an welche sich dann die Zustände des Wirtes und seiner Familie, des
Pastors und Apothekers unmittelbar anknüpfen, so daß wir, da das Landstädtchen nicht in seinen
politischen Verhältnissen er- scheint, einen unberechtigten Sprung finden und die Vermittlung des
Zusammenhanges vermissen können; doch gerade durch das Weglas- sen dieses Mittelgliedes bewahrt das
Ganze seinen eigentümlichen Charakter. Denn meisterhaft hat Goethe die Revolution, obschon er sie zur
Erweiterung des Gedichts aufs glücklichste zu benutzen wußte, ganz in die Ferne zurückgestellt und nur
solche Zustände derselben in die Handlung eingeflochten, welche sich in ihrer einfachen Menschlichkeit an
jene häuslichen und städtischen Verhältnisse und Situationen durch- aus zwanglos anschließen.”
845
Hegel, VÄ III, pp. 343-44: “Die Existenz der Heroen aber hat eine ungleich ursprünglichere Einfachheit
der Gegenstände und Erfindungen und kann sich bei ihrer Beschreibung aufhalten, weil alle diese Dinge
noch in gleichem Range stehen und als etwas gelten, worin der Mensch, insofern sein ganzes Leben ihn
nicht davon ableitet und in eine nur intellektuelle Sphäre führt, noch eine Ehre seiner Geschicklichkeit,
seines Reichtums seines positiven Interesses hat. Ochsen zu schlachten, zuzubereiten, Wein einzuschenken
usf. ist ein Geschäft der Heroen selbst, das sie als Zweck und Genuß treiben, während bei uns ein
Mittagessen, wenn es nicht alltäglich sein soll, nicht nur seltene delikate Sachen zutage bringen muß,
sondern außerdem auch vortreffliche Diskurse verlangt.”!
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“Odysseus hat sich sein großes Ehebett selbst gezimmert…” (Hegel, VÄ I, p. 338.)

!

391!
!!
!
makes reference to the greater world: coffee, or sugar, indicates the world market’s trade,
“civil society’s” intrusion into the traditional (and potentially heroic) life of the family.
Hegel’s negative example throughout the Aesthetics Lectures is Voss’s Luise, in which
precisely coffee and sugar are enjoyed. For Hegel, this attempt at idyllic epic breaks its
balance through inadvertent reference to the advanced world condition, no longer general
but specifically split into family, civil society, and state, in increasingly global trade.
Goethe, on the other hand, gets its right.847
Hermann und Dorothea, for Hegel, leaves the breakdown of order in France and
its intrusion into the Rhein region separate from the intrusion of the market into familial
relations. The characters are presented in better light as they are themselves more
cosmopolitan, but the epic element is introduced by the objects:
So trinkt z. B., um nur an dies eine zu erinnern, der Wirt mit seinen Gästen, dem Pfarrer
und Apotheker, nicht etwa Kaffee: “Sorgsam brachte die Mutter des klaren, herrlichen
Weines,/ In geschliffener Flasche auf blankem zinnernen Runde,/ Mit den grünlichen
Römern,/ den echten Bechern des Rheinweins.” Sie trinken in der Kühle ein heimisches
Gewächs, Dreiundachtziger, in den heimischen, nur für den Rheinwein passenden Gläsern;
„die Fluten des Rheinstroms und sein liebliches Ufer“ wird uns gleich darauf vor die
Vorstellung gebracht, und bald werden wir auch in die eigenen Weinberge hinter dem
Hause des Besitzers geführt, so daß hier nichts aus der eigentümlichen Sphäre eines in sich
behaglichen, seine Bedürfnisse innerhalb seiner sich gebenden Zustands hinausgeht.848

Wine and its container come to the rescue of philosophy, and of the epic. And it is in this
strange passage of aesthetic judgment that Hegel’s most ambivalent word about Goethe is
spoken. For Hegel is uncharacteristically advocating an unmediated quality in the
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“Die idyllischen Zustände unserer heutigen Gegenwart haben wieder das Mangelhafte, daß diese
Einfachheit, das Häusliche und Ländliche in Empfindung der Liebe oder der Wohlbehägigkeit eines guten
Kaffees im Freien usf., gleichfalls von geringfügigem Interesse sind, indem von allem weiteren
Zusammenhange mit tieferen Verflechtungen in gehaltreichere Zwecke und Verhältnisse bei diesem
Landpfarrerleben usf. nur abstrahiert wird. Daher ist auch in dieser Beziehung Goethes Genius zu
bewundern, daß er sich in Hermann und Dorothea zwar auf ein ähnliches Gebiet konzentriert, indem er aus
dem Leben der Gegenwart eine engbegrenzte Besonderheit herausgreift, zugleich aber als Hintergrund und
als Atmosphäre, in welcher sich dieser Kreis bewegt, die großen Interessen der Revolution und des eigenen
Vaterlandes eröffnet und den für sich beschränkten Stoff mit den weitesten, mächtigsten
Weltbegebenheiten in Beziehung bringt.” (Hegel, VÄ I, pp. 250-51.)
848
Hegel, VÄ I, p. 340.
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thought-work of the poem. The return to the “general world condition” in the Revolution
calls, according to the Lectures, for exclusion of the market—the locality of the objects—
in its now once again epic representation. The private is broken by that market and the
abstract distance of international trade, but the breakdown of governmental order requires
this return to beds and food and wine made by heroes themselves. Wine helps philosophy
under revolutionary conditions, precisely where coffee and sugar fail it.
But if Goethe’s project were—from precisely ca. 1798—to allow for the
categorial transformation of the world in development, then Hegel is unconsciously
drawing attention here to a moment in which Goethe—according to Hegel, correctly—
grasps a world-situation returned to the general. In that space, a revolution occurred, and
then occurred again, in July of 1830. For Hegel, Goethe had produced a poetological
organology—inspired by wine—that justified not the revolution itself but the
transformative efforts it made necessary.849 Hermann und Dorothea anticipates what
Peter Schwartz has identified as the paradigmatic Goethean web of concerns in civil
politics: the interrelation of property, inheritance, and marriage.850 Indeed, the text
displays concern for all three both literally (Hermann’s father wants him to marry the
neighbor’s daughter to enrich the household Hermann will ultimately inherit) and
metaphorically (what counts as our world is in constant question because of the alien
threat, and it is precisely the Rhein but also the vineyards which mark the territorial
boundary—Hermann crosses outside the vineyards, against his habit, to weep for
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Karl Otto Conrady, Goethe und die französische Revolution (Frankfurt/Main.: Insel, 1988), pp. 120-2,
points out that some of Goethe’s most sympathetic words about the Jacobins are expressed with respect to
the first fiancé of Dorothea, who died in Paris in support of the cause. For the different reactions of German
writers to the Revolution, see Stammen, Goethe und die politische Welt, pp. 107-43.
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See Peter Schwartz, After Jena: Goethe’s Elective Affinities and the End of the Old Regime (Lewisburg:
Bucknell University Press, 2010).!!
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Dorothea, and again to find her). The epic in idyll is a mimesis of the Weltzustand
because it, and it alone, shows objective spirit in revolution where absolute spirit is
correctly engaged with it. Ultimately, Dorothea is the bearer of the Hegelian judgment—
she is allowed to reverse legal and gender relations in her violent rescue of herself and a
roomful of other young women from marauding rape. Yet famously, the epic ends with
her domestication through marriage, and the twin monologues—her first husband’s, who
has gone to Paris and died, which she speaks—and Hermann’s, with the famous lines:
Denn der Mensch, der zur schwankenden Zeit auch schwankend gesinnt ist,
Der vermehret das Übel und breitet es weiter und weiter;
Aber wer fest auf dem Sinne beharrt, der bildet die Welt sich…
Du bist mein; und nun ist das Meine meiner als jemals.
Nicht mit Kummer will ichs bewahren und sorgend genießen,
Sondern mit Mut und Kraft…851

This mysterious line can be read in the following way: you Dorothea are mine, and now
that which is mine my inheritance of the Goldener Löwe and the vineyards belongs more
to me because I have formed the world according to my wish (and not my father’s).
Inheritance is not a passive process: the new generation must earn its world by
domesticating it differently in different conditions than its parents had. In Hegelian terms,
literal possession at all three levels is underpinned by absolute spirit’s poetic vessel—and
also undermined. The idyllic epic has the virtue of immediate presentation of the actual—
but it becomes through this very presentation the mediation of that developing actuality,
in this case the imminent emergence of civil politics. The absolute becomes the
instrument of the representation and alteration of historical circumstance.
Hermann und Dorothea was organological: it formed the world, insisting on its
rightness, on possession as a generational and gendered category justifiably in
development, but not yet revolutionized, at least east of the Rhine. If we consider this
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work from the perspective of 1830—at the beginning of the end of the revolutionary
epoch—then its lessons look nationalist compared to the internationalist Goethe of Die
Wahlverwandtschaften, Faust II, and the nascent concept of Weltliteratur. But perhaps it
is precisely through the time-sensitive organological lens that we can locate already in
1798 the beginning—passive and not without resistance—of what Thomas Mann
described as Goethe’s late Zug ins Weltweite.852 Hermann und Dorothea’s aesthetic
program can be retroactively grasped as the first wobbly step into the new cosmopolitan
civil era, where the human is systemically capable in the apparent contingency of
historical breakdown, capable precisely of technological reorganization of the natural and
social worlds. This attitude is formally (if not politically) identical to that of the Young
Hegelians, connecting Hegel’s absolute and objective spirits, metaphysics and
institutions. It seeks to reproduce this world mimetically in order to change it. Goethe’s
Owl of Minerva flies alongside History, reproducing the world in representation, and in
that reproduction holding the possibility of intervention into that history in reserve.

!
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Thomas Mann, Goethe als Repräsentant des bürgerlichen Zeitalters (Berlin: Fischer, 1932). See also
Dieter Borchmeyer’s speech, “Welthandel – Weltfrömmigkeit – Weltliteratur,” available at http://www.uniheidelberg.de/presse/news/2212borch.html, visited 20 May 2012.
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Communist Organs and the Legacies of Organology: statt eines Epilogs
If I have been faithful in this study to what I called in its Introduction a
“restitutive” impulse with respect to Romantic organology, then my conclusion will flesh
out that intention. I have not argued that Romanticism is the paradigm under which we
still live; I have not been reconstructing organology with the thought of rescuing it from
the rubble-heap of semi-forgotten history; nor, finally, have I wanted to argue that its
doctrines are of pressing importance for the solution of our contemporary problems. Each
of these claims could be tempered, of course. Romanticism was a major development in
Western intellectual history, and its legacies are not absent in the present.
Historiographically speaking, I have been laboring precisely to save a strand of its
thought—organology—that would otherwise potentially fade into scholarly oblivion. The
last point, however, is the most worried in my presentation: while I do not think that
Romantic organs can be unproblematically applied to our world, I do think my
investigation calls attention to a kind of thinking that, at the beginning of the age we are
perhaps witness to the end of, presents us with a much-needed theoretical call to arms.
Schlegel’s organs of representational government, for example, are clearly artifacts of the
post-revolutionary setting. It will hardly do to claim them as our own. And yet, the
grander problems that motivated the development of Romantic organology—
metaphysical and scientific despair and political disintegration—are not only not gone
from our contemporary scene: they are pitched as echoes (not to say: death-rattles) of the
very chaos that inaugurated the modern political order and its philosophical imagination
in Europe.
Francis Fukuyama wrote famously, after the fall of the Soviet Socialist
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governments in 1989/90, that history had ended. He saw the triumph of democracy—and
an end to war—in the end of the USSR, and with that triumph an alternate vision to
Hegel’s Prussian end to history.853 Hardly a decade later, however, history had
“recommenced” for Fukuyama, and not because of the spectre of international terrorism.
The worries of the future were those of biology.854 The very notion of “biotechnology”
shakes the pacific façade of the neo-Hegelian end-times. This is because that façade is
built on the metaphorical ground of technomorphism, and politics is immediately
implicated in any shifting of those Aristotelian terms.855 Worries about bio-technology
have a conceptual depth based in the techne-phusis analogy. As Fukuyama frames the
issue: what is to become of “human nature” and “natural law” when our happiness, aging
processes, and perhaps even our ability to live are affected by intentional intervention? In
other words, what kind of a thing is a human after the political order has settled its
accounts and left further developments up to that very human? Fukuyama thus repeats
Hegel’s gesture: objective spirit has reduced itself to the proper arrangement of human
affairs on top of which absolute spirit can develop itself. But where Hegel saw a
progression of absolute spirit from art through religion to philosophy, Fukuyama sees a
technological risk of recursively political proportions. Just when History had laid down
its tools and come to apparent rest, absolute spirit re-enters the scene in the guise of a
reminder that phusis and techne have long since been separated. The conceptual worries
of the present do, in this particular sense, bear more than a passing resemblance to those
the Romantics confronted. What they invented as a response—technologia
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Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992/2006).
Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York:
Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2003).!
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Fukuyama is explicit about his Aristotelianism, see Posthuman Future, pp. 12 ff.
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transcendentalis—has an empirical correlate in what we might call technological
capitalism. But as Fukuyama’s worries demonstrate, the correlate is only mildly
“empirical,” since the object of judgment that genetic manipulation (for example)
produces is not merely another being, but calls the categories of being-identification into
question. Posthuman serves as a designation of this metaphysical and political doubt.
This analogy should remain one: I wish to leave at the level of a suggestion the
connection between the technological discourse of 1800 and the realities of 2000. The
distance between the two is the distance of that analogy. Without suggesting the
perimeter of an organic historical unity, we can see that the organological project was
central in its time, and as generic theoretical intervention might not be trivial in ours. But
I want to follow up on this possible usefulness not in the elaboration of “organology in
the present,” but in a few of its legacies.
Max Horkheimer, writing at the outbreak of the Second World War and in the
passage from the Institute of Social Research to the formation we now call the Frankfurt
School, recognized a hidden organological agenda of the early Marx’s project. The
mission-statement of the Frankfurt School, Traditionelle und kritische Theorie (1937),
divides famously between a traditional theory caught in an attempt to describe everything
the skeptical subject can come to know, and a critical theory which realizes itself as the
legitimate product of the class-relation as it emerges from the mode of production. This
second, historicized theory treats its very objects and its means of perception not as static,
but as the result of social development (of work). Horkheimer writes:
Die Tatsachen, welche die Sinne uns zuführen, sind in doppelter Weise gesellschaftlich
präformiert: durch den geschichtlichen Charakter des wahrgenommenen Gegenstandsund
den geschichtlichen Charakter des wahrnehmenden Organs. Beide sind nicht nur
natürlich, sondern durch menschliche Aktivität geformt; das Individuum jedoch erfährt
sich selbst bei der Wahrnehmung als aufnehmend und passiv. Der Gegensatz von
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Passivität und Aktivität, der in der Erkenntnistheorie als Dualismus von Sinnlichkeit und
Verstand auftritt, gilt für die Gesellschaft nicht im gleichen Maß wie für das Individuum.
Wo sich dieses als passiv und abhängig erfährt, ist jene, die sich doch aus Individuen
zusammensetzt, ein wenn auch bewusstloses und insofern uneigentliches, jedoch
tätiges Subjekt.856

The appearance of passivity—the sense of an external limitation not produced by the
self—is the result of social work (as it had been for Fichte). The passage is a précis of the
larger argument. Even with his sophistication, Kant has reified a felt contradiction by
retaining a view from the subject (Horkheimer goes on to read the epigenesis-metaphor
with respect to the emergence of ideology from the infrastructure). To the subject, to be
sure, the organs are passive, static, receptive. From the social standpoint of critique,
however, they are also active, because they are the result of a history. This means not that
they are themselves dynamic in reception, but that this very receptivity is active in the
sense of form-giving. These are the ambivalent organs of an ideology, and the task is to
critique their offerings, to make them match up with the content of the class struggle.
This notion of ideological organs is ultimately derived from Marx, as we will see
momentarily. But it was a powerful strain of thought in the circles of the Frankfurt
school. Its formulation goes back at least to Walter Benjamin’s famous essay on Das
Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner Reproduzierbarkeit (1936):
Da kam der Film und hat diese Kerkerwelt mit dem Dynamit der Zehntelsekunden
gesprengt, so daß wir nun zwischen ihren weitverstreuten Trümmern gelassen
abenteuerliche Reisen unternehmen. Unter der Großaufnahme dehnt sich der Raum, unter
der Zeitlupe die Bewegung.857

The categorial banality of the everyday is redoubled and exploded by the technological
organ of the aesthetic, film. The tricks of the medium’s presentation cut, in Benjamin’s
terms, surgically into the complex of our perception, altering time and movement
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Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften. Band 4: Schriften 1936-1941, ed. Alfred Schmidt
(Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1988), p. 174.
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Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Band I, Teil 2, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), pp. 499-500.
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fundamentally. If we look forward to Horkheimer’s essay of the next year, we can see an
organological strand in this ideologically critical media theory. That is not incidental, of
course: as far back as Herder it had always been clear that media need organs to sustain
any investigation of them.
Horkheimer, writing with Theodor Adorno, would later give another striking
formulation to the thought:
Die Leistung, die der kantische Schematismus noch von den Subjekten erwartet hatte,
nämlich die sinnliche Mannifgaltigkeit vorweg auf die fundamentalen zu beziehen, wird
dem Subjekt von der Industrie abgenommen. Sie betreibt den Schematismus als ersten
Dienst am Kunden. In der Seele sollte ein geheimer Mechanismus wirken, der die
unmittelbaren Daten bereits so präpariert, daß sie ins System der Reinen Vernunft
hineinpassen. Das Geheimnis ist heute enträtselt.858

The schematism is the empirical subsumption of intuition under concept—the
application of the epigenetic quality of pure reason. Transcendental schemata must be
generated, for Kant, in order to allow for this mediation between the a priori and the a
posteriori to occur. These schemata allow for the formation of empirical correlates (the
form of a plate, say, or a dog, in general). Schematism allows the KdrV to pass from
possible experience to actual experience.
Film, for Horkheimer and Adorno in 1945, changes all that. Or rather, it changes
the source of schematic generation. Film takes over the task of making the categories
applicable to empirical intuitions, literally because it replaces the mechanism for
intuition-delivery, displacing it from the senses in relation to their world to the senses in
relation to a mechanically-generated and completely controlled simulation of a world.
The film destroys the mythical secret of the soul’s schematism (the “ground of
sensibility,” into which we cannot see, lacking schickliche Werkzeuge). Shifting the
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Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente
(Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1988), p. 151.
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construction and constructability of the object of the senses, film fulfills the aesthetic task
of creating a “world within a world.” But it also shifts the burden of aesthetic content—
the generation of ideology—to Hollywood, to the culture industry. Ideology is thus
buried deeper than previously possible: it is delivered directly to the disenchanted soul,
which understands its immediacy as myth. Filmic Enlightenment returns of itself to its
opposite, and Benjamin’s optimism is undermined. The Frankfurt School inherited a
strand of organology, but found no hope in it for a salutary politics.859
Returning to Traditionelle und kritische Theorie, however, we find a striking deorganicizing version of the claim that also ultimately goes back to Marx:
Der physiologische Sinnesapparat des Menschen arbeitet selbst schon längst weitgehend
in der Richtung physikalischer Versuche. Die Art, wie im aufnehmenden Betrachten
Stücke geschieden und zusammengefasst werden, wie einzelnes nicht bemerkt, anderes
hervorgehoben wird, ist ebensosehr Resultat der modernen Produktionsweise, wie die
Wahrnehmung eines Mannes aus irgendeinem Stamm primitive Jäger und Fischer
Resultat seiner Existenzbedingungen und freilich auch des Gegenstandes ist. Bezogen
darauf ließe sich der Satz, die Werkzeuge seien Verlängerungen der menschlichen
Organe, so umdrehen, dass die Organe auch Verlängerungen der Instrumente sind. Auf
den höheren Stufen der Zivilisation bestimmt die bewusste menschliche Praxis unbewusst
nicht bloß die subjektive Seite der Wahrnehmung, sondern in höherem Maß auch den
Gegenstand.860

Critical theory grasps, at its very starting-point, an essential element of the organological
program. On the basis of the Marxist theory of modes of production (and this not
accidentally, as we shall see in a moment), tools and organs become interchangeable.
Work is here reduced to its most abstract concept (in keeping with Marx’s elaboration in
the Grundrisse): techne as the condition of a world with humans in it means that organs
are the result of work, and that their object-determining work is in turn a source for the
production of a better ideology. This moment of optimism in 1937 was drowned out by
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Where the term organ occurs in elsewhere in the Dialektik, it is usually subordinated to the logic of pure
(or bad) instrumentality. Needless to say, this logic usually overlooks the Romantic sensibility about
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resistances that derive most obviously from Marx.
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war, and especially the technologies of mass murder, by the time Horkheimer and
Adorno reformulated the doctrine in 1945.861 Still, the version of organology Horkheimer
had drawn on for his early definition of critical theory was Marxist down to the very text.
The passage indeed picks up two parts of Marx’s organology: on the one hand,
the idea of a history of the human senses, and on the other, the technical
interchangeability of “organ” and “tool.” Marx gave voice to the first in his Ökonomischphilosophische Manuskripte (1844), and the second in chapter 13, volume I, of Das
Kapital (1867).
The Manuskripte are a curious mix of Feuerbach and Hegel. We can read
Feuerbach in Marx’s attachment to the human, and Hegel in such formulations as
“communism is the standpoint of the negation of the negation.”862 The term organ, which
runs throughout the section on “private property and communism,” is of other (Romantic)
provenance.863 The abstract character of industrial work has, for Marx, stripped humans
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Not that the restraint is absent in 1937. For example: “Das Reden glaubt, das Organ der Allgemeinheit
zu sein. In der zerrissenen Gesellschaft der Gegenwart ist dieses Denken, vor allem in gesellschaftlichen
Fragen, harmonistisch und illusionär.” (Horkheimer, “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie,” p. 184.)
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Kommunismus ist nicht als solcher das Ziel der menschlichen Entwicklung – die Gestalt der menschlichen
Gesellschaft.” Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, Ergänzungsband, I. Teil (Berlin: Dietz, 1968), p.
546. Cited as Marx, Manuskripte, p. 546.
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Of course, Feuerbach also speaks of organs, even active ones: P40: “Also ist nicht nur das Endliche, das
Erscheinende, sondern auch das wahre, göttliche Wesen Gegenstand der Sinne—der Sinn Organ des
Absoluten.” And again, p. 93: “die Organe des Ergreifens.” But Marx’s text, as we shall see, if shot through
with a dynamism in the organ that corresponds to the dynamism he would demand of materialism in
response to Feuerbach. At least in 1844, that dynamism is framed in Hegelian terms. John Toews,
Hegelianism (p. 327), writes: “The distinctiveness of Feuerbach's viewpoint lay in his conception of human
essence, of man's “species being.” It was not his “humanism,” his reduction of theology and metaphysics to
“anthropology,” that made him unique among the Left Hegelians, but his “sensualism,” “naturalism,” or
“materialism,” his attempt to ground man's autonomy and universality as a “species being” in the concrete
reality of his natural, sensuous, “immediate” existence.” The picture is complicated by Warren Breckman:
“The need to accommodate sensuousness in a thoroughly immanent concept of human social being became
the leitmotif of his seminal critique of Christian personalism and speculative Idealism in the years between
1838 and 1843. A search for that accommodation became the dominant task of the “philosophy of the
future” that Feuerbach enunciated in the early 1840s.” (Warren Breckman, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and
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not only of their possessions through immiseration, but also of the specifically human
property of their very perceptions. To reclaim the commonality of perception is an
essential part of the project of the establishment of a non-abstract communism. The latter
requires the formation of literally communistic organs, both in the social sense
(institutions as organs) and in the physiological sense (common organs of metaphysical
and ethical perception conducive to socialist politics).864 The first statement of the postorganological program (from which Horkheimer seems to be drawing) reads:
Denn nicht nur die 5 Sinne, sondern auch die sogenannten geistigen Sinne, die
praktischen Sinne (Wille, Liebe etc.), mit einem Wort der menschliche Sinn, die
Menschlichkeit der Sinne wird erst durch das Dasein seines Gegenstandes, durch
die vermenschlichte Natur. Die Bildung der 5 Sinne ist eine Arbeit der ganzen bisherigen
Weltgeschichte. Der unter dem rohen praktischen Bedürfnis befangene Sinn hat auch nur
einen bornierten Sinn… also die Vergegenständlichung des menschlichen Wesens,
sowohl in theoretischer als praktischer Hinsicht, gehört dazu, sowohl um die Sinne des
Menschen menschlich zu machen als um für den ganzen Reichtum des menschlichen und
natürlichen Wesens entsprechenden menschlichen Sinn zu schaffen.865

Note that this statement contains the essential characteristics of Romantic organology.
The five senses are the precipitate of the history of humanity; they are essentially related
to the practical senses and the spiritual “senses”; and they are used ultimately to make the
world human and those sense themselves proper to humanity. Der menschliche Sinn runs
the two senses of sense through each other: it is both the field of potentiality of
humanity’s self-recognition (as the bearer of historical and infinite fields of potentiality),
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the Origins of Radical Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 199.) Marx, of
course, rejected all such immediacy, here locating mediation in a historical organ.
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This early Marx is explicit about the latter project. He writes, with respect to the unification of science
and philosophy: “Der Wille war da, aber das Vermögen fehlte.” (Marx, Manuskripte, p. 543.) Here
Vermögen might profitably be re-written as organ. The entire essay carries the the notion that the
expression of common human essence (Feuerbach’s Gattungswesen) requires an overhaul of science in the
terms set by industry in order to change industrial conditions. The human must become the object of natural
science, since, it is implied, he is the medium of that science: “Die Naturwissenschaft wird später
ebensowohl die Wissenschaft von dem Menschen wie die Wissenschaft von dem Menschen die
Naturwissenschaft unter sich subsumieren: es wird eine Wissenschaft sein.” (Marx, Manuskripte, p. 543.)
This line of thought runs through later Marxism, of course, from the Second International’s debate of
“scientific socialism” to issues of science under actually existing socialism. The question raised here is
slightly different: it is that of a Marxist New Mythology in a post-Romantic sense.
865
Marx, Manuskripte, p. 541; emphasis in original.
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and the rhetorically milder understanding for other humans. The work of history must be
matched by a new kind of work if this sense is to be developed.866
This project is necessarily communistic, since the human is defined in
Feuerbachian terms as the generality of its essence. This generality is alienated, of course,
for the young Marx, alienated through the process of abstract work and the privatization
of property. The specific cocktail of perception and legality that ownership of objects867
hampers the free development of the organs of human perception, creation, and social
being. Thus:
Die Aufhebung des Privateigentums ist daher die vollständige Emanzipation aller
menschlichen Sinne und Eigenschaften; aber sie ist diese Emanzipation grade dadurch,
daß diese Sinne und Eigenschaften menschlich, sowohl subjektiv als objektiv, geworden
sind. Das Auge ist zum menschlichen Auge geworden, wie sein Gegenstand zu einem
gesellschaftlichen, menschlichen, vom Menschen für den Menschen herrührenden
Gegenstand geworden ist. Die Sinne sind daher unmittelbar in ihrer
Praxis Theoretiker geworden. Sie verhalten sich zu der Sache um der Sache willen, aber
die Sache selbst ist ein gegenständliches menschliches Verhalten zu sich selbst und zum
Menschen und umgekehrt. Das Bedürfnis oder der Genuß haben darum
ihre egoistische Natur und die Natur ihre bloße Nützlichkeit verloren, indem der Nutzen
zum menschlichen Nutzen geworden ist. Ebenso sind die Sinne und der Genuß der andren
Menschen meine eigne Aneignung geworden. Außer diesen unmittelbaren Organen
bilden sich daher gesellschaftliche Organe, in der Form der Gesellschaft, also z.B. die
Tätigkeit unmittelbar in Gesellschaft mit andren etc. ist ein Organ
meiner Lebensäußerung geworden und eine Weise der Aneignung des menschlichen
Lebens.868

Private property is not merely a legal problem—it is an epistemological problem. In the
perception of a possessed object, something goes missing not only from the object but
also from the field of possibility represented by the literal organ, the eye. The senses have
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Thus: “Der Mensch eignet sich sein allseitiges Wesen auf eine allseitige Art an, also als ein totaler
Mensch. Jedes seiner menschlichen Verhältnisse zur Welt, Sehn, Hören, Riechen, Schmecken, Fühlen,
Denken, Anschauen, Empfinden, Wollen, Tätigsein, Lieben, kurz, alle Organe seiner Individualität, wie die
Organe, welche unmittelbar in ihrer Form als gemeinschaftliche Organe sind, sind in
ihrem gegenständlichen Verhalten oder in ihrem Verhalten zum Gegenstand die Aneignung desselben. Die
Aneignung der menschlichen Wirklichkeit, ihr Verhalten zum Gegenstand ist die Betätigung der
menschlichen Wirklichkeit; menschliche Wirksamkeit und menschliches Leiden, denn das Leiden,
menschlich gefaßt, ist ein Selbstgenuß des Menschen.” (Marx, Manuskripte, p. 540; emphasis in original.)
867
But also of others: the section contains a long analysis of the “communism of women” in non-Hegelian
socialist experimental societies—see Marx, Manuskripte, pp. 534 ff.
868
Marx, Manuskripte, p. 540; emphasis in original.
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become immediate theorists, because perception itself is not innocent of the productionprocesses that stand behind its objects. The development of the senses—itself a product
of social historical work in common—is thus perverted by the privately possessed, we
might almost say, by private perception. The atomistic ego is the result of this process,
and its relations are those of mere instrumentality. But for Marx, there is no going back.
The senses should not return to their unadulterated state. They should be built and
educated further, in the direction of “humanity.” This means taking a further step, one
anticipated by the Romantics and despaired of in the Frankfurt school: creating social
(and ultimately socialist) organs in the forms of society. We might think of Goethe’s
imagined scientific community in this context. Marx thinks of such communal (and
communist) organs as the bearers of superstructural organization. In a sense not given by
his work of the following year, Die deutsche Ideologie (1845), such organs would be
ideological in a positive sense.869 They would have been the non-instrumental organs of
the content of the state.
What Horkheimer had identified—the historicity and produced nature of the
organs of perception—was thus derived from an early hope of Marx himself. And
Horkheimer had also recognized, perhaps unintentionally, another part of Marx’s
organology. When the former spoke of the interchangeability of organs and experimental
tools (as extensions of one another), he was calling upon the non-utopian discourse of
Das Kapital.
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On the uses, Marxist and otherwise, of the term ideology, see Emmet Kennedy, “Ideology from Destutt
de Tracy to Marx,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 40:3 (1979), pp. 353-68. As Kennedy notes, the original
idéologues in post-revolutionary Paris sometimes used the epigenetic metaphor with respect to the
generation of ideas from impressions. For Marx, ideology is not a set of illegitimate ideas, but a set of
illegitimate ideas about the origins of ideas.
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There has been, of course, endless debate on Marx’s development.870 I tend to see
this problem as one of method above all.871 In the early works, Marx is concerned, as his
Young Hegelian peers were, to state the program for a good politics based on various
intentional distortions of Hegel’s system.872 Das Kapital, on the other hand, is committed
to dialectical method as the substantial connection of discourse and reality. It does not
seek to represent the future, but to penetrate the laws of the present deeply enough to
provide them with a counterweight. If the anti-capitalist Owl of Minerva flies only at
dusk, it nevertheless thinks the next day might be constituted differently because of its
flight. Das Kapital is thus also an organological response to Hegel, as we are about to
see. Like Goethe, Marx proposes that the dialectical method might be used to change the
rules—of the natural world as well as the social.
For Marx, the advent of the machine-driven factory represents the industrial mode
of production finally achieving its normative form. Marx is treating such developments as
the Cotton Gin and the Spinning Jenny, replacements for hand-driven machines that
increase productivity through an increase and differentiation of the abilities of fixed
capital. The machine is divided into three parts: the force-impulse mechanism, the
transmission mechanism, and the mechanism of tools. According to Marx, the third of
these is the key, and a shift in its constitution has brought the factory into its own—it has
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The classic terms of the contemporary debate were set out by Louis Althusser in various writings in the
1960s and 1970s, and reflect concern about the role of the “human” in Marx. The sharp distinction made by
Althusser can be set against Kolakowski’s view that there is only a re-setting of terms (see Leszek
Kolakowski, Main Current in Marxism, transl. P.S. Falla (New York: Norton, 2005), pp. 146-50.
871
The distinctions in method I elaborate here are based on a larger agreement with Breckman’s
presentation of critique as universal. By shifting the object of critique from local areas (like religion) to the
very form of any possible set of propositions (that is, by “secularizing” critique, in Marx’s language), Marx
sets his discourse literally against the entire constitution of the human-produced world—such my
rephrasing of the argument at Breckman, Dethroning, pp. 292 ff.
872
Kolakowski describes this as the “Fichteanization” of Hegel—see Kolakowski, Main Currents, pp. 4380.!
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technized the site of work. Older developments had, of course, changed the source of
energy, for example through the use of animal or water power to lend force to the
machine for operating. The complexity of transmission-mechanisms, which guide and
transfer the force to the functional parts of the machine, has also increased. But neither
the origin of force nor the design of the transfer have changed the fundamental character
of the machine, and thus of work. This change depends on the last, on the character of the
tools of the machine—that change brings about the revolution that is called industrial.873
The workshop had undergone a similar transition, from the site of isolated workstations to a functional unity in greater production because of the division of labor. But
even the resulting factory still relied on juxtaposed elements, not in its use of human
labor, but in its use of machines. These machines were replacements for human handoperations: they worked on individual areas of application, each functioning on the above
model. The factory realizes its own concept, however, only when the machines are united
such that laborers are only guiding their activity. When this happens, the individual
machines become functional parts of a greater factory-machine—just as the factory was a
greater unity of the workshop.874 And just as individual workers became functional parts
of the factory, the tool-mechanisms of individual machines becomes, in the greater
factory-machine, organs:
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“Dieser Teil der Maschinerie, die Werkzeugmaschine, ist es, wovon die industrielle Revolution im 18.
Jahrhundert ausgeht. Sie bildet noch jeden Tag von neuem den Ausgangspunkt, sooft Handwerksbetrieb
oder Manufakturbetrieb in Maschinenbetrieb übergeht.” (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, Band 23,
“Das Kapital,” Bd. I, Vierter Abschnitt (Berlin: Dietz, 1968), p. 393.)
874
“Nachdem erst die Werkzeuge aus Werkzeugen des menschlichen Organismus in Werkzeuge eines
mechanischen Apparats, der Werkzeugmaschine, verwandelt, erhielt nun auch die Bewegungsmaschine
eine selbständige, von den Schranken menschlicher Kraft völlig emanzipierte Form. Damit sinkt die
einzelne Werkzeugmaschine, die wir bisher betrachtet, zu einem bloßen Element der maschinenmäßigen
Produktion herab. Eine Bewegungsmaschine konnte jetzt viele Arbeitsmaschinen gleichzeitig treiben.”
(Marx, Das Kapital, p. 398.)
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Ganz wie viele Werkzeuge die Organe einer Arbeitsmaschine, bilden viele
Arbeitsmaschinen jetzt nur noch gleichartige Organe desselben
Bewegungsmechanismus.875

Tools become organs in the completion of the concept of the industrial revolution. The
complexity of the factory now takes on the fullness of its concept as a higher unity: it
becomes organic. If there was indecision in the 18th century about where organs could
properly be located—from Leibniz to Reil one had spoken of machine-organs—Marx
points to the re-emergence of organological unity on the other side of supposed machinic
reduction. What might have seemed a technicization876 and machinification877 in the
simple terms of mechanism takes on, in its character as and determination of work, the
characteristics of the humanity Marx had sought twenty years earlier. Organ becomes the
necessary resurgent designator of this apparent return, on the other side of abstraction and
degradation, to a higher unity in the workplace.
The resurgence, however, has a dark side. The machine-factory intensifies labor
even as it simplifies it, forcing women and children into the factory in greater masses
(Marx notes that, due to their relative lack of education, they are effectively sold as slaves
by men in this context). The re-emergent organic unity of the machine is monstrous:
Als gegliedertes System von Arbeitsmaschinen, die ihre Bewegung nur vermittelst der
Transmissionsmaschinerie von einem zentralen Automaten empfangen, besitzt der
Maschinenbetrieb seine entwickeltste Gestalt. An die Stelle der einzelnen Maschine tritt
hier ein mechanisches Ungeheuer, dessen Leib ganze Fabrikgebäude füllt und dessen
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Marx, Das Kapital, p. 400.
For example: “Mit der Zunahme der Erfindungen und der wachsenden Nachfrage nach den neu
erfundnen Maschinen entwickelte sich mehr und mehr einerseits die Sondrung der Maschinenfabrikation in
mannigfaltige selbständige Zweige, andrerseits die Teilung der Arbeit im Innern der maschinenbauenden
Manufakturen. Wir erblicken hier also in der Manufaktur die unmittelbare technische Grundlage der großen
Industrie.” (Marx, Das Kapital, p. 403.) And again: “Die große Industrie mußte sich also ihres
charakteristischen Produktionsmittels, der Maschine selbst, bemächtigen und Maschinen durch Maschinen
produzieren. So erst schuf sie ihre adäquate technische Unterlage und stellte sich auf ihre eignen Füße.”
(Marx, Das Kapital p. 406.)
877
“Durch die Maschine wird, wie wir sahen, das Werkzeug nicht verdrängt. Aus einem Zwergwerkzeug
des menschlichen Organismus reckt es sich in Umfang und Anzahl zum Werkzeug eines vom Menschen
geschaffnen Mechanismus. Statt mit dem Handwerkszeug, läßt das Kapital den Arbeiter jetzt mit einer
Maschine arbeiten, die ihre Werkzeuge selbst führt.” (Marx, Das Kapital, p. 408.)
876
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dämonische Kraft, erst versteckt durch die fast feierlich gemeßne Bewegung seiner
Riesenglieder, im fieberhaft tollen Wirbeltanz seiner zahllosen eigentlichen
Arbeitsorgane ausbricht.878

Organics is not organology: Marx’ vision threatens here to deliver the humanity of
humans to the machines replacement-organs. It seems that the structure of work will
cannibalize the worker. The robust organology of the Manuskripte seems to have been
replaced with a terrifying anticipatory version of Horkheimer’s claim that organs and
tools have become extensions of each other. Two lines of flight from this theoretical
pessimism present themselves.
First, in a move that will be adopted throughout the Marxist tradition in reaction
to refinements of the capitalist system that threaten the ability to resist, Marx points to the
cooperative character of the machine-factory:
Als Maschinerie erhält das Arbeitsmittel eine materielle Existenzweise, welche Ersetzung
der Menschenkraft durch Naturkräfte und erfahrungsmäßiger Routine durch bewußte
Anwendung der Naturwissenschaft bedingt. In der Manufaktur ist die Gliederung des
gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsprozesses rein subjektiv, Kombination von Teilarbeitern; im
Maschinensystem besitzt die große Industrie einen ganz objektiven
Produktionsorganismus, den der Arbeiter als fertige materielle Produktionsbedingung
vorfindet. In der einfachen und selbst in der durch Teilung der Arbeit spezifizierten
Kooperation erscheint die Verdrängung des vereinzelten Arbeiters durch den
vergesellschafteten immer noch mehr oder minder zufällig. Die Maschinerie, mit einigen
später zu erwähnenden Ausnahmen, funktioniert nur in der Hand unmittelbar
vergesellschafteter oder gemeinsamer Arbeit. Der kooperative Charakter des
Arbeitsprozesses wird jetzt also durch die Natur des Arbeitsmittels selbst diktierte
technische Notwendigkeit.879

In one sense, then, the hope for the humanization of work and of the organs of that work
from the Manuskripte is suggested in its dual subjective and objective character.
Cooperation is no longer a contingent element of factory-life—it is a technical necessity.
Technicization has brought with it not only immiseration and partial irrelevance of the
specificity of human work, but also the necessity of community, the necessity of planning
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Marx, Das Kapital, p. 402.
Marx, Das Kapital, p. 407.!
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to force the organs of production to work in concert. The telos of the organic factory
should emerge, then, from the internal planning of what would eventually receive the
name soviet. This optimism, however, about cooperation and community, has always
been in one sense reactionary. To hope for the opposite to emerge, to point to new
conditions of organization, does not solve the fundamental problem of technicity, namely,
that the higher organic unity of the machine-factory (and the system of such factories in
the global market) threatens to grow out of all proportion with any even cooperative
effort to master and guide that system. If, then, any hope is to emerge from this
characterization, it will have to be more than an imposed telos, more than a regulative
suggestion.
When Marx first mentions the Spinning Jenny and the problem of the machinerevolution, he appends a long footnote on methodology, which I reproduce here in its
entirety:
Schon vor ihm [dem Spinning Jenny] wurden, wenn auch sehr unvollkommene,
Maschinen zum Vorspinnen angewandt, wahrscheinlich zuerst in Italien. Eine kritische
Geschichte der Technologie würde überhaupt nachweisen, wie wenig irgendeine
Erfindung des 18. Jahrhunderts einem einzelnen Individuum gehört. Bisher existiert kein
solches Werk. Darwin hat das Interesse auf die Geschichte der natürlichen Technologie
gelenkt, d.h. auf die Bildung der Pflanzen- und Tierorgane als Produktionsinstrumente für
das Leben der Pflanzen und Tiere. Verdient die Bildungsgeschichte der produktiven
Organe des Gesellschaftsmenschen, der materiellen Basis jeder besondren
Gesellschaftsorganisation, nicht gleiche Aufmerksamkeit? Und wäre sie nicht leichter
zu liefern, da, wie Vico sagt, die Menschengeschichte sich dadurch von der
Naturgeschichte unterscheidet, daß wir die eine gemacht und die andre nicht gemacht
haben? Die Technologie enthüllt das aktive Verhalten des Menschen zur Natur, den
unmittelbaren Produktionsprozeß seines Lebens, damit auch seiner
gesellschaftlichen Lebensverhältnisse und der ihnen entquellenden geistigen
Vorstellungen. Selbst alle Religionsgeschichte, die von dieser materiellen Basis
abstrahiert, ist - unkritisch. Es ist in der Tat viel leichter, durch Analyse den irdischen
Kern der religiösen Nebelbildungen zu finden, als umgekehrt, aus den jedesmaligen
wirklichen Lebensverhältnissen ihre verhimmelten Formen zu entwickeln. Die letztre ist
die einzig materialistische und daher wissenschaftliche Methode. Die Mängel des
abstrakt naturwissenschaftlichen Materialismus, der den geschichtlichen Prozeß
ausschließt, ersieht man schon aus den abstrakten und ideologischen Vorstellungen seiner
Wortführer, sobald sie sich über ihre Spezialität hinauswagen.880
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Natural history is the history of a godless technology, its Darwinian organs seeking
nothing but nevertheless open to analysis. A history of technology would exclude the
analogy to God as an externally imposing function from its writing —the individual, the
human is excluded as telos, even in the most human and most obviously end-related areas
of human activity. Technology, here, is nothing other than the ground of philosophy, the
“active relation of the human to nature,” stripped of its seemingly natural teleology. For
Marx, the active relation to nature is the most abstract definition of work, and the means
of that work are now, in the technicized fully industrial era, to be characterized as organs.
Those organs are the source of any set of ideas, any ideology, any religion—but not any
science, since here as in the Manuskripte science is the privileged locus of reflection on
just these organs. Sub-disciplines of that science (like Darwinian biology) can of course
exist, and even claim legitimacy. But they are and must be subordinated to the human
history of humans, which, conditioned now by the resurgent and monstrous organs of a
second organics, are paradoxically also excluded from that history. Humans are
retrospectively not the fundamental term: organs are the object of a new science—the
new science—that follows on a technical revolution. Rather than resisting its instrumental
impulse, the Marx of Das Kapital responds with a shift in terms. Organs might be only
marginally human when they emerge in the machine, but if the method and history of
human science has always been that of organs—as it now is, for him—then they are not
without his ken and potential control. This is so because he is not outside their orbit,
because he is characterized by their very problem. We can go further: it is because, as
Marx says following Vico, he has produced their very problem, that it cannot ultimately
threaten to spin outside the purview of his activity. The machinic unconscious simply is
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that activity, and the effort to describe its particularity in the present is thus not
methodologically innocent. Instead, even in this pessimism, in this statistically-driven
analysis, the other side of the dialectic has not fully disappeared. The usual dialectical
reading demands that we observe the emergence of this qualitatively new form
(technicity of work) in a process of synthesis. But openly hidden in the language that
emerges alongside the image of the technical is the will to intervene. A description of that
intervention, for the late Marx, is nothing less than a betrayal of the method. And yet the
politics of Das Kapital can be read in its literal organs: alongside the monstrous
resurgence of organics in the machine-system, there is the retrospective casting of the
human in those very terms. The human organs of Marxism as a political project are patent
in the very text of its science. By tying science and politics together in dialectical
presentation and through the term organ, Marx inherits and passes on the impulse and
legacy of Romantic organology.
If we recall the terms Blumenberg set forth for a history of technology, we can see
here that his characterization of Marx misses the mark. The text of Das Kapital reveals,
in light of Romantic organology, much more than the identification of conditioning
circumstances for technological development (see the Introduction above). I said above
that this study would examine how a technological imagination (rather than will) would
step out of history.881 In Romantic organology, we can read the reflexive moment of a
first techno-imagination, one that does not merely play with new images, but literalizes
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With respect to this admirable formulation by Blumenberg: “Geschichte der Technik wird auch und vor
allem die Geschichte des Heraustretens der Technik aus der Geschichte sein müssen. Ob und wie aus
einem bestimmten neuen Verständnis der Wirklichkeit und der Stellung des Menschen innerhalb dieser
Wirklichkeit technischer Wille entsteht, wird Thema einer Geistesgeschichte der Technik sein müssen, die
nicht nur Selbstdeutungen der technischen Tätigkeit und Urheberschaft sammelt und registriert, sondern die
Motivationen eines auf Technik zielenden und von Technik getragenen Lebensstils faßbar werden läßt.”
(Blumenberg, Geistesgeschichte, 13; emphasis in original.)
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and transcendentalizes the conditions of its own thought. In so doing, the Romantics offer
a kind of response (rather than reaction) to the conditions of disciplinarity and
technicization. Technological will might be taken, with Marx, to be the hallmark of
human activity (simply techne) and the ground of philosophy alike. Alternatively, the
specificity of technological will in Blumenberg’s sense might be taken to appear earlier
than the technological imagination. Even if that is true, however, a second technological
will is the result of the connection of metaphysics and politics in Romantic organology.
Whatever the status of the origins of the modern technological moment (and this question
remains of the utmost importance for work in this field), the will to make the abstract
concrete—and the means to impose technologies of the spirit onto the apparently given
world—will have been the locus of a modern metaphysical imagination. I hope to have
shown here that this imagination was a signal contribution of the Jena Romantics to
intellectual history. That is, I take it, an unexpected Romanticism, and the possibility of
historical dialogue with it for presentist purposes is for all that the richer, and perhaps the
more pressing.
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